
Glass. 
Book 



-"> 




HERMES 




OR 



A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY 



CONCERNING. 



n 



VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 



BY 



IAMES HARRIS ESQ. 



I1ZIINA1 9APP0TNTA2 E1NAI TAP KAI ENTAYOA ©EOYZ. 



THE SIXTH EDITION. 



LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR F. WINGRAVE, IN THE STRAND, 
SUCCESSOR TO MR. NOURSE. 



M.DCCC.VI. 



n 



**r 



?I5 3 

,H3 



tij Transfer 



Wrif'nt, Trinter, St. John's SquWc, Clcrkdflfefc 



To the Right Honourable iii 

Philip Lord Hardwicke, 

sr 

Lorcl Hig-h Chancellor of Great- \ 
Britain.* 



My Lord, 
AS no one has exercised the 
Powers of Speech with juster and 
more universal applause, than your- 
self ; I have presumed to inscribe 
the following Treatise to your Lord- 
ship, its End being to investigate 
the Principles of those Powers. It 
has a farther claim to your Lord- 
ship's Patronage, by being connect- 
ed in some degree with that politer 
Literature, which, in the most im- 
portant scenes of Business, you 
A 2 have 

■ The above Dedication is printed as it originally 
stood, the Author being desirous that what he intended 
as a real Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should 
now.be considered, as a Testimony of Gratitude to his 
Memory. 



iv DEDICATION. 

have still found time to cultivate. 
With regard to myself, if what I 
have written be the fruits of that 
Security and Leisure, obtained by 
living under a mild and free Go- 
vernment ; to whom for this am I 
more indebted, than to your Lord- 
ship, w 7 hether I consider you as a 
Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the 
first both in dignity and reputation? 
Permit me therefore thus publicly 
to assure your Lordship, that with 
the greatest gratitude and respect I 
am, My Lord, 

Your Lordship s most obliged, 



Close of Salisbury 
Oct\ 1, 1751. 



and most obedient humble Servant, 

. James Harris- 



[ v ] 



PREFACE. 

1 HE chief End proposed by the Au- 
thor of this Treatise in making it public, 
has been to excite his Readers to curiosi- 
ty and inquiry ; not to teach them him- 
self by prolix and formal Lectures, (from 
the efficacy of which he has little expec- 
tation) but to induce them, if possible, to 
become Teachers to themselves, by an im- 
partial use of their ozvn understandings. 
He thinks nothing more absurd than the 
common notion of Instruction, as if Sci- 
ence were to be poured into the Mind, 
like water into a cistern, that passively 
waits to receive all that comes. The 
grozcth of Knowledge he rattier thinks 
to resemble the growth of Fruit ; however 
external causes may in some degree co- 
operate, it is the interiial vigour j andvir- 
A 3 tue 



yi PREFACE. 

tue of the tree, that -must ripen the juices 
to their just maturity. 

This then, namely, the exciting men to 
inquire for themselves into subjects wor- 
thy of their contemplation, this the Au- 
thor declares to have been his first and 
principal motive for appearing in print. 
Next to that, as he has always been a lo- 
ver of Letters, he would willingly approve 
his studies to the liberal and ingenuous. 
He has particularly named these, in dis- 
tinction to others ; because, as his studies 
were never prosecuted with the least re- 
gard to lucre, so they are no way calcu- 
lated for any lucrative End. The libe- 
ral therefore and ingenuous (whom lie 
has mentioned already) are those, to 
whose perusal he offers what he has writ- 
ten. Should they judge favourably of 
his attempt, he may not perhaps hesitate 
to confess, 

Hoc juvat et mclli est. 

For 



PREFACE. rii. 

For tho he hopes he cannot be charged 
with the foolish love of vain Praise, lie 
has no desire to be thought indifferent, or 
insensible to honest Fame. 

From the influence of these sentiments, 
he has endeavoured to treat his subject 
with as much order, correctness, and per- 
spicuity as in his power ; and if he has 
failed, he can safely say (according to 
the vulgar phrase) that the failure has 
been his misfortune, and not his fault. 
He scorns those trite and contemptible 
methods of anticipating pardon for a bad 
performance, that " it was the hasty 
66 fruits of a few idle hours; written 
" merely for private amusement ; never 
" revised; published against consent, at 
46 the importunity of friends, copies 
" ( God knozvs how) having by stealth 
" gotten abroad;" ztith other stale jar- 
gon of equal falsehood and inanity. 
May we not ask such Prefacers, If what 
they allege be true, what has the 
A I world 



riii PREFACE. 

world to do with them and their cru- 
dities. 

As to the book it self 9 it can say this in 
its behalf, that it docs not merely confine 
itself to what its title promises, but ex- 
patiates freely into zvhatever is collateral; 
aiming on every occasion to rise in its in- 
quiries, and to pass, as far as possible, 
from small matters to the greatest. Nor 
is it formed merely upon sentiments that 
are now in fashion, or supported only by 
such authorities as are modern. Many 
Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are 
but little studied ; and some perliaps, 
whose very names are hardly known. 

The Fate indeed of ancient Authors 
(as we have happened to mention them) 
is not unworthy of our notice. A few of 
them survive in the Libraries of the. 
learned, zvhere some venerable Folio, that 
still goes by their name, just suffices to 
gii).e them a hind of nominal existence. 

The 



PREFACE. ix 

The rest have long fallen into a deeper 
obscurity, their very names when men- 
t toned, affecting ns as little, as the names, 
when we read them, of those subordinate 
Heroes, 

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No 
emonaque, Prytanimque. 

Now if an Author, not content with 
the more eminent of antient Writers, 
should venture to bring his reader into 
such company as these last, among peo- 
ple (in the fashionable phrase) that no- 
body knows ; what usage, what quarter 
can he have reason to expect ? Should 
the Author of these speculations have 
done this (and it is to be feared he has) 
what method had he best take in a circum- 
stance so critical? — Let us suppose him 
to apologize in the best manner he can, 
and in consequence of this, to suggest as 
follows — 



lie 



PREFAC E. 

He hopes there will be found a plea- 
sure in the contemplation of anticnt sen- 
timents, as the view of anticnt Architec- 
ture, tW in ruins, has something venera- 
ble. Add to this, what from its antiqui- 
ty is but little known, has from that very 
circumstance the recommendation of no- 
velty ; so that here, as in other instances, 
Extremes may be said to meet. Far- 
ther still, as the Authors, whom he has 
quoted, lived in various ages, and in dis- 
tant countries; some in the full maturity 
of Grecian and Roman Literature; 
some in its declension ; and others in pe- 
riods still more barbarous, and depraved; 
it may afford perhaps no iinpleasing spe- 
culation, to see how the same Reason 
has at all times prevailed; how there is 
one Truth, like one Sun, that has en- 
lightened hitman Intelligence through 
every age, and saved it from the dark- 
ness both of Sophistry and Error. 

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the 

Mind 



PREFACE. xi 

Mind, than these extensive views of Men, 
and human Knowledge; nothing can 
more effectually take us off from the fool- 
ish admiration of what is immediately 
before our eyes, and help us to ajuster 
estimate both of present Men, and present 
Literature. 

It is perhaps too much the case with 
the multitude in every nation, that as 
they know little beyond themselves, and 
their own affairs, so out of this narrow 
sphere of knowledge, they think nothing 
worth knowing. As we Britons by 
our situation live divided from the whole, 
world, this perhaps will be found to be 
more remarkably our case. And hence 
the reason, that our studies are usually 
satisfied in the works of our own Coun- 
trymen ; that in Philosophy, in Poetry, 
in every kind of subject, whether serious 
or ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, 
we think perfection with ourselves, and 
that it is superfluous to search far titer. 

The 



xii PREFACE. 

The Author of this Treatise would by 
no means detract from the just honours 
due to those of his Countrymen, who ei- 
ther in the present, or preceding age, 
have so illustriously adorned it. But 
tho lie can with pleasure and sincerity 
join in celebrating their deserts, he would 
not have the admiration of these, or of 
any other few, to pass thro blind excess 
into a contempt of all others. Were such 
Admiration to become universal, an odd 
event would follow; a few learned ??ie?i 9 
without any fault of their own, would 
contribute in a manner to the extinction 
of Letters. 

A like evil to that of admiring only 
the authors of our own age, is that of ad- 
miring only the authors of one particular 
Science. There is indeed in this last 
prejudice something peculiarly unfortu- 
nate, and that is, the more excellent the 
Science, the more likely it mil be found 
to produce this effect 

There 



PREFACE. xiii 

There are few Sciences more intrinsi- 
cally valuable, than Mathematics. 
It is hard indeed to say ; to which they 
have more contributed, whether to the 
Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts 
of Science. They are the noblest Praxis 
of Logic, or universal Reasoning. 
It is thro them we may perceive, how 
the stated Forms of Syllogism are exem- 
plified in one Subject, namely the Pre- 
dicament of Quantity. By marking the 
force of these Form?;, as they are applied 
here, we may be enabled lo apply them 
of ourselves elsewhere. Nay farther 
still — by viewing the Mind, during its 
process in these syllogistic employ- 
ments, we may come to know in part, 
what kind of Being it is; since Mind, 
like other Powers, can be only known 
from its Operations. Whoever there- 
fore will study Mathematics in this 
view, will become not only by Mathema- 
tics a more expert Logician, and by lo- 
gic a more rational Mathematician, but 

a wiser 



xiv PREFACE. 

a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Rea- 
soner, in all the possible subjects either 
of science or deliberation. 

But when Mathematics, instead of be- 
ing applied to this excellent purpose, are 
used not to exemplify Logic, but to sup- 
ply its place; no wonder if Logic pass 
into contempt, and if Mathematics, 
instead of furthering science, become in 
fact an obstacle. For when men, knott- 
ing nothing of that Reasoning which is 
universal, come to attach themselves for 
years to a single Species, a species 
wholly involved in Lines and Numbers 
only; they grow insensibly to believe 
these last as inseparable from all Reason- 
ing, as the poor Indians thought every 
horseman to be inseparable from his 
horse. 

And thus we see the use, nay the neces- 
sity of enlarging our literary views, lest 
even Knowledge itself should obstruct 

its 



PREFACE. xr 

its own growth, and perform in some 
measure the part of ignorance and bar- 
barity. 

Such then is the Apology made by the 
Author of this Treatise, for the multipli- 
city of ant lent quotations, with which he 
has filed his Book. If he am excite in 
his readers a proper spirit of curiosity ; 
if he can help in the least degree to en- 
large the bounds of Science ; to revive 
the decaying taste of antient Literature ; 
to lessen the bigotted co<i"empt of every 
thing not modern; and to assert to Au- 
thors of every age their just portion of 
esteem; if he can in the least degree con- 
tribute to these ends, he hopes it may be 
allowed, that he has done a service to 
mankind. Should this service be a rea- 
son for his Work to suriwe, he has con- 
test already, it would be no unpleasing 
event. Should the contrary happen, he 
must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peace- 
ably pass to those destined regions, whi- 
ther 



xvi PREFACE 

iher the productions of modern Wit arc 

every day passing, 

■in vicum vendentem thus et 
odores, 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

The Header is desired to take notice 9 
that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. 
&c. he refers to Three Treatises publish- 
ed first in one Volume, Octavo, in the 
year 1744, 



TUP, 



[ xvii ] 

THE 

CONTENTS. 



BOOK I. 

Chapter I. Introduction. Design of the 
whole. - - - page 1 

Chap. II. Concerning the Analyzing of 
Speech into its smallest 
Parts. - - - - p. 9 

Chap. III. Concerning the several Species 
of those smallest Parts p. 23 

Chap, IV. Concerning Substantives, pro- 
perly so called. - - p. 37 

Chap. V. Concerning Substantives of the 
Secondary Order. - p. 63 

Chap. VI. Concerning Attributives, and 
first concerning Verbs, p. 87 

Chap, VII. Concerning Time and Tenses. 

p. 100 

Chap. VIII. Concerning Modes, p. 140 

Chap. IX. Concerning Verbs, as to their 

Species and other remaining 

Properties, - - - p. 173 

a Chap. 



xviii CONTENTS. 

Chap. X. Concerning Participles and 
Adjectives. - - p. 184 

Chap. XI. Concerning Attributives of the 
Secondary Order. - p. 1921 

BOOK. II. 

Chapter I. Concerning Definitives. 

page 213 
Chap. II. Concerning Connectives, and 
first those called Conjunc- 
tions. ----- p. 237 
Chap. III. Concerning those other Con- 
nectives, called Prepositions. 

p. 261 

Chap. IV. Concerning Cases. - p. 275 

Chap. V. Concerning Interjections — 

Recapitulation — Conclusion. 

p. 289 
BOOK III. 

Chapter I. Introduction Division of 

the Subject into its principal 
Parts. ' - - - page 305 

Chap. II. Upon the Matter or common 
Subject of Language, p. 316 

Chap. 



CONTENTS. xix 

Chap. III. Upon the Form, or peculiar 
Character of Language. 

p. 327 
Chap. IV. Concerning general or univer- 
sal Ideas. - - - p. 350 
Cliap . V. Subordination of Intelligence 
— Difference of Ideas, both 
in particular Men, and in 
whole Nations — Different 
Genius of different Lan- 
guages — Character of the 
English — the Oriental, the 
Latin, and the Greek Lan- 
guages — Superlative Excel- 
lence of the Last — Conclu- 
sion. ----- p. 403 



LATELY PUBLISHED, 

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Price &.Z 13 6 in Boards, 

THE WORKS of JAMES HARRIS, Esq. 

WITH 

An Account of his Life and Character, 

BY HIS SON, 

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY. 

Printed for F. WINGRAVE, in the Strand. 

Where may be had, 

A New Edition of The Same Work, handsomely printed in 
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Price £.1 12 6 in Boards. 

N. B. The Life, and either of the Volumes in Octavo, may be 
had separate. 

HERMES 



HERMES 

OR 

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 

CONCERNING 

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK L 



CHAP. I. 
INTRODUCTION. 

Design of the Whole. 

If Men by nature had been framed Ch. I. 
for Solitude, they had never felt an Im- 
pulse to converse one with another: 
And if, like lower Animals, they had 
been by nature irrational, they could 
not have recognized the proper Subjects 
of Discourse. ' Since Speech then is 
the joint Energie of our best and noblest 
Faculties,^) (that is to say, of our Rea- 
ls son 

(°) See V. I. p. 147 to ] 69. See also Note xv. p. 292, 
and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume. 




HER M E S. 

son and our social Affection) being with- 
al our peculiar Ornament and Distinc- 
tion, as Men i those Inquiries may surely 
be deemed interesting as well as liberal, 
which either search how Speech may 
be naturally resolved ; or how, when re- 
solved, it may be again combined. 

Here a large field for speculating 
opens before us* We may either behold 
Speech, as divided into its constituent 
Parts, as a Statue may be divided into 
its several Limbs ; or else, as resolved 
into its Matter and Form, as the same 
Statue may be resolved into its Marble 
and Figure. 

These different Analysings or Resolu- 
tions constitute what we calK^ Philoso- 
phical, or Universal Grammar. 

When 

(V Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia sit 
liter aria, «/mphilosophica, cjc. Bacon, de Jugm. Sa'cnt. 
VI. 1. And soon after he adds — Verum/amcn hac ipsa 
re moniti, cogitalione complcxi surrtus Grammaticam quan- 
dam, qux non anulogiam vcrborum ad invicem, sed analo- 
giam inter verba ct res sivc rutioncm scdulb inqutrat. 



Book the First. 3 

When we have viewed Speech thus Ck I. 
analysed, we may then consider it, as 
compounded. And here in the first place 
we may contemplate that^ c ) Synthesis, 
which by combining simple Terms pro- 
duces a Truth; then by combining tuo 
Truths produces a third ; and thus 
others, and others, in continued De- 
monstration, till we are led, as by a 
road, into the regions of Science. 

Now this is that superior and most ex- 
cellent Synthesis, which alone applies 
itself to our Intellect or Reason, and 
B 2 which 



(°) Aristotle says — rZv ot xx\x ^.rioi^lxv a-vixirXowv Xsyc- 
imvuv iidlv an xhyQis &rt ^tvSh l<rtv' o>cr xvB^xtt^, /.zZx.^, t^e- 
■pi, viy.ee — Of those zcords ichich are spoken zvit/wut con- 
nection, there is no one cither true or false ; as for in- 
stance, Marty zchite, runneth, conqucrefh. Cat. C 4. So 
again in the beginning of his Treatise De Iutcrprclatione, 
fctq) yxp crvvBto-iv k, ouzieurtv IV' to -^i-JoU Tc j£ to x'An9es . 
True and False are seen in Composition and Division. 
Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division inako< 
negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far 
therefore may be called *$ nthetieal. 



4 HERMES. 

2^ which to conduct according to Rule, 
constitutes the Art of Logic. 

After this we may turn to those 
W inferior Compositions, which are 
productive of the Pathetic, and the 

Pleasant 



( d ) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise Tlegt 
EptMYEixs, p. 53, gives the following Extract from Theo- 
phrastuS) which is here inserted at length, as well for 
the Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I 
believe) elsewhere extant. 

J±ir%s yag 'iavis Ta Koya cryi(reus, (x.oc.9* a divgurev o $t\o- 
cro<p& ®tiq>g*r®>) rvs re nPOS TOTS AKP0HMEN0T2, 
ois ^ tm^aivei n, tl, rns nPOS TA nPArMATA, vire^ u>v 
o ksyujv Tstiaxi mporiBvirxt ras ax^ow^svas, 'cse^i //Jv ay rrjy 
c^eV/v av% rh nPOS TOTS AKPOATA2 xalayivovlai 
Tsotyjlixv} yL prflopixy, $iori sgyov avlaTs IxXeyeaBat ra ae/AVO- 
rega rm ovofAara/v, aXXa //.?) ra xotva Kj 5e£»3/aev/aeW, Kj ravra 
tvagfAOvias aviA.7fkix.Btv aXXyXots, u<?e $ia riruv x^ ruv rirois emo- 
fA.lvu)v, o'tov cratyweias, yXvxvrrtr^, Kj ru>v oiXXuv l^euv, art re 
fjixxgoXoyixs, it, figxxyXoylas, xa\a xxigov vravruv ZJagxXxfA,- 
^.avofA.ivuVj oicral re tov axgoxrw, ■£ lx7rXv)%xi t tCj zjpos t*jv 
raetBu xe/fwflevla $%ur r*s & ye FIPOZ TA nPATMATA 
ra Xoya tryiaeus o tyiXotxotp©* zjpoy)yS(ji.iyws Inii^eX-no-tlai, to, re 
■vJ/ei/S©- ^leXey^uv, ^ to aXyBh aTrod&xvvs. The Relation of 
Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher Theophrastus 
hath settled it) one to the Hearers, to whom it ex- 
plains 



Book the First. t 

Pleasant in all their kinds. These latter ch - J - 
Compositions aspire not to the Intel- 
lect, but being addressed to the Imagi- 
nation, the Affections, and the Sense, 

become 



plains something, and one to the Things, concerning 
which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers: 
With respecl to the first Relation , that which regards the 
Hearers, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it 
becomes the business of these two, to selecl the most re- 
spectable Words, and not those that are common and of 
vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one 
with another, so as thro'' these things and their conse- 
quences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other 
Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Bre- 
vity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, 
and strike him, and hold him vanquished by the power of 
Persuasion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech 
to Things, here the Philosopher icill be found to have 
a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in de- 
monstrating the True. 

Sanclius speaks elegantly on the same subject. Cre- 
avit Deus hominem rationis participem ; cui, quia Socia- 
bilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem. — 
Sermoni autem perjiciendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima 
est G rammatica, quce ab oratione solcecismos Sf barbarismos 
expellit ,• secunda Dialeclica, qua; in Sermonis veritate ver- 
satur; tertia Rhetorica, qua: ornatum Sermonis tantum 
cxquirit.yi in. 1. 1. c. 2. 

B3 



6 HER TV! E S. 

CIl# L become from their different heightnings 
either Rhetoric or Poetry. 

Nor need we necessarily view these 
Arts distinctly and apart ; we may ob- 
serve, if we please, how perfectly they 
co-incide. Grammar is equally re- 
quisite to every one of the rest. And 
though Logic may indeed subsist with- 
out Rhetoric or Poetry, yet so ne- 
cessary to these last is a sound and 
correct Logic, that without it, they 
arc no better than warbling Trifles. 

Now all these Inquiries (as we have 
said already) and such others arising 
from them as are of still sublimer Con- 
* templation, (of which in the Sequel 

there may be possibly not a few) may 
with justice be deemed Inquiries both 
interesting and liberal. 

At present we shall postpone the 
whole synthetical Part, (that is to say, 

Logic 



Book the First. T 

Logic and Rhetoric) and confine our- ch - J- 
selves to the analytical, that is to say, 
Universal Grammar. In this we 
shall follow the Order, that we have above 
laid down, first dividing Speech, as a 
Whole, into its constituent Parts; 
then resolving it, as a Comtosite, into 
its Matter and Form ; two Methods 
of Analysis very different in their kind, 
and which lead to a variety of very dif- 
ferent Speculations. 

Should any one object, that in -the 
course of our Inquiry we sometimes de- 
scend to things, which appear trivial 
and low ; let him look upon the effects, 
to which those things contribute, then 
from the Dignity of the Consequences, 
let him honour the Principles. 

The following Story may not impro- 
perly be here inserted. " When the 
" Fame of Heraclitus was celebrated 
* throughout Greece, there were cer- 
B 4 " tain 




HERMES. 

" tain Persons, that had a curiosity to 
" see so great a Man. They came, and, 
" as it happened, found him warming 
" himself in a Kitchen. The meanness 
" of the place occasioned them to stop ; 
"upon which the Philosopher thus ac- 
" costedthem — Enter, (says he) bold- 

" LY, FOR HERE TOO THERE ARE 

" GodsC*)." 

We shall only add, that as there is no 
part of Nature too mean for the Divine 
Presence ; so there is no kind of Sub- 
ject, having its foundation in Nature, 
that is below the Dignity of a philoso- 
phical Inquiry. 

W See Aristot. de Part. Animal. 1. 1. c. 5. 



CHAP. 



Book the First 9 

CHAP. II. 

Concerning the Analysing of Speech into 
its smallest Parts. 

1 hose things which are first to Na- Ch. II. 
tare, are not first to Man. Nature be- v- ^ v ^" / 
gins from Causes, and thence descends 
to Effects. Human Perceptions first 
open upon Effects, and thence by slow 
degrees ascend to Causes. Often had 
Mankind seen the Sun in Eclipse, be- 
fore they knew its Cause to be the Moon's 
Interposition; much oftener had they 
seen those unceasing Revolutions of 
Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, 
before they knew the Cause to be 
the Earth's double Motion (*). Even 

in 



(«) This Distinction of \first to Man, zxidjirst to Nature, 
was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. — 
See Arist. Phys. Auscult. 1.1. c. 1. Themistius's Com- 
ment on the same, Poster. Analyt. 1. I.e. 2. Dc Anima, 

I. 2. c. 2. 



10 HERMES. 

Ch. II. in Matters of Art and human Crea- 
tion, if we except a few Artists and cri- 
tical 



1. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very 
Important Distinction between Intelligence Divine and 
Intelligence Human. Gi>d may be said to view the First, 
as first ; and the Last, as last ; that is, he views Effects 
through Causes' in their natural Order. Man views the 
Last, as first ; and the First* as last ; that is, he views 
Causes through Effects, in an inverse Order, and hence 
the Meaning of that Passage fn Aristotle : wa-mp yotp rx 
T&iv vvxltptdvv oyL^xlx irpos to <plyy& iyH to /aeQ' vtf/Jpxv, ar« 
♦t, Tvs yiAsrtpas -^vy^ns o Nbj ntp or tx rn (pv<rtt tyxvegurxlx 
tfxvIcov. As are the Eyes of Bats- to the Light of the Day, 
so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that are by Na- 
ture the brightest and most conspicuous of all things. Me- 
taph. 1. 2. c. 1. See also I. 7. c. i. and Ethic. Nico?n. 
!. 1. c. 4. Ammonias, reasoning in the same way, says 
very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatise — *Aj*hpi- 
Tov t*T xvOpwrrivy q>v<rei, Ix ruv xrt\t<?tfcai> k, (rvvBercov titt ret. 
a.nXi'rspx tC rsXeiorepx nrpoiivxf rx yxp &xvdsrx w.aAXov <Tfv*jo*} 
i)(jA)i, ^ yvcopiixurepx' "Ovru y«v k, o itxls dpxi fj.lv Xoyov, x} 
utteTv, ~Zioy.pa.rris ire^iirxleT, «7oY tbtov 5"e xvc&vctxi sis ovo^x x* 
ftpx, Kj rxvrx us <tvX\x£xs, KXKtTvx tis ^oiy^six, ux.iri' Hu- 
man Nature may be zccll contented to o'diftnce from the 
more imperfect and complex to the more simple and per* 
feet ; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, 
and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child 
knows how to put a Sentence together, and say, Socrates 
walketh ; but how to resolve this Sentence hxto a Noun 

and 



Book the First. 11 

tical Observers, the rest look no higher &*• **• 
than to the Practice and mere Work, 
knowing nothing of those Principles, on 
which the whole depends. 

'Thus in Speech for example — All 
men, even the lowest, can speak their 
Mother-Tongue. Yet how n^any of this 
multitude can neither write, nor even 
read ? How many of those, who are thus 
far literate, know nothing of that Gram- 
mar, which respects the Genius of their 
own language? How few then must 
be those, who know Grammar uni- 
versal; that Grammar, which without 
regarding the several Idioms of parti- 
cular Languages, only respects those 
Principles, that are essential to them all? 

Tis our present Design to inquire 
about this Grammar ; in doing which we 

shall 



and Verb, and these again into Syllables, and Syllables 
into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in Com. 
ifc P^cdic. p. 29. 



12 HERMES. 

Ch. II. shall follow the Order consonant to hu- 
man Perception, as being for that reason 
the more easy to be understood. 

We shall begin therefore first from a 
Period or Sentence, that combination in 
Speech, which is obvious to all ; and 
thence pass, if possible, to those its pri- 
mary Parts, which, however essential, 
are only obvious to a few. 

With respect therefore to the dif- 
ferent Species of Sentences, who is there 
so ignorant, as if we address him in his 
Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis 
we assert, and when we question ; when 
'tis we command, and when we pray or 
wish ? 

For example, when we read in Shake- 
speare*, 

The Man that hath no music in himself, 
And is not moved with concord of sweet 
sounds, 

Is fit for Treasons 

Or 



* Merchant of Venice. 



t 



Book the First. % IS 

Or in Milton*, Ch. II. 

O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble 

feet, 
Hasting this way — 

'tis obvious that these are assertive Sen- 
tences, one founded upon Judgment, 
the other upon Sensation. 

When the Witch in Macbeth says to 
her Companions, 

When shall we three meet again 
In thunder, lightning, and in rain ? 

this 'tis evident is an interrogative Sen- 
tence. 

When Macbeth says to the Ghost of 
Banquo, 

-Hence, horrible Shadow, 

Unreal Mock'ry, hence ! 

he speaks an imperative Sentence, found- 
ed upon the passion of hatred. 

When 



* P. L. IV. 866, 



14 HERMES. 

Ch. II. When Milton says in th£ character 
of his Allegro, 

Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee 
Jest and youthful Jollity, 
he too speaks an imperative Sentence, 
though founded on the passion, not of 
hatred but of love. 

When in the beginning of the Para- 
dise Lost we read the following address, 

And chiefly thou, Spirit, that dost 
prefer 

Before all temples tK upright heart, and 
pure, 

Instruct me, for thou hiow'st — 
this is not to be called an imperative 
Sentence, tho' perhaps it bear the same 
Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 
'tis a Sentence precative or optative. 

What then shall we say ? Are Sen- 
tences to be quoted in this manner with- 
out ceasing, all differing from each other 
in their stamp and character? Are they 
no way reducible to certain definite 

Classes? 



Book the First. 15 

Classes ? If not, they can be no objects ch - TI - 
of rational comprehension. — Let us how- 
ever try. 

Tis a phrase often applied to a man, 
when speaking, that he speaks his m ind; 
as much as to say, that his Speech or 
Discourse is a publishing of some Energie 
or Motion of his Soul. So it indeed is in 
every one that speaks, excepting alone 
the Dissembler or Hypocrite ; and he 
too, as far as possible, affects the ap- 
pearance. 

Now the Powers of the soul (over 
and above the mere-f nutritive) may be 
included all of them in those of Per- 
ception and those of Volition. By 
the Powers of Perception, I mean the 
Senses and the Intellect ; by the Powers 
of Volition, I mean, in an extended 
sense, not only the Will, but the several 
Passions and Appetites ; in short, all that 

moves 

+ Vid. Aristot. de Ao. II. 4. 



16 HERMES. 

Ch. II. moves to Action, whether rational or ir- 
rational. 

If then the leading Powers of the 
Soul be these two, 'tis plain that every 
Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhi- 
bits the Soul, must of course respect 
one or other of these. 

If we assert, then is it a Sentence 
which respects the Powers of Percep- 
tion. For what indeed is to assert, if 
we consider the examples above alleged, 
but to publish some Perception either of 
the Senses or the Intellect ? 

Again, if we interrogate, if we com- 
mand, if we pray, or if we wish, (which 
in terms of Art is to speak Sentences in- 
terrogative, imperative, precative, or op- 
tative) what do we but publish so many 
different Volitions ? — For who is it 
that questions? He that has a Desire to 
be informed. — Who is it that commands? 
He that has a Will, which he would have 

obeyed. 



Book the First. 17 

obeyed. — What are those Beings, who ch - n - 
either wish or pray ? Those, who feel 
certain wants either for themselves, or 
others. 

If then the SouTs leading Powers be 
the two above mentioned, and it be true 
that all Speech is a publication of these 
Powers, it will follow that every Sen- 
tence WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE 

of Assertion, or a Sentence of 
Volition. And thus, by referring all 
of them to one of these two classes, have 
we found an expedient to reduce their 
infinitude^). 

The 



(*) P^Ieo* at oti rris -^vyjis rys ri(j(.ETsgxs Sirias \yji<rr\s $vta- 
(*.£<*, rxs /xe» yvurixas, rxs Ve ^uriKxs, rxs ^ o^ekIikxs Xsyofxe- 
vxs" {Ktyu oe ytu^iy.xs /xev, xa9' as yitucraofxit 'ixx^ot rut otrut, 
o/ov xu», Sixvoixv, £o£av, Qxyrxtrixv k, ato-Qricrit' o^skIikxs $e, xxQ* 
tcs opeyofxidx rut xyxQut, * rut otrut, ri rut ^oy.Hirut, oiot 
fi&\y<rtt Xsyu, zzgoxipEtriv, $u/xov, Kj lirtQvfxixv) rx MEN rerixg* 
t't $y t5 hoys (rx rsx^oi rot xTrotpxtrix.ot) xito rut ogrtlixut Svta- 
y.tm VJgoipxovrxi rns "^vyjhs, «x %vr^s x«9' avryt ttipy&aris, 

Q dx?Ji 



18 HER M E S. 

Cb. ii. The Extensions of Speech are quite 
indefinite, as may be seen, if we com- 
pare 



glXXoL ts^os eT££ov xrnoreivo^lvris r rov <tv[jl£x\Xso-Qxi oox.zvtx Tvgos 
to rvy^ilv tyis og£<*eus) Kj riroi Koyov tzxp xvls fy/T&criris, v.xQx'ntp 
htl t5 nYZMATIKOT k, EPHTHMATIKOY xxXh^vh Aoys, 
v> 'OT^xyf/.x, ttj £< zs%xyy»x, y\roi xv\x Ixbi'vu tu^ejv e^e/aeviis, zs^os 
ov o Xoy^, uattzp liri tS KAHTIKOT, t? nvos zjxp' xv\x zsgx- 
^sus' tC, txvtyis, y us zrxgx x^f/rloy©^, us liri rr>s ETXHX, w us 
tnxgoL ys/pov©-, us Itti tS xvptus xxXsfAsvvs nPO£TAEEfi£ 
[aovov AE to AnO<£ANTIKON airo ruv yvurutuv, k, eV< twto 
lci-xy[s\rixov rv>s yevofxevris Iv viyuv yvuasus ruv tn^xyy-xruv 
aXvjBus, v) (patvo/jiEvus, $10 k, [aovov tSto (SekIixov l?iv oLXyBtlxs ri 

^evStss, ruv <$l x\\uv x!$iv. The Meaning of the above pas- 
sage being implied in the Text, we taike its translation 
from the Latin Interpreter. Dicendum igitur est, cum 
anima nostra duplicem potestatem habeat, cognitionis, Sf 
vita?, qua* etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellator, qua: 
vero cognitionis est, vis est, qua res singulas cognoscimus, 
vt mens, cogitatio, opinio, pkantasia, sensus : appetitus 
vero facultas est, qua bona, vel qua: sunt, vel qua: viden- 
tur, conctipiscimus, nt sunt voluntas, consilium, ira, cu- 
piditas : quatuor orationis species, prater enunciantem, a 
partibus animi projiciscuntur , qua: concupiscunt ; non cum 
animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se convertit, qui 
ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere posse videa- 
tur ; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirit, ut in ora- 
Hone, quam Percunctantem aut Interrogantem vocant ; 
vel rem : sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, quicum 

loquitur, 



Book the First. 19 

pare the iEneid to an Epigram of Mar- ch - ft 
tial. But the longest Extension, with 
which Grammar has to do, is the Ex- 
tension here considered, that is to say, 
a Sentence. The greater Extensions 
(such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, Sec- 
tions, and complete Works) belong not 
to Grammar, but to Arts of higher or- 
der ; not to mention that all of them are 
but Sentences repeated. 

Now a Sentence ( c ) may be sketched 
in the following description — a com 

pound 



loquitur, utin optante oratione, velaliquam ejus actionem 
atque in hac, vel ut a pr&stantiore, ut in Deprecatione ; 
vel ut ab inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nomina- 
tor. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facilitate prqfi- 
cvcitur : hceque nunciat rerum cognitionem, qum in nobis 
est, aut veram, aid simulatam. ltaque Hsec sola verum 
falsumquecapit: pra>tereavero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. 
de Interpretatione. 

( c ) Aoy©* £e $uvy) avvQiTrt cmiAavrtKYi, is tvta. y.k%r\ KaV 

avra, wifAxim rt. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de In- 
terpret, c. 4. 

C2 



20 H.ERME S. 

Ch. II. pound Quantity of Sound significant, of 
which certain Parts are themselves also 
significant. 

Thus when I say [the Sun shineth'} 
not only the whole quantity of sound has 
a meaning, but certain parts also, such 
as [_Surf\ and [shineth.'] 

But what shall we say ? Have these 
Parts again other Parts, which * are in 
like manner significant, and so may the 
progress be pursued to infinite ? Can 
we suppose all Meaning, like Body, to 
be divisible, and to include within it- 
self other meanings without end ? If 
this be absurd, then must we necessarily 
admit, that there is such a thing as a 
Sound significant, of which no Part is of 
itself significant. And this is what Ave 
call the proper character of a W Word. 

For 

De Poetic, c. 20. De Interpret, c. 2 & 3. Priscia?i's 
Definition of a Wotd (Lib. 2.) is as follows — Ditftie est 

pars 



Book the First. 21 

For thus, though the Words [Sun] and Ch. n. 
[shinetli] have each a Meaning, j r et is 
there certainly no Meaning in any of 
their Parts, neither in the Syllables of 
the one, nor in the Letters of the other. 

If therefore all Speech, whether 
in prose or verse, every Whole, every 
Section, every Paragraph, every Sen- 
tence, imply a certain Meaning, divisible 
into other Meanings, but Words imply 
a Meaning, which is not so divisible : it 
follows that Words will be the smallest 
paints of Speech, in as much as nothing 
less has any Meaning at all. 

To 



pars minima orationis construct®, id est, in ordine compo- 
site Pars autem, quantum ad totum intclligendum, id 
est, ad t otitis sensus intellect urn. Hoc autem ideo dictum 
est, ne quis conctur vires in duas partes divider e, hoc est, 
in vi Sf res ; non enhn ad totum intclligendum heccfit divi- 
sio. To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza. — Ai%is de, 
lA.iq©' Ixtx^i^ov Kara, a-vvrct^iv ?.oy«. Introd. Gram. 1.4. 
Plato shewed them this characteristic of a Word — See 
Cra/jjlus, p. 385. Edit. Scrr. 

C 3 



22 HERMES. 

Ch. II. y know therefore the species of Words, 
must needs contribute to the knowledge 
of Speech, as it implies a knowledge of 
its minutest Parts. 

This therefore must become our next 
Inquiry. 



CHAP, 



Book the First. 23 



CHAP III. 

Concerning the species of Words, the 
smallest Parts of Speech. 

JUET us first search for the Species of ch. III. 
Words among those Parts of Speech, v - r >^~ / 
commonly received by Grammarians. 
For Example, in one of the passages 
above cited, — 

The Man that hath no music in himself 
And is not movd with concord of szveet 

sounds, 
Is fit for treasons — 

Here the Word [The] is an Article ; — 
[Man] [No] [Music] [Concord] [Sweet] 
[Sounds] [Fit] [Treasons] are all Nouns, 
some Substantive, and some Adjective — 
[That] and [Himself] are Pronouns — 
[Hath] and [is] are Verbs — [movd] a 
Participle — [Not] an Adverb — 
[And] a Conjunction — [In] [With] 
C 4 and 



24 HERME S. 

Ch. in. anc j [JPor] are Prepositions. In one 
sentence we 'have all those Parts of 
Speech, which the Greek Grammarians 
are found to acknowledge. The Latins 
only differ in having no Article, and in 
separating the Interjection, as a 
Part of itself, which the Greeks include 
among the Species of Adverbs. 

What then shall we determine ? why 
are there not more Species of Words ? 
why so many ? or if neither more nor 
fewer, why these and not others ? 

To resolve, if possible, these several 
Queries, let us examine any Sentence 
that comes in our way, and see what 
differences we can discover it its Parts. 
For example, the same Sentence above, 

The Man that hath no Music, $c. 

One Difference soon occurs, that 
some Words are variable, and others in- 
variable. Thus the Word Man may be 
varied into Maris and Men ; Hath, into 

Have, 



Book the First. 25 

Have, Hast, Had, $c. Sweet into Sweet- Cb. III. 
er and Sweetest; Fit into Fitter and 
Fittest. On the contrary, the Words 
The, In, And, and some others, remain 
as they are, and cannot be altered. 

And yet it may be questioned, how 
far this Difference is essential. For in 
the first place, there are Variations, 
which can be hardly called necessary, 
because only some Languages have 
them, and others have them not. Thus 
the Greeks have the dual Variation, 
which is unknown both to the Moderns, 
and to the ancient Latins. Thus the 
Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives 
by the triple Variation of Gender, Case, 
and Number ; whereas the English ne- 
ver vary them in any of those ways, 
but through all kinds of Concord pre- 
serve them still the same. Nay even 
those very Variations, which appear 
most necessary, may have their places 
supplied by other methods ; some by 
Auxiliars, as when for Bruti or Bruto, 

we 




HERMES. 

we say, of Brutus, to Brutus ; some by 
meer Position, as when for Brutum ama- 
vit Cassius, we say, Cassius lovd Brutus. 
For here the Accusative, which in Latin 
is known any where from its Variation, 
is in English only known from its Posi- 
tion or place. 

If then the Distinction of Variable 
and Invariable will not answer our pur- 
pose, let us look farther for some other 
more essential. 

Suppose then we should dissolve the 
Sentence above cited, and view its seve- 
ral Parts as they stand separate and de- 
tached. Some 'tis plain still preserve a 
Meaning (such as Man, Music, Sweet, 
&c.) others on the contrary immediately 
lose it (such as, And, The, With, &c.) 
Not that these last have no meaning at 
all, but in fact they never have it, but 
when in company, or associated. 

Now 



Book the First. 27 

Now it should seem that this Dis- Ch. HI. 
tinction, if any, was essential. For all 
Words are significant, or else they would 
not be Words ; and if every thing not 
absohite^ is of course relative, then will 
all Words be significant either absolutely 
or relatively. 

With respect therefore to this Dis- 
tinction, the first sort of Words may be 
calFd significant by themselves; the latter 
may be calFd significant by relation ; or 
if we like it better, the first sort may be 
calFd Principals, the latter Accessories. 
The first are like those stones in the ba- 
sis of an Arch, which are able to support 
themselves, even when the Arch is de- 
stroyed ; the latter are like those stones 
in its Summit or Curve, which can no 
longer stand, than while the whole sub- 
sists^). 

§This 

< e ) Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest Au- 
thors that ever wrote on the Subject of Grammar) illus- 
trates the different power of Words, by the different 

power 



28 HER M E S. 

Ch. III. | This Distinction being admitted, 
we thus pursue our Speculations. All 

things 



power of J^etters. "Ex/, ov rpoirov ruv s-o/^e/^v ^i ^h lr< 
<pavr>Evroc, a. j£ xocQ' \ocvroc (puvwv dnrortXtr roc Vz o-vfj.tywvx, txnreg 
oivw ruv (pcovwvlcov «k ej£« prw tvjv Ik^uwictiv. Toy dvrov TfoVoy 
Ifiv enivoncroci xdirl tuiv ks^scov. ou //Jv yocg aJJwv, t^oVov rtvx 
ruv Ocovmvruv p-nroci licrt' xa-QocTrse I'm ru>v fa^ocrwv, ovofxcxruvy 
dvra>vu(j.iwv, iTrippYiiAtxrajV — ou <>e, vcrirsgu a-i/^uvx y dvx(A,svaa-i 
roc (pcovnsvroc, « Suva/xEva k»t' Idiocv pnroc slvxi — ytocSocns^ lirl twk 
tztpoOeVewv, ru>v ocpBpuv, rwv avvMa^uV roc <yocp roiocvrac dei ruv 
ixo^im <rv<T<7V)[Aocivzi. In the same manner, as of the Ele- 
ments or Letters, some are Vowels, which of themselves 
complete a Sound; others are Consonants, which without 
the help of Vowels have no express Vocality ; so likewise 
may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, 
like Vowels, are of themselves expressive, as is the case of 
Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs ; others, like Con- 
sonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become ex- 
pressive by their own proper strength, as is the case of 
Prepositions, Articles, and Conjunclions ; for these parts 
of Speech are always Consignificant, that is, are only sig- 
nificant , nchen associated to something else. Apollon. de 
Syntax!. L* 1. c. 3. Itaque quibusdam philosophis pla- 

Cllit NOMEN Sf VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES OrATIONIS J 

catera vero, Adminicula vel Juncturas earum : quomo~ 
do nav'utm, partes sunt tabuLe Sf trabes, ccctcra autcm (id 
est, cera, stuppa, dp clavi & situ ilia) vin.cula Sf conglutina- 

tioms 



Book the First. 29 

things whatever either exist as the Ener- ch - !& 
gies, or Affections, of some other thing, or 
without being the Energies or Affections 
of some other thing. If they exist as the 
Energies or Affections of something else, 
then are they called Attributes. — 
Thus to think is the attribute of a Man ; 
to be white, of a r Swan ; to fly, of an 
Eagle; to be four footed, of a Horse. — 
If they exist not after this manner, then 
are they call'd Substances*. Thus 
Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are 
none of them Attributes, but all Sub- 
stances, because however they may 
exist in Time and Place, yet neither of 
these, nor of any thing else, do they 



exist as Energies or Affections. 



An 



D 



tiones partium navis (hoc est, tabularum § trabium) non 
partes navis dicuntur. Prise. L. XI. 913. 

* Substances.] Thus Aristotle. N£v /aev «v rvirv t^%- 
rxi, ri rsor If/v 7] isattz, on to ///Jj xaQ* vTroKzifAsvu, aAA« x«0' 
« to. olxxu. Metaph. Z. y . p. 100. Ed. Sylb. 



30 HERMES. 

Ch. in. A^std thus all things whatsoever, being 
either C/") Substances or Attributes, it fol- 
lows of course that all Words, which are 
significant as Principals, must needs be 
significant of either the one or the other. 
If they are significant of Substances, they 
are calFd Substantives ; if of Attributes, 
they are calFd Attributives. So that 
all Words whatever, significant as 
Principals, are either Substantives 
or Attributives. 

Again, as to Words, which are only 
significant as Accessories, they acquire a 
Signification either from being asso- 
ciated to one Word, or else to many: If 
to one Word alone, then as they can do 
no more than in some manner define or 
determine, they may justly for that rea- 
son 



(/> This division of things into Substance and Attribute 
seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Seels 
and ages. See Catagor. c. % Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. 
ticCaih, L. III. c. i. 



Book the First. 31 

son be called Definitives, litoma- ch - Ilr - 
ny Words at once, then as they serve to 
no other purpose than to connect, they 
are called for that reason by the name 
of Connectives. 

"And thus it is that all Words what- 
ever are either Principals or Accessories; 
or under other Names, either significant 
from themselves, or significant by rela- 
tion. — If significant from themselves, they 
are either Substantives or Attributives; 
if significant by relation, they are either 
Definitives or Connectives. So that un- 
der one of these four Species, Sub- 
stantives, Attr ibutives, Defini- 
tives, and Connectives, are all 
Words, however different, in a manner 
included. 

If any of these Names seem new and 
unusual, we may introduce others 
more usual, by calling the Substantives, 
Nouns; the Attributives, Verbs ; the 

Definitives, 



32 HERMES. 

Ch. III. J)efinitives, Articles; and the Con- 
nectives, Conjunctions. 

Should it be ask'd, what then be- 
comes of Pronouns, Adverbs, Prepositions, 
and Interjections ; the answer is, either 
they must be found included within the 
Species above-mentioned, or else must 
be admitted for so many. Species by 
themselves. 

§ There were various opinions in 
ancient Days, as to the number of these 
Parts or Elements of Speech. 

Plato in his * Sophist mentions only 
two, the Noiin and the Verb. Aristotle 
mentions no more, where he treats of 
^-Prepositions. Not that those acute 
Philosophers were ignorant of the other 
Parts, but they spoke with reference to 

Logic 



* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser. 
+ De Interpr. c, 2 & 3. 



Book the First. S3 

Logic or DialecticCs^ considering the Ck III. 
Essence of Speech as contained in these 
two, because these alone combined 
make a perfect assertive Sentence, which 
none of the rest without them are able 
to effect. Hence therefore Aristotle in 
his * treatise of Poetry (where he w r as to 
lay doAvn the elements of a more varie- 
gated 

# 

(s) Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos 
duct) Nomen Sf Verbum ; quia hoe soloe etiam per se con- 
junctce plenum faciunt orationem ; alias autem partes 
wbutkyog'np.oiTxy hoc est, cofisignificantia appellabant. 
Priscian. 1. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putschii. Existit hie qucedam 
quastio, cur duo tantum, Nomen # Verbum, se (Aristo- 
teles sc.) determinarc promittat, cum plures partes ora- 
tionis esse vidcantur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum 
Aristotelcm hoc libro diffinisse, quantum Mi ad id, quod 
institucrat tractare, suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici 
enuntiativa oratione, quce scilicet hujusmodi est, id June- 
lis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur. — Quare su- 
pcrjluum est quairere, cur alias quoque, qua: videntur ora- 
tionis partes, non proposaerit, qui non totius simpliciter 
orationis, sed tantum simpUcis orationis instituit elements 
partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. Apol- 
lonius from the above principles elegantly calls the Noun 
and Verb T a l^v^orxra, ^le* t6 >.6yn, the most animated 
parts of Speech. De Syntaxi, I. 1. c. 3, p. 24«. See also 
Plutarch. Qincst. Platon. p. 1009. 

* Poet . Cap. 20- 

D 



34 HERMES. 

Ch. III. gated speech) adds the Article and Con- 
junction to the Noun and Verb, and so 
adopts the same Parts, with those esta- 
blished in this Treatise. To Aristotle's 
authority (if indeed better can be re- 
quired) may be added that also of the 
elder Stoics W. 

The latter Stoics instead of four 
Parts made five, by dividing the Noun 
into the Appellative and Proper. Others 
increased the number, by detaching 
the Pronoun from the Noun ; the Parti- 
ciple and Adverb from the Verb ; and 
the Preposition from the Conjunction. 
The Latin Grammarians went farther, 
and detached the Interjection from the 
Adverb, within which by the Greeks it 
was always included, as a Species. 

We 



( h ) For this we have the authority of Dionysius, of 
HalkamassuS) Dc Strubl. Orat. Se6l. 2. whom Quinti- 
lian follows, Inst. I. 1. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and 
Priscian make them always to have admitted five Parts , 
See Prucian^ as before, and Lae?'tiu$, Lib, VII. Scgm. 57. 



Book the First. 35 

We are told indeed by (0 Dionysius Ch. Til. 
of Halicarnassus and Quintilian, that 
Aristotle, with Theodectes, and the more 
early writers, held but three Parts of 
speech, the Noun, the Verb, and the 
Conjunction. This, it must be owned, 
accords with the oriental Tongues, 
whose Grammars (we are ( k ) told) admit 
no other. But as to Aristotle, we have 
his own authority to assert the contrarj r , 
who not only enumerates the four 
Species which we have adopted, but 
ascertains them each by a proper De- 
finition.* 

D 2 To 

fl) See the places quoted in the note immediately pre- 
ceding. 

W Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faci- 
unt. Est que hcec Arabian quoque sententia — Hebrcei quo- 
que (qui, cum Arabes Grammdlicam scribere desinerent, 
artem earn demum scribere cceperunt, quod ante annos con- 
tigit circiter quadringentos) Hebrcei, inquam, hac in re se- 
cuti sunt magistros suos Arabes. — Immo vero trium das- 
nam numerum alice etiam Orientis linguce retinent. — 
Dubium, utrum ed in re Orientates imitati sunt antiquos 
Grcecorum, an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum. 
Utut est, etiam "uteres Graxos tres tantum partes agno- 
visse, non solum autor est Dionysius, &c. Voss. de Ana- 
log. I. 1. c. 1. Sec also Sancdi Mincrr. I. l. c, 2 

* Sup, p, 34. 



36 HERMES. 

Ch. III. To conclude— the Subject of the fol- 
lowing Chapters will be a distinct and 
separate consideration of the Noun, the 
Verb, the Article, and the Con- 
junction; which four, the better (as 
we apprehend) to express their respec- 
tive natures, wechuseto call Substan- 
tives, Attributives, Definitives, 
and Connectives. 



CHAP. 



Book the First. 3? 



CHAP. IV. 



Concerning Substantives, properly so 
called. 

Oubstantives are all those principal Ch.IV. 
Words, which are significant of Substances, 
considered as Substances. 

The first sort of Substances are the 
natural, such as Animal, Vegetable, 
Man, Oak. 

There are other Substances of our 
own making. Thus by giving a Figure 
not natural to natural Materials, we 
create such Substances, as House, Ship, 
Watch, Telescope, fyc. 

Again, by a more refined operation of 
our Mind alone, we abstract any Attri- 
bute from its necessary subject, and 
consider it apart, devoid of its depen- 
D 3 dence. 



38 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. dence. For example, from Body we 
abstract to Fly ; from Surface, the being 
White ; from Soul, the being Temperate. 

And thus it is we convert even Attri- 
butes into Substances, denoting them on 
this occasion by proper Substantives, 
such as Flight, Wliiteness, Temperance; 
or else by others more general, such as 
Motion, Colour, Virtue. These we call 
abstract Substances ; the second 
sort we call artificial. 

Now all those several Substances 
have their Genus, their Species, and 
their Individuals. For example, in na- 
tural Substances, Animal is a Genus; 
Man, a Species/ Alexander, an Indivi- 
dual. In artificial Substances, Edifice 
is a Genus ; Palace, a Species ; the Va- 
tican, an Individual. In abstract Sub- 
stances, Motion is a Genus \ Flight, a 
Species ; this Flight or that Flight are 
Individuals. 



As 



Book the First. 39 

As therefore every G Genus maybe Cb. iv. 
found whole and intire in each one of its 
Species ; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, 
are each of them distinctly a complete 
and intire Animal) and as every Species 
may be found whole and intire in each one 
of its Individuals; (for thus Socrates, 
Plato, and Xenophon, are each of them 
completely and distinctly a Man) hence 
it is, that every Genus, though One, is 
multiplied into Many; and every Spe- 
cies, though One, is also multiplied into 
Many, by reference to those beings which 
are their proper subordinates. Since then 
no individual has any such subordinates, it 
can never in strictness be considered as 
Many, and so is truly an Individual 
as well in Nature as in Name. 

D 4 From 



( fl ) This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a 
manner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of ^tx* 

locxv ottx. z;oWujv, Ivor Warn xf//t/.£vB y^ugls, ©avlij S/art rocixivriv — 

5C TZoWotG, ETEgXS dh.Xr)\(tJV f U7T0 fJ.lS.S I^uObv ZJtQktyOLA.ivUS . — ■ 

Sophist, p. 253. Edit. Serrani. For the common defi- 
nition of Genus and Species, see the Isagoge or Tntro- 
du&iOn of Porphyry to Arrtotle's Logic. 



40 HERME S. 

Ch. IV. From these Principles it is, that 
Words following the nature and genius 
of Things, such Substantives admit of 
Number as denote Genera or Species, 
while those, which denote ( h ) Indivi- 
duals, in strictness admit it not. 

Besides 



(*) Yet sometimes Individuals have plurality or Num- 
ber y from the causes following. In the first place the 
Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, 
even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to 
invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. — 
Hence then instead of one only being call'd Marcus, and 
one only Antonius, it happens that many are called Mar- 
cus and many called Antonius; and thus 'tis the Romans 
had their Plurals, Mara and Antonii, as we in later days 
have our Marks and our Anthonics. Now the Plurals of 
this sort may be well called accidental, because it is 
merely by chance that the Names coincide. 

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the Pto- 
lemies, Scipios, Catos, or (to instance in modern names) 
the Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues ; because a Race 
or Family is like a smaller sort of Species ; so that the 
family Name extends to the Kindred, as the specific 
Name extends to the Individuals. 

A third cause which contributed to make proper 
Names become Plural, was the high Character or Emi- 
nence of some one Individual, whose Name became after- 
wards a kind of common Appellative, to denote all those, 

who 



Book the First, 41 

Besides Number, another character- Cb - IV - 
istic, visible in Substances, is that of 
Sex. Every Substance is either Male 
or Female ; or both Male and Female ; 
or neither one nor the other. So thajt 
with respect to Sexes and their Negation, 
all Substances conceivable are compre- 
hended under this fourfold considera- 
tion. 

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites 
being rare, if not doubtful ; hence Lan- 
guage, 



who had pretensions to merit in the same way. Thus 
every great Critic was call'd an Aristarchus ; every great 
Warrior, an Alexander; every great Beauty, a Helen, &c. 

A Daniel come to judgment! yea a Daniel, 

cries Shylock in the Play, when he would express the 
wisdom of the young Lawyer. 

So Martial in that well known verse, 

Sint M^cenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones. 

So L/ucilius, 

AiriAinoi monies, JEtnje omnes, aspcri Athones. 

woo-o/ 4>AE0ONTE2 ; r, 4ETKAAinNE2. Lucian in Timon. 
T. I. p. 108. 



42 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. guage, only regarding those distinctions 
which are more obvious, considers 
Words denoting Substances to be either 
Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter*. 

As to our own Species, and all those 
animal Species, which have reference to 
common Life, or of which the Male and 
the Female, by their size, form, colour, 
8fC. are eminently distinguished, most 
Languages have different Substantives, 
to denote the Male and the Female. — i 
But as to those animal Species, which 
either less frequently occur, or of which 
one Sex is less apparently distinguished 
from the other, in these a single Sub- 
stantive commonly serves for both Sexes. 



In 



* After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle. 

TfcJv OV0(A<XTUV T« /XEV OtppEVX, T<£ $£ ^XEX, T« £f fXSTX^V- Poet. 

cap. 21. Protagoras before him had established the 
same Distinction, calling them cL}fax, §J>\sx, ^ cx.lvn. — 
Aristot. Rhet. L, III. c. 5. Where mark what were af- 
terwards called 8&s'Tef«, or Neuters, were by these called 

T<X [AST3t%V It; (TXiVY). 



Book the First. 

•f-lN the English Tongue it seems a ge- 
neral rule (except only when infringed 
by a figure of Speech) that no Substan- 
tive is Masculine, but what denotes a 
Male animal Substance, none Feminine, 
but what denotes a Female animal Sub- 
stance ; and that where the Substance 
has no Secc, the Substantive is always 
'Neuter. 

But 'tis not so in Greek, Latin, and 
many of the modern Tongues. These 
all of them have Words, some masculine, 
some feminine (and those too in great 
multitudes) which have reference to 
Substances, where Sex never had exist- 
ence. To give one instance for many. 
Mind is surely neither male, nor fe- 
male ; yet isNOTX, in Greek, masculine, 

and mens, in Latin, feminine. 

In 



+ Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, 
neutrum haberi oporteret, sed id Ars, &c. Consent, apud 
Putsch, p. 2023, 2024. 

The whole Passage from Genera Ilominum, qua natu- 
ralia sunt, &c is worth perusing. 




44 HERME S. 

Ch. IV. j N some Words these distinctions 
seem owing to nothing else, than to the 
mere casual structure of the Word it- 
self: It is of such a Gender, from having 
such a Termination; or from belonging 
perhaps to such a Declension. In others 
we may imagine a more subtle kind of 
reasoning, a reasoning which discerns, 
even in things without Sex, a distant ana- 
logy to that great natural Distinc- 
tion, which (according to Milton) ani- 
mates the World. % 

In this view we may conceive such 
Substantives to have been considered 
as Masculine, which were " conspi- 
" cuous for the Attributes of imparting 
" or communicating ; or which were by 
" nature active, strong, and efficacious, 
" and that indiscriminately whether to 
" good or to ill ; or which had claim to 

Eminence, 



+ Mr. Linnaeus , the celebrated Botanist, has traced the 
Distinction of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable World, 
and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method. 



Book the First. 45 

" Eminence, either laudable or other- ch - IV « 
" wise. 

The Feminine on the contrary were 
" such, as were conspicuous for the At- 
" tributes either of receiving, of con- 
" taining, or of producing and bringing 
" forth ; or which had more of the pas- 
" sive in their nature, than of the ac- 
" tive ; or which were peculiarly beau- 
" tiful and amiable; or which had re- 
" spect to such excesses, as were rather 
" Feminine, than Masculine/' 

Upon these Principles the two great- 
er Luminaries were considered, one as 
Masculine, the other as Feminine ; the 
Sun ("Hxi^, Sol) as Masculine, from com- 
municating Light, which was native and 
original, as well as from the vigorous 
warmth and efficacy of his Rays ; the 
Moon (Sex?!™, Luna) as Feminine, from 
being the Receptacle only of another's 
Light, and from shining with rays more- 
delicate and soft. 

Tm 8 



46 HERMES. 

Ch.lV. Thus Milton, 

First in his East the glorious Lamp was 

seen, 
Regent of Day, and all ih' Horizon round 
Invested with bngJkt rays ; jocund to run 
His longitude thro' Heavns high road : 

the gray 
Dawn, and the Pleiades before him dancd, 
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the 

Moon 
But opposite^ in levell'd West was set, 
His mirrour, with full face borrowing 

her Light 
From him; for other light she needed 

none. P. L. VII. 370. 

By Virgil they were considered as 
Brother and Sister, which still preserves 
the same distinction. 

Nee Fratris radiis obnoxia surgere 
Luna. G. I. 396. 

The Sky or Ether is in Greek and 
Latin Masculine, as being the source of 
those showers, which impregnate the 

Earth. 



Book the First. 47 

Earth. *The Earth on the contrary chIV « 
is universally Feminine, from being the 
grand Receiver, the grand Container, 
but above all from being the Mother 
(either mediately or immediately) of 
every sublunary Substance, whether 
animal or vegetable. 

Thus Virgil, 
Turn Pater omn i poten s fcecundis im- 

bribus jEth-er 
Coxjugis in gremium l.etje descendit, 

§ (mints 
Magnus alit inagno commixtus corpore 

foetus. G. II. 32.5. 

Thus Shakespear, 

J Common Mother, Thou 

Whose Womb immeasurable, and infinite 

breast 
Teems and feeds all — Tim. of Athens. 

So Milton, 
Whatever Earth, all-bearing Mo- 
ther, yields, P. L. V. 

So 

* Senecae Nat. Quccst. HI. 14. 

t ria/x^rop yv xoCi^.— Grace. Anth. p. 281. 



48 HER M E S. 

Ch. IV. So Virgil, 

Non jam mater alit Tellus, viresque 
ministrat ( c) . 

Mn. XL 71. 

Among artificial Substances theSHrp 
(N a ^, Navis) is feminine, as being so emi- 
nently a Receiver and Container of va- 
rious things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, 
Goods, #c. Hence Sailors, speaking of 
their Vessel, say always, " she rides at 
" anchor" "she is under sail" 

A City (IIo>us-, Ci-oitas) and a Coun- 
try, (riar^if, T atria) are feminine also, 
by being (like the Ship) Containers and 
Receivers, and farther by being as it 
were the Mothers and Nurses of their 
respective Inhabitants. 

Thus 



(<0— S,o k, h t£ o'Xw t^v THS 0y<7<y, w> 0IIAY xj MIITEPA 
vopi&o-if OYPANON Se ^ HAION, ^ ifi r< ruv aXXuv ruv 
To<8Twv, d>* TENfiNTAS ^ IIATEPA2 CT£o<75cyofEi'eGr<. Arist 

de Gener. Anim. 1. c. 2. 



Book the First* 49 

Thus Virgil, Ch. IV. 

Salve, magna Parens frugum, Sa- 

turnia Tellns, 
Magna Virum Geor. II. 173. 

So. i* that Heroic Epigram on those 
brave Greeks, who fell at Chceronea, 

Toucc he Ti&vqiQ i%ti xbXntoig vwv TrXeTqcc ku- 

Their parent Country in her bosom 

holds 
Their wearied bodies. — * 

So Milton, 
The City, which Thou seest, no other deem 
Than great and glorious Rome, Queen 
of the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV. 



As to the Ocean, tho* from its being 
the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the 
Container and Productress of so many 

Vegetables 

* Dcmost. in Orat. de Corona. 

E 



50 HERME S. 

Cn. IV. Vegetables and Animals, it might just- 
ly have been made (like the Earth) 
Feminine; yet its deep Voice and bois- 
terous Nature have, in spight of these 
reasons, prevailed to make it Male, In- 
deed the very sound of Homer s 

would suggest to a hearer, even igno- 
rant of its meaning, that the Subject 
was incompatible with female delicacy 
and softness. 

Time (x$6v©*) from his mighty Effi- 
cacy upon every thing around us, is by 
the Greeks and English justly consider- 
ed as Masculine. Thus in that elegant 
distich, spoken by a decrepit old Man, 

Me Time hath bent, that sorry Artist, he 
That surely makes, whateer he handles, 
worse. 

So 

* n Xgon, 'Bxdoiuv $»»)l£y «7flW7r/axo7TE &tx7{A.ov. Gr«ec. 
Anth. p. 290. 

+ Stob. Eel. p. 591. 



Book the First. 51 

So too Shakespear, speaking likewise Ch. IV. 
of Time, 

Orl. Whom doth he gallop withal f 
Ros. With a thief to the gallows. — 

As you like it. 

The Greek 0*W©^ or Aftv^, and the 
English Death, seem from the same 
irresistible Power to have been consi- 
dered as Masculine. Even the vulgar 
with us are so accustomed to this no- 
tion, that a Female Death they 
would treat as ridiculousW. 

Take a few examples of the mascu- 
line Death. 

E 2 Calli- 



( d ) Well therefore did Milton in his Paradise Lost not 
only adopt Death as a Person, but consider, him as 
Masculine : in which he was so far from introducing a 
Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not sup- 
ported by Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanc- 
tion of national Opinion for his Masculine Death, as the 
ancient Poets had for many of their Deities. 



52 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. Callimachus upon the Elegies of his 
Friend Heraclitus — 

Ai tie Teal Zwstriv ctySoveg, yriv b kccvtoov 
yet thy sweet warbling strains 



Still live immortal, nor on them shall 

Death 
His hand e'er lay, thd Ravager of all. 

In the Alcestis of Euripides, qAvzt®* 
or Death is one of the Persons of the 
drama; the beginning of the play is 
made up of dialogue between Him and 
Apollo ; and towards its end, there is a 
fight between Him and Hercules, in 
which Hercules is conqueror, and res- 
cues Alcestis from his hands. 

It is well known too, that Sleep and 
Death are made Brothers by Homer. 
It was to this old Gorgias elegantly al- 
iuded, when at the extremity of a long 
life he lay slumbering on his Death-bed. 
A Friend asked him, " How he did?"— 

Sleep. 



Book the First. 53 

" Sleep (replied, the old Man) is just Ch.IV. 
" upon delivering me over to the care of 

" AwBrotherW/' 

Thus Shakespear, speaking of Life, 

merely Thou art Death's Fool ; 

For him Thou labour st by thy flight to 

shun, 
And yet run'st towards him still. 

Meas. for Meas. 

So Milton. 
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans; 

Despair 
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to 

couch : 
And over them triumphant Death his 
dart 

Shook ; but delay' d to strike 

P. L. XI. 489 f A 
E3 The 



AAEA^HI. Stob. Eel. p. 600. 

tf) Suppose in any one of these examples we introduce 
d female Death ; suppose we read, 

And 




HERMES. 

The supreme Being (God, Qehg, 
Deus, Dieu, Sec.) is in all languages 
Masculine, in as much as the masculine 
Sex is the superior and more excellent ; 
and as He is the Creator of all, the Fa- 
ther of Gods and Men. Sometimes in- 
deed we meet with such words as To 
ngwTov, To Obm, Numeji, Deity (which 
last we English join to a neuter, saying 
Deity itself) sometimes I say we meet 
with these Neuters. The reason in 
these instances seems to be, that as God 
is prior to all things, both in dignity 
and in time, this Priority is better cha- 
racterized and exprest by a Negation, 
than by any of those Distinctions which 
are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as 

Male 



And over them triumphant Death her dart 
Shook y &c. 

What a falling off ! How are the nerves and strength of 
the whole sentiment weakened ! 



Book the First. 55 

Male for example is co-ordinate with ch - IV. 
Female, Right with Left, #c. #cM 

Virtue ('a^tvj, Virtus J as well as 
most of its Species, are all Feminine, 
perhaps from their Beauty and amiable 
Appearance, which are not without 
effect even upon the most reprobate and 
corrupt. 

E 4 abash' d 



fe) Thus AmmoniuS) speaking on the same Subject — 
TO FIPflTON Aiyojtxsv, Iqf u /u/o oe tuiv otx [jt.v(k\oyiocs zjxga- 
Sovrwv r>/>uy ras §zo\oyitx.s lrokyt.inai ris >j appw^ov, y SvAwf £7r»i 
(lege SvtXvirgEtrv)) <$ioc{A.6gtpu<riv <pi%ur ^ tbto Imorus' t« fxev 
yxg alpptvi to §r)\v a-v^oiy^or to (lege tZ) $t FIANTHI AIlAfiE 
AITIOI o-vroixpv £s$iv uWa, ^ orxv ugo-evixZs TON ©EON 
ovo/x<x£o/.aev, [tTfoy] to cte/xvote^ov ruiv ysvvv tS v<pci(/.ivti 'agari- 
[MJvrts, *rws otlrov zj%o<rotyo%ivovAv. Primum dicimus, quod 
nemo etiam eorum> qui theologiam nobis fabularum inte- 
gumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fceminct 
specie Jingere ausus est: idque merito : conjugatum 
enim mari fcemininum est. Causae autem omnino abso- 
lute ac simplici nihil est conjugatum. Immo vero cum 
Deum masculino genere appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus 

genus pr&stantius submisso atque humili prceferentes 

Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30. b.— « y ^ Iwrio* r? 
TifuTu &». Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb. 



56 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. abash'd the Devil stood, 

And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw 
Virtue in her shape how lovely ; saw, 
and pind 

His loss 

P. L. IV. 846. 

This being allowed, Vice (Kax/a) 
becomes Feminine of course, as being, 
in the <rvqoixlx, or Co-ordination of 
things, Virtue's natural Opposite^. 

The Fancies, Caprices, and fickle 
Changes of Fortune would appear but 
awkwardly under a Character that was 
Male : but taken together they make a 

very 



W They are bath represented as Females by Xenophon, 
in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from Prodicus. 
See Memorab. L. II. c. 1. As to the avsoiyjot. here men- 
tioned, thus Varro Pythagoras Samius ait omnium 

rerum initia esse bina : utjinitum <Sf infinitum, bonum § 
malum, vitam <Sf mortem, diemfy noctcm. De Ling. Lat. 
L. IV. See also Arist. Metaph. L. 1. c. 5. and Eccle* 
siasticus. Chap. Ixii. ver. 24. 

l 



Book the First. 57 

very natural Female, which has no small P 1 - VI - f 
resemblance to the Coquette of a mo- 
dern Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing, 
and shifting her favours, as different 
Beaus succeed to her good graces. 

Transmutat incertos honores, 

Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna, Hor. 

Why the Furies were made Female, 
is not so easy to explain, unless it be 
that female Passions of all kinds were 
considered as susceptible of greater ex- 
cess, than male Passions ; and that the 
Furies were to be represented, as Things 
superlatively outrageous. 

Talibus Alecto dictis exarsit in iras. 

At Juveni oranti subitus tremor occupat 

artus : 
Diriguere oculi : tot Erinnys sibilat Hy- 

dris, 
Tantaque se fades aperit : turn fiammea 

torquens 

Lumina 



58 HERMES 

Ch. IV. Lumina cunctantem fy qucerentem dicere 
plura 
Repulit, fy geminos erexit crinibus an- 

gues, 
Verberaque insonuit, rabidoque hcec addi- 

dit ore : 
En! Ego victa situ, &c. 

^n. VII. 455«. 



He 



® The Words above mentioned Time, Death, Fortune, 
Virtue, &c in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern 
Languages, though they are diversified with Genders in 
the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which 
they have once acquir'd, except in a few instances, 
where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say * *%t\r, 
or o tzeilri, hcec Virtus or hie Virtus, la Virtu or le Virtu, 
and so of the rest. But it is otherwise in English. We 
in our own language say, Virtue is its own reward, or 
Virtue is her own reward ; Time maintains its wonted 
Pace, or Time maintains his wonted Pace. 

There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it en- 
ables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction 
between the severe or Logical Style, and the ornamental 
or Rhetorical. For thus when wc speak of the above 

Words, 



Book the First. 59 

He, that would see more on this Sub- Ch. IV. 
ject, may consult Ammonius the Peripa- 
tetic, 



Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as 
Neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes 
a logical Inquiry. When we give them Sex, by making 
them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth 
personified ; are a kind of intelligent Beings, and become, 
as such, the proper ornaments either of Rhetoric or 
of Poetry. 

Thus Milton, 

The Thunder 9 

Wingd with red light* ning and impetuous rage x 
Perhaps hath spent his shafts P. Lost. I. 174. 

The Poet, having just before called the Hail, and Thun- 
der, God's Ministers of Vengeance, and so personified 
them, had he afterwards said its Shafts for his Shafts, 
would have destroyed his own Image, and approached 
withal so much nearer to Prose. 

The following Passage is from the same Poem. 

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again 

His red right hand P. L. II. 174. 

In this Place His Hand is clearly preferable either to 
Her's or It's, by immediately referring us to God himself, 
the Avenger. 

I shall 



60 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. tetic, in his Commentary on the Treatise 
de Interpretations, where the Subject is 
treated at large with respect to the 
Greek Tongue. We shall only observe, 
that as all such Speculations are at best 
but Conjectures, they should therefore 

be 



I shall .only give one instance more, and quit this 
Subject. 

At his command th' up-rooted Hills retired 
Each to his place : they heard his voice and went 
Obsequious ; Heaven his wonted face renew' d y 
And with fresh Jlourets Hill and Valley smil'd. 

P. L. VI. 

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book. 

Here all things are personified ; the Hills hear, the 
Valleys smile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed. — 
Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws 
of his Language to have said — Each Hill retired to its 
Place — Heaven renew'd its wonted face — how prosaic 
and lifeless would these Neuters have appeared ; how 
detrimental to the Prosopopeia, which he was aiming to 
establish ! In this therefore he was happy, that the 
Language, in which he wrote, imposed no such necessity ; 
and he was too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. 
It were to be wished, his correctors had been as wise on 
their parts. 



Book the First. 61 

be received with candour, rather than ch - IV - 
scrutinized with rigour. Varro's words 
on a Subject near akin, are for their 
aptness and elegance well worth at- 
tending. Non mediocres enim tenebrce in 
silva, ubi hcec captanda ; neqne ed, quo 
pervenire volumus, semitce tritm ; neque 
non in tr multibus qucedam object a, qua: 
euntem retinere possunt* 

To conclude this Chapter. We may 
collect from what has been said, that, 
both Number and Gender appertain 
to Words, because in the first place 
they appertain to Things; that is to 
say, because Substances are Many, and 
have either Sex, or no Sex ; therefore Sub- 
stantives have Number, and are Mascu- 
line, Feminine, or Neuter. There is 
however this difference between the two 
Attributes : Number in strictness de- 
scends no lower, than to the last Hank 

of 



* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. 



62 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. of Species^ : Gender pn the contrary 
stops not here, but descends to every 
Individual, however diversified. And 
so much for Substantives, proper* 

IY SO CALLED. 



(*) The reason why Number goes no lower, is that it 
does not naturally appertain to Individuals : the cause of 
which see before, p. 39. 



CHAP. 



Book the First. G$ 

CHAP. V. 

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary 
Order. 

W E are now to proceed to a Secon- Cil - v « 
dary Race of Substantives^ Race 
quite different from any already men- 
tioned, and whose Nature may be ex- 
plained in the following manner. 

Every Object which presents itself 
to the Senses or the Intellect, is either 
then perceived for theirs* time, or else 
is recognized as having been perceived 
before. In the former case it is called 
an Object t% t^t^ yvajsug, of the 
first knowledge or acquaintance^; in the 

latter 



(a J See Apoll. de Syntcuci, 1. 1. c. 16. p. 49. 1. 2. c. 3. 
p. 103. Thus Priscian — Interest autcm inter demon- 
strutionem fy relationem hoc; quod demonstration inter- 
rogationi reddita, Primam Cognitioncm ostendit ; Quis 

fecit ? 



64 HERMES. 

ch * v - latter It is called an Object t% Sevreqag 
yvujaccg of the second knowledge or ac- 
quaintance. 

Now as all Conversation passes be- 
tween Particulars or Individuals, these 
will often happen to be reciprocally 
Objects Tvfc nquTYiQ yva<reoi)g 9 that is to 
say, till that instant unacquainted with 
each other. What then is to be done ? 
How shall the Speaker address the 
other, when he knows not his Name ? 
or how explain himself by his own 
Name, of which the other is wholly ig- 
norant ? Nouns, as they have been de- 
scribed, cannot answer the purpose. 
The first expedient upon this occasion 
seems to have been te7Zig 9 that is, 
Pointing, or Indication by the Finger or 
Hand, some traces of which are still to 
be observed, as a part of that Action, 
which naturally attends our speaking. 

But 

fecit ? Ego : relatio vcro Secundaria Cognitionom signift- 
cat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. p. 936. Edit. 
Putschii, 



Book the First. 

But the Authors of Language were not 
content with this. They invented a 
race of Words to supply this Pointing ; 
which Words, as they always stood for 
Substantives or Nouns, were charac- 
terized by the Name of 'Avt&vu^/^, or 
Pronouns^). These also they distin- 
guished into three several sorts, calling 
them Pronouns of the First, the Second, 
and the Third Person, with a view to 
certain distinctions, which may be ex- 
plained as follows. 

Suppose the Parties conversing to be 
wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor 
Countenance on either side known, and 

the 



(b) 'ExeIVo «w ^AvruvvfA-icc, ro iaetcc AEISEHS y> avxipogaLs: ' 
'ANTONOMAZOMENON. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. 
p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so peculiarly 
destined to the expression of Individuals, that he does 
not say they supply the place of any Noun, but that of 
the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was their 
original, and still is their true and natural use. Pro- 
nomen est pars orationis, qua; pro nomine proprio uni- 
uscujusque incipitur. Prise. L. XII. See also Apoll. 
L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118. 

F 




66 HERME S. 

Ch. V. the Subject of the Conversation to be 
the Speaker himself. Here, to Supply 
the place of Pointing by a Word of 
equal Power, they furnished the Speaker 
with the Pronoun, I. I write, I say, I 
desire, &c. and as the Speaker is always 
principal with respect to his own dis- 
course, this they called for that reason 
the Pronoun of the First Person. 

Again, suppose the Subject of the 
Conversation to be the Party addrest. 
Here for similar reasons they invented 
the Pronoun, Thou. Thou writ est, Thou 
walkest, Sec. and as the Party addrest is 
next in dignity to the Speaker, or at 
least comes next with reference to the 
discourse ; this Pronoun they therefore 
called the Pronoun of the Second Person. 

Last ly, suppose the Subject of Con- 
versation neither the Speaker, nor the 
Party addrest, but some Third Object, 
different from both. Here they provided 
another Pronoun. He, She, or It, 

which 



Book the First. 67 

which in distinction to the two former Ch - V. 
was called the Pronoun of the Third 
Person, 

And thus it was that Pronouns came 
to be distinguished by their respective 

Persons^). 

F2 As 



C c ) The description of the different Persons here given 
is taken from Priscian, who took it from Apollonius, 
Personce Pronominum sunt tres ; prima, secunda, tertia. 
Prima est, cum ipsa, quce loquitur, de se pronuntiat; 
Secunda, cum de ed pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone 
loquitur ; Tertia, cum de ed, quae nee loquitur, nee ad 
se directum accipit Sermoncm. L. XII. p. 940. Theo~ 
dore Gaza gives the same Distinctions, n^urov (zj^oa-uvov 

SC.) u -E7E£< eavlu q>ga.fyi o Xiyuv' divltgov, u zjtgi T«, xsgos ov o 

Xoy©-* rgtrov, u zjegl Ir^e. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152, 

This account of Persons is far preferable to the com- 
mon one, which makes the First the Speaker; the Se- 
cond, the Party addrest ; and the Third, the Subjett. 
For tho' the First and Second be as commonly described, 
one the Speaker, the other the Party addrest; yet till 
they become subjecls of the discourse, they have no ex- 
istence. Again as to the Third Person's being the sub. 
jeet, this is a character, which it shares in common with 

both 



68 HERMES. 

ch - v « As to Number, the Pronoun of each 
Person has it: (I) has the plural (we), 
because there may be many Speakers at 

once 



both the other Persons, and which can never therefore 
be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an 
instance or two. When Eneas begins the narrative of 
his adventures, the second Person immediately appears, 
because he makes Dido, whom he addresses, the imme- 
diate subject of his Discourse. 

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolor em. 

From hence forward for 1500 Verses (tho' she be all 
that time the party addrest) we hear nothing farther of 
this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up 
the Narrative. 

In the mean time the First Person may be seen every 
where, because the Speaker every where is himself the 
Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself, 

— quccqne ipse miserrzma vidi, 
Et quorum pars magna fui 

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the 
course of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a 
Figure of Speech, when those, who by their absence are 
in fact so many Third Persons, are converted into Second 

Persons 



Book the First. 69 

once of the same Sentiment ; as well as ch - v - 
one, who, including himself, speaks the 
Sentiment of many. (Thou) has the 
plural (you), because a Speech may 
be spoken to many, as well as to one. 
(He) has the plural (they), because 
the Subject of discourse is often many 
at once. 

But tho' all these Pronouns have 
Number, it does not appear either in 
Greek, or Latin, or any modern Lan- 
guage, that those of the first and second 
Person carry the distinctions of Sex. 
The reason seems to be, that the 
F 3 Speaker 



Persons by being introduced aspresent. The real Second 
Person (Dido) is never once hinted. 

Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Euclid, wc 
find neither First Person, nor Second, in any Part of the 
whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor 
Party add rest, (in which light wc may always view the 
Writer and his reader) can possibly become the Subject 
of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else, ex- 
cept abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor 
is spoken to by another. 



70 HERME S. 

ch - v - Speaker and Hearer being generally 
present to each other, it would have 
been superfluous to have marked a dis- 
tinction by Art, which from Nature 
and even Dress was commonly ( rf ) appa- 
rent on both sides. But this does not 
hold with respect to the third Person, 
of whose Character and Distinctions, 
(including Sex among the rest) we often 
know no more, than what we learn from 
the discourse. And hence it is that in 
most Languages the third Person has 
its Genders, and that even English 
(which allows its Adjectives no Genders 
at all) has in this Pronoun the tripled) 
distinction of He, She, and It. 

Hence 



< d ) Demonstratio ipsa secum genus ostendit. Priscian. 
L. XII. p. 942. See JpolL de Syntax. L. II. c. 7. 
p. 109. 

< e > The Utility of this Distinction may be better found 
in supposing it away. Suppose for example we should 
read in history these words — He caused him to destroy 

him — 



Book the First. 71 

Hence too we see the reason why a Ch. V. 

single Pronoun (f) to each Person, an I" 

to the First, and a Thou to the Second, 

are abundantly sufficient to all the pur- 

F 4 poses 



him — and that we were to be informed the [He] , which 
is here thrice repeated, stood each time for something dif- 
ferent, that is to say, for a Man, for a Woman, and for 
a City, whose Names were Alexander, Thais, and Per- 
sepolis. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, divested 
of its Genders, how would it appear, which was de- 
stroyed ; which was the destroyer ; and which the cause, 
that moved to the destruction ? But there are not such 
doubts, when we hear the Genders distinguished; when 
instead of the ambiguous sentence, He caused him to 
destroy him, we are told with the proper distinctions, 
that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with 
certainty, what before we could not : that the Promoter 
was the woman ; that her Instrument was the Hero ; 
and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate 
City. 

#3 Quccritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona 8f secun- 
da singula Pronomina habeant, tartiam vero sex diversae 
indicent voces ? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima 
quidem fy secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, 
quod semper praesentes inter se sunt, Sf demonstrative ; 
tertia vero Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut, Hie, Iste ; 
modo relativa, ut Is, Ipse, &c. Priscian. L. Xll. p. 933. 

1 



72 HERMES. 

Ch. V. poses of Speech. But it is not so with 
respect to the Third Person. The va- 
rious relations of the various Objects 
exhibited by this (I mean relations of 
near and distant, present and absent, 
same and different, definite and indefi- 
nite, §0.) made it necessary that here 
thefe should not be one, but many Pro- 
nouns, such as He, This, That, Other, 
Any, Some, &c. 

It must be confessed indeed, that all 
these Words do not always appear as 
Pronouns. When they stand by them- 
selves, and represent some Noun, (as 
when we say, This is Virtue, or SeutTikug, 
Give me That) then are they Pronouns. 
But when they are associated to some 
Noun (as when we say, This Habit is 
Virtue; or Sewuxug, That Man de- 
frauded me) then as they supply not the 
place of a Noun, but only serve to as- 
certain one, they fall rather into the 
Species of Definitives or Articles. That 
there is indeed a near relation between 

Pronouns 



Book the First. 73 

Pronouns and Articles, the old Gram- SCh. V. 
marians have all acknowledged, and s **~ i ^ m/ 
some words it has been doubtful to 
which Class to refer. The best rule to 
distinguish them is this — The genuine 
Pronoun always stands by itself, as- 
suming the Power of a Noun, and sup- 
plying its place — The genuine Article 
never stands by itself, but appears at all 
times associated to something else, re- 
quiring a Noun for its support, as much 
as Attributives or te) Adjectives, 



As 



fe) To ' AgBgov fj-fla. ovo/xal©', tL ft \Av!&>vi//a/<x avT ovo/xal®-. 
The Article stands with a Noun; but the Pronoun 
stands for a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. 9 Avl* «v 
r<x olgBga,, rris zyqos ri ovo^xlx cvvx^r^atus oLTrora-vroi, us ryv 
viroTsTayfAsvyv avruwfxixv ixsrutriiflei. Now Articles them- 
selves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, pass 
into such Pronoun, as is proper upon the occasion. Ibid. 
Again — "Ot«v to "AgOgov ^ y.sr ovofxixr^ f aa,%a.'ha.y£>a.vr i TOLi i 
zjotrivrvtftzi $1 (rvvTac%iv ovo/M-aT©- ^v 'EtgoeifleQsifAeQx., Ik tsxa-ns 
avotyxYis z}$ a.v\uvvfj/ix)> [A.E]oi\y(p8r><TET<zi, s'l'ye taciyl^oyityov y.tr 

ovo^ocr^ livxyi.li avn oxo/Aar©- *au%ikh<$1h. When the Arti- 
cle 



74 HERME S; 

ch - v - As to the Coalescence of these Pro- 
nouns, it is, as follows. The First or 
Second will, either of them, by them- 
selves 



cle is assumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained 
before ) the same Syntax, which the Noun has ; it must of 
absolute necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it 
appears without a Noun, and yet is in Power assumed for 
one. Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96.— 
Inter Pronomina Sy Articulos hoc Interest, quod Prono- 
mina eaputantur, quce, cunt sola si nt, vicem nominis conu 
plenty id quis, ille, iste : Articuli vero cum Pronomini- 
bus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur. Donat. 
Gram. p. 1753. 

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows : Ait- 
ticulis autem Pronomina coxinumer antes, finitos ea 
Articulos appellabant ; ipsos autem Articulos, quibus 
nos caremus, infinitos Articulos dicebant. Vel, ut 
alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, $ 
Articularia eos Pronomina vocabant, &c. Pris. L. I. 
p. 574. Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hie, calls them 
both Articles, the first indefinite, the second definite. 
Be Ling. Lat. L. VII. See also L. IX. p. 1 32. Vossius 
indeed in his Analogia (L. 1. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, 
because Hie has not the same power with the Greek 
Article o. But he did not enough attend to the antient 

Writers 



Book the First. 75 

selves coalesce with the Third, but not Ch. V. 
with each other. For example, it is 
good sense, as well as good Grammar, 
to say in any Language — I am He — 
Thou art He — but we cannot say — I 
am Thou — nor Thou art I. The 
reason is, there is no absurdity for the 
Speaker to be the Subject also of the 
Discourse, as when we say, I am He ; 
or for the Person addrest ; as when we 
say, Thou art He. But for the same 
Person, in the same circumstances, to 
be at once the Speaker, and the Party 
addrest, this is impossible ; and so 
therefore is the Coalescence of the First 
and Second Person. 

And now perhaps we have seen 
enough of Pronouns, to perceive how 

they 



Writers on this Subject, who- considered all Words, as 
Articles, which being associated to Nouns (and not 
standing in their place) served in any manner to ascertain^ 
and determine their sig/ujication. 




HERMES. 

they differ from other Substantives. 
The others are Primary, these are their 
Substitutes ; a kind of secondary Race, 
which were taken in aid, when for rea- 
sons already ty mentioned the others 
could not be used. It is moreover by 
means of these, and of Articles, which 

are 



W See these reasons at the beginning of this chap- 
ter, of which reasons the principal one is, that " no 
" Noun, properly so called, implies its own Presence. 
<< It is therefore to ascertain such Presence, that the Pro- 
Ci noun is taken in aid ; and hence it is it becomes equi- 
ic valent to h7%ts, that is, to Pointing or Indication by 
<< the Finger." It is worth remarking in that Verse of 
Persius, 

Sed pulchrum est digito monstrari, <5f dicier, 

HlC EST, 

how the osl^is and the Pronoun are introduced toge- 
ther, and made to co-operate to the same end. 

Sometimes by virtue of ht^is the Pronoun of the third 
Person stands for thejirst. 

Quod si militibus purees, erit mc quoquc Miles. 
That is, / also will be a Soldier. 

Tibul. L. II. El. 6, v. 7. Sec Vulpius. 

It 



Book the First. 

are nearly allied to them, that " Lan- 
" guage, tho' in itself only significant 
" of general Ideas, is brought down to 
" denote that infinitude of Particulars, 
" which are for ever arising, and ceas- 
" ing to be." But more of this here- 
after in a proper place. 

As to the three orders of Pronouns 
already mentioned, they may be called 
Prepositive, as may indeed all Substan- 
tives, because they are capable of in- 
troducing or leading a Sentence, with- 
out having reference to any thing pre- 
vious. But besides those there is ano- 
ther 



It may be observed too, that even in Epistolary Cor- 
respondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where 
the Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there 
is a sort of implied Presence, which they are supposed 
to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever so 
great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction 
in ApolloniilS, rais fj.lv ryv o-^tut elvoct dei^eis, rais $1 tS v«, 
that some Indications are ocular, and some are mental. 
De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104. 




78 HERME S. 

Ch. V. ther Pronoun (in Greek og, oqigO) ; in 
Latifi, Qui; in English, Who, Which, 
That) a Pronotln having a character 
peculiar to itself, the nature o£ which 
may be explained as follows. 

Suppose I was to say — Light is a 
Body, Light moves with' great celerity. 
These would apparently be two distinct 

Sentences. 



(?) The Greeks, it must be confest, call this Pronoun 
vnonxKltKov oi(>Q%ov, the subjunctive Article. Yet, as it 
should seem, this is but an improper Appellation. ApoU 
lonius, when he compares it to the rs^orx^tKov or true 
prepositive Article, not only confesses it to differ, as 
being exprest by a different Word, and having a differ- 
ent place in every Sentence ; but in Syntax he adds, it 
is wholly different. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. 
Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore 

adds oQ&v civ }q « ytvglus civ zm olgOgov Txvli for these 

reasons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly 
be an Article. And just before he says, yco^s ye /*»»» 

olgBgov to GjgoTtvciiHov however properly speaking it is 

the Prepositive is the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. 
The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in 
ranging it with the Pronouns. 



Book the First. 79 

Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Se- ch - v - 
cond, Light, I were to place the pre- 
positive Pronoun, it, and say — Light 
is a Body ; it moves with great celerity — 
the Sentences would still be distinct 
and two. But if I add a Connective (as 
for Example an and) saying— Light 
is a Body, and it moves with great cele- 
rity — I then by Connection make the 
two into one, as by cementing many 
Stones I make one Wall. 

Now it is in the united Powers of a 
Connective, and another Pronoun, that 
we may see the force, and character of 
the Pronoun here treated. Thus there- 
fore, if in the place of and it, we 
substitute that, or which, saying 
Light is a Body, which moves with 
great celerity — the Sentence still retains 
its Unity and Perfection, and becomes 
if possible more compact than before. 
AVe may with just reason therefore call 
this Pronoun the Subjunctive, be- 
cause 



80 HERMES. 

Ch. V. cause it cannot (like the Prepositive) 
introduce an original Sentence, but 
only serves to subjoin one to some other, 
which is previous^. 

The 



(*) Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is 
always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence., 
which Sentence contains, either exprest or understood, 
two Verbs, and two Nominatives. 

Thus in that Verse of Horace, 

Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam. 

Ille non erit liber — is one Sentence ; qui metuens vhit 
— is another. Ille and Qui are the two Nominatives ; 
Erit and Vivit, the two Verbs; and so" in all other 
instances. 

The following passage from Apollonius (though some- 
what corrupt in more places than one) will serve to 
shew, whence the above speculations are taken. To 

virorootliKov txgQgov lifi pr>[/.x I'Stov <psgsr<xi, o-yv^e^/xsvov oi& rrn 
avottpo^oLs tw -e7£oxe///,£vw ovo(A.xrt* yL IvrtZQev a.it'hxv Xoyov a 'vStx.- 
gi$-divEi Kocla. rviv rut $vo pmtA.ot.Twv ervvtai^v (Acyo; ryv Iv rZ ovo[Axri f 
tCj t»jv iv a.vTu> ru olgQgw) oVe£ tJoiXiv TZocgEifnTo ru KAI <tvvoe0- 
{j.u. Ko/vov ph (lege TO KAI yctf koivov ph) &x$i\xp€xvE rl 

OVOfAX 



Book the First. 81 

The Application of this Subjuko ch - v - 
ttve, like the other Pronouns, is uni- 
versal. It may be the Substitute of all 

kinds 



ovo/xa to -nr^oxEZ/txEvov, crv^.trXty.ov 5e ete^ov Xoyoy tsocvrus k. %ts%ov 
x fiy.a, <cxaf£Aa//.Cavs, k, «tw to, nAPErENETO O TPAMMA- 
TIK02, 02 &IEAEEATO, ^vvocfAti tov uvtov ccnoTtXu tv (fors, 
ru) O rPAMMATip.02 nAPErENETO, KAI AIEAESATO. 
The subjunctive Article , (that is, the Pronoun here men* 
tioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, dnd yet U con* 
nected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never 
serve to constitute a simple Sentence, by reason of the Syn- 
tax of the two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Noun 
or Antecedent, and that which respects the Article or Re- 
lative. The same too follows as to the Conjunction, and. 
This Copulative assumes the antecedent Noun, which is ca- 
pable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting 
to it a new Sentence, of necessity assumes a new Verb also. 
And hence it is that the Words — the Grammarian caine, 
who discoursed— form in power nearly the same sentence, 
as if we were to say — the Grammarian came, and dis- 
coursed. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 9-2. See also 
an ingenious French Treatise, called Grammaire generale 
if raisonnee, Chap. IX. 

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, 
seem to have well represented its compound Nature of 
part Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their qui 
and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to 

G 




HERMES, 

kinds of Substantives, natural, artificial, 
or abstract ; as well as general, special, 
or particular. We may say, the Ani- 
mal, Which, &c. the Man, Whom, &c. the 
Ship, JVhich, &c. Alexander, Who, Sec; 
Bucephalus, That, &c. Virtue, Which, 
&c. &c. 

Nay, it may even be the Substitute 
of all the other Pronouns, and is of 
course therefore expressive of all three 
Persons. Thus we say, I, who now 
read, have near finished this Chapter ; 
Thou, who nowreadest; He, who now 
readeth, Sec. Sec. 

And thus is this Subjunctive 
truly a Pronoun from its Substitution, 

there 

the Greek) from km amTos and KM and'O. Seal dc 
Caus. Ling. hat. c. 127. 

Homer also expresses the Force of this Subjunctive, 
Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepositive and a 
Connective, exactly consonant to the Theory here esta- 
blished. See Iliad, A, ver, 270, 553. N. 571. n. 54, 
1 57, 158. 



Book the First. 83 

there being no Substantive existing, in Cb. V. 
whose place it may not stand. At the 
same time, it is essentially distinguished 
from the other Pronouns, by this pecu- 
liar, that it is not only a Substitute, but 
withal a Connective W-. 

G2 And 



< l > Before we quit this Subject, it may not be impro- 
per to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues the 
two principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Se. 
cond Person, the Ego and the 2w, are implied in the 
very Form of the Verb itself (ygdiQy yf a^j/y, scribo, scri* 
bis) and are for that reason never exprest, unless it be to 
mark a Contradistinction ; such as in Virgil, 

Nos patriam fugimus ; Tu, Tityre, lentils in umbrd 
Formosam resonate doces, &c. 

This however is true with respect only to the Casus rec* 
tus, or Nominative of these Pronouns, but not with res*, 
pect to their oblique Cases, which must always be added, 
because tho' we see the Ego in Amo, and the Tu in Amas, 
we see not the Te or Me in Amat y or Amant. 

Yet even these oblique Cases appear in a different man- 
ner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. 
If they contradistinguish, then are they commonly placed 
at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the 
Verb, or leading Substantive. 



M H ERIE S. 

Ch. V, And now to conclude what we have 
said concerning Substantives. AW Sub- 



stantives 



Thus Virgil, 

Quid Thesea-y magnum 

Quid memorem Alciden ? Et mi genus ab Jove summo. 



Thus Homer ', 

'TMIN ph hoi dohv- 



Tlaida, £e MOI Xvcrocrt <p!Xw — «—— 1\. A. 

where the *Y/x?V and the Mo? stand, as contradistinguished, 
and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the 
'tfjv even leading the whole Sentence. In other in- 
stances, these Pronouns commonly take their place be- 
hind the Verb, as may be seen in examples every where 
obvious. The Greek Language went farther still. When 
the oblique Case of these Pronouns happened to contra- 
distinguish, they assumed a peculiar Accent of their own, 
whi'-h gave them the name of o^Qqtov^ixbvxi, or Pronouns 
uprightly accented. When they marked no such opposi- 
tion, they not only took their place behind the Verb, 
but even gave it their Accent, and (as it were) inclined 
themselves upon it. And hence they acquired the name 
of EyxJurixai, that is, Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. 
The Greeks too had in the first person 'E^S, 'E/W, 'E/*« for 
Cvnlradisti/ictives, and M3, Me*, Me for Enclitics. And 
hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the pas- 
sage above quoted from the first Iliad, we shoud read 



Book the First. 85 

stantives are either Primary, or Se- c ^- v * 
condary, that is to say, according to a 
Language more familiar and known, 
are either Nouns or Pronouns, The 
Nouns denote Substances, and those 
either Natural, Artificial, or -Abstract*. 
They moreover denote Things either 
General, or Special, or Particular. The 
Pronouns, their Substitutes, are either 
Prepositive, or Subjunctive. The Pre- 
positive is distinguished into three 
Orders, called the First, the Second, and 
G 3 the 



xjxtioc. V *EMOI, for ztxTSoc. $1 MOI, on account of the Con- 
tradistinction, which there occurs between the Grecians 
and Chrj/ses. See JpolL de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 3. p. 20. 
L. II. c. 2. p. 102, 103. 

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, 
and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the English 
Tongue. When we say, Give me Content, the (Me) in 
this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, Give 
Me Content, Give Him his thousands, the (Me) and (Him) 
arc no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume 
an Accent of their own, and so become the true et>Qoro~ 

V\4(AEVXl. 

* See before, p. 37, 38. 



86 HERMES 

Ch.V. the Third Person. The Subjunctive 
includes the powers of all those three, 
having superadded, as of its own, the 
peculiar force of a Connective. 

Having done with Substantives, 
we now proceed to Attributives. 



CHAP. 



Book the First, 87 

CHAP. VI. 

Concerning A ttributives. 

Attributives are all those principal ch - VI. 
Words, that denote Attributes, consider- 
ed as Attributes. Such for example 
are the Words, Black, White, Great, 
Little, Wise, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, 
Writing, &cS a \ 

G4 How- 



C fl ) In the above list of Words are included what 
Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles, 
in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes of 
Substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their 
very nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all 
predicated of some Subject or Substance. Snow is white, 
Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA 
or Verb is employed by Logicians in an extended Sense 
to denote them all. Thus Ammonius explaining the rea- 
son, why Aristotle in his Tract de Interpretation calls 
Xiyj<or a Verb, tells us tsxo-av Quvw, K<xrnyogv(A.ivov opov h 
vfQTourtt sjofScay, 'PHMA y.a,WiaQou } that every Sound ar- 
ticulate, 




H ERME S. 

However, previously to these, and 
to every other possible Attribute, 
whatever a thing may be, whether black 
or white, square or round, wise or elo- 
quent, writing or thinking, it must Jirst 
of necessity exist, before it can possi- 
bly be any thing else, For Exist- 
ence may be considered as an universal 
Genus, to which all things of all kinds 
are at all times to be referred. The 
Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim 
precedence of all others, as being es- 
sential to the very being of every Pro- 
position, in which they may still be 
found, either exprest, or by implication ; 
exprest, as when we say, The Sun is 
bright jj by implication, as when we say, 

The 



ticulate, that forms the Predicate in a Proposition, is called 
a Verb. p. 24. Edit. Veil. Priscian's observation, 
though made on another occasion, is very pertinent to 
the present. Non Declinatio, sed proprietas excutiendu 
est signijicationis. L. II. p. 576. And in another place 

he says non similititdo dedinationis omnimodo conjun- 

git vel discernit partes orationis inter se t sed vis ipsiitt 
signijicationis. L. XIIL p. 970. 



Book the First. 89 

The Sun rises, which means, when re- ch - VI - 
solved, The Sun is rising®. 

The Verbs, Is, Groweth, Becometk, 
Est, Fit, vnzqxei *Sh neket, yiyveTai> 9 are 
all of them used to express this general 
Genus. The Latins have called them 
Verba Substantiva, Verbs Substantive, bat 
the Greeks 'v^ccia *Tsa$&iiH& Verbs of 
Existence, a Name more apt, as being 
of greater latitude, and comprehending 
equally as well Attribute, as Substance. 
The principal of those Verbs, and which 
we shall particularly here consider, is 
the Verb, *E& Est > Is - 

Now all Existence is either abso- 
lute or qualified — absolute, as when we 
say, B is; qualified, as when we say, 
B is an Animal; B is black, is 
round, fyc. 

With 



< b > See Mctaphys. Arido^ L. V. c. 7. Edi*. Du-Valh 



90 HERME S. 

Ch. VI. With respect to this difference, the 
Verb (is) can by itself express absolute 
Existence, but never the qualified, with- 
out subjoining the particular Form, be- 
cause the Forms of Existence being in 
number infinite, if the particular Form 
be not exprest, we cannot know which 
is intended. And hence it follows, that 
when (is) only serves to subjoin some 
such Form, it has little more force, than 
that of a mere Assertion. It is under 
the same character, that it becomes a 
latent part in every other Verb, by 
expressing that Assertion, which is one 
of their Essentials. Thus, as was ob- 
served just before, Riseth means, is m- 
ing ; Writeth, is writing* 

Again— As to Existence in gene- 
ral it is either mutable, or immutable ; 
mutable, as in the Objects of Sensation ; 
immutable, as in the Objects of Intellec- 
tion and Science. Now mutable Objects 
exist all in Time, and admit the several 
Distinctions of present, past, and fu- 
ture. 



Book the First.' 91 

ture. But immutable Objects know no Ch. VI. 
such distinctions, but rather stand op- 
posed to all things temporary. 

And hence two different Significa- 
tions of the substantive Verb (is) ac- 
cording as it denotes mutable, or immu- 
table Being. 

For example, if we say, This Orange 
is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it existeth so 
now at this present, in opposition to past 
time, when it was green, and to future 
time, when it will be rotten. 

But if we say, The Diameter of the 
Squai^e is incommensurable with its side, 
we do not intend by (is) that it is in- 
commensurable now, having been for- 
merly commensurable, or being to be- 
come so hereafter ; on the contrary we 
intend that Perfection of Existence, to 
which Time and its Distinctions are ut- 
terly unknown. It is under the same 
meaning we employ this Verb, when 
2 we 



m H ERME S. 

Ch. VI. we say, Truth is, or, God is. The 
opposition is not of Time present to 
other ; Times, but of necessary Existence 
to a// temporary Existence whatever^. 
And so much for Verbs of Existence, 
commonly called Verbs Substantive. 

We are now to descend to the com- 
mon Herd of Attributives, such as 
black and white, to write, to speak, to 
walk, &c. among which, when com- 
pared and opposed to each other, one 
of the most eminent distinctions ap- 
pears to be this. Some, by being join- 
ed to a proper Substantive make with- 
out 



f?) Cum emm dkimus, Deus est, non cum dkimus 
nunc esse, sled tantum in Substantia esse, id hoc ad im- 
mutalilitatem potius substantice, quam ad tempus aliquod 
rrfcratur. Si autem dkimus, dies est, ad mdlam diet 
nibstanfiam pcrtinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constituti- 
onem ; hoc enim, quod signtfiv.at, tale est, tanquam si dica- 
mus, nunc est. Qua? e cum dkimus esse, ut substantiam 
designcmus, simplkiter est addimus ; cum vero ita ut ali- 
quid pra>sens significelur, secundum Tempus. Booth, in 
Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. 
Edit. S err am. 



Book the Fikst. 93 

out farther help a perfect assertive Sen- ch - VI - 
tence; while the rest, tho' othenvise 
perfect, are in this respect deficient. 

To explain by an example. When 
we say, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise, 
these are imperfect Sentences, though 
they denote a Substance and an At- 
tribute. The reason is, that they want 
an Assertion, to shew that such At- 
tribute appertains to such Substance. 
We must therefore call in the help of 
an Assertion elsewhere, an (is) or a 
(was) to complete the Sentence, say- 
ing Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent. 
On the contrary, when we say, Cicero 
writeth, Cicero walketh, in instances 
like these there is no such occasion, 
because the words [writeth) and (walk- 
ethj imply in their own Form not an 
Attribute only, but an Assertion like- 
wise. Hence it is they may be resolv- 
ed, the one into Is and Writing, the 
other into Is and Walking. 

Now 



94 HERMES. 

Ch. VI. Now all those Attributives, which 
have this complex Power of denoting 
both an Attribute and an Assertion, 
make that Species of Words, which 
Grammarians call Verbs. If we re- 
solve this complex Power into its dis- 
tinct Parts, and take the Attribute alone, 
without the Assertion, then have we 
Participles. All other Attributives, 
besides the two Species before, are in- 
cluded together in the general Name 
of Adjectives. 

And thus it is, that all Attribu- 
tives are either Verbs, Partici- 
ples, or Adjectives. 

Besides the Distinctions abovemen- 
tioned, there are others, which deserve 
notice. Some Attributes have their 
Essence in Motion ; such are to walk, to 
fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in 
the privation of Motion ; such are to 
stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And lastly, 
others have it in subjects, which have 

nothing 



Book the First. 95 

nothing to do with either Motion or its ch - VL 
Privation ; such are the Attributes of, 
Great and Little, White and Black, 
Wise and Foolish, and in a word the se- 
veral Quantities and Qualities of all 
Things. Now these last are Adject- 
ives ; those which denote Motions, or 
their Privation, are either Verbs or 
Participles. 

And this Circumstance leads to a 
farther Distinction, which may be ex- 
plained as follows. That all Motion i$ 
in Time, and therefore, wherever it exists, 
implies Time as its concomitant, is evi- 
dent to all, and requires no proving. 
But besides this, all Rest or Privation of 
Motion implies Time likewise. For how 
can a thing be said to rest or stop, by be- 
ing in one Place for one instant only ? — so 
too is that thing, which moves with the 
greatest velocity. jTo stop therefore or 

rest, 

■\ Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treatise con- 
cerning Motion. H££/*«» Ifi to W£oTifo» xj tV*f«v h t£ mtZ 
rlirZ S>, ^ ccvtJ, >£ t» i^*f?. 



96 HERMES. 

Ch. VI. res t ? is to be in one Place for more than 
one Instant, that is to say, during an Ex- 
tension between two Instants, and this of 
course gives us the idea of Time. As 
therefore M otions and their Privation im- 
ply Time as their concomitant, so verbs, 
which denote them, come to denote 
Time alsoW. And hence the origin and 
use of Tenses, " which are so many 
" different forms, assigned to each Verb, 
" to shew, without altering its princi- 
" pal meaning, the various Times in 
" which such meaning may exist." — 
Thus Scribit, Scripsit, Scripserat, and 
Scribet, denote all equally the Attribute, 
To Write, while the difference between 
them, is, that they denote Writing in 

different Times. 

Should 

W The ancient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have 
* well described this Property. The following is part of 

their Definition of a Verb foi*.a, le tr< to zj^oa-an^xho)) 

%?ovov, a Verb is something, which signifies Time over 
and above (for such is the force of the Preposition n^ os .) 
If it should be asked, over and above vhat? It may 
be answered, over and above its principal Signilication, 
which is to denote some moving and energizing Attribute. 
See Arist. de Interpret, c. 3. together with his Com. 
mcutators Ammonias and Boetkitis. 



BdoK the First. 

Should it be asked, whether Time it- 
self may not become upon occasion the 
Verb's principal Signification ; it is an- 
swered, No. And this appears, because 
the same Time may be denoted by differ- 
ent verbs (as in the words, writeth and 
speaketh) and different Times by the 
same Verb (as in the words, writeth and 
wrote) neither of which could happen, 
were Time any thing more, than a mere 
Concomitant. Add to cnis, that when 
words denote Time, not collaterally, 
but principally, they cease to be verbs, 
and become either adjectives, or sub- 
stantives. Of the adjective kind are 
Timely ', Yearly, Dayly, Hourly, &c. of 
the substantive kind are Time, Year, 
Day, Hour, &c. 

The most obvious division of Time 
is into Present, Past, and Future, nor 
is any language complete, whose Verbs 
have not Tenses, to mark these dis- 
tinctions. But we may go still further. 
Time past and future are both infinitely 
H extended. 





HERMES. 

extended. Hence it is that in universal 
Time past we may assume many parti- 
cular Times past, and in universal Time 
future, many particular Times future, 
some more, some less remote, and cor-' 
responding to each other under different 
relations. Even present Time itself is 
not exempt from these differences, and 
as necessarily implies some degree of 
'Extension, as does every given line, 
however minute. 

Here then we are to seek for the 
reason, which first introduced into lan- 
guage that variety of Tenses. It was 
not it seems enough to denote indefinite- 
ly (or by Aorists) mere Present, Past, or 
Future, but it was necessary on many 
occasions to define with more precision, 
what hind of Past, Present, or Future. 
And hence the multiplicitly of Futures, 
Prseterits, and even Present TenseSj 
with which all languages are found to 
abound, and without which it would 
be difficult to ascertain our Ideas. 

However 



Book the First. 99 

However as the knowledge of ch - VI. 
Tenses depends on the Theory of 
Time, and this is a subject of no mean 
speculation, we shall reserve it by itself 
for the following chapter. 



H 2 CHAP. 



100 HERM E S. 

CHAP. VII. 

Concerning Time, and Tenses, 



C. VII. 



Time and Space have this in com- 
mon, that they are both of them by 
nature things continuous, and as such 
they both of them imply Extension. 
Thus between London and Salisbury 
there is the Extension of Space, and 
between Yesterday and To-morrow, the 
Extension of Time. But in this they 
differ, that all the parts of Space exist 
at once and together, while those of 
Time only exist in Transition or Sue- 
cession^). .Hence then we may gain 
some Idea of Time, by considering it 

under 



(«) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we 
may add, what is said by Ammonius — ovSe y»f o %^ov©- 
oX©- oifJioc l^xrxt, M * xara povov to NYN" Iv ya? ru y/- 
vnrQxt ■>$ <p9Bi^a9xt to slvxi e£*|. Time doth not subsist the 
7i-Jwle at once, but only in a single Now or Instant ; for 
it hath its Existence in becoming and in ceasing to be* 
A mm. in Predicant, p. 82. b. 



Book the First. 101 

under the notion of a transient Conti- c - VI I- 
nuity. Hence also, as far as the af- 
fections and properties of Transition go, 
Time is different from Space ; but as to 
those of Extension and Continuity, they 
perfectly coincide. 

Let vis take, for example, such a part 
of Space, as a Line. In every given 
Line we may assume any where a 
Point, and therefore in every given 
Line there may be assumed infinite 
Points, So in every given Time we 
may assume any where a Now or In- 
stant, and therefore in every given Time 
there may be assumed infinite Nows or 
Instants* 

Farther still — A Point is the 
Pound of every infinite Line ; and a 
Now or Instant, of every finite Time. 
But altho' they arc Bounds, they are 
neither of them Parts, neither the Point 
of any Line, nor the Now or Instant of 
any Time, If this appear strange, we 
II 3 may 



102 HERMES. 

C. VII. may remember, that the parts of any 
thing extended are necessarily extended 
also, it being essential to their charac- 
ter, that they should measure their Whole. 
But if a Point or Now were extended, 
each of them would contain within 
itself infinite other Points, and infinite 
other Nows (for these may be assumed 
infinitely within the minutest Exten- 
sion) and this, it is evident, would be 
absurd and impossible. 

These assertions therefore being ad- 
mitted, and both Points and Nows being 
taken as Bounds, but not as Parts®, it 

will 



(*) — <p«vs£ov or) e§\ [A,ogtov ro NYN t« %f ov», ua-trtq «cP at 
$iyy<.cc.) rr>s ygocpiAys' at de y^a^t*.*) $60 rys y.lxs pogix. It is 
evident that a Now or Instant is no more a part of Time, 
than Points are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line 
are two other Lines. Natur. Ausc. L. IV. c. 17. And 

not long before — To 0^ NYN a i*.t(>&>' /aet^b rt yxg ro (At<3(&>, 
£ avyxuaBoci £« to cAov ex ruv /*£f*v §g XPON02 a $oxh 
avyxeiadou U ruv NYN. A Now is no Part of Time ; for a 
Tart is able to measure its Whole, and the Whole is ne- 
cessarily made up of its Parts ; but Time doth not appear 
to be made up of Nows. Ibid. c. 14. 



Book the First. 103 

will follow, that in the same manner as c - VII « 
the same Point may be the End of one 
Line, and the Beginning of another, so 
the same Now or Instant may be the 
End of one Time, and the Beginning of 
another. Let us suppose for example, 
the Lines, A B, B C. 

B 




A C 

I say that the Point B is the End of the 
Line A B, and the Beginning of the 
Line, B C. In the same manner let us 
suppose A B, B C to represent certain 
Times, and let B be a Now or Instant. 
In such case I say that the Instant B is 
the End of the Time A B, and the Be- 
ginning of the Time BC. I say like- 
wise of these two Times, that with re- 
spect to the Now or Instant, which they 
include, the first of them is necessarily 
Past Time, as being previous to it; 
II 4 the 



104 HERME S. 

C. VII. the other is necessarily Future, as 
being subsequent. As therefore every 
Now or Instant always exists in 
Time, and without being Time, is 
Times Bound ; the Bound of Completion 
to the Past 9 and the Bound of Com- 
mencement to the Future : from hence 
we may conceive its nature or end,, 
which is to be the Medium of Continuity 
between the Past and the Future, so as to 
render Time, thro 9 all its Parts, one In-* 
^tire and Perfect Whole^K 

From the above speculations, there 
follow some conclusions, which may be 
perhaps called paradoxes, till they have 

been 



(c) To l\ NTN hi ervvi%eia %e ova, $ame fos'xflv- vvn^H y<zg 
rov xqovov rlv zja.gz'kQovnx. ^ lcro[XEVov, ^ oXus megus xgovz Iri'v' 
Up y«f t2 [aev aeyy, tS qs rtXsvTn- A Now or Instant is 
(as was said before) the Continuity or holding together of 
Time; for it makes Time continuous, the past and the fu- 
ture, and is in general its boundary, as being the begin* 
?iing of one Time and the ending of another. Natur. 
Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. 2w£'x«« in this place means not 
Continuity, as standing for Extension, but rather that 
Junction or x Holding together, by which Extension is *nw 
parted to other things. 



Book the First. 105 

been attentively considered. In the first c < VII » 
place there cannot (strictly speaking) be 
any such Thing as Time present. For if 
all Time be transient as well as continue 
ous, it cannot like a Line be present all 
together, but part will necessarily be 
gone, and part be coming. If there- 
fore any portion of its continuity were 
to be present at once, it would so far 
quit its transient nature, and be Time 
no longer. But if no portion of its con^ 
tinuity can be thus present, how can 
Time possibly be present, to which such 
Continuity is essential. 

Farther than this — Jf there be no 
such thing as Time Present, there can be 
no Sensation of Time, by any one of the . 
senses. For all Sensation is of the 
^Present onhj, the Past being preserved 
not by Sense but by Memory, and the 
Future being anticipated by Prudence 
only and w^isc Foresight. 

But 

* Tavrri yxg (aciaQricrci sc.) ovre to (sJWov, outb to y<yvo//.Eyov 
ywgifyiAtv, aKXx to xvagov ^6>ov. Agis, Tjrff* My»/A, A. oc. 



106 HERMES. 

C. VII. But if no Portion of Time be the ob- 
ject of any Sensation ; farther, if the Pre- 
sent never exist ; if the Past be no more ; 
if the Future be not as yet ; and if these 
are all the parts, out of which Time is 
compounded : how strange and shadowy 
a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap- 
proaching to a perfect Non-entity (<0? 
Let us try however, since the senses fail 
us, if we have not faculties of higher 
power, to seize this fleeting Being. 

The World has been likened to a va- 
riety of Things, but it appears to resem- 
ble 

(d)"Ori [xsv «y oXus a* iV'v, y {juvyis ^ ocfAvb^Zs, Ix. ra/v.^s ns 
av v7ro7r)gy<76/£* to /xev ya,g ccvits yiyovs, y^ kx sfi' to £e fxiXXet, 
jc Hiru If/v* la Se tutcov k, o atTretq ©* v^ o asi A*//.Cavo//,Ev©* 
j££ov©>» (rvfycetroci' to £' Ix. {*■/> ovruv eryfks//./,svov, a^vvxrov av <$6%sis 
xan^Hv mors ua-iocs. That therefore Time exists not at all, 
or at least has but a faint and obscure existence -, one may 
suspect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no 
more ; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet ; and out 
of these is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be 
assume ddill farther and farther. Now that ichich is made 
up of nothing but Non-entities, it should seem teas impos- 
sible ever to participate of Entity. Natural. A use. L„ 
IV. c. 14. See also Philop. M.S. Com. in Nicomack 
p. 10. 



Book the First. 107 

ble no one more, than some moving c « VI1 - 
spectacle (such as a procession or a tri- 
umph) that abounds in every part with 
splendid objects, some of which are 
still departing, as fast as others make 
their appearance. The Senses look on, 
while the sight passes, perceiving as 
much as is immediately present, which 
they report with tolerable accuracy to the 
Soul's superior powers. Having done 
this, they have done their duty, being 
concerned with nothing, save what is 
present and instantaneous. But to the 
Memory, to the Imagination, and above 
all to the Intellect, the several Nows or 
Instants are not lost, as to the Senses, 
but are preserved and made objects of 
steady comprehension, however in then; 
own nature they may be transitory and 
passing. " Now it is from contemplate 
" ing two or more of these Instants un- 
" der one view, together with that In- 
" terval of Continuity, which subsists 
" between them, that we acquire in- 

" sensibly 



108 HER M E S. 

c. vii. « sensibly the Idea of TiiciW For 
example : The Sun rises ; this I remem- 
ber ; it rises again ; this too I remember. 
These Events are not together ; there is 

an 



( e ) Tors <P_<x(azv yiyovivat ftgovov, orscv r« zjgoTtge x* Iriga ev 
ty %ivhaH oliaOvjStv Xa,£wp.iv. 'O^/^o/aev oe tw aAAo ■£. oikKo vira- 
%.ot£iiv a.VTtx, ytj (#sral;v rt ocvrcuv srsgov' orav yocp ra. ixxgoc stipx 

■rS {JLEtTU VOYKTUIASV, JC %VQ UTTYi Y) 4"VJ£>} TOC NTN, TO (Jjlv 'VSeOTlPOVy 

to ^ t/ff^ov, Tore £ raro px[Aey zjvczi XPONON. Jt is then we 
say there has been Time, when we can acquire a Sensation 
of prior and subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish 
and settle these two, by considering one first : , then the other , 
together with an interval between them different from both. 
For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different 
from the Mean, and the Soid talks of two Nows, one prior 
and the other subsequent, then it is we say there is Time, 
and this it is we call Time. Natural. Auscult. L. IV. c. 
16. Themistius' , s Comment upon this passage is. to thq 
same purpose. "Oracv yap o vhs <xva.iArr>a-Qns r« NTN, o y(Bls 
ITirsv, lirspov ztizXiv Imy to tv'{aspov, tote kJ xZ° voy "^ hsvoyo-tv, 
v7ro ruv <$vo NTN hpi^o^zvov, oTov vitq ts&poltuv Suo'iV x^ bt«/ As'yE.'i* 

jy3,t)TI moO-OV Ifi 'GJSVTBita.lOSY.OC W^Sv, V) EXXa/cb.xa, 010V e| aTTEl- 

ph yocc^y^s tjri'yvtxia.v ^vo (tyiimiiois «7roT£//,vo/.AEV©/ For when 

the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yester- 
day, talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it im- 
mediately has an idea of Time, terminated by these two, 
News, as by two Boundaries; and thus it is enabled to 
say, that the Quantity is of fifteen, >or of sixteen hours, as 
if it zcere to sever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line 
by two Points, Themist. Op. edit. Aldi. p. 43 I), 



Book the First. 

an Extension between them — not how- 
ever of Space, for we may suppose the 
place of rising the same, or at least to 
exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still 
we recognize some Extention between 
them. Now what is this Extention, 
but a natural Day ? And what is that, 
but pure Time? It is after the same 
manner, by recognizing two new Moons, 
and the Extention between these : two 
vernal Equinoxes, and the Extention 
between these ; that we gain Ideas of 
other Times, such as Months and Years, 
which are all so many Intervals, de- 
scribed as above ; that is to say, passing 
Intervals of Continuity between two In- 
stants viewed together. 

And thus it is the Mind acquires 
the Idea of Time. But this Time it 
must be remembered is Past Time 
only, which is always the first Species, 
that occurs to the human intellect. 
How then do we acquire the Idea of 
Time Future? The answer is, we 
acquire it by Anticipation. Should it 




110 HERMES. 

c. VII. be demanded still farther, And what h 
Anticipation? We answer, that in this 
case it is a kind of reasoning by analo- 
gy from similar to similar ; from succes- 
sions of events, that are past already, to 
similar successions, that are presumed 
hereafter. For example : I observe as 
far back as my memory can carry me, 
how every day has been succeeded by 
a night; that night, by another day; 
that day, by another night; and so 
downwards in order to the Day that is 
now. Hence then I anticipate a similar 
succession froiXL the present Day, and 
thus gain the Idea of days and nights 
. in futurity. After the same manner, by 
attending to the periodical returns of 
New and Full Moons ; of Springs, Sum- 
mers, Autumns and Winters, all of 
which in Time past I find never to have 
failed, I anticipate a like orderly and di- 
versified succession, which makes Months, 
and Seasons, and Years, in Time future. 

We go farther than this, and not on- 
ly thus anticipate in these natural Pe- 
ll riods 



Book the First. Ill 

riods, but even in matters of human and c - VI1 - 
€ivil concern. For example: Having 
observed in many past instances how 
health had succeeded to exercise, and 
sickness to sloth; we anticipate future 
health to those, who, being now sickly, 
use exercise; and future sickness to 
those, who, being now healthy, are sloth- 
ful. It is a variety of such observa- 
tions, all respecting one subject, which 
when systematized by just reasoning, 
and made habitual by due practice, 
form the character of a Master- Artist, 
or Man of practical Wisdom. If they 
respect the human body (as above) they 
form the Physician ; if matters military, 
the General; if matters national, the 
Statesman ; if matters of private life, 
the Moralist; and the same in other 
subjects. All these several characters in 
their respective ways may be said to 
possess a kind of prophetic discern- 
ment, which not only presents them 
the barren prospect of futurity (a pros- 
pect not hid from the meanest of men) 
but shew* withal those events, which 

are 



112 HERME & 

e. VII. are likely to attend it, and thus enables 
them to act with superior certainty and 
rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we 
except those, who have had diviner as* 
sistances) we may justly say, as was 
said of old, - 

He's the best Prophet, who conjectures 
welUf). 

From 



So Milton, 

Till old Experience do attain 

To something like Prophetic Strain: 

Et facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodam- 
modo Divinationem. 

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici. 

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the 
Mind or Intellect only, as the Future does, since we 
can find no place for its existence any where else. Not 
hut the same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past. 
For though it may have once had another kind of being, 
when (according to common Phrase) it actually teas, yet 
was it then something Present, and not something Past. 
As Past, it has no existence but in the Mind or Memory, 
since had it in fact any other, it could not properly be 
called Past. It was this intimate connection between 
Time, and the Soul, that made some Philosophers doubt 
whether if there zeds no Soul, there could be any Time y 
since Time appears to have its being in no other region. 
HoTEfov Ss pn varus tyx™ * lVi *" • X?° m > &iFo$w€u* <* v rts > *• 



Book the First. 113 

From what has been reasoned it ap- c - VI1 - 
pears, that knowledge of the Future 
comes from knowledge of the Past ; as 
does knowledge of the Past from know- 
ledge of the Present, so that their Order 
to us is that of Present, Past, and 
Future. 

Of these Species of knowledge, that 
of the Present is the lowest, not only as 
first in perception, but as far the more 
extensive, being necessarily common to 
all animal Beings, and reaching even to 
Zoophytes, as far as they possess Sensa- 
tion. Knowledge of the Past comes next, 
which is superior to the former, as being 
confined to those animals, that have 
Memory as well as Senses. Knowledge 

of 



r. x. Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. Themhlius, -who 
comments the above passage, expresses himself more po- 
sitively. E< Toiwv oiyus Kiyzrxt tote dg$iJ.r,rlv y^ to a.% iQfj.e- 
fxfvov, to fxtv to a^t9[xrtroy SriXxoy ^vvx(xii, to $1 htoyucc, txvtx 
ot ex. «.» v7ro<?<xiv, /ati ovto* t« a^;9/x.>)7ovTos' //.r ; TE civdi*.£t [x-nre 
Ivtpyslcc, <pavf£o» wr ovx uvl y^vos t\v, (Ml to-vs ^vyjfis- ilieill. 
p. '48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. ctiam ejuad, Comm. in Lib. de 
An. p. 91. 

I 



I 



114 HER M E Si 

C. VII. of the Future comes last, as bains: de- 
Arist. de rived from the other two, and which is 
3*p 28 "f° r that reason the most excellent as well 
as the most rare, since Nature in her su- 
peradditions rises from worse always to 
better, and is never found to sink from 
better down to worse*. 

And now having seen, how we ac- 
quire the knowledge of Time past, and 
Time future ; which is first in percep- 
tion, which first in dignity ; which more 
common, which more rare ; let us com- 
pare them both to the present Nora or 
Instant, and examine what relations 
they maintain towards it. 

In the first place there maybe Times 
both past and future, in which the pre- 
sent Now has no existence, as for exam- 
ple iii Yesterday, and To-morrow. 

Again, the present Now may so far 
belong to Time of either sort, as to be 

the 

* See below, Note (r) of this Chapter. 



Book the First. 115 

the End of the past, and the Beginning S'^ l h 
of the future ; but it cannot be included 
within the limits of either. For if it 
were possible, let us suppose C thepre- 
sent Now included 



BCD 



within the limits of the past Time AD. 
In such case CD, part of the past Time 
AD, will be subsequent to C the present 
Now, and so of course be future. But 
by the Hypothesis it is past, and so will 
be both Past and Future at once, which 
is absurd. In the same manner we 
prove that C cannot be included within 
the limits of a future Time, such as BE. 

What then shall we say of such 

Times, as this Day, this Month, this 

Year, this Century, all which include 

within them the present Now ? They 

1 2 cannot 



11& HERMES 

^X^j cannot be past Times or future, from 
what has been proved ; and present Time 
has no existence, as has been proved like- 
wise*. Or shall we allow them to be pre- 
sent, from the present Now, which exists 
within them ; so that from the presence 
offAflfwe-ca.il these also present, tho* 
the shortest among them has infinite 
parts always absent? If so, and in con- 
formity to custom we allow such Times 
present, as present Days, Months, Years, 
and Centuries, each must of necessity 
be a compound of the Past and the Fu- 
ture, divided from each other by some 
present Now or Instant, and jointly 
called Present, while that Now remains 
within them. Let us suppose for exam- 
ple the Time X Y, which 



f X A B C D E Y 

let 

* Sup. p„ 104, 



Book the First, 117 

let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let c - VII. 
the present Now or Instant exist at A. """"^ 
I say, in as much as A exists within 
XY, that therefore XA is Time past, 
and AY Time future, and the whole 
XA, AY, Time Present, The same holds, 
if we suppose the present Now to exist 
at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where 
before Y. When the present Now 
exists at Y, then is the whole XY Time 
j)ast, and still more so, wiien the Now 
gets to g, or onwards. In like manner 
before the Present Now entered X, as 
for example when it was at jf, then was 
the whole XY Time future ; it was the 
same, when the present Now was at X. 
When it had past that, then XY be- 
came Time present* And thus it is that 
Time is Present, while passing, in its 
present Now or Instant. It is the 
*ame indeed here, as it is in Space. A 
Sphere passing over'k Plane, and being 
for that reason present to it, is only pre- 
sent to that Plane in a single Point at 
I 3 ona\ 



118 HERMES. 

C. VII. onC e 9 while daring the whole progres- 
sion its parts absent are infinite^). 

From what has been said, we may 
perceive that all Time, of every deno- 
mination 



(s) Place, according to the antients, was either medi- 
ate or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe, be- 
cause I am in England; in England, because in Wilt- 
shire ; in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury ; in Salisbury , 
because in my ozen house ; in my ozon house, because in 
my study. Thus far Mediate Place. And what is 
my immediate Place ? It is the internal Bound of that 
containing Body (zchatever it be) zvhich co-incides with 
the external Bound of my own Body. T3 z7se^x ovTOS 
Tsi%as, xaS' S Tsteiiyti to cte^e^o^evov. Now as this imme- 
diate Place is included within the limits of all the former 
Places, it is from this relation that those mediate Places 
also are called each of them my Place, tho' the least 
among them so far exceed my magnitude. To apply 
this to Time. The Present Century is present in the 
present Year ; that, in the present Month; that, in the 
present Day; that, in the present Hour; that, in the 
present Minute. It is thus by circumscription within 
circumscription that we arrive at that real and indi- 
visible Instant, which by being itself the rcry Essence 
of the Present, diffuses Presence throughout all even the 

largest 



Book the First. 

mination, is divisible and extended. But 
if so, then whenever we suppose a de- 
finite Time, even though it be a Time 
present, it must needs have a Beginning, 
a Middle, and an End. And so much 
for Time. 

Now from the above doctrine of 
Time, we propose by way of Hypo- 
thesis the following Theorie of Tenses. 

The Tenses are used to mark Pre- 
sent, Past, and Future Time, either 
indefinitely without reference to any 
I 4 Beo-inning, 



largest of Times, which arc found to include it izithin 
tlicir respective limits. Nicephorus Blemmides speaks 
much to the same purpose. "'B.vsrws «v xgora* 15-11 o \<p 

ekxtb^x tJxgxx.etiAsvos tw xvguos NYN* xgovos /^?^/>co?, ex. tzxps- 
>.Y>Xv9oros xl (jAAKovtos trvys^us, j£ $ix rr>v 'ujgos to xvgius NYN 
yeilvixatv, NYN tayo/AEvof ^ avion- PRESENT TlME therefore: 

is thai which adjoins to the real Now or Instant on 
either side, being a limited Time made iip of Past and 
Future, and from its vicinity to that heal Now said to 
be Now also itself. *£w/7. tpvaiHys Kt$. 9'. Sec also Jridti 
Phytic. L. VI. c. 2, 3, #c. 




120 HERME S. 

C. VII. Beginning, Middle, or End ; or else 
definitely, in reference to such distinc- 
tions. 

If indefinitely, then have we theee 
Tenses, an Aorist of the Present, an 
Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the 
Future. If definitely, then have we 
three Tenses to mark the Beginnings of 
these three Times ; three, to denote 
their Middles; and three to denote their 
Ends; in all Nine. 

The three first of these Tenses we 
call the Inceptive Present, the Incep- 
tive Past, and the Inceptive Future; 
The three next, the Middle Present, 
the Middle Past, and the Middle Fu- 
ture. And the three last, the Comple- 
tive Present, the Completive Past, and 
the Completive Future. 

And thus it is, that the Tenses in 
their natural number appear to be 

twelve; 



Book the First. 121 

twelve ; three to denote Time absolute, c - VIr - 
and nine to denote it under its respective 
distinctions. 

Aorist of the Present. 
T$ei<f)u. Scribo. I write. 

Aorist of the Past. 
y Eyp\J/2. Scripsi. I wrote. 

Aorist of the Future. 
rp\f/a\ Scribam. I shall write. 

Inceptive Present. 
MeWu y$x(p£iv. Scriptiirus sum. I am 
going to write. 

Middle or extended Present. 
Tvyxdvu y$d<pcov. Scribo or Scribens 
sum. I am writing. 

Completive Present. 
Tkyqct<pa. Scripsi. I have written. 

Inceptive Past. 
E[keXXov y$d(pew. Scripturas eram. I 
"Was beginning to write. 

Middle 



im HERMES. 

C- VIL Middle or extended Past. 

''EyqxCpov or l^yxavoy y$x(puv. Scribe- 
bam. I was writing. 

Completive Past. , 

'Eyeyqityeiv. Scripseram. I had done 
writing. 

Inceptive Future. 

MfXXvj<ny yqoiC^eiv. Scripturus ero. I 
shall be beginning to write. 

Middle or extended Future. 

' ; E<jo\kcu ry%d(pcov. Scribens ero. I shall 
be writing. 

Completive Future. 

3/ E(70{jl^; y£yg2<pw£. Scripsero. I shall 
have done writing. 



It is not to be expected that the above 

Hypothesis should be justified through 

all instances in every language. It fares 

1 with 



Book the First. 123 

with Tenses, as with other affections c - YIL 
of speech ; be the Language upon the 
whole ever so perfect, much must be 
left, in defiance of all analogy, to 
the harsh laws of mere authority and 
chance. 

It may not however be improper to 
inquire, what traces may be discovered 
in favour of this system, either in lan- 
guages themselves, or in those authors 
who have written upon this part of 
Grammar, or lastly in the nature and 
reason of things. 

In the first place, as to Aorists. 
Aorists are usually by Grammarians 
referred to the Past : such are yXbov, I 
went ; ivevov, I fell; cScc. We seldom 
hear of them in the Future, and more 
rarely still in the Present. Yet it seems 
agreeable to reason, that wherever Time 
is signified without any farther circum- 
scription, than that of Simple present, 
past, or future, the Tense is an Aorist. 

Thus 



1W HE R M E S. 

CVIT. Thus Milf0?h 

Millions of spiritual creatufes walk the 

earth 
Unseen, both when we wake, and when we- 

sleep. P. L. IV. 277. 

Here the verb (walk) means not that 
they were walking at that instant only, 
when Adam spoke, but xoqlqug indefinitely^ 
take any instant whatever. So when 
the same author calls Hypocrisy, 



•the only Evil, that w t a:iks 



Invisible, except to God alone, 

the Verb (walks) hath the like aoristi- 
cal or indefinite application. The same 
may be said in general of all Sentences 
of the Gnomologic kind, such as 

Ad pcznitendum proper at, cito qui 

jndicat. 

Avar us, nisi cum morituv, nil recte 

tacit, #c. 

All. 



Book the First. 125 

All these Tenses are so many C. VII. 

AORISTS OF THE PRESENT. 



Gnomologic Sentences after the same 
manner make likewise Aorists of 
the Future. 

Tit nihil admittes in te, formidinc 
pccnce. Hor. 

So too Legislative Sentences, Thou 
Shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, 
Sec. for this means no one particular fu- 
ture Time, but is a prohibition extend- 
ed indefinitely, to every part of Time fu- 
ture W. 

We 



( h ) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than ordi- 
narily deficient, as to the article of Aorists. It ha9 
no peculiar form even for an Aorist of the Past, and 
therefore (as Priscian tells us) the Prxteritum is forced 
to do the double duty both of that Aorist, and of the 
perfect Present, its application in particular instances 
being to be gathered from the Context. Thus it is 
that fixi means (as the same author informs us) both 
w«*o<W and* mine*, I have done it, and I did it ; vidi 

both 



126 HERMES. 

C.VII. We pass from Aorists, to the in- 
ceptive tenses. 



These may be found in part sup- 
plied (like many other Tenses) by verbs 
auxiliar. MEAAQ yqdtpew. Scripturus 
sum. I am going to write. But the 
Latins go farther, and have a species of 
Verbs, derived from others, which do 
the duty of these Tenses, and are 
themselves for that reason called In- 
choatives or Inceptives. Thus from Ca- 
leo,Iam warm, comes Calesco, I begin to 
grow warm ; from Tnmeo, I swell, comes 
Tumesco, I begin to swell: These In- 
choative Verbs are so peculiarly appro- 
priated to the Beginnings of Time, that 
they are defective as to all Tenses, 
which denote it in its Completion, and 
therefore have neither Perfeetum, Plus 
quam-perfectum, or Perfect Future. 

There 



both ii'^Mcai and tl$ Q y, / have just seen it, and / saw it 
once. Prise. Gram. L. VIII. 'p. 814. 838. Edit. 
Putsch. 



Book the First. 127 



There is likewise a species of Verbs 
called in Greek 'ECpfnHa, in Latin Desi- 
derativa, the Desideratives or Medita- 
tives, which if they are not strictly In- 
ceptives, yet both in Greek and Latin 
have a near affinity with them. Such 
are TtoXe^welu, Bellaturio, I have a desire 
to make war ; fycoa-eiu, Esimo, I long to 
eat( l K And so much for the Incep- 
tive Tenses. 

The two last orders of Tenses which 
remain, are those we called W the 
Middle Tenses (which express Time 
as extended&ndpassing) and the Perfect 

or 



W As all Beginnings have reference to what is fu- 
ture, hence we see how properly these Verbs are form- 
ed, the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from 
a future Participle. From vroXipuva-M and Pfuvu come 
mthtfMtntij and (S^aWa/; from Baltuturus and Esnrua 
come BeUaturio and Esurio. See Mucrubius, p. 6*91. 
Ed. Var.g zjdiu y§ /xj vvt ov FKAA-KIONTA BTToiyo-xs ytXxaxt. 

Plato in Phaedone. 

W Care must be taken not to confound these middle 
Tenses, with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the 
same name among Grammarians. 



C. VII. 



128 HERMES. 

C. VII. or Completive, which express its 
Completion or En d. 

Now for these the authorities are many. 
They have been acknowledged already 
in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. Hbarf- 
Zy, and explained and confirmed by Dr. 
Samuel Clarke, in his rational edition of 
Homers Iliad. Nay, long before either 
of these, we find the same scheme in Sca- 
liger, and by him CO ascribed to -fGro~ 
cinus, as its author. The learned Gaza 

(who 

C z ) Ex his percipimtfs Grocinum acute admodum Tempo* 
ra divisisse, sed minus commode. Tria enim constituit, ut 
nos, sed quae bifariam secat, Perfectum Sf Imperfectum : 
sic, Prceteritum imperfectum , Amabam : Pritteritum per- 
fectum, Amaveram. Recte sane. Et Prce sens imperfect- 
um, Amo. Recte hactenus ; continuat enim amorem, 
neque absolvit. At Prxsens perfectum, Amavi : quis hoc 
dicat ? — De Futuro autem ut non male sentit, ita contro- 
versum est. Futurum, itiquit, imperfectum, Amabo : 
Perfectum, Amavero. Non male, inquam : signifioat enim 
Amavero, amor em futurum fy absolutumiri: Amabo per- 
fectioncm nullum indicat. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. 

t His name was William Grocin, an Englishman, con- 
temporary with Erasmus, and celebrated for his learn- 
ing, lie went to Florence to study under Landin, and 
was Professor at Oxford. Spec. Lit, Flor. p. 205. 



Book the First. 129 

(who was himself a Greek, and one of C. VII. 
the ablest restorers of that language in 
the western world) characterizes the 
Tenses in nearly the same manner^). 
What Apollonius hints, is exactly con- 
sonant^). Priscian too advances the 

same 

( m > The Present Tense (as this author informs us in 
his excellent Grammar) denotes to lw3-a.fj1.Evov >£, ureXh, that 
which is now Instant and incomplete ; the Perfectum, to 
uaq eXnXvQos oigrt, >y IvleXls tS Iverwros, that which is now im- 
mediately past , and is the Completion of the Present; the 

ImpERFECTUM, to 'Sjo.^ocIsIxia.evov y^ ocrsXh T« ^x^uy^^ha-, 

the extended and incomplete part of the Past ; and the 

PluSQUAM-PER TECTUM, To TjxgtXv>Xv9oi' izxXxi, ^ evteXes. T« 

zjoc? axn[jiivH, that which is past long ago, and is the com- 
pletion of the praiteritum. Gram. L. IV. 

("J ''EvTZvQev OS Z7eM(Xe9x, OTt B T3X% O^'/J/yJvy (T'JVT&EtXV <Tfi- 

fAxi'vsi zzocgxKEt'fAEvGs, T'nv y£ [j.r,v IvES'ufjxv — Hence we arc per- 
suaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the completion 
of the Past, but tresent Completion. Apollon. L. III. 
c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this opinion, 
was the application and use of the Particle «v, of which 
he was then treating, and which, as it denoted Potentia- 
lity or Contingence, would assort (he says) with any of 
the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but never 
with this Perfectum, because this implied such a com- 
pute and indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified 
into the nature of a Contingent. 

K 



130 HERMES. 

c - VII « same doctrine from the Stoics, whose 
authority we esteem greater than all the 
rest, not only from the more early age 
when they lived, but from their supe- 
rior skill in Philosophy, and their pecu- 
liar attachment to Dialectic, which na- 
turally led them to great accuracy in 
these Grammatical Speculations^ ). 

Before 



C°) By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was 
called the Imperfect Present, and the vulgar Prceteri- 
tum, the Perfect Present, than which nothing can be 
more consonant to the system that we favour. But let 
us hear Priscian, from#whom we learn these facts. — 
Pr^sens temfus proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam prxteriit, 
pars futura est. Cum enim Tempus, ftuvii more, instabili 
volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in prctsenti, hoc 
est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum 
est) vel prceteriit vel futura est. Unde Stoici jure hoc 
temfus presens etiam Imperfectum vocabant (ut dictum 
est) eo quod prior ejus pars, quce prceteriit, transacta est, 
deest autem sequens, id est, futura. Ut si in medio verm 
dicam scribo versum, priore ejus parte scriptd ; cui ad* 
hue deest extremapars, prxsenti utor verbo, dicendo, scri- 
bo versum : sed Imperfectum est, quod deest adhuc ver- 

sui, quod scribatur Ex eodem igitur Prcrscidi nascitur 

etiam Perfectum. Si enim adjincm perceniat inccptum, 
statim idimur pr^eterito perfecto ; continuo enim, script o 

ad 



Book the First, 131 

Before we conclude, we shall add a c - VH * 
few miscellaneous observations, which 
will be more easily intelligible from the 
hypothesis here advanced, and serve 
withal to confirm its truth. 

And first, the Latins used their Free- 
teritum Perfectum in some instances af- 
ter a very peculiar manner, so as to im- 
ply the very reverse of the verb in its na- 
tural signification. Thus, Vixit, sig- 
nified, is dead; Fu it, signified, now 
is not, is no more. It was in this 
sense that Cicero addressed the people 
of Rome, when he had put to death the 
leaders in the Catalinarian Conspiracy. 
He appeared in the Forum, and cried 
K 2 out 



ad finem verm, dteo, scripsi versum. — And soon after 

speaking of the Latin Perfectum, he says sciendum 

tametiy quod Romani Prjeterito Perfecto non solum 
in re modo completa uluntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui 
apud Grcecos vra,£**eli*.tvos vocalur, quern Stoici TEAEION 
ENEITHTA nominaverunt) sed eliam pro "'Aogi'raaccipitur, 
&c. Lib. Vill. p. 812, 813; 814. 



132 HERME S. 

C. VII. out with a loud voice, *Vixerunt.— * 
So Virgil, 

llFuiMUs Trots, fuit Ilium $ 

ingens 
Gloria Dardanidum—*r- iEn. IE 

And 

* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the 
Pleaders had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim Dixe- 
runt, i» e. they have done speaking. Ascon. Psed. in 
Verr. II. 

|| So Tibuttus speaking of certain Prodigies and evil 
Omens. 

Hcec fuerint olim. Sed tn,jam mitis, Apollo, 
Prodigia indomitis merge sub cequoribus. 

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19. 
Let these .Eaew^ have been in days of old; — by Impli- 
cation therefore — But henceforth let them be no more* 
So Eneas in Virgil prays to Phoebus. 

Hac Trojana tenus fuerit for tuna secuta. 

Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, 
and its inhabitants,) have so far followed us. By im- 
plication therefore, but let it follow us no farther, Here 
let it end, Hie sit Finis, as Servius well observes in the 
place. 

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the 
force of the Tense^ but of the Mood, the Precative or, 
Imperative, not in the Future but in the Past. See 
p. 154, 155, 156. 



Book the First. 

And again, 

Locus Ardea quondam 

JDictus avis, fy nunc magnum manet 
Ardea nomen, 

*Sedfortuna fuit — iZEn-. VII. 

The reason of these significations is 
derived from the Completive Power 
of the Tense here mentioned. We see 
that the periods of Nature, and of hu- 
man affairs, are maintained by the reci- 
procal succession of Contraries. It is 
thus with Calm and Tempest; with 
Day and Night ; with Prosperity and 
Adversity ; with Glory and Ignominy ; 
with Life and Death. Hence then, in 
the instances above, the completion of 
one contrary is put for the commence- 
ment of the other, and to say, hath 
lived, or hath been, has the same 
meaning with, is Dead, or, is no 
more. 

K3 It 

* Certus in hospitibus non est amor ; errat, ut ipsi: 
Cumque nihil spares fir mius esse, rurr. 

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190. 
Sive erimus, seu nos Fata fuisse volcnt. 

Tibull. III. 5. 32 




134 HERMES, 

C. VII. It is remarkable in * Virgil, that lie 
^^^ frequently joins in the same sentence 
this complete and perfect Present with 
the extended and passing Present ; which 
proves that he considered the two, as 
belonging to the same species of Time, 
and therefore naturally formed to coin- 
cide, with each other. 

Tibijam brachia contrahit ardens 

Scorpius, § ccelijustd plus parte reliquit* 

G. I. 

Terra tremit; fugere/me— G.I* 

Prcesertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis 
Incubuit, glomeratque f evens incendia 
ventus. G. II. 

ilia noto citius, volucrique sagitta, 

Ad terram fugit, <$• portu se condidit 
alto. Mn. V. 

Ik 



* See also Spenser's Fairy Queen , B. I. C. 3. St. 19. 
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9. 

He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his sword he 
draws. 



Book the Pirst. 135 

In the same manner he joins the C. VII. 
same two modifications of Time in the 
Fast, that is to say, the complete and 
perfect Past with the extended and pas- 



wig. 



Inruerant Danai, $ tectum omne 
tenebant. JEn. II. 

Tres imbris iorti radios, tres nubis aquosce, 
Addiderant rutili tres ignis, fy alitis 

ausiri* 
Fulgores nunc terrificos, sonitumque me- 

tumque 

Miscebant operi, fiammisque sequacibus 
iras 00. JEn. VIII. 

K4 As 



(p) The intention of Virgil may be better seen, in ren- 
dering one or two of the above passages into English. 

Tibijam brachia contrahit ardens 

Scorpius ct cwlijustd plus parte reliquit. 

For thee the scorpion is now contracting his dazes, and 
hath already left thee more than a just portion of 
Heaven. The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adula- 
tion, supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting Au- 
gustus among the heavenly signs, that though he has alrea- 
dy made him more than room enough, yet he still continues 

to 



136 HERMES. 

C. vir. As to the Imperfectum, it is some-* 
- " v ^ times employed to denote what is usual 
and customary. Thus surgebat and scri- 
bebat signify not only, he was rising; he 
was writing, but upon occasion they 
signify, he used to rise, he used to 
write. The reason of this is, that what- 
ever is customary, must be something 
which has been frequently ^repeated. But 
what has been frequently repeated, must 
needs require an Extension of Time past, 
and thus we fall insensibly into the 

Tense here mentioned. 

Again, 

to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, 
one perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the 
two different Tenses. Sonte editions read relinquit; but 
reliquit has the authority of the celebrated Medicean ma- 
nuscript. 

Ilia noto citius, volucrique sagitta, 

Ad terram fugit, fy porta se condidit alto. 

The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, con- 
tinues flying to land, and is hid within the lofty har- 
bour. We may suppose this Harbour, (like many others) 
to have been surrounded with high Land. Hence the 
Vessel, immediately on entering it, was completely hid 
from those spectators who had gone out to see the Ship- 
race, 



Book the First. 137 

Again, we are told by Pliny (whose & VII « 
authority likewise is confirmed by many 
gems and marbles still extant) that the 
ancient painters and sculptors, when 
they fixed their names to their works, 
did it pendenti titulo, in a suspensive kind 
of Inscription, and employed for that 
purpose the Tense here mentioned. It 
was 'AtteXXvIs eW«, Apelles faciebat, no- 
hvaXeiT®* ivoiei, Tolycletus faciebat, and 
never eWW or fecit. By this they ima- 
gined that they avoided the shew of ar- 
rogance, and had in case of censure an 
apology (as it were) prepared, since it 
appeared from the work itself, that it 
was once indeed in hand, but no preten- 
sion that it was ever finished^). 

It 



race, but yet might still continue sailing towards the shore 
within. 

Inruerant Danai, Sf tectum omnc tenebant. 

The Greeks had entered and were then tosses- 
sing the whole house ; as much as to say, they had en- 
tered, and that was over^ but their Possession continued still. 
(9) Plhi. Nat. Hist. L. I. The first Printers (who 
were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the 

antient 



133 HERMES. 

C VII. j T j s remarkable that the very man* 
ner, in which the Latins derive these 
Tenses from one another, shews a plain 
reference to the system here advanced* 
From the passing Present come the pas^ 
sing Past, and Future. Scribo, Scribe- 
bam, Scribam. From the perfect Present 
come the perfect Past, and Future.—* 
Scripsi, Scripseram, Scripsero. And so 
in all instances, even where the verbs 
are irregular, as from Fero come Fere- 
bam and Feram ; from Tuli come Tide- 
ram and Tulero. 

We shall conclude by observing, that 
the Order of the Tenses, as they stand 
ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a 
fortuitous Order, but is consonant to 
our perceptions, in the recognition of 
Time, according to what we have ex- 
plained 



antient Artists used the same Tense. Excudebat 11. Ste* 
phanus. Exciidebat Guil. Morelius. Absolvebat Joan. 
Benenatus, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in his 
late valuable edition of Demosthenes. 



Book the First* 139 

plained already^* Hence it is, that c - vir > 
the Present Tense stands first ; then the 
Past Tenses ; and lastly the Future. 

And now, having seen what authori- 
ties there are for Aorists, or those Tenses, 
which denote Time indefinitely; and 
what for those Tenses, opposed to 
Aorists, which mark it definitely, (such 
as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the 
Completive) we here finish the subject 
of Time and Tenses, and proceed to 
consider the Verb in other Attri- 
butes, which it will be necessary to 
deduce from other principles. 

CHAP. 

W See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scaliger's 
observation upon this occasion is elegant. — Ordo autem 
(Temporum scil.) alitcr est, quam natura eorum. Quod 
enimprxteriit, prius est, quam quod est, itaque primo loco 
debere pom videbatur. Veriim, quod primo quoque tem- 
pore offertur nobis, id creat primas species in animo : 
quamobrem Prcevens Tempus primum locum occupavit ; 
est enim commune omnibus animalibus. Prceteritum au- 
tem Us tantum, qua memoria prccdila sunt. Fulurum ve- 
rb etiam pauciuribus, quippe quibus datum est prudentia: 
officiujn. De Cans. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Senecos 
Epist. 124. Mutum animal sensu comprchendit procsen- 
tia ; prxteritorum , &c. 



140 HERME & 

CHAP. VIII. 

Concerning Modes. 

C. VIII. W E have observed already to that 
the Soul's leading powers are those of 
Perception and those of Volition, which 
words we have taken in their most com- 
prehensive acceptation. . We have ob- 
served also, that all Speech or Discourse 
is a publishing or exhibiting some part 
of our soul, either a certain Perception, 
or a certain Volition. Hence, then, ac- 
cording as we exhibit it either in a dif- 
ferent part, or after a different manner, 
hence I say the variety of Modes or 
Moods^). 

If 



(a) See Chap. II. 

<b ) Gaza defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doc- 
trine. He says it is-^— fiiKm^tx, 1/T »v -craG^a -^v/vis, dia. 
<puv*>s <miA.ettvoiA.evov— a Volition or Affection of the Soul, sig- 
nified through some Voice or Sound articulate. Gram. 
L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and 
Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes— - 

rots 



Book the First. 141 

If we simply declare, or indicate some-? c » vm - 
thing to be, or not to be, (whether a 
Perception or Volition it is equally the 
same) this constitutes that Mode called 
the Declarative or Indicative. 

A Perception. 

— No sco crines, incanaque menta 
Regis Romani r Virg. JEn. VI, 

A Volition. 

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere 

formas 
Corpora- : Ovid. Metarn. I, 

If we do not strictly assert, as of 
something absolute and certain, but as 
of something possible only, and in the 
number of Continge?its, this makes that 
Mode, which Grammarians call the 

POTEN- 



ro7s fYi/AtziTtv l%octgfTus 'CJxgd.x.EiTou 7) -^v^ikt) ^laQtan — the 
Soul's disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. 
De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian: Modi sunt 
diverstc inclinations Animi, quas varia comcquitur 

BECLINATIO VERBI. L. VIII. p. 821. 

1 



142 HERME S. 

C.VIIL Potential; and which becomes on 
such occasions the leading Mode of the 
sentence. 

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus 9 Ha- 

BERET 

Plus dapis, Sec. Hor. 

Yet sometimes it is not the leading 
Mode, but only subjoined to the Indica- 
tive. In such case, it is mostly used to 
denote the End, or final Cause ; which 
End, as in human Life it is always a 
Contingent, and may never perhaps 
happen in despite of all our foresight, is, 
therefore exprest most naturally by the 
Mode here mentioned. For example, 

Ut Jugulent homines, surgunt de 
node latrones. Hor. 

Thieves rise by night, that they may cut 
mens throats. 

Here that they rise, is positively as* 
serted in the Declarative or Indicative 

Mode ; 



Book the First. 143 

Mode; but as to their cutting mens C.VIIL 
throats, this is only delivered potentially, 
because how truly soever it may be the 
End of their rising, it is still but a Con- 
tingent, that may never perhaps happen. 
This Mode, as often as it is in this man- 
ner subjoined, is called by Grammarians 
not the Potential, but the Subjunc- 
tive, 

But it so happens, in the constitu- 
tion of human affairs, that it is not al- 
ways sufficient merely to declare our- 
selves to others. We find it often ex- 
pedient, from a consciousness of our in- 
ability, to address them after a manner 
more interesting to ourselves, whether 
to have some Perception informed, or some 
Volition gratified. Hence then new 
Modes of speaking ; if we interrogate, 
it is the Interrogative Mode ; if we 
require, it is the Requisitive. Even 
the Requisitive itself hath its subordinate 
Species : With respect to inferiors, it is 
an Imperative Mode; with respect 

to 



144 HERME S. 

a viii. to equals and superiors, it is aPRECA- 
"^ tive or Optative.* 



And thus have we established a vari- 
ety of Modes; the Indicative or De- 
clarative, to assert what we think cer- 
tain; the Potential, for the Purposes 
of whatever we think Contingent ; the 
Interrogative, when we are doubtful, 
to procure us Information ; and the Re- 
quisitive, to assist us in the gratifica- 
tion of oar Volitions. The Requisitive too 
appears under too distinct species, either 
as it is Imperative to* inferiors, or 

Precative to superiors^. 

As 



* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave 
rise to a Sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in 
beginning his Iliad with — Sing, Muse, the Wrath^ — > 
When he thinks to pray^ in reality commands. fj^crQai 
gUiasvos, iTrirdrlst. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. ' The solution 
is evident from the Division here established, the Gram- 
matical form being m both cases the same. 

( c ) The Species of Modes in great measure depend on 
the Species of Sentences. The Stoics increased the num- 
ber of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides 
those mentioned in Chapter II. Note (b) they had 

many: 



Book the First. 145 

As therefore all these several Modes C VIE, 
have their foundation in nature, so have 

certain 



many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret, 
p. 4. and Diogenes Laertiiis* L. VII. 66. The Peri- 
|>atetics ("and it seems too with reason) considered all 
these additional Sentences as included within those, 
which they themselves acknowledged, and which they 
made to be fire in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, 
the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Assertive.— 
There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may 
be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive, or Indica- 
tive. The Vocative, ( which the Peripatetics called the 
**$os xhnTixlv, but the Stoics more properly ts^oa-otyoqivri- 
xlv) was nothing more than the Form of address in point 
of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply our- 
selves one to another. As therefore it seldom included 
any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a 
verbal Mode. Ammonius and Bcethius, the one a Greek 
Peripatetic, the other a. Latin, have illustrated the Species 
of Sentences from Homer and Virgil, after the following 
manner. 

*AXXa t5 Xcy* z;i>% S<&», tS rt KAHTIKOT, us 

to, CI /*«K«f ArgeiOTi- ■ — 
^ tS nPOZTAKTIKOY, us to, 

Baa-K t'Qi, T lgt totyiiat 

>£ 



146 HERMES. 

c. vill- certain marks or signs of them been in- 
troduced into languages, that we may 

be 



Kf t« 'EPOTHMATIKOY, as to, 

T/V, zjoQsv sts avo^iv ; 

*§ t5 'EYKTIKOY, ws to, 

*A< <ya£ Zsv rs tnartg — — 
?c lir\ tvtois, t3 'AIl04>ANTIKOY, x«0' ov a-jro^a/vo/AeJat 

-CTE^/ OTOUBV TWV 'GJgxyfAO.TUIVj o'lOV 

Qeoi !$s te -cravTa la-ocaiv 

a -C7£ft -cravTW, &c. Els to -cn^ E^/u,. p. 4. 

Boethius's Account is as follows. Perfectarum ver& 
Qralionum partes quinque sunt : Deprecativa, ut, 

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus sijlectcris ullis, 

Da delude auxilium, Pater, atque hcec ominafirma. 

Imperativa, id, 

Fade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, fy labere pennis. 

Interrogate a, ut, 

Die mihi, Damata, cujum pecus ? ■ 

VOCATIVA, Ut, 

0! Pater, 01 hominum rer unique cetcrna potest as\ 

Knuntiativa, in qua Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut y 
Principio arboribits varia est natura crcandis. 

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291. 

In 



Book the First. 147 

be enabled by our discourse to signify C- VIII. 
them, one to another. And hence those 
various Modes or Moods, of which we 
find in common Grammars so prolix a 
detail, and which are in fact no more 
than " so many literal Forms, intended to 
" express these natural Distinctions (*)■!? 
L 2 All 



In Milton the same sentences may be found, as follows* 
The Precative, 

— Uiiiversal Lord! be bounteous still 
To give us only Good ~ 

The Imperative, 

txo then. Thou mightiest, in thy Father's might. 

The Interrogative, 

Whence and what art thou, execrable Shape? 

The Vocative, 

Adam, earth's hallozz'd Mold, 

Of God inspird 

The Assertive or Enunciative, 

The conquer' d also and enslaved by uar 
Shall, uith their Freedom lost y all virtue lose. 

id > The Greek Language, which is of all the most ele- 
gant and complete, expresses these several Modes, and 

ali 



148 HERMES, 

c. vhi. ^ LL these Modes have this in com- 
mon, that they exhibit some way or other 

the 



all distinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number 
of Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations 
may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others 
at its ending, and consist for the most part either in 
multiplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or 
else in lengthening or shortening their respective Quan- 
tities, which two methods are called by Grammarians 
the Syllabic and the Temporal, The Latin, which is but 
a species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in like 
manner a large portion of those variations, which are 
chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but 
rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and 
Passives, it is so far defective, as to be forced to have 
recourse to the Auxiliary sum. The modern Languages, 
which have still fewer of those Variations, have been 
necessitated all of them to assume two Auxiliars at least, 
that is to say, those which express in each Language the 
Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the English Tongue, it is 
ao poor in this respect, as to admit no Variation for 
Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to ex- 
press an Aorist of the Past. Thus from Write cornet^ 
Wrote ; from Give, Gave; from Speak, Spake, &c. — 
Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled 
to employ no less than seven Auxiliars, viz. Do, Am, 
Have , Shall, Will, May, and Can ; which we use some- 
time* singly, as when we say, I am writing, I have writ- 
ten ; 



Book the First. 149 

the Soul and its Affections. Their C.viii. 
Peculiarities and Distinctions are in 
part, as follows. 

THE REQUlSITIVEandlNTERROGA- 

tive Modes are distinguished from the 
Judicative and Potential, that whereas 
these last seldom call for a Return, to the 
two former it is always necessary. 

If we compare the Requisitive 
Mode with the Interrogative, we 
shall find these also distinguished, and 
that not only in the Return, but in other 
Peculiarities, 

L 5 The 



ten ; sometimes two together, as I have been writing, I 
should have written ; sometimes no less than three, as I 
might have been lost, he could have been preserved. But 
for these, and all other speculations, relative to the Ge- 
nius of the English Language, we refer tho reader, who 
wishes for the most authentic information, to that ex- 
cellent Treatise of the learned Dr. Loxotk, intitled, A 
short Introduction to English Grammar. 



150 HERMES. 

C. VIII. The Return to the Requisitive is some* 
times made in Words, sometimes in Deeds, 
To the request of Dido to Enea$-~- 

■ ^ ■ a prima die, hospes, origine nobis 
Insidias Danaum-^ — ? 

the proper Return was in Words, that is, 
in an historical Narrative. To the Re- 
quest of the unfortunate Chief- date 

obolum Belisario — the proper Return was 
in a Deed, that is, in 3 charitable Relief. 
But with respect to the Interrogative, 
the Return is necessarily made in Words 
alone, in Words, which are called a He*- 
sponse or Answer, and which are always 
actually or by implication some defini- 
tive assertive Sentence. Take Examples. 
Whose Verses are these ? — the Return is a 
Sentence — These are Verses of Homer. 
Was Brutus a worthy Man ?-^the Return 
is a Sentence — Brutus was a worthy Man. 

And hence (if we may be permitted 
to digress) we may perceive the near 

affinity 



Book the First. 151 

affinity of this- Interrogative Mode with c - vin - 
the Indicative, in which last its Response 
or Return is mostly made. So near in- 
deed is this Affinity, that in these two 
Modes alone the Verb retains the same 
Form/^, nor are they otherwise distin- 
guished, than either by the Addition or 
Absence of some small particle, or by 
some minute change in the collocation 
of the words, or sometimes only by a 
change in the Tone, or Accent^. 

- U But 



CO "Hyt ev t7^0K£//x/v*j c^/f/xr) fyxX/c/*, t^v lyxetf/.tim v.xrdL- 
q>a.<riv otnoGdWeo-x, ^t^'t^xrxt t« xx\t7<rQxi oqiTiK-n — ayairXr^. 
%ii<T% Vi rris nxTxtyxasiJi, vTPor£i$et iU ro tlvxt s^fixift, The 
Indicative Mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that 
Assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name 
of Indicative— when it reassumes the Assertion, it returns 
again ta its proper Character. A poll, de Synt. h. III. 
c. 21. l^heodore Gaza says the same, hit rod. Gram. 
L. IV. 

W> It may be observed of the Ikterroc vti vv:, tliat a^ 
often as the Interrogation is simple and definite, the Re- 
tpousc may be made in almost the same Words, by con- 
verting 



153 HERME S. 

c. viii. But to return to our comparison be- 
tween the Interrogative Mode and the 
Requisitive* 

The 



verting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, ac- 
cording as the truth is either one or the other. For ex- 
ample — Are these Verses of Homer ? — Response— "These 
Verses are of Homer. Are those Verses of Virgil ? — 
Response — Those are not Verses of Virgil. And here 
the Artists of Language, for the sake of brevity and 
dispatch, have provided two Particles, to represent alt 
such Responses ; Yes, for all the affirmative ; No, for all 
the negative* 

But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we say 
i — Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil ? — much more,, 
when it is indefinite, as when we say in general — Whose 
ere these Verses? — We cannot then respond after the 
manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no In- 
terrogation can be answered by a simple Yes y or a sim- 
ple No, except only those, which are themselves so sim- 
ple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now 
the least complex Interrogation will admit of four An- 
swers, two affirmative, two negative, if not, perhaps of 
more. The reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot 
subsist of less than two simple ones ; each of which 

may 



Book the First. 153 

The Interrogative (in the Ian- C. Vin. 
guage of Grammarians) has all Persons 
of both Numbers. The Requisitive 

or 



may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For 
instance — Are these Verses Homer's, or Virgil's? (1.) 
They are Homer's — (2.) They are not Homer's — (3.) 
They are Virgil's — (4.) They are not Virgil's — we may 
add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interro- 
gations go still farther ; for these may be answered by 
infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance 
— Whose are these Verses? We may answer affirma- 
tively — They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They arc 
Ovid's, <Sfc— or negatively — They are not Virgil's, Tfiey 
are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on, either 
way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a sin- 
gle YeS) or a single No, which particular is meant among 
infinite Possibles ? These therefore are Interrogations 
which must be always answered by a Sentence. Yet even 
here Custom has consulted for Brevity, by returning for 
Answer only the single essential characteristic JVbrd, and 
retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest, which rest the In- 
terrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus when 
we are asked — Hozv many right angles equal the angles of 
a triangle ?-~- we answer in the short monosyllable, Two ; 
whereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer would have 
been — Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle. 



The 



134 HERMES. 

C.VIII. or Imperative has no first Person of 
the singular, and that from this plain 
reason, that it is equally absurd in 
Modes for a person to request or give 
commands to himself, as it is in Pronouns* 
for the speaker to become the subject of 
his own address* \ 

Agaix, we may interrogate as to all 
Times, both Present, Past, and Future. 
Who was Founder of Rome ? Who is 
King of China? Who will discover 
the Longitude ? — But Intreating and 
Commanding (which are the Essence o_f 

the 



The Ancients distinguished these two Species of Inter- 
rogation by different names. The simple they called 
'E^w-nj/xa, Interrogatio ; the complex, xsva-^x^ Perconta- 
tio. Ammonius calls the first of these 'Ef urveris &*XexlijeA ; 
the other, 'Egurma-ts <av<ryiMTMh. See Am. in Lib. cle In-. 
terpr. p. 160. Diog. Lacrt. VII. 66. Quintil. Imp., 
IX. 2. 

* Sup. p. 74, 75. 



Book the First. . 155 

the Requisitive Mode) have a necessary C. Vlil. 
respect to the Fuiure { s) only. For in- 
deed -what have they to do with the 

present 



ft) Apollonius's Account of the Future, implied in 
all Imperatives, is worth observing. 'Eth yx.% //.»> y/vo//.l- 

lois y (xv ytyovoaiv v nPOSTASIS* roc. Se fxy ytvo[XBvac y {4.vt ye- 
yovoTtz, Ittirr^Biornroc Vt 'iyovra. t's to scrsa-Qoci, MEAAONTOS 
I -i. A Command has respect to those things ichiph either 
are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those 
things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been 
done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be 
property said to appertain to the Future. De Syn- 
taxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says— '• Airocvroc ri 
TJ^xitltKa. ifxtifxtvyv tyt' r * v T " V-*M> 0VT0S ^i^siriv— %*)Sov ya.% 
h '!<tu> tfi to, 'O TYPANNOKTONH2A2 TIMAX0H, if, 
TIMH0H2ETAI, xocra. *n« x?° v8 ** w ' xv ' 7* ■wA'*V £">**<*- 

yls, XaGo TO fJ.IV -CTf05-«X^/XOV, TQ §£ Of/^XOV. All IMPERA- 
TIVES have a disposition within them, which respects the 
Future — with regard therefore to Time, it is the same 
thing to say, Let him, that kills a Tyrant, be 
honoured, or, he, that kills one, shall be 
honoured; the difference being only in tlie Mode, in as 
much as one is Imperative, the other Indicative or 
declarative. Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. 1. c. 35. Priscian 
seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, as 
well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Pre- 
sent 



156 H ERMES. 

c. vnr. present or the past, the natures of which 
J are immutable and necessary ? 

It 



sent to fee nothing else than an immediate Future, as op- 
posed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Prcesens- 
Sf Futurum [Tempus~\ naturali qua-darn necessitate vide- 
tur posse accipere. Ea etenim impermnus, quce vel in 
prcesenti statim volumus fieri sine aliqua dilatione, vel in 
futuro. Lib. VIII. p. 806. 

It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit cer- 
tain Tenses of the Past, such as those of the Perfectum, 
and of the two Aorists. But then these Tenses, when 
so applied, either totally lose their temporary Character, 
or else are used to insinuate such a Speed of execution^. 
that the deed should be (as it were) done in the very 
instant when commanded. The same difference seems to 
subsist between our English Imperative, Be gone, and 
those others of, Go, or Be going. The first (if we 
please) may be stiled the Imperative of the Perfectum, 
as calling in the very instant for the completion of our 
Commands : the others may be stiled Imperatives of the 
Future, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and 
finish after wards * 

It is thus Apollonius, in the Chapter first cited, dis- 
tinguishes between <r%xit\ir'j} rus a//,7rsA«*, Go to digging 
the Vines, and o-kx^xtu ra.s a.p.<rrfou$ } Get the Vines dug. 

The 



Book the First. 15? 

It is from this connection of Futurity c - VIII 
with Commands, that the Future Indica- 
tive is sometimes used for thelmperative, 
and that to say to any one, You shall 
do this, has often the same force with 
the Imperative, Do this. So in the 
Decalogue — Thou shalt not kill 
— Thou shalt not bear false 

witness 



The first is spoken (as he calls it) zU zjxqxrciaiv, by way 
of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work; the 
second, t )s <tvvti\uw<tiv> with a view to immediate Comple- 
tion. And in another place, explaining the difference 
between the same Tenses, 2x«V7e and 2xa%J,ov, he says of 
the last, h /xovov to /xij yiiofjuyov zs^oardaati, «AAa j£ to y<»o'- 
fjuvov h zjxgxTolatt dmotyoqiv^i, that it not only commands 
something which has not been yet done, but forbids also 
that, which is now doing in an Extension, that is to say, in 
a slozc and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man has 
been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten 
him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, rPA<J>E, Write 
(for that he is now, and has been long doing) but rPA¥ON, 
Get your Writing done; make no delays. Sec 
Apoll. L. III. c. 24. Sec also Macrobius de Dijf. Verb. 
Grcec. fy hat. p. 680. Edit. Varior. Lalini non (tatiina- 
verunt, &c. 



158 HERMES 

C.VIII. witness-^- which denote (we kiidw) 
v- ^ r ^ > the strictest and most authoritative 
Commands. 

As to the Potential MoDEj, it is 
distinguished from all the rest, by its 
subordinate or subjunctive Nature. It is 
also farther distinguished from the He- 
quisitive and Interrogative, by implying 
a kind of feeble and weak Assertion, and 
so becoming in some degree susceptible 
of Truth and Falshood. Thus, if it be 
said potentially, This may be, or, This 
might have been y we may remark with- 
out absurdity, It is true, or It is false. 
But if it be said, Do this, meaning, Fly 
to Heaven, or, Can this be done ? meaning, 
to square the Circle, we cannot say in 
either case, it is true or it is false, though 
the Command and the Question are 
about things impossible. Yet still the 
Potential does not aspire to the Indica- 
tive, because it implies but a dubious 
and conjectural Assertion, whereas that 

of 



Rook the First. 159 

of the Indicative is absolute, and with- C - VI11 
out reserve. 

This therefore (the Indicative I 
mean) is the Mode, which, as in all 
Grammars it is the first in order, so is 
truly first both in dignity and use. It 
is this, which publishes our sublimest 
perceptions ; which exhibits the Soul 
in her purest Energies, superior to the 
Imperfections of desires and wants ; 
which includes the whole of Time, and 
its minutest distinctions ; which, in its 
various Past Tenses, is employed by 
History, to preserve to us the remem- 
brance of former Events ; in its Futures 
is used by Prophecy, or (in default of 
this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and 
forewarn us, as to that which is coming ; 
but above all in its Present Tense serves 
Philosophy and the Sciences, by just 
Demonstrations to establish necessary 
Truth ; that Truth, which from its na- 
ture only exists in the Present ; which 

knows 



160 HERMES. 

c. VIII. knows no distinctions either of Past or 
of Future, but is every where, and al- 
ways invariably one W. 

Through 



< h > See the quotation, Note W Chapter the Sixth* 
Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse % 
sedy &c. 

BoethiuS) author of the sentiment there quoted, was 
by birth a Roman of the first quality ; by religion, a 
Christian ; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripa- 
tetic ; which two Sects, as they sprang from the same 
Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly 
adopted by the same Persons, such as Themistius, Por- 
phyry, Iamblichus, Ammonius, and others. There were 
no Sects of Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the 
distinction between things existing in Time and not in 
Time, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine 
of the Peripatetics on this Subject (since it is these that 
Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from 
the following Sketch. 

(c The things, that exist in Time, are those 
i( whose Existence Time can measure. But if their 
ic Existence may be measured by Time, then there 
" may be assumed a Time greater than the Existence 
u of any one of them, as there may be assumed a 
" number greater than the greatest multitude, that is 

" capable 



Book the First. 16L 

Through all the above Modes, with C. vin. 
their respective Tenses, the Verb being 



con* 



" capable of being numbered. And hence it is that 
" things temporary have their Existence, as it were U* 
" mited by Time ; that they are confined within it, as 
" within some bound ; and that in some degree or other 
" they all submit to its power, according to those com- 
" mon Phrases, that Time is a destroyer; that things de~ 
" cay through Time ; that men forget in Time, and lose 
" their abilities, and seldom that they improve, or grow 
1 ' young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time alzcays 
" attends Motion. Now the natural effect of Motion is 
" to put something, which now is, out of that state, in 
" which it now is, and so far therefore to destroy that 
" state. 

" The reverse of all this holds wi<h things that exist 
" eternally. These exist not in Time, because Time 
" is so far from being able to measure their Existence, 
" that no Time can be assumed, which their existence doth 
\ l not surpass. To which we may add, that they feel 
" none of Us effects, being no way obnoxious either to 
" damage or dissolution. 

".To instance in examples of either kind of Being. — 
" There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge 
" and the Pyramids, It is likewise true at this instant, 
" that the Diameter of the st/uare is commensurable with 
" its tide* What then shall we say ? Was there ever a 
M Tin?, 



162 H ERIE S. 

C. viii. considered as denoting an Attribute, 
has always reference to some Person, or 
Substance. Thus if we say, Went, 
or, Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have 
gone, we must add a Person or Sub- 
stance, to make the Sentence complete. 
Cicero went ; Caesar might have gone ; 
whither goeth the Wind ? Go ! Thou Trai- 
tor ! But there is a Mode or Form, under 
which Verbs sometimes appear, where 
they have no reference at all to Persons 
or Substances. For example — To eat is 

pleasant ; 
$ _, 

i4 Time, when it was not incommensurable, as it is cer- 
ci tain there was a Time, when there was no Stonehenge, 
u or Pyramids ? or is it daily growing less incommcn- 
" surable, as we are assured of Decays in both those 
ct massy Structures ?" From these unchangeable Truths, 
we may pass to their Place, or Region ; to the unceasing 
Intellection of the universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, 
knowing no remissions, languors, fyc. See Nat, Ausc, 
L. IV. c. 19. Mcfaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. 
Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII. The following 
Passage may deserve Attention. 

Toy yocq Nou o /xev vozTv zteQvksv, "kL \J-f\ vowv' o oe y^ "CTE^VXP, '/£. 
vos7. diXXa, yL ovros bviru teXeos, a.v [x-h mgoa-Qris clvrw to x^, vostv 
du, x^ zjocvrx voe7v, ty //.») aAAoTE ocXXcc. sj$e &wj av evTsherafos o 
voxv uil ■>£, ^xin^ >ci ai/.a. Max. Tvr. Diss. XVII. p. 201. Ed^ 
Lend. 



Book the First. 163 

pleasant ; but to fast is wholesome. Here C.VIII. 
the Verbs To eat, and, To fast, stand alone 
by themselves, nor is it requisite or even 
practicable to prefix a Person or Sub- 
stance. Hence the Latin and modern 
Grammarians have called Verbs under 
this Mode, from this their indefinite na- 
ture, Infinitives. Sanctius has given 
them the name of Impersonals ; and the 
Greeks that of ' ATa^ey^ccra, from the 
same reason of their not discovering ei- 
ther Person or Number. 

These Infinitives go farther. — 
They not only lay aside the character of 
Attributives, but they also assume that 
of Substantives, and as such themselves 
become distinguished with their several 
Attributes. Thus in the instance above, 
Pleasant is the Attribute, attending the 
Infinitive, To Eat ; JVholesome the attri- 
bute attending the Infinitive, To Fast. 
Examples in Greek and Latin of like 
kind are innumerable. 



M2 'Duh 



cc 




Vermes. 

Didce Sc decorum est pro patria mori. 
Scire tuum nihil est 

The Stoics in their grammatical in- 
quiries had this Infinitive in such esteem, 

that 



$ It is from the Infinitive thus participating the 
nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Gramma- 
rians have called it sometimes "Ovoixa. pvHAatrixo*, A verbal 
Noun ; sometimes "Ovo^x p^ixxros, the Verb's Noun. — 
The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek more evident, 
from its taking the prepositive Article before it in all 
cases ,• to ygccpiv, t« ygd<psiv, tw ygaQsiv. The same con- 
struction is not unknown in English. 

Thus Spenser, 

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake. 
Could sate the son of Thetis from to die — 

»iro ts SotveTv. In like manner we say, He did it, to be 
rich, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, 
For. He did it, for to be rich, the same as if we had 

said, He did it for gain sW« rS zjXsrsTv, eVexoc t« xe'f- 

$ ts in French, pour s'emicher. Even when we speak 

such Sentences, as' the following, 1 choose to philoso- 
phise, rather than to be rich, to (pikoaoQsh fisKo^xt, %mf 
to vXttTw, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accusa- 
tives, as if we were to say, I choose Philosophy rather 

than 



Book the First. 165 

that they held- this alone to be the ge- C. VIII. 
nuine PHMA or Verb, a name, which 
they denied to all the other Modes. 
Their reasoning was, they considered 
the true verbal character to be contained 
simple and unmixed in the Infinitive only. 
Thus the Infinitives Wz^xtuv, Ambu- 
lare, To walk, mean simply that energy, 
and nothing more. The other Modes, 
besides expressing this energy, superadd 
certain Affections, which respect per- 
sons and circumstances. Thus Ambulo 
and Ambula mean not simply To walk, 
but mean, I walk, and, Walk Thou. And 

hence 



than Riches, rr,v (piKoo-oQi&v /SbAo/ask/, vnri% to* CTAarov. Thus 
too Priscian, speaking of Infinitives — Currere enim est 
Cursds; Sf Scribere, Scriptura ; $ Legere, Lectio. 
Itaquc frequenter SfNominibus adjunguntur, &; aliis casua- 
libus, more Nominum ; ut Persiks, 

Sed pulcrum est digit o monstrari, $ dicier, hie est. 

And soon after — Cum enim dico, Bo mum est legere, ni- 
hil aliud signt/ico, nisi, Box a est eectio. L. XVI 1 1, 
p. 1 130. See also Apoll. L. I. C. 8. Gaza Grain. L. IV, 
Tc dl aTruftiA^ciTDv/dVGuol l<?i f,%fj.xros x. t. ?.. 

Ma 



166 H E R M E S. 

C.VIII. hence the j are all of them resolvable 
into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, to- 
gether with some sentence or word, ex- 
pressive of their proper Character, Am- 
bulo, I walk ; this is, Indico meambulare, 
I declare myself to walk. Ambula, Walk 
Thou ; that is, Impero te ambulare, I com- 
mand thee to walk; and so with the 
Modes of every other species. Take 
away therefore the Assertion, the Coni- t 
mand, or whatever else gives a Character 
to any one of these Modes, and there 
remains nothing more than the mere 
Infinitive, which (as Priscian says) 
significat ipsam rem, quam continet Ver- 

bum(^K 

The 



' ( k ) See Apollon. L. III. 13. Ka&oXa -crav zra^yfxivot 
cino nvos x. r. a. See also Gaza, in the note before. Igi- 
tur a Construction quoque Vim rei Verborum (id est, No- 
minis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere Infinitivlm 
possumus dignoscere; res antem in Pcrsonas distribute 
facit alios yerbi motus. — Itaque onirics modi in hum, id 
est- Infinitivum, iransumuntur sive resolvuntur. Prise, 
L. XVIII. p. 1131. From these Principles Jpollonius 
calls the Infinitive 'P^/xa yiviKurxrov, and Priscian, Verbum 
generale. 



Book the First. 167 

The application of this infinitive is C.VIII. 
somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces 
with all those Verbs that denote any 
Tendencc, Desire, or Volition of the Soul, 
but not readily with others. Thus it is 
sense as well as syntax, to say fis\o[Kcu c#v, 
Cupio vivere, I desire to live ; but not to 
say 'Es-Q/o; Cvfy, Edo vivere, or even in Eng- 
lish, I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, 
instead of J eat for to live; as we say 
avexa *S £vjV, or pour vivre. The reason 
is, that though different Actions may 
unite in the same Subject, and therefore 
be coupled together (as when we say, 
lie walked and discoursed) yet the 
Actions notwithstanding remain sepa- 
rate and distinct. But it is not so with 
respect to Volitions, and Actions. Here 
the coalescence is often so intimate, that 
the Volition is unintelligible, till the 
Action be exprest. Cupio, Volo, Deside- 
ro — I desire, I am willing^ I want — 
What ? — The sentences, we see, are de- 
fective and imperfect. We must help 
them then by Infinitives, which express 
M 4 the 



168 HERMES. 

C.VIII. the proper actions to which they tend, 
Cupio legere, Volo dhcere, Desidero v&* 
dere, I desire to ready I am willing to live % 
I want to see. Thus is the whole ren- 
dered complete, as well in sentiment as 
in syntax W 

And so much for Modes, and their 
several Species. We are to attempt to 
denominate them according to their 
most eminent characters ; it may be done 
in the following manner. As every ne-^ 
cessary truth, and every demonstrative 
syllogism (which last is no more than §, 
combination of such truths) must always 
be exprest under positive assertions, 
and as positive assertions only belong 

to 



(V Priscian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede 
Infinitives, Verba Voluntativa ; they are called in Greek 
U^oaiezrixa,. See L. XVIII. 1129. but mqre particularly 
see Jpollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine 
is explained with great Accuracy. Sec also Macrobius 
de Biff. Verb. Gr. # Lot. p. 685. Ed. Var. 

-™-iVec omnc a<rr<x%t[jL<parM cuicunque Verbo, &c. 



Book the First. 16Q 

to the Indicative, we may denominate it C. VIII, 
for that reason the Mode of Sci- 
exce^. Again, as the Potential is only 
conversant about Contingents, of which 
we cannot say with certainty that they 
will happen or not, we may call this 
Mode the Mode of Conjecture. — • 
Again, as those that are ignorant and 
would be informed, must ask of those 
that already know, this being the natu- 
ral way of becoming Proficients ; hence 
we may call the Interrogative, the 
Mode of Proficiency. 

Inter cunct a leges, # fercontabere 

doctos, 
Quy ratione qucas trmlucere Unite r cevum, 
Quid pure tranquillet, Sec. Hor. 

Farther still, as the highest and most 
excellent use of the Requisitive Mode is 

legis- 



l m ) Ob nobilitatcm pnehit Indicativus, tolas Modus 
aptus ScicnliiS) solus Pater Veritatis. Seal, de Caus. L. 
jlat. c. 1 in. 



170 HER M E S. 

C. VIII. legislative command, we may stile it for 
this reason the Mode of Legisla- 
ture. Ad Divos adeunto caste, says Ci- 
cero in the character of a Roman law- 
giver ; Be it therefore enacted, say the 
laws of England ; and in the same Mode 
speak the laws of every other nation. It 
, is also in this Mode that the geometri- 
cian, with the authority of a legislator, 
orders lines to be bisected, and circles 
described, as preparatives to that sci- 
ence, which he is about to establish. 

There are other supposed affections 
* of Verbs, such as Number and Person. 
But these surely cannot be called a part 
of their essence, nor indeed are they the 
essence of any other Attribute, being in 
fact the properties, not of Attributes, 
but of Substances. The most that can 
be said, is, that Verbs in the more ele- 
gant languages are provided with cer- 
tain terminations, which respect the 
Number and Person of every Substantive, 

that 



Book the First. 171 

that we may know with more precision, C. VIII. 
in a complex sentence, each particular v- ^ r ^ / 
substance, with its attendant verbal At- 
tributes. The same may be said of Sex, 
with respect to Adjectives. They have 
terminations which van r , as-they respect 
Beings male or female, tho' Substances 
past dispute are alone susceptible of 
sex r "). We therefore pass over these 

matters, 



(*) It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and 
rational a Grammarian as S (melius, should justly deny 
G aiders, or the distinction of Sex to Adjectives, and yet 
make Persons appertain, not to Substantives , but to 
Verbs. His commentator Perhonius is much more con- 
sistent, who says — At vero si rem recti consideres, ipsis 
No/ninibus 6f Pronominibus vet inuximi, imb unice inest 
ipsa Persona ; Sf Verba se habent in Personarum ratio, ;c 
ad Nomina plane sicuti Adject iva in ratione Generum ad 
Substantia, qnibus solis autor (Sauctius sell. L. I. c. 7.) 
Sc recti- Genus ad^cribit, exclusis Adject iv is. Sane!. Mi- 
nenr. L. I. c. 12. There is indeed an exact Analogy 
between the Accidents of Sex and Person. There are 
but two Sexes, that is to say, the Male and the Female ; 
and but two Persons (or Characters essential (o discourse) 
that is to say, the Speaker, and the Party addresse/d. - 
The third Se\ and third Person are improper!) so called, 
being in fact but Negations of the other two, 



172 HERM E S. 

C. VIII. matters, and all of like kind, as being ra- 
ther among the elegancies, than the es- 
sentials^ ) of language, which essentials 
are the subject of our present inquiry. 
The principal of these now remaining is 
the Difference of Verbs, as to 

THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which WC 

endeavour to explain in the following 
manner. 



(°> Whoever would see more upon a subject of impor- 
tance, referred to in many parts of this treatise, and par- 
ticularly in note (h) of this chapter, may consult Let- 
ters concerning Mind, an Octavo Volume published 
1750, the Author Mr. John Petvin, Vicar of Bsington 
in Devon, a person who, though from his retired situa- 
tion little known, was deeply skilled in the Philosophy 
both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, 
was valued by all that knew him for his virtue ancj 
worth. 



CHAP 



Book the First. 173 



CHAP. IX. 



Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their 
other remaining Properties. 

-nLLL Verbs, that are strictly so called ch - IX. 
denote W Energies. Now as all Ener- 
gies are Attributes, they have reference 
of course to certain energizing Substances. 
Thus it is impossible there should be 
such Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, 
&c. if there were not such beings as 
Men, Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every 
Energy doth not only require an Ener- 
gizer, but is necessarily conversant about 
some Subject. For example, if we say, 
Brutus loves — we must needs supply — 

loves 



(a) Wc use this word Energy, rather than Motion, 
from its more comprehensive meaning 1 ; it being a sort of 
Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Pri- 
vation. See before, p. 94, 05. 



174 HERMES, 

Ch. IX. loves Cato, Cassius, Portia, or some one. 
The Sword wounds — i. e. wounds Hector, 
Sarpedon, Priam, or some one. And 
thus is it, that every Energy is necessa- 
rily situate between two Substantives, 
an Energizer which is active, and a Sub- 
• ject which is passive. Hence then, if 
the Energizer lead the sentence, the 
Energy follows its character, and be- 
comes what we call a Verb active. — 
Thus we say Brutus amat, Brutus loves. 
On the contrary, if the passive Subject 
be principal, it follows the character of 
this too, and then becomes what we call 
a Verb passive. Thus we say, Por- 
tia amatur, Portia is loved. It is in like 
manner that the same Road between the 
summit and foot of the same mountain, 
with respect to the summit is Ascent, 
with respect to the foot is Descent. — 
Since then every Energy respects an 
Energizer, or a passive Subject; hence 
the Reason why every Verb, whether 
active or passive, has in language a ne- 
1 -, cessary 



Book the First. 175 

cessary reference to some Noun for its ch - IX - 
Nominative Case ( &. 

But to proceed still farther from what 
has been alreadv observed. Brutus 
loved Portia. — Here Brutus is the Ener- 
gizer ; loved, the Energy ; and Portia, 
the Subject. But it might have been, 
Brutus loved Cato, or Cassius, or the JRo- 
man Republic; for the Energy is refer- 
able to Subjects infinite. Now among 
these infinite Subjects, when that hap- 
pens to occur, which is the Energizer 
also, as when we say Brutus loved him- 
self, slew himself, &c. in such Case the 
Energy hath to the same bei:ig a double 
Relation, both active and passive.' And 
this it is which gave rise among the 

Greeks 



( & ) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly 
rejected by the best Grammarians, both antient and mo- 
dern. See Sand. Min. L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. 
c. 3. Priscian. L. XVIII. p. 1131. Jpoll. L. III. 
sub. fin. In which places the reader will see a proper 
Nominative supplied to all Verbs of this supposed cha 
raster. 



176 HER M E S. 

Ch. IX. Greeks to that species of Verbs, called 
Verbs middle^), and such was their 
true and original use, however in many 
instances they may have since happened 
to deviate. In other languages the Verb 
still retains its active Form, and the 
passive Subject (se or himself J is ex- 
pressed like other accusatives. 

Again, in some Verbs it happens 
that the Energy always keeps within the 
Energizer, and never passes out to any 
foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when 
we say, Ccesar walketh, Cctsar sitteth, 
it is impossible the Energy should pass 

out 



( c ) Tot, yxg x.x\£(jlevx pttroTYiros y4\y»xrx crvvs^fflua-iv ave- 
$e|aTo I»£f yenx-ns ^ itx^nms liixQLasus. The Verbs, called 
Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and pas- 
sive Character. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would 
see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the 
mtddle verb explained and confirmed with great Inge- 
nuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that 
able Critic Raster, entitled, De Vero Usu Verborum Me- 
diorum, A neat edition of this scarce piece has been 
lately published. 



Book the First. 177 

out (as in the Case of those Verbs called Ch.lX. 
by the Grammarians Verbs transi- 
tive) because both the Energizer and 
the Passive Subject are united in the same 
Person. For what is the cause of this 
walking or sitting? — It is the Will and 
Vital Powers belonging to Ccesar. And 
what is the Subject, made so to move or 
to sit ? — It is the Body &nd Limbs belong- 
ing also to the same Ccesan. It is this 
then forms that species of Verbs, which 
grammarians have thought fit to call 
Verbs neuter, as if indeed they were 
void both of Action and Passion, when 
perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may 
be rather said to imply both. Not how- 
ever to dispute about Names, as these 
Neuters in their Energizer always dis- 
cover their passive Subject®, which other 

Verbs 



to This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily 
express by the Terms, ' AvrondQax and 'i^owaflsi*, which 
Priscian renders quce ex se in seipsafit intrinsecus Pasao. 
L. VIII. 790. Consentii Ars apud Putsch, p. 2051. 

N it 



178 II E RMES. 

Ch. IX. Verbs cannot, their passive Subjects be- 
ing infinite ; hence the reason why it is 
as superfluous in these Neuters to have 
the Subject expressed, as in other Verbs 
it is necessary, and cannot be omitted. 
And thus it is that we are taught in 
common grammars that Verbs Active 

require 



It may be here observed, that even these Verbs, called 
Actives, can upon occasion lay aside their transitive cha- 
racter ; that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusa- 
tive, and assume the Form of Neuter's, so as to stand by 
themselves. This happens, when the Discourse respects 
the mere Energy or Affection only, and has no regard to 
the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say-, «* 
olfov olvxyivua-ycuv 5ros, This Man k?iov:s not how to read, 
speaking only of the Energy, in which we suppose him 
deficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of 
reading, we must have added them, «V. oJ£e> dvxytvuo-xsiv rx 
'Ofxvge, He knows not hozc to read Homer, or Virgil, or 
Cicero, &c. 

Thus Horace, 
Qui cupit aut met u it, juvat ilium sic clomus aut res, 
Ut lippum picta? tabula: 

He that desires or fears (not this thing in particular 
nor that, but in general he within whose breast these 

affections 



Book the First. 179 

require an Accusative, while Neuters re- Ch - IX « 
quire none. 

Of the above species of Verbs, the 
Middle cannot be called necessary, be- 
cause most languages have done with- 
out it. The Species of Verbs there- 
fore remaining are the Active, the 
Passive and the Neuter, and those 
seem essential to all languages what- 
everW. 

N2 There 



affections prevail) has the same joy in a House or Estate , 
as the Man zzith bad Eyes has injine Pictures. So Coesar 
in his celebrated Laconic Epistle of, Veni, Vidi, Vici, 
where two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same 
detached Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems 
was in the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came 
as quick, as he could come himself, and look about him. 
Whom he saw, and whom he conquered, was not the 
thing, of which he boasted. See Apoll. L. III. c. 31. 
p. 279. 

W) The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as 
making part in Propositions, considered them under the 
four following Sorts. 




HERMES. 

There remains a remark or two far- 
ther, and then we quit the Subject of 
Verbs. It is true in general that the 
greater part of them denote Attributes 
of Energy and Motion. But there are 
some which appear to denote nothing 

more, 



When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some 
Noun, made without farther help a perfect assertive Sen- 
tence, as ZwytgcLrvis uTegtir&rtt, Socrates walketh ; then as 
the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect 
Predicate, they called it for that reason K^rny dgv^x, a 
Predicable, or else, from its readiness erv^xiv^v, to coin- 
cide with its Noun in completing the Sentence, they called 
it Zv'pGapx, a Co-incider. 

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect 
assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such 
Noun, but under some oblique Case, as 2cox.ga.Tti ^ira.^i\n 
Socratem pamitet : Such a Verb, from its near approach 
to just Co-incidence, and Predication, they called Uxgxavy.- 
Quyx Or UxgceKa.r7jydgvjy.cx. 

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun 
in its Nominative, still required, to complete the Senti- 
ment, some other Noun under an oblique Case, as YiXxruv 
cftKtT Aiuvx, Plato loveth Dio (where without Dio or some 
other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite :) Such Verb, 

from 



Book the First. 181 

more, than a mere simple Adjective, joined CJl - IX - 
to an Assertion. Thus fo&Zei in Greek, 
and Equalleth in English, mean nothing 
more than hog eqi, is equal. So Albeo 
in Latin is no more than albas sum. 

N 3 — Cam- 



from this Defect, they called v, r %v y cru^x^x, or j) x*Twyo- 
f y?//.a, something less than a Co-incider, or less than a Pre* 
dicable. 

Lastly, when a Verb required too Nouns in oblique 
Cases, to render the Sentiment complete f as when we say 
^.ux^xra ^A^KiQtx^as (x&tt, Toedet me Vitce, or the like : 
Such Verb they called 5t7ov, or h'kxrlov 5 'ax^xa^^xfxx, or 
tt zj*fxxxTV)yogv)[A.x, something less than an imperfect Co-in- 
cider, or an imperfect Predicable. 

These were the Appellations which they gave to Verbs, 
when employed along with Nouns, to the forming of Pro. 
positions. As to the Name of C PHMA, or Verb, they de- 
nied it to them all, giving it only to the Infinitive, as we 
have shewn already. Seepage 164. See also Amnion, 
in Lib. de Interpret, p. 37. Jpollon. de Syntaxi, L. 1 . 
c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Thcod. Gaz. 
Gram. L. IV. 

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs 
Neuter arc 2iy.Gx[Axlx\ Verbs Active^ vrlovx r> a-v^xfAxlx. 



182 *H ERMES, 

Ch.IX. . Gampique ingentes ossibus albent . Virg. 

The same may be said of Tameo.— 
Mons tumet, i. e. tumidas est, is tumid. 
To express the Energy in these instances, 
we must have recourse to the Inceptives. 

Fluctus uti primo cazpit cum albescere 
Venta. Virg. 



Fret a ponti 



Incipiunt agitata tumescem. Virg. 

There are Verbs also to be foutid, 
which are formed out of Nouns. So 
that in Abstract Nouns (such as White- 
ness from White, Gqodness from Good) 
as also in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, 
the Attributive is converted into a Sub- 
stantive ; here the Substantive on the con- 
trary is converted into an Attributive, — 
Such are TLwlieiv from xtW, to act the 
part of a Dog, or be a Cynic ; QiXiwliew 
from */A*tt©^ to Philippize, or favour 
Philip ; Syllaturire from Sylla, to medi- 
tate 



Book the First. 183 

tate acting the same part as Sylla did. — Ch.IX. 
Thus too the wise and virtuous Empe- 
rour, by way of counsel to himself— -oq* 
yA inoYLUt<rctqub%Q, bewarethou beest not be- 
c^sard; as though he said, Beware, 
that by being Emperor, thou dost not 
dwindle into a mere C^sar^. In like 
manner one of our own witty Poets, 

Sternhold himself he Out-Sterx- 

HOLDED. 

And long before him the facetious Ful- 
ler, speaking of one Morgan, a sangui- 
nary Bishop in the Reign of Queen 
Mary, says of him, that he out-box- 
nerd even Hosier himself* 

And so much for that Species of At- 
tributes, called Vires is the 

STRICTEST SEXSE, 

N4 CHAP. 



•) Marc. Antonin. L. VI. § 30. 
* Church Hist. B. Villi p. 2K 



184 HER M E S. 



CHAP. X 



Ch. X. 



Concerning those other Attributes, 
Participles and Adjectives. 

1 HE nature of Verbs being under- 
stood, that of Participles is no way 
difficult. Every complete Verb is ex- 
pressive of an A ttribute; of Time; and 
of an Assertion. Now if we take away 
the Assertion, and thus destroy the Verb, 
there will remain the Attribute and the 
Time, which make the essence of a Par- 
ticiple. Thus take away the Asser- 
tion from the Verb, T^Cpei, Writeth, and 
there remains the Participle, Tq&Cpuv, 
Writing, which (without the Assertion) 
denotes the same Attribute, and the 
same Time. After the same manner, by 
withdrawing the Assertion, we discover 
Tga^ctg in ,N Ey£#\(/£, Tqi^/uv in Yqx-^ei, for 
we cbfase to refer to the Greek, as being 

of 



Book the First. 185 

of all languages the most complete, as ch - x * 
well in this respect, as in others. 

And so much for ParticiplesH 

The 



( c > The Lectins are defective in this Article of Parti- 
ciples. Their Active Verbs, ending in or, (commonly 
called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times 
(such as Loquens, Locutus^ Locuturus) but none of the 
Passive. Their Actives ending in 0, have Participles of 
the Present and Future (such as Scribens, and Scripturus) 
but none of the Past. On the contrary, their Passives 
have Participles of the Past ('such as Scriptus) but none 
of the Present or Future, unless we admit such as Scri- 
bendus and Docendus for Futures, which Grammarians 
controvert. The want of these Participles they supply by 
a Periphrasis — for ygd^xs they say cum scripsisset — for 
ygx<p6[Atvos dum scribitur^ &c. In English we have some- 
times recourse to the same Periphrasis ; and sometimes 
we avail ourselves of the same Auxiliars, which form our 
Modes and Tenses. 

The English Grammar lays down a good rule with re- 
spect to its Participles of the Past, that they all termi- 
nate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to 
as few Exceptions as any. Considering therefore how 
little Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it 

seems. 



186 HERME S. 

Ch.X. The nature of Verbs and Participles 
being understood, that of Adjectives 
becomes easy. A Verb implies (as we 
have said) both an Attribute, and Time> 
and an Assertion ; a Participle only im- 
plies an Attribute, and Time, and an 
Adjective only implies an Attribute \ 
that is to say, in other Words, an Ad- 
jective has no Assertion, and only de- 
notes such an Attribute, as has not its es- 
sence either in Motion or its Privation. — 
Thus in general the Attributes of quan- 
tity, quality, and relation (such as many 
and few, great and little, black and white, 
good and bad, double, treble, quadru- 
ple, 



seems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, that may be 
found. It would be well therefore, if all writers, who 
endeavour to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a 
corruption, at present so prevalent, of saying, it was wrote, 
for, it was written ; he was drove, for, he was driven ; 
I have went, for, I have gone, &c. in all which instances 
a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Participle> 
without any necessity from the want of such Wprd. 

1 



Book the First. 187 

pie, Sec.) are all denoted by Adjeo Ch.x. 

TIVES- 

It must indeed be confessed, that 
sometimes even those Attributes, which 
are wholly foreign to the idea of Mo- 
tion, assume an assertion, and appear 
as Verbs. Of such we gave instances 
before, in albeo, tumeo, hi&, and others. 
These however, compared to the rest 
of Verbs, are but few in number, and 
may be called, if thought proper, Ver- 
bal Adjectives. It is in like manner, 
that Participles insensibly pass too into 
Adjectives. Thus doctus, in Latin, and 
learned in English, lose their power, as 
Participles, and mean a Person pos- 
sessed of an habitual Quality. Thus 
Vir eloquens means not a man nozv speak- 
ing, but a man who possesses the habit of 
speaking, whether he speak or no. So 
when we say in English, he is a think- 
ing Man, an understanding Man, we 
mean not a person, whose mind is in 

actual 



188 HER M E & 

Ch. X. actual Energy r , but whose mind is en- 
riched with a larger* portion of those 
powers. It is indeed no wonder, as all 
Attributives are homogeneous, that at 
times the several species should appear 
to interfere, and the difference between 
them be scarcely perceptible. Even in 
natural species, which are congenial and 
of kin, the specific difference is not al- 
ways to be discerned, and in appear- 
ance at least they seem to run into each 
other. 

We have shewn already^) in the In- 
stances of $t\iwv%ew 9 Syllaturire, 'Axo- 
iMCKTctqubwcih and others, how Substan- 
tives may be transformed into Verbal 
Attributives. We shall now shew, how 
they may be converted into Adjectives. 
When we say the party of Pompey, the 
stile of Cicero? the philosophy of So- 

crates, 



r*)Sup. p. 182, 183. 



Book the First. 189 

crates, in these cases the party, the stile, ch - x 
and the philosophy spoken of, receive 
a stamp and character from the persons, 
whom they respect. Those persons 
therefore perform the part of Attributes, 
that is, stamp and characterize their 
respective Subjects. Hence then they 
actually pass into Attributes, and assume, 
as such, the form of Adjectives. And 
thus it is we say, the Pompeian party, 
the Ciceronian stile, and the Socfatic 
philosophy. It is in like manner for a 
trumpet of Brass, we say, a brazen 
Trumpet; for a Crown of Gold, & golden 
Crown, &c. Even Pronominal Substan- 
tives admit the like mutation. Thus, 
instead of saying, the Book of Me, of 
Thee, and of Him, we say, My Book, 
Thy Book, and His Book ; instead of 
saying the Country of I h, of You, and 
of Them, we say Our Country, Your 
Country, and Their Country, which 
Words may be called so many Prono- 
minal Adjectives. 

h 



190 HERMES 

Ch. x. It has been observed already, and 
must needs be obvious to all, that Ad- 
jectives, as marking Attributes, can have 
no sexto. And yet their having termi- 
nations conformable to the sex, num- 
ber, and case of their Substantive, seems 
to have led grammarians into that 
strange absurdity of ranging them with 
Nouns, and separating them from Verbs, 
tho' with respect to these they are per- 
fectly homogeneous ; with respect to 
the others, quite contrary. They are 
homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as 
both sorts denote Attributes ; they are 
heterogeneous with respect to Nouns, 
as never properly denoting Substances. — • 
But of this we have spoken before^. 

The Attributives hitherto treated, 
that is to say, Verbs, Participles, 

and 



(«0 Sap. p. 171. 

m Sup. C. VI. Note (a). See also C. III. p. 28, fcc. 



Book the First. 191 

andADjECTi.v£s 5 maybecalledATTRi- Ch.X. 

BUTIVES OF ME FIRST ORDER. The 

reason of this name will be better un- 
derstood, when we have more fully dis- 
cussed Attributives of the se- 
cond Order, to which we now pro- 
ceed in the following chapter. 



CHAP. 



192 HERMES. 

CHAP. XL 

Concerning Attributives of the second 
Order. 

Ch. XT. j^Lg ^ e Attributives hitherto mention- 
ed denote the Attributes of Substances, 
so there is an inferior class of them, 
which denote the Attributes only of At- 
tributes. 

To explain by examples in either 
kind — when we say, Cicero and Pliny 
were both of them eloquent ; Statius and 
Virgil both of them wrote ; in these in- 
stances the Attributives eloquent, and 
wrote, are immediately referable to the 
substantives, Cicero, Virgil, Sec. As there- 
fore denoting the Attributes of 
Substances, we call them Attri- 
butives OF THE FIRST ORDER. But 
when we say Pliny was moderately elo- 
quent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ; 
Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil 

wrote. 



Book the First. ,193 

wrote admirably ; in these instances, the ch - v v 
Attributives, Moderately, Eiceedingly, 
Indifferently, Admirably, are not refer- 
able to Substantives, but to other Attribu- 
tives, that is, to the words, Eloquent and 
Wrote. As therefore denoting Attributes 
of Attributes, we call them Attribu- 
tives OF THE SECOND ORDER. 

Grammarians have given them the 
Name of E^ppvj^Toi, Adverbia, Ad- 
verbs. And indeed if we take the 
word T^, or Verb, in its most compre- 
hensive Signification, as including not 
only Verbs properly so called, but also 
Participles and Adjectives [an usage, 
which may bejustihed by the best autho- 
rities^] we shall find the name, EWppii- 



( a >* Thus Aristotle in his Treatise de Interpretations, 

instances ''AtOguiros as a Noun, and AiZkos as a Verb So 
AmmOiiius — y.arx tSto to cw(A.xivoiJ.tvov. to fxh KAA02?£ 
A1RAIOI xj oca To/ayra-'PHMATA hiytaQat >cj ex ONO- 
Mata. According to this Signification (that is ol de- 
notiyg the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate 
O iu 



194 HER M E S. 

Ch. XI. {x^ 5 or Adverb, to be a very just ap- 
pellation, as denoting a Part oe 
Speech, the natural Appendage 
of Verbs. So great is this dependence 
in Grammatical Syntax, that an Ad- 
verb can no more subsist without its 
Verb, than a Verb can subsist without 
its Substantive. It is the same here, as 
in certain natural Subjects. Every Co- 
lour for its existence as much requires 
a Superficies, as the Superficies for its 
existence requires a solid Bod}^). 

Among 



in Propositions) the words. Fair, Just, and the like, are 
called Verbs, and not Nouns. Am. in llbr. dc Intern, 
p. 37. b. Arist de Interp. L. I. c. 1. See also of this 
Jreatise, c. 6. Note (a) p. 87. 

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the Partici- 
ple. Nam Participium connumer antes Verbis, Parti- 
cipiale Verbum vocabant vel Casuale. Priscian, L. I. 
p. 574. 

(*) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the same 
Genus zcith the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) 
and of explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective; 
(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is 

conformable 



Book the First. 195 

Among the Attributes of Substance Cll - XT - 
are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. 
Thus we say, a white Garment, a high 
Mountain. Now some of these Quan- 
tities and Qualities are capable of In- 
tension, and Remission. Thus we say, 
a Garment exceedingly white; a 
Mountain tolerably high, or mode- 
rately high. It is plain therefore 
O 2 that 



conformable to the best authorities. Theodore Ga-a 
defines an Adverb, as follows — p'sgos Aoy« ol'rflurov. xxtcL 

pv>(j.xTos XiyofjAvov, 7] l<7Titeyo(jt.svov prif^xn, Kj oiov ew/Setov piJ/A*- 

ras. A Part of Speech devoid of Cases, predicated of a 
Verb, or subjoined to if, and being as it were the Verb's 
Adjective. L. IV. (where by the way we may observe, 
how properly the Adverb is made an Aptote, since its 
principal sometimes has cases, as in Valde Sapiens; 
sometimes has none, as in Valde amat.) Priscian's de- 
finition of an Adverb is as follows — Adverbium est pars 
orationis indeclinabilis, ci/jus significatio Verbis adjicitur. 
Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjecti- 
va nomina appellativis nominibus adjunct a ; at prudens 
homo ; prudenter egit ; felix Vir ; feliciter vivit. L. XV. 
p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says — • 
Etiam Adverbia Nominibus vel Verbis connumerabant, 
cV </«««* adjlxtiva Verborum nominubant. L. I. p. 57-1. 
See also Apoll. dc Sjjnt. L. I. c. 3. subjin. 



196 



II eIme s. 



CIj. XI. that Intention and Remission are arnonsj 
the Attributes of such Attributes. — 
Hence then one copious Source of se- 
condary Attributives, Or Adverbs, to 
denote these two, that is, Intension and 
Remission, The Greeks have their Saw- 
\LotqSg ^xXiqct, ziccvv, W^a ; the Latins 
their valde, vehementer, maxime, satis, me- 
diocriter ; the English their greatly, vast- 
ly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, to- 
lerably, indifferently, &c. 

Farther than this, where there are 
different Intensions of the same Attri- 
bute, they may be compared together. 
Thus if the Garment A be exceeding- 
ly White, and the Garment B be mo- 
derately White, we may sajytfAe Gar- 
ment A is more white than the Gar- 
ment B. 

I \ these Instances the Adverb More 
not only denotes Intension, but relative 
Intension. Nay we stop not here. We 
not only denote Intension merely rela- 
tive 



Book the First/ 197 

tive but relative Intension, than which cl1 - x *« 
there is none greater. Thus we not only 
say the Mountain A is more high than the 
Mountain B, but that it is the most high 
of all Mountains. Even Verbs, properly 
so called, as they admit simple Intensions, 
so they admit also these comparative 
ones. Thus in the following Example 

Fame he loveth more than Riches, 

but Virtue of all things he loveth most 
— the Words more and most denote 
the different comparative Intensions of 
the Verbal Attributive, Loveth. 

And hence the rise of Comparison?, 
and of its different Degrees ; which can- 
not well be more, than the two Species 
above mentioned, one to denote Simple 
Excess, and one to denote Superlative. 
Were we indeed to introduce more de- 
grees than these, we ought perhaps to 
introduce infinite, which is absurd. For 
why stop at a limited Number, when in 
all subjects, susceptible of Intension, 
the intermediate Excesses are in a man- 
O 3 ner 




HERMES. 

ner infinite ? There are infinite De~ 
grees of more White, between the first 
Simple White, and the Superlative, 
Whitest ; the same may be said of more 
Great, more Strong, more Minute, $c. 
The Doctrine of Grammarians about 
three such Degrees, which they call the 
Positive, the Comparative, and the Su- 
perlative, must needs be absurd ; both 
because in their Positive there is -f- no 
Comparison at all, and because their 
Superlative is a Comparative, as much 
as their Comparative itself. Examples 
to evince this may be found every where. 
Socrates was the most wise of all the 
Athenians — Homer was the most sub- 
lime of all Poets. — 
« 

— Cadit et Ripheus Justissimus units 
Quifuit in Teucris — Virg. 



It 



+ Qui (scil. Gradus Positivus) quoniam perfectus est^ 
a qitibu&dam in numero Graduum non computatur . Con- 
sents Ars apud Putsch, p. 2022. 



Book the First. 199 

It must be confessed these Compa- Ch. XI. 
ratives, as well the simple, as the super- 
lative, seem sometimes to part with 
their relative Nature, and only retain 
their intensive. Thus in the Degree, 
denoting simple Excess, 

Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa ni- 

tentes. ^ r g- 

Rusticior^ra/o est — Hor. 

In the Superlative this is more usual. 
Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimus, a most 
learned Man, a most brave man, — that 
is to say, not the bravest and most learn- 
ed Man, that ever existed, but a Man 
possessing those Qualities in an eminent 
Degree. 

The Authors of Language have con- 
trived a method to retrench these Com- 
parative Adverbs, by expressing their 
force in the Primary Attributive. Thus 
instead of More fair, they say Fair EE ; 
instead of Most fair, Fairest, and tlic 
same holds true both In the Greek and 
O 4 Latin. 



200 HERME §. 

Ch. XL Latin. This Practice however has 
reached no farther than to Adjectives, 
or at least to Participles, sharing the na- 
ture of Adjectives. Verbs perhaps were 
thought too much diversified already, 
to admit more Variations without per- 
plexity 

As there are some Attributives, which 
admit of Comparison, so there are 
others, which admit of none. Such for 
example are those, which denote that 
Quality of Bodies arising from their Fi- 
gure ; as when we say, a Circular Table, 
a Quadrangular Court, a Conical Piece 
of Metal, <§c. The reason is, that ?L 
million of things, participating the same 
Figure, participate it equally, if they 
participate it at all. To say therefore 
that while A and B are both quadran- 
gular, A is more or less quadrangular 
than B, is absurd. The same holds 
true in all Attributives, denoting defi- 
nite Quantities, whether continuous or 
discrete, whether absolute or relative. — 

Thus 



Book the First. 201 

Thus the two-foot Rule A cannot be Ch. xr. 
more a two-foot Rule, than any other of ' w 
the same length. Twenty Lions cannot 
be more twenty than twenty Flies. If A 
and B be both triple or quadruple to C, 
they cannot be more triple, or more qua- 
druple, one than the other. The reason 
of all this is, there can be no Compa- 
rison without Intension and Remission ; 
there can be no Intension and Remis- 
sion in things always definite ; and such 
are the Attributives, which we have last 
mentioned. 

In the same reasoning we see the 
cause, why no Substantive is susceptible 
of these Comparative Degrees. A Moun^ 
tain cannot be said more to Be, or to 
Exist, than a Mole-hill, but the More 
and Less must be sought for in their 
Quantities. In like manner when we 
refer many Individuals to one Species, 
the Lion A cannot be called more a Lion, 
than the Lion B, but if more any thing, 
he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceed- 
ing 



202 HERMES. 

Ch. xi. j n g { n S ome such Attribute. So again, 
in referring many Species to one Genus, 
a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than 
a Lizard ; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, 
but if any thing, they are more bulky, 
more strong, Sec. the Excess, as before, 
being derived from their Attributes. — 
So true is that saying of the acute Sta- 
girite — thatSuBSTANCE is not susceptible 
of more and less^). But this by way 
of digression ; to return to the subject 
of Adverbs. 

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attri- 
butives already mentioned, these de- 
noting Intension or Remission may be 
called Adverbs of Quantity continuous ; 
Once, Twice, Thrice, are Adverbs of 
Quantity discrete ; More and Most, Less 

and 



( c ) hk a.v JthSe'^o/to ri hcfloc to /xaAAov >c to*jt7gv, CcttegOV* 

c. 5. See also Sanclius, L. I. c. II. L. II. c. 10, 

11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated in 
a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also 
Friscian, p. 598. Derivantw igitur Comparativa a No- 
minibus Adject ivis, &c. 



Book the First. 203 

and Least, to which may be added ch - XI. 
Equally, Proportionally, fyc. are Adverbs 
of Relation. There are others of Qua- 
lity, as when we say, Honestly indus- 
trious, Prudently brave, they fought 
bravely, he painted finely, a Portico 
formed Circularly, a Plain cut Tri- 
angularly, fyc. 

And here it is worth while to observe, 
how the same thing, participating the 
same Essence, assumes different gram- 
matical forms from its different rela- 
tions. For example, suppose it should 
be asked, how differ Honest, Honestly, 
and Honesty. The Answer is, they are 
in Essence the same, but they differ, in 
as much as Honest is the Attributive of 
a Substantive; Honestly, of a Verb; and 
Honesty, being divested of these its at- 
tributive Relations, assumes the Power 
of a Substantive, so as to stand by itself. 

The Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, 
are common to Verbs of every Species ; 

1 but 



204 HERMES. 

C h - XI but there are some which are peculiar 
to Verbs properly so called, the t is to say, 
to such as denote Motion or Energy, with 
their Privations. All Motion and Rest 
imply Time and Place, as a kind of 
necessary Coincidents. Hence then, if 
we would express the Place or Time of 
either, we must needs have recourse to 
the proper Adverbs ; of Place, as when 
we say, he stood there ; he went 
hence; h$ travelled far, fyc. : of Time, 
as when we say, he stood then; he 
went afterward; he travelled for- 
merly, SfC. Should it be asked 

why Adverbs of Time, when Verbs have 
Tenses ? The Answer is, tho' Tenses 
may be sufficient to denote the greater 
distinctions of Time, yet to denote them 
all by Tenses would be a perplexity 
without end. "What a variety of Forms, 
to denote Yesterday, To-day, To-morrow, 
Formerly, Lately, Just now, Now, Im- 
mediately, Presently, Soon, Hereafter, 
&c. ? It was this then that made the 

Tern- 



Book the First. 205 

Temporal Adverbs necessary, over and Ch. XU 
above the Tenses. 



To the Adverbs just mentioned may 
be added those, which denote the In- 
tensions and Remissions peculiar to Mo- 
tion, such as speedily, hast ily, swiftly, slow- 
ly, &c. as also Adverbs of Place, made 
out of Prepositions, such as &vw and k«to; 
from avx and k^, in English upward 
and downward, from up and down. In 
some instances the Preposition suffers 
no change, but becomes an Adverb by 
nothing more than its xVpplication, as 
when we say, circa equitat, he rides 
about; prope cecidit, he was near 
falling ; Verum ne post confer as culpam 
in me, But do not after lay the blame 
on meW, 

There 



(<*> Sosip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent Eun. 
Act II. Sc. 3. 



206 HERMES. 

Ch. XI. There are likewise Adverbs of Inter- 
rogation, such as Where, Whence, Whi- 
ther, How ; of which there is this re- 
markable, that when the} 7 lose their In- 
terrogative power, they assume that of 
a Relative, so as even to represent the 
Relative or Subjunctive Pronoun. Thus 
Ovid, 

Et Seges est, ubi Troja fuit — 

translated in our old English Ballad, 

And Corn doth grow where Troy 
town stood. 

That is to say, Seges est in eo loco, in 
quo, SfC. Corn groweth in that place, in 
which, §c. the power of the Relative, 
being implied in the Adverb. Thus Te^ 
rence, 

Ilujasmodi miki res semper comminiscere, 
Ubi me excarnufices — Heaut. IV. 6. 

where ubi relates to res, and stands for 

qidbus rebus. 

It 






Book the First. 207 

It is in like manner that the Relative Ch.xi. 
Tronoun upon occasion becomes an In- 
terrogative, at least in Latin and English. 
Thus Horace, 

Quem Virum aut Heroa lyra, vel acri 
Tibia sumes celebrare, Clio ? 

So Milton, 

\s no first seducd them to that foul re- 
volt ? 

The reason of all this is as follows, 
The Pronoun and Adverbs here men- 
tioned are all alike, in their original 
character, Relatives. Even when 
thej r become Interrogatives, they lose 
not this character, but are still Rela- 
tives, as much as ever. The difference 
is, that without an Interrogation, they 
have reference to a Subject, which is 
antecedent, definite, and known ; with an 
Interrogation, to a Subject which is 
subsequent, indefinite, and unhnozcn, and 

which 



208 HERME S. 

Ch. XI. which it is expected that the Answer 
should express and ascertain. 

Who first seducd them ? 



The very Question itself supposes a Se- 
ducer, to which, though unknown, the 
Pronoun, Who, has a reference. 

TK infernal Serpent - 

Here in the Answer we have the Subject, 
which was indefinite, ascertained ; so that 
the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) 
as much a Relative, as if it had been 
said originally, without any interroga- 
tion at all, It was the infernal Serpent, 
who first seduced them. 

And thus is it that Interrogatives 
and Relatives mutually pass into each 
other. 

And so much for Adverbs, peculiar 
to Verbs properly so called. We have 
already spoken of those, which are com- 
mon to all Attributives. We have like- 
wise 



Book the First. ♦ 209 

wise attempted to explain their general Cb. XI. 
Nature, which we have found to consist 
in being the Attributes of' Attributes. 
There remains only to add, that Ad- 
verbs may be derived from almost every 
Tart of Speech : from Prepositions, as 
when from After we derive Afterwards — 
from Participles, and through these 
from Verbs, as when from Know we de- 
rive Knowing, and thence Knowingly ; 
from Scio, Sciens, and thence Scienter — 
from Adjectives, as when from Vir- 
tuous and Vicious, we derive Virtuously 
and Viciously — from Substantives, as 
when from n/6vjx©^, an Ape, we derive 
IL6v|X£iov fiXiwew, to look Apishly ; from 
Aew t a Lion, AeovruSSg, Leoninely — nay 
even from Proper Names, as when 
from Socrates and Demosthenes, wo de- 
rive Somatically and Demosthenically. — 
It was Somatically reasoned, we say ; it 
was Demosthenically spoken* Of the 

same 



* Aristotle has Kwt^owixf* Gyclopically, from J^vkI.w^ 
Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X. <J. 

P 



[ 213 3 



HERMES 



OR 



A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 



CONCERNING 



UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK II. 



CHAP. I. 

Concerning Definitives. 

W HAT remains of our Work, is a ^ j 
matter of less difficulty, it being the s -^~- 
same here, as in some Historical Pic- 
ture ; when the principal Figures are 
once formed, it is an easy labour to de- 
sign the rest. 

P3 Df.- 




H E RMES, 

Definitives, the Subject of the pre- 
sent Chapter, are jcqnam'only called by 
Grammarians, Articles, Articuli, 
' 9/ A$fyx, They are of two kinds, either 
those properly and strictly so called, or 
else the Pronominal Articles, such as TIris, 
That, Any, &c. 

We shall first treat of those Articles 
more strictly so denominated, the reason 
and use of which may be explained, as 
follows. 

Th e visible and individual Substances 
of Nature are infinitely more numerous, 
than for each to admit of a particular 
Name. To supply this defect, when 
any Individual occurs, which either 
wants a proper Name, or whose ^proper 
Name is not known, we ascertain it, as 
well as we can, by ^ referring it to its 
Species ; or, if the Species be unknown, 
then at least to some Genus. For ex- 
ample—a certain Object occurs, with a 

head 



Book the Second. 

head and limbs, and appearing to pos- 
sess the powers of Self-motion and Sen- 
sation. If we know it not as an Indi- 
vidual, we refer it to its proper Species, 
and call it Dog, or Horse, or Lion, or 
the like. If none of these Names fit* 
we go to the Genus, and call it, Ani- 
mal. 

But this is not enough. The Thing, 
at which we are looking, is neither a 
Species, nor a Genus. What is it 
then ? An Individual. — Of what kind ? 
Known, or unknown ? Seen now for the 
first time, or seen before, and now re- 
membered ? It is here we shall discover 
the use of the two Articles (A) and 
(The); (A) respects our primary Per- 
ception, and denotes Individuals as ?m- 
known; (The) respects our secondary 
Perception, and denotes Individuals as 
known. To explain by an example — 
I see an object pass by, which I never 
saw till now. What do I say ? — There 
P 4 goes 




\ 




HERMES. 

goes a Beggar with a long Beard. The 
Man departs, and returns a Week after. 
What do I say then ? — There goes the 
Beggar with the long Beard. The Ar- 
ticle only is changed, the rest remains 
unaltered. 

Yet mark the force of this apparently 
minute Change. The Individual, once 
vague i is now recognized as something 
known, and that merely by the efficacy 
of this latter Article, which tacitly in- 
sinuates a kind of previous acquaint- 
ance, by referring the present Percep- 
tion to a like Perception already past>) 

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and 
(The) are both of them definitives, as 
they circumscribe the latitude of Gene- 
ra and Species, by reducing them for the 

most 



W See B. 1. c. 5. p. 63, 64. 



Book the Second. 

most part to denote Individuals. The 
difference however between them is this ; 
the Article (A) leaves the Individual it- 
self unascertained, whereas the Article 
(The) ascertains the Individual also, and 
is for that reason the more accurate De- 
finitive of the two. 

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect 
manner, in which the Article (A) de- 
fines, that the Greeks have no Article 
correspondent to it, but supply its place, 
by a negation of their Article, c O. f o 
ivbqwT:®* enetrev, The man fell — £v- 
fyo*®* tnetrev, A Man fell without any 
thing prefixed, but only the Article with- 
drawn.^) Even in English, where the 

Article 




) T« yag dogirudws -exo'te vou/jcmx, v T« de 0£8 zjx^dBtffts 
vjro o ?l( T(j.lv t« Tr^oa-uTra dyst. Those things, which are at 
limes understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article 
makes to be definite as to- their Person. Apoll. L. IV. 
c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. zjom(rl 
"AeOeov sc.) y dvotvoXno-tv zreoiyvwo-fAtv* t£ ev r* cWTa^tr o*ov i' 
2 



Mw 



218 HERMES 

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be used, as in plu- 
rals, its force is exprest by the same Ne- 
gation. Those are the Men, means those 
are Individuals, of which we possess 
some previous Knowledge. Those are 
Men, the Article apart, means no more 
than that they are so many vague and 
uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, 
A Man, in the singular, implies one of 
the same number. 

Bur 



p.h Xeyot rts, AN0PfiriO2 HKE, ol^Xov rivx ayQgwjrov Ai- 
ytt. h ^f O AN0POnO^, o5jAo», 'CT£OE'yvwcr//.£>ov yocq nvoc. 
Ky&gwjrov hiysi. Taro $1 atvro fisXavrtxt yij ot ipaantovTes r 
agQgov <mfJiocvTiAQ¥ tzguTrts yvwazus -^ <$sVTiga:s< The Article 

causes a Reviezc within the Mind of something known be- 
fore the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says 
*Ai/0£&/7r®- 9x4 Man came (which is the same? as zchcn zee 
fay in English a man came) it is not evident, of whom he 
speaks. Bui if he says o JivQewn®* ^xe, The man came, 
then it is evident ; fir he speaks of some Person known be- 
fore. And this is what those mean zcho say that the Ar- 
ticle is expressive ifttw First and Second Knowledge toge- 
ther. Theoil. Gazae. L. IV. 



Book the Second. 

But tho' the Greeks have no Article 
correspondent to the Article (A,) yet 
nothing can be more nearly related, than 
their '0, to the Article The. 'o fixa-iXatg, 
The King; TO ^o v , The Gift, $c. 
Nor is this only to be proved by parallel 
examples, but by the Attributes of the 
Greek Article, as they are described by 
Apollonius, one of the earliest and most 
acute of the old Grammarians, now re- 
maining. 

'Eov 8i/ xxbo x.xi ev xWoig x7:e(pyvx[LE$x' 9 

ISlGV hfi^WV V[ XVxCpGqX, VJ iqi rnqOKXTeiXey- 

ij.£v8 'rnqoToonw ^xqxqxTiy^. — Now the pecu- 
liar Attribute of the Article, as we have 
shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which 
implies some certain Person already men- 
tioned. Again — 'Ou yxq h^ye vx lvo\kxvx 
e£ iviwv ava$oqxv Tsxqiqv^div, el ^juvj (Tv^nx- 
qxXxtviev to ifiqov, 8 i^xiqevog Iqiv vj xvx(po- 
qx. For Nouns of themselves imply not 
Reference, unless they take to them the Ar- 
ticle, 





HER M E S. 

tick, whose peculiar Character is Refc- 
fence. Again — To xqbqov nqovQaqacxv yua~ 
ffiv SyXoi — The Article indicates a pre-esta- 
blished acquaintance/*) 

His reasoning upon Proper Names is 
worth remarking. Proper Names (he 
tells us) often fall into Homonymie^ that 
is, different Persons often go by the same 
Name. To solve this ambiguity, we 
have recourse to Adjectives or Epithets. 
For example — there were two Grecian 
chiefs, who bore the name of Ajax. It 
was not therefore without reason, that 
Menestheas uses Epithets, when this 
intent was to distinguish the one of them 
from the other. 

*AXXa 



to Apoll. de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of Re- 
ference is as follows — 'l^iuyix a.vx<pogais 'CT^oxATE/Xey/xiwt 
zTgocrwrnt (Ssvriga. yvuas, The peculiar character of Refe- 
rence is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person 
(thready mentioned, L. II. c. 3. 



Book the Second. 221 

'AAA* Tseq o7®* Um T*\*\kovi®" cc\hi\l©» Ch.I. 
Aictg. Horn. * f?" 

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, 

at least alont 

Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come. 

Apollonius proceeds Even Epi- 
thets themselves are diffused thro' vari- 
ous Subjects, 'in as much as the same 
Adjective may be referred to many 
Substantives* 



In order therefore to render both 
Parts of Speech equally definite, that 
is to say the Adjective as well as the 
Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes 
an Article before it, that it may indicate 
a Reference to some single Person only, 
[LovaSiKvi ZvoiCpoqx, according to the Au- 
thor's own Phrase. And thus it is we 
say, TfiCpm o Yqawcnixoq, Trypho THE 
Grammarian; AtoAAo^j©^ b Ku^va?©^, 
Apollodorus the Cyrenean, &c. The 

Author's 



222 HERMES. 

Ch - T ' Author's Conclusion of this Section is 
worth remarking. Aeovtuq ho& kxH wr a. 

TO TOLSTOI/ V\ ?iJQ6(r&a<Tl!g IqL TH CCQ&q'S, <TVVL()Lci£8- 

crx to aKL&eTLKbv tw Kvpiip ovo^oltl — It is with 
reason therefore that the Article is here 
also added, as it brings the Adjective to 
an Individuality, as precise, as the proper 

Namc.W - 

We may carry this reasoning farther, 
and shew, how by help of the Article 
even common Appellatives, com§ to have 
the force of proper Names, and that unas- 
sisted by epithets of any kinds. Among 
the Athenians UXoTou meant Ship ; f Evc^x*, 
Eleven ; and ''Avflf aw©^ Man. Yet add 
but the Article, and To n\o7ov,THE Ship, 
meant that particular Ship, which they 
sent annually to Delos ; 'Ol^EvSehx, the 
eleven meant ceftain Officers of Jus- 
tice ; and'o^Av&pcoK©^, the man, meant 
their public Executioner. So in Englishy 

City, 



W See Apoli. L. L c. 12. where by mistake Menclaus 
is put for Metwstheus. 



Boojc the Second. 22& 

City; is a Name common to many places ; Ch. I. 
and Speaker, a Name common to many 
Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, t h e 
City; means our Metropolis: and the 
Speaker, a high Officer in the British 
Parliament. 

And thus it is by an easy transition, 
that the Article, from denoting liefer 
rence, comes to denote Eminence also ; 
that is to say, from implying an ordinary 
pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of n 
general and universal Notoriety. Thus 
among the Greeks r oTloLV]T^g, the poet, 
meant Homer ( &; and'o H?xy£i()fcv,g 9 the 
stagirite, meant Aristotle; not that 

there 



W There are so few exceptions to this Observation, 
that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet 
Aristotle twice denotes Euripirfc s by the Phrase o -no^lr^, 
once at the end of the seventh Book of his Nicomachian 
Ethics, and again in his Physics, L. IT. 2. Pluto also in 
his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit. Scrr.) (kmofwi 
Stesiod after the same maimer. 



VU HERMES 

. Cht *• , there were not many Poets, beside 
Homer; and many Stagirites, beside 
Aristotle ; but none equally illustrious 
for their Poetry and Philosophy. 

It is on a like principle that Aristotle 
tells us, it is by no means the same thing 
to assert — dvoci tv|V vj^ovvjv dya&bv, or, TO 
iyzbbv— that, Pleasure is a Good, or, 
The Good. The first only makes it a 
common Object of Desire, upon a level 
with many others, which daily raise 
our wishes ; the last supposes it that su- 
preme and sovereign Good, the ultimate 
Scope of all our Actions and Endea- 
vours//) 

But to pursue our Subject. It has. 
been said alread}' that the Article has 
no meaning, but when associated to 
some other word. — To what words then 
may it be associated ? — To such as re- 
quire 



<f) Anatyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40. 



Book the Second. 225 

quire defining, for it is by nature a De- Ch. I. 
jinitive.— And &7za£ Words are these ? — 
Not those which already are as definite, 
as may be. Nor yet those, which, being 
indefinite, cannot properly be made other- 
wise. It remains then they must be 
those, which though indefinite, are yet ca- 
pable, through the Article, of becoming 
definite, 

Upon these Principles we see the rea- 
son, why it is absurd to say, O ETQ, The 
I, or oet, The Thou, because nothing 
can make those Pronouns more definite^ 
than they are. Ud The same may be as- 
serted 



(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Defini- 
tion, to refuse eo-alescence with the Article. 'Ey.sTvo «» 
'Avrwvf/x/it, to /xET<i 7$il£,tujs y uvoctyogxs a.vTovofjLx^ofj.evov, ui « a-v- 
jffj to i'f 0f ov. That therefore is a Pronoun, which with 
Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and WITH 
which the Article doth not associate. L. If. c. 5. 
So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns — ndv% Ss—tt*. liritexotien 
*§9§ov. L. IV. Priscian says the same. Jure igitur 
ppud Grcccos prima ct sccunda persona pronominuw, qua 

Q riw 



226 HERME S. 

Ch. I. serted of Proper Names, and though the 
Greeks say o Sojx^'t^, vj H^v^TrTrvj, and the 
like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, 
unless perhaps it serve to distinguish 
Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say 
in Greek, 01 am<S>0TEP0I, or in English, 
The both, because these Words in 
their own nature are each of them pei% 
fectly defined, so that to define them 
farther would be quite superfluous. — . 
Thus, if it be said, I haroe read both 
Poets, this plainly indicates a definite 
fair, of whom some mention has been 
made already ; &vag l^vuvukv^, a known 
Duad, as Apollonius expresses himself,^) 
when he speaks of this Subject. On 
the contrary, if it be said, I have read 
Two Poets, this may mean any pair out 

of 



sine dubio demonstrative? sunt, articidis adjungi non pos- 
sunt ; ncctertia, quando demonstraiivaest. L. XII. p. 938. 
— In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true 
reason of this. Supra omnes alias partes orationis finjt 

PEllSONAS PrONOMEN.. 



(h) 



Apollon, L. I. c. 1(3. 



Book the Second. 

of all that ever existed. And hence this 
Numeral, being in this Sense indefinite 
(as indeed are all others, as well as it- 
self) is forced to assume the Article, 
whenever it would become definite.* 
And thus it is, The Two in English, 
and 01 ATO in Greek, mean nearly the 
same thing, as Both or AM$OTEPOl.-~ 
Hence also it is, that as Two, when 
taken alone, has reference to some 'pri- 
mary and indefinite Perception, while the 
Article, The, has reference to some se* 
condary and definite -f ; hence I say the 
Reason, why it is bad Greek to say ATO 
01 AN0PQIIOI, and bad English, to say 
Two the men. Such S}mtax is in 
fact a Blending of Incompatibles, that is 
Q2 to 



* This explains Senilis on the XII th /Eneid. v. 511. 
where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amboruw. In 
English or Greek the Article \voul4 have clone the busi- 
ness, for the Tzeo, or roh^voTv are equivalent to Both or 
a/y.<poic£wv, but not so DuoruM) because the Latins lui\e no 
Articles to prefix, 




+ Sup. p. 215,216. 



ns HERMES. 

Ch. I. to say of a defined Substantive with an 
undefined Attributive. On the contrary 
to say in Greek AM*OTEPOI 01 AN0PQIIOI, 
of in English, Both the Men, is good 
and allowable, because the Substantive 
cannot possibly be less apt, by being 
defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, 
which is defined as well as itself. So 
likewise, it is correct to say, 01 Axo 
AN0PQIIOI, The two Men, because 
here the Article, being placed in the 
beginning, extends its Power as well 
through Substantive as Attributive, 
and equally contributes to define them 
both. 

As some of the words above admit 
of no Article, because they are by Nature 
as definite as may be, so there are others, 
which admit it not, because they are not 
to be defined at all. Of this sort are all 
Interrogatives. If we question 
about Substances, we cannot say O TIE 
OTTOS, The who is this; but Ti£ 

OTTOS 



Book the Second. 229 

OTTOS, Who is this ?0>. The same Ch - L 
as to Qualities and both kinds of Quan- 
tity. We say without an Article, noios 
nosoi, IIHAIKOX:, in English, what sort 

OF, HOW MANTj HOW GREAT. The 

Reason is, that the Articles f and the, 
respect Beings, already known ; Interro- 
gatives respect Beings, about which we 
are ignorant ; for as to what we know, 
Interrogation is superfluous. 

In a word the natural Associators with 
Articles are all those common Appella- 
tives^ which denote the several Genera 
and Species of Beings. It is these, 
which, by assuming a different Article, 
serve either to explain an Individual 
upon its first being perceived, or else 
to indicate, upon its return, a Recogni- 
tion, or repeated Knowledge/*) 

Q 3 We 

(0 Apollonius calls TI2, IvxAiutsctov tin afBgw, a Part 
of Speech ?nost contrary , most averse to Articles, L. IV. 
C. J. 

fk) What is here said respects the tico Articles which 

we 



230 HERMES. 

Ch.I. We shall here subjoin a few In* 
stances of the Peculiar Power of Ar- 
ticles. 



Every Proposition consists of a Sub- 
ject, and a Predicate. In English these 
are distinguished by their Position, the 
Subject standing^V^, the Predicate last. 
Happiness is Pleasure — Here, Happiness 
is the Subject ; Pleasure, the Predicate. 
If we change their order, and say, Plea- 
sure is Happiness; then Pleasure be- 
comes the Subject, and Happiness the 
Predicate. In Greek these are distin- 
guished not by any Order of Position, 
but by help of the Article, which the 
Subject always assumes, and the Predi- 
cate in most instances (some few ex- 
cepted) rejects. Happiness is Pleasure — 
uhovvi vj hhxi\kovlx — Pleasureis Happiness — 
v> vihovvi hhxi\koyia — Fine things are difficult 
— %cc\anx vol kx\cc — Difficult things are fine 
—tx %x\zi:x nxXx. 

In 

we have in English, In Greek the Article does no more, 
than imply a Recognition. See before p. 216, 217, 218. 



Book the Second. 231 

In Greek it is worth attending, how ch - r « 
in the same Sentence, the same Article, 
by being prefixed to a different Word, 
quite changes the whole meaning. For 
example — O UtoXs^l®^ ^[xvajiccqx^crccg, 
£t*[xviQvj — Ptolemy, having presided over 
the Games, was publickly honoured. The 
Participle yvpvcurLaqxwag has here no 
other force, than to denote to us the Time, 
'when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after 
having presided over the Games. But 
if, instead of the Substantive, we join 
the Participle to the Article, and say, 
*Oyujjut/£<n«f%vjj«$ TiToXe^cii,®* 3 eTijjuvj^vj!, OUT 
meaning is then — The Ptolemy, who pre- 
sided over the Games, was honoured. The 
Participle in this case, being joined to 
the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not 
one Ptolemy but many, of which num- 
ber a particular one participated of 
honour.^ 

Q 4 lx 



co 



Apollon.L. Lc. 33, 34. 



232 HERME S. 

Cb. T. j N English likewise it deserves re- 
marking, how the Sense is changed by 
changing of the Articles^ tho' we leave 
every other Word of the Sentence un- 
touched. — And Nathan said unto David, 
Thou art the Man* In that single 
the, that diminutive Particle, all the 
force and efficacy of the Reason is con- 
tained. By that alone are the Premises 
applied, and so firmly fixed, as never 
to be shaken. It is possible this Asser- 
tion may appear at first somewhat 
strange ; but let him, who doubts it, 
only change the Article, and then see 
what will become of the Prophet and 
his reasoning. — And Nathan said unto 
David^nou art a Man. Might not 
the King well have demanded upon so 
impertinent a position. 

Non dices hodie, quorsum hate tarn pu- 
tida tendant ? 

But 



* ZT EI r O ANHP. Boco-iK B'. «p. #C. 



Bootf the Second. 233 

Bi;t enough of such Speculations. Ch. I. 
The only remark, which we shall make 
on them, is this ; that " minute Change 
" in Principles leads to mighty 
u Change in Effects ; so that well are 
" Principles intitled to our regard, 
u however in appearance they may be 
" trivial and low/' 

The Articles already mentioned 
are those strictly so called ; but besides 
these there are the Pronominal A re- 
ticles, such as, This, That, Any, Other, 
Some, All, No, or None, &c. Of these 
we have spoken already in our Chapter 
of Pronouns/'*) where we have shewn, 

when 



(*») See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been 
some view of words, like that here given, which induced 
Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue — Noster sermo Ar- 
iiculos nun dtsiderat ; ideoque in alias partes oratiunis spar- 
guntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaligcr. His de- 
claratis, satis constat Grcecorum Articulos nun neglectos a 
nobis, sed eorum usum supcrjluum. Nam ubi illiquid pne- 
tcribendum est, quod Grucci per articulum cjjiciunt (h.t*tv 

% i/.i,t) 

4 



234 HERMES. 

Ch. I. w hen they may be taken as Pronouns* 
and when as Articles* Yet in truth it 
must be confessed, if the Essence of an 
Article be to define and ascertain, they 
are much more properly Articles, than 
any thing else, and as such should be 
considered in Universal Grammar. — 
Thus when we say, this Picture I ap- 
prove, but that 1 dislike, what do we 
perform by the help of these Defini- 
tives, but bring down the common Ap- 
pellative to denote two Individuals^ 
the one as the more near, the other as 
the more distant ? So when we say, Some 
men are virtuous, but All men are mor^ 
tal, what is the natural Effect of this 
All and Some, but to define that Uni* 
versality, and Particularity, which would 

remain 

t> SaAoy) expletur a Latinis per Is aut Ille ; Is, aut, Hie 
servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui 
alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei 
memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut 
ad prcescribendam intclleciionem, qua' latius patere queat ; 
veluti cum dicimus, C. Caesar, Is qui postea dictator fuif* 
Nam aliifuere C. Cctsares. Sic Greece Kx7<jxg o avroxgx~ 
me- Dc Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131. 

4 



Book the Second. 

remain indefinite, were we to take them 
away ? The same is evident in such 
Sentences, as — Some substances have sen- 
sation; others want it — Chuse any way 
of acting, and some men will find fault L , 
&c. For here some, other, and any, 
serve all of them to define different Parts 
of a given Whole ; Some, to denote a 
definite Part ; Any, to denote an indefi^ 
nite; and Other, to denote the remain- 
ing Part, when a Part has been assumed 
already. Sometimes this last Word de- 
notes a large indefinite Portion, set in op- 
position to some single, definite, and re- 
maining Part, which receives from such 
Opposition no small degree of heighten- 
ing. Thus Virgil, 

Excudent alii spirantia mollius &ra\ 
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de mar- 
more vultus; 
Orabunt cansas melius, critique meatus 
Describent radio, ct surgentia sidera 

dice tit : 
Tu regere impcrio populos, Romaxk, 
7uemento, &c. /En. VI. 

Notu i \<; 





HERMES. 

Nothing can be stronger Or more 
sublime, than this Antithesis; one Act 
set as equal to many other Acts taken to- 
gether, and the Roman singly (for it is 
Tu Romane, not Vos Romani) to all other 
Men ; and yet this performed by so tri- 
vial a cause, as the just opposition of 
Alii to Tu. 

But here we conclude, and proceed 
to treat of Connectives, 



CHAP 



Book the Second. 237 

CHAP. II. 

Concerning Connectives, and first thosz 
called Conjunctions. 

Connectives are the subject of ch.n. 

what follows ; which, according as they s ~~v* 
connect either Sentences or Words, are 
called by the different Names of Con- 
junctions, or Prepositions. Of 
these Names, that of the ^reposition is 
taken from a mere accident, as it com- 
monly stands in connection before the 
Part, which it connects. The name of 
the Conjunction, as is evident, has refe- 
rence to its essential character. 

Of these two we shall consider the 
Conj unction first,because it connects, 
not Words, but Sentences. This is con- 
formable to the Analysis, with which we 
began this inquiry*, and which led 

us, 

* Sup. p. 11, 12. 




HERM E S. 

us, by parity of reason, to consider Sen- 
tences themselves before Words. Now 
the Definition of a Conjunction is as 
follows — a Part of Speech, void of Sig- 
nification itself but so formed as to help 
Signification, by making two or more sig- 
nificant Sentences to be one significant 
Sentence^, 

This 



(") Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunc- 
tion as connecting rather single Parts of Speech, than 
whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like 
with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, 
Case with Case, Sfe. This Sancliiis justly explodes. — ■ 
Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (nt 
imperiti docent) conjimgit, ipsa: enim partes inter se con* 
junguntur—sed conjunctio Orationcs infer se conjungit. — 
Miner. L. III. c. 1 4. He then establishes his doctrine by 
a variety of examples. He had already said as much, 
L. I. c 18. and in this he appears to have followed Sea- 
liger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunct 
tionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere ; 
neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsa: enim 
partes per se inter se conjunguntur) — scd conjunctio est, 
qua: conjutigit Orationcs plurcs. Pe Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 

165. 

This 



Book the Second. 239 

This therefore being the general Ch.H. 
Idea of Conjunctions, we deduce 
their Species in the following manner. 

Con-* 



This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius^ 
who in the several places, -where he mentions the Con- 
junction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting 
Sentences and not Words, though in his works now ex- 
tant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. 
p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234. 

But we have stronger authority than this to support 
Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's Definition, 
as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and 
Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is 
(pcuvrt avntAOS, Ik zjXsiovuv ia.Iv ipujvuv [aioLs, (r^y.avlix.uv c?e ; tsomv 
qjzfyvxvioc //./av (pojrnv arifxxvlimv. An articulate sound, devoid 
of Signification, which is so formed as to make one signi- 
ficant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds; 
tohich are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this 
view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed 
by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Syl- 
lables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more 
Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more sim- 
ple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is consider- 
ed as one, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected 
by the Conjunctions. For example, Id us take the Sen- 
tence, which follows. If Men arc by nature social, it it 

their 



240 H ERIE S. 

Ch.ll. Conjunctions, while they connect 
Sentences, either connect also their mean-* 
ings, or not. For example : let us take 

these 



their Interest to be just , though it were not so ordained by 
the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences, 
(1.) Men are by nature social. (2.) It is Man's Interest 
to be just. (3.) It is not ordained by the Laws of every 
Country that Man should be just. The first two of these 
Sentences are made One by the Conjunction, If ; these, 
One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, Tho' ; 
and the three, thus united, make that (puv* ^la. cr*j//.av];xw, 
that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle 
speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power, 

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he men- 
tions the same Subject, 'o y*% o-iv^eapos h izoiu to <&o\Xoc 
&>S-£ lav f|a^£0vj, <^Aov on Tevavr/ov 'ir*t to h -sjoXAa. The 
Conjunction makes many, one; so that if it be taken aza/y, 
it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many. 
Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance of a Sentence, divested of 
its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, 
vxBov, ivn{k<ra, Ih^w, veni, occurri, rogavi, where by the 
way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, 
(for 5)A0ov, avWw*, and Idewnv, are each of them, when 
unconnected, so many perfect Sentences) prove that 
these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunctions connec- 
tive faculty. 

Ammoniums 






Book the First. 209 

wise attempted to explain their general Ch. XL 
Nature, which we have found to consist 
in being the Attributes of Attributes. - 
There remains only to add, that Ad- 
verbs may be derived from almost every 
Part of Speech : from Prepositions, as 
when from. After we derive Afterwards — 
from Participles, and through these 
from Verbs, as when from Know we de- 
rive Knowing, and thence Knowingly ; 
from Scio, Sciens, and thence Scienter — 
from Adjectives, as when from Vir- 
tuous and Vicious, we derive Virtuously 
and Viciously — from Substantives, as 
when from n/Qvjx(§K an Ape, we derive 
Tlibweiov p\iw£iv,to look Ap is hly ; from 
AfW a Lion, AeovruSug, Leoninely — nay 
even from Proper,. Names, as when 
from Socrates and Demosthenes, we de- 
rive Somatically and Demosthenkally. — 
It was Somatically reasoned, we say ; it 
was Demosthenkally spoken* Of the 

same 



* Aristotle has KvxXoviiiZs Cyrfvpically, from KtfxX*4 
« Cyclops. Etfa. Nic. X. 9. 

P 



510 HER ME S. 

Cli.xi. $a,me sort are many others, cited by the 
old Grammarians, such as Catiliniter 
from Catilma, Sisenniter from Sisenna, 
Tiillianb from Tullius, &c.W 

Nor are they thus extensive only in 
Derivation, but in Signification also. 
Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs 
us//^ that Adverbs tiiay be found in 
every one of the Predicaments, and that 
the readiest way to reduce their Infini- 
tude, was to refer them by classes to 
those ten universal Genera. The Stoics 
too called the Adverb by the name of 
nav5ixTn£, and that from a view to the 
same multiform Nature. Omnia in se 
cctpit quasi collata per satiram, concessit 
sibi reriim varid potestate. It is thus 
that Sosipater explains the Word,^ from 

whose 



C See Prise. L. XV. p. 1022. Sot. Charts. 161. 
Edit. Putschii. 

(f) —ho S* k, apeim ?<rus lUx K, ru> imftwKTUf yU* 
Sso-Qat Ikuvx, ha-ixff «ro<o», xjocrot, XJgos ri, x. r. X. Gram. 
Introd. L. II. 

<W Sosip. Char. p. 175. Edit Putsch*. 



Book the First. 211 

whose authority we know it to be Ch.Xl. 
Stoical. But of this enough. 

And now having finished these prin- 
cipal Parts of Speech, the Substan- 
tive and the Attributive, which are 
significant when alone, we pro- 
ceed to those auxiliaryParts, which 
are only significant, when asso- ; 

ci at ed. But as these make the Sub- 
ject of a Book by themselves, we here 
conclude the first Book of this Treatise. 

P 2 HER- 



[- 213 ] 

HERMES 

OR 

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 

CONCERNING 

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK II. 

' ■ ■ "T r~ 

CHAP. I. 

Concerning Definitives. 

W HAT remains of our Work, is a q^ j 
matter of less difficulty, it being the s *n-*- 
same here, as in some Historical Pic- 
ture ; when the principal Figures are 
once formed, it is an easy labour to de- 
sign the rest. 

P3 JDe~ 




HERMES. 

Definitives, the Subject of the pre- 
sent Chapter, are commonly called by 
Grammarians, Articles, Articuli, 
y Affl?a. They are of two kinds, either 
those properly and strictly so called, or 
else the Pronominal Articles, such as This, 
That, Any, &c. 

We shall first treat of those Articles 
more strictly so denominated, the reason 
and use of which may be explained, as 
follows. 

Th e visible and individual Substances 
of Nature are infinitely more numerous, 
than for each to admit of a particular 
Name. To supply this defect, when 
any Individual occurs, which either 
wants a proper Name, or whose proper 
Name is not known, we ascertain it, as 
well as we can, by referring it to its 
Species ; or, if the Species be unknown, 
then at least to some Genus. For ex- 
ample — a certain Object occurs, with a 

head 



Book, the Second. 

head and limbs, and appearing to pos- 
sess the powers of Self-motion and Sen- 
sation. If we know it not as an Indi- 
vidual, Ave refer it to its proper Species, 
and call it Dog, of Horse, or Lion, or 
the like. If none of these Names fit, 
we go to the Genus, and call it, Ani- 
mal. 

But this is not enough. The Thing, 
at which we are looking, is neither a 
Species, nor a Genus. What is it 
then ? An Individual. — Of what kind ? 
Known, or unknown ? Seen now for the 
first time, or seen before, and now re- 
membered ? It is here we shall discover 
the use of the two Articles (A) q,nd 
(The). (A) respects our primary Per- 
ception, and denotes Individuals as un- 
known; (The) respects our secondary 
Perception, and denotes Individuals as 
known. To explain by an example — 
I see an object pass by, which I nev^r 
saw till now. What do i say ? — There 
P 4 goes 





HERMES. 

'goes -a Beggar with a long Beard. The 
Man departs, and returns a Week after. 
What do I say then ? — There goes the 
Beggar with the long Beard. The Ar- 
ticle only is changed, the rest remains 
unaltered. 

Yet mark the force of this apparently 
minute Change. The Individual, once 
vague, is now recognized as something 
known, and that merely by the efficacy 
of this latter Article, which tacitly in- 
sinuates a kind of previous acquaint- 
ance, by referring the present Percep- 
tion to a like Perception already past.^> 

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and 
(The) are both of them definitives, as 
they circumscribe the latitude of Gene- 
ra and Species, by reducing them for the 

most 



<«) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64. 



Book the Second. 

most part to denote Individuals. The 
difference however between them is this ; 
the Article (A) leaves the Individual it- 
self unascertained, w r hereas the Article 
(The) ascertains the Individual also, and 
is for that reason the more accurate De- 
finitive of the two. 

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect 
manner, in which the Article (A) de- 
fines, that the Greeks have no Article 
correspondent to it, but supply its place, 
by a negation of their Article, f o. f O 
&v&own@» eTetrev, The man fell — ccv- 
Q^7r©o tvscTEv, A Man fell without any 
thing prefixed, but only the Article with- 
drawn/*) Even in English, where the 

Article 




M o^<t(a.o)> t« it^ocutth oiyu. Those things, which are at 
times understood indefinitely, the addition of the Article 
makes to be definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. IV. 
c. 1. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. ^tTfri 

Atffi bc.) 5 avattroXrKrty vr^otyvu<T^ivh tS iv rn (nvrdi^tr otoi l 1 



118 HERMES 

Ch.I. Article (A) cannat be used, as in plu- 
rals, its force is exprest I y the same Ne- 
gation. These are th e Men> means those 
are Individuals, of which we possess 
some previous Knowledge. Those are 
Men, the Article apart, means no more 
than that they are so many vague and 
uncertain Individuals, just as the Phrase, 
A Man, in the singular, implies one of 
the same number. 

But 



pi* tiyot ris, ANOPnnOS HKE, oih^ov rUoc oleoma* Xs- 
ye/. h $e O AN®PnnOS, Syhov, ^osyvua-fAsvav yag Tittx. 
tlvQgwrrov Xiysi. T3<ro §e akiro @v\orrcu >£ o* QdiantovrES r 
k^qov crr,fji><zvTiY.QV xsgwitis yvutnws k, uevrigtzs. The Article 
causes a Review within the Mind of something known be* 
fore the texture of the Discourse. Thus if any one says 
w A*0f ftnsr©* m% Man came {which is the same, as when we 
say in English a man came") it is not :vident y of whom hg 
speaks. But if he says } cLv&fuw®' vas. The man came* 
then it is evident ; for he speaks of some Person known be* 
fore. And this is what those mean who say that the Ar* 
tide is expressive of the First and Second Knowledge toge- 
ther. Theod. Gazae. L. IV. 



Book the Second. 

But tho' the Greeks have no Article 
correspondent to the Article (A,) yet 
nothing can be more nearly related, than 
their '0, to the Article The. 'O fianXeigi 
The King; TO Sugov, The Gift, $c. 
Nor is this only to be proved by parallel 
examples, but by the Attributes of the 
Greek Article, as they are described by 
Apollonius, one of the earliest and most 
acute of the old Grammarians, now re- 
maining. 

'E^iv «V Kz$b noli Iv ctWotg une(pyvd[LeQay 

{jif vs -aqojw'xu TsxqxqxTi^i'i, — Now the pecu- 
liar Attribute of the Article, as we have 
shewn elsewhere, is that Reference, which 
implies some certain Person already men- 
tioned. Again — y 0v ycco hv\<ye ii qv6\loctol 
t% uvtSv ccvtz(po$xv rsoctfqvunv, el [xv| av^na- 
QotXatoiev to u$Qqqv, « ZZ&fyeTog Iqw vj av#(po- 
qoc. For Nouns of themselves imply not 
Reference, unless they take to them the Ar- 
ticle, 




220 HERME S. 

Ch.i. tick, whose peculiar Character is Refe- 
rence. Again — To czfioov nqovQeqSiray yva- 
ewfyXoi — The Article indicates a pre-esta- 
blished acquaintance/^ 

His reasoning upon Proper Names is 
worth remarking. Proper Names (he 
tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that 
is, different Persons often go by the same 
Name. To solve this ambiguity, we 
have recourse to Adjectives or Epithets. 
For example — there were two Grecian 
chiefs, who bore the name of A j ax* It 
was not therefore without reason, that 
Menestheus uses Epithets, when this 
intent was to distinguish the one of them 
from the other. 



W ApolL de Synt. L. I. e. 6, 7. His account of Re- 
ference is as follows — 'iS/w/xa attzQogois -STfoxaTE/Xey/Ai** 
zjgocruTrt: $Eurtgoc yvZ<ris, The peculiar character of Refe- 
rence is the second or repeated Knowledge of some Person 
already mentioned. L. II. c. 3. 



Book the Second. 221 

*A\Xa neg o7©*> iru Tek&pwi®* aXHiyJ&> Ch. L 
Klxg. Horn. «-^— * 

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, 

at least alone 

Z>et mighty Telamonian Ajax come. 

Apollonius proceeds — —Even Epi- 
thets themselves are diffused thro* vari- 
ous Subjects, in as much as the same 
Adjective may be referred to many 
Substantives. 



I isr order therefore to render both 
Parts of Speech equally definite, that 
is to say the Adjective as well as the 
Substantive, the Adjective itself assumes 
an Article before it, that it may indicate 
a Reference to some single Person only, 
\kovei$Mvi £vct§o%x y according to the Au- 
thor's own Phrase. And thus it is we 
sa y> T£>u(pa;v b r^x[L[LXTLabg, Trypho THE 
Grammarian; Awo\\6Sa%@» b Kv%v\vx7&> 9 
Apollodorus the Cyrenean, &c. The 

Author's 



222 HERMES. 

eh. I. Author's Conclusion of this Section is 
worth remarking, teowrug kqct aou hutx 
to T0t8T0v vj wq6ffba<rig Iqi t» kq&qu, <rvvL$td&- 

€CC TO £7ri^€TiX0V t£ KVQIQ 0VO[K,XTl It is wltll 

reason therefore that the Article is here 
also added, as it brings the Adjective to 
an Individuality, as precise, as the proper 

NmneS^ 

We may carry this reasoning farther, 
and shew, how by help of the Article 
even common Appellatives, come to have 
the force of proper Names,&nd that unas- 
sisted by epithets of any kinds. Among 
the Athenians UXoTou meant Ship ;'Ev8exa 9 
Eleven ; and "Ai/d^w©*, Man. Yet add 
but the Article, and To TlkoTov, the Ship., 
meant that particular Ship, which they 
sent annually to Delos ; 'Oi^Evhsnz, the 
eleven meant certain Officers of Jus- 
tice ; and r O''Avboccn©», the man, meant 
their public Executioner. So in English, 

City, 



( d > See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by mistakfe Mendaus 
is put for Metiestheus. 



Book the Second. 

City, is a Name common to many places ; 
and Speaker, a Name common to many 
Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, the 
City means our Metropolis ; and the 
Speaker, a high Officer in the British 
Parliament. 

And thus it is by an easy transition, 
that the Article, from denoting Jle/e- 
rence, comes to denote Eminence also ; 
that is to say, from implying an ordinary 
pre-acquaintance, to presume a kind of 
general and universal Notoriety. Thus 
among the Greeks f ono^T^, the poet, 
meant H omer^; and f O ZTccye^li^g, the 
stagirite, meant Aristotle; not that 

there 



<*) There arc so few exceptions to this Observation, 
that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet 
Aristotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrase o votjlvs, 
once at the end of the seventh Book of his Nicomachian 
Ethics, and again in his Physics, L. II. 2. Plato also in 
bis tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit. Scrr.) denote 
Hesiod after the same manner. 




224 HERMES 

L Ch * L , there were not many Poets, beside 
Homer; and many Stagirites, beside 
Aristotle ; but none equally illustrious 
t for their Poetry and Philosophy. 

It is on a like principle that Aristotle 
tells us, it is by no means the same thing 
to assert — dvoci tv\v v^ovvjv dya&ov, or, TO 
uyecbov — that, Pleasure is a Good, or, 
The Good. The first only makes it a 
common Object of Desire, upon a level 
with many others, which daily raise 
our wishes ; the last supposes it that su- 
preme and sovereign Good, the ultimate 
Scope of all our Actions and Endea- 
vours. CO 

But to pursue our Subject. It has 
been said already that the Article has 
no meaning, but when associated to 
some other word. — To what words then 
may it be associated ? — To such as re- 
quire 



(/) 



Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40. 



Book the Second. 

quire defining, for it is by nature a De- 
Jinitive. — And za hat Words are these ?< — 
Not those which already are as definite, 
as may be. Nor yet those, which, being 
indefinite, cannot properly be made other- 
wise. It remains then they must be 
those, which though indefinite, are yet ca- 
pable, through the Article, of becoming 
definite, 

Upox these Principles we see the rea- 
son, why it is absurd to say, O Era, The 
I, or OUT, The Thou, because nothing 
can make those Pronouns more definite^ 
than they are. te) The same may be as>- 

serted 



(g) Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Defini- 
tion, to refuse eo-alescence with the Article. 'Ex^vo «y 

''AvruJvviAtx, to lAtra, ^bi^buis rt cttxtyo^cis uvrovofAx^i/xevov, Z « av- 

v£r< to oL%Q%ov. That therefore is a Pronoun, which zcith 
Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and w mi 
which the Article doth not associ ite. I,. II. c. 5. 
So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns — riav'i* $1— ts* liuoix *!*' 
ii^ov. L. IV. Priscian says the same. Jure igUut 
apud Grwcos prima ct sccunda persona pronominuin, </utc 

Q 




226 HERMES. 

Ch. I. serted of Proper Names, and though the 
Greeks say o s^k^t^^, vj Eccvbinny, and the 
like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, 
unless perhaps it serve to distinguish 
Sexes. By the same rule we cannot say 
in Greek, 01 AMSOTEPOI, or in English* 
The both, because these Words in 
their own nature are each of them per- 
fectly defined, so that to define them 
farther would be quite superfluous.— 
Thus, if it be said, I have read both 
Poets, this plainly indicates a definite 
pair, of whom some mention has been 
made already; Av#s iyvaxr^iuvij & known 
JDuad, as Apollonius expresses himself,^) 
when he speaks of this Subject. On 
the contrary, if it be said, I have read 
Two Poets, this may mean any pair out 

of 



sine dubio demonstratives sunt, articulis adjungi non pos- 
sunf ; nee tertia, quando demonstrativa est. L. XII. p. 938. 
— In the beginning of the same Book, he gives the true 
reason of this. Supra ornnes alias partes orationis finit 

PERSONAS PRONOMEN. 



») Jpollon. L. I. c. 16. 



Book the Second. 

of all that ever existed. And hence this 
Numeral, being in this Sense indefinite 
(as indeed are all others, as well as it- 
self) is forced to assume the Article, 
whenever it would become definite* 
And thus it is, The Two in English, 
and oi ATO in Greek, mean nearly the 
same thing, as Both or AM$OTEPQi. — 
Hence also it is, that as Two, when 
taken alone, has reference to some pri- 
mary and indefinite Perception, while the 
Article, The, has reference to some se* 
condary and definite^ ; hence I say the 
Reason, why it is bad Greek to say ATO 
01 ANOPQnoi, and bad English, to say 
Two the men. Such Syntax is in 
fact a Blending of Incompatibles, that is 
Q2 * to 



* This explains Senilis on the XII th yEncid. v. 511. 
where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. la 
English or Greek the Article would have done the busi- 
ness, for the Two, or tqTvovoTv are equivalent to Both or 
«e/x<polf=£&/v, but not so DuoMin^ because the Latins have no 
Articles to prefix. 




+ Sup. p. 215,216. 



228 HERMES. 

ch - J - to say of a defined Substantive with an 
undefined Attributive. On the contrary 
$> say in Greek AM$OTEPOI 01 AN0PQIIOI, 
or in English, Both the Men, is good 
and allowable, because the Substantive 
cannot possibly be less apt, by being 
defined, to coalesce with an Attributive, 
which is defined as well as itself. So 
likewise, it is correct to say, oi ATO 
AN0PQIIOI, The two Men, because 
here the Article, being placed in tho 
beginning, extends its Tower as well 
through Substantive as Attributive, 
and equally contributes to define them 
■ both. 

As some of the words above admit 
of no Article, because they are by Nature 
as definite as may be, so there are others^ 
which admit it not, because they are not 
to be defined at all. Of this sort are all 
Interrogatives. If we question 
about Substances, we cannot say O TIE 
ottos, The who is this; but tie 

otto^ 



Book the Second. 229 

OTTOS, Who is this ?W. The same ch - t 
as to Qualities and both kinds of Quan- 
tity. We say without an Article, noiOE 
riOEOI, riHAIKOS, in English, what sort 

OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The 

Reason is, that the Articles f O and the, 
respect Beings, already known ; Interro- 
gates respect Beings, about which we 
are ignorant ; for as to what we know, 
Interrogation is superfluous^ 

In a word the natural Associat or s with 
Articles are all those common Appella- 
tives, which denote the several Genera 
and Species of Beings. It is these, 
which, by assuming a different Article, 
serve either to explain an Individual 
upon its first being perceived, or else 
to indicate, upon its return, a Recogni- 
tion, or repeated Knowledge/*) 

Q 3 We 

W Apollonius calls TI2, tvavltunxrov rZv agOfuv, a Part 
of Speech most contrary ^ most averse to Articles^ L. IV. 
c. j. 

f*) What is here said respects the txo Articles which 



<230 HERMES. 

Ch.I. We shall here subjoin a few In- 
stances of the Peculiar Power of Ar- 
ticles. 



Every Proposition consists of a Sub* 
ject, and a Predicate. In English these 
are distinguished by their Position, the 
Subject standing first, the Predicate last. 
Happiness is Pleasure — Here, Happiness 
is the Subject ; Pleasure, the Predicate. 
If. we change their order, and say, Plea- 
sure is Happiness ; then Pleasure be- 
comes the Subject, and Happiness the 
Predicate. In Greek these are distin- 
guished not by any Order or Position, 
but by help of the Article, which the 
Subject always assumes, and the Predi- 
cate in most instances (some few ex- 
cepted) rejects. Happiness is Pleasure — ' 
uSovv\ vj ivSaiibovia — Pleasure is Happiness — 
if vj^ovvj ev8<u[i,ouict — Fine things are difficult 
— %aXzitcc tcc KocXct. — Difficult things are fine 
—vol %ct\ewci y.ct\d. 

In 

we have in English. In Greek the Article does no more, 
than imply a Recognition, See before p. 216, 217, 218. 






Book the Second. 

In Greek it is worth attending, how 
in the same Sentence, the same Article, 
by being prefixed to a different Word, 
quite changes the whole meaning. For 
example — O UtoXs [x£i©-> yv\Lvcc<riaLq%v[<rxc 9 
€tajjlvi6vj — Ptolemy, having presided over 
the Games, was publickly honoured. The 
Participle yvy<vx<jixqxw&s has here no 
other force, than to denote to ns the Time, 
when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after 
having presided over the Games. But 
if, instead of the Substantive, we join 
the Participle to the Article, and say, 
*0<yv\kvaTiz%%^JXQ Y17o\£\lcci®^ e<ri\Lv\bv\, our 
meaning is then — The Ptolemy, who pre- 
sided over the Games, was honoured. The 
Participle in this case, being joined to 
the Article, tends tacitly to indicate not 
one Ptolemy but many, of which num- 
ber a particular one participated of 
honour.^ 

Q 4 In 




/; 



Jpollotu L. I. c. 33, 34. 



232 HER M E S, 

Ch. I. I N E?iglish likewise it deserves re- 
markings how the Sense is changed by 
changing of the Articles, tho' we leave 
every other Word of the Sentence un- 
touched. — And Nathan said unto David, 
Thou art the Man.* Inthatsingle 
the, that diminutive Particle, all the 
force and efficacy of the Reason is con- 
tained. By that alone are the Premises 
applied, and so firmly fixed, as never 
to be shaken. It is possible this Asser- 
tion may appear at first somewhat 
strange ; but let him, who doubts it, 
only change the Article, and then see 
what will become of the Prophet and 
his reasoning. — And Nathan said unto 
David,Tiiou art a Man. Might not 
the King well have demanded upon so 
impertinent a position. 

Non dices hodie, quorsum h&c tarn pu- 
tida tendant ? 

But 



* 2T EI e O ANHP. B«<r<A. B'. xtp. iQ\ 



Book the Second. 233 

But enough of such Speculations. ch - T * 
The only remark, which we shall make 
on them, is this ; that " minute Change 
" in Principles leads to mighty 
" Change in Effects ; so that well are 
" Principles intitled to our regard, 
" however in appearance they may be 
" trivial and low/' 

The Articles already mentioned 
are those strictly so called ; but besides 
these there are the Pronominal Ar- 
ticles, such as, This, That, Any, Other, 
Some, All, No, or None, Sec. Of these 
we have spoken already in our Chapter 
of Pronouns/"') where we have shewn, 

when 



< m ) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been 
iomc view of words, like that here given, which induced 
Quintilian to say of the Latin Tongue — Noster sernw Ar~ 
ticulosnon desidvrat ; ideogue in alias parte* orationis spar- 
guntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His de~ 
daratis, satis constat Grcccorum Artiados non neglectot a 
nobis^ scd eorumusum supojluum. Nam ubi aliquid prce- 
saiOendum est, quod Gncci per artkalum ejjiciuiit (titftf 
i • - 



234 HERME S. 

Ch. I. when they may be taken as Pronouns, 
and when as Articles, Yet in truth it 
must be confessed, if the Essence of an 
Article be to define and ascertain, they 
are much more properly Articles, than 
any thing else, and as such should be 
considered in Universal Grammar.— 
Thus when we say, this Picture I ap- 
prove, but that J dislike, what do we 
perform by the help of these Defini- 
tives, but bring down the common Ap- 
pellative to denote two Individuals, 
the one as the more near, the other as 
the more distant ? So when we say, Some 
men are virtuous, but AlL men are mor~ 
tal, what is the natural Effect of this 
All and Some, but to define that TJni-> 
versality, and Particularity, which would 

remain 



© lu\os) expletur a Latinis per Is aut Ille ; Is, aut, Ille 
servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui 
alio quo pacto notus sit. Additur enim Artiadus ad rei 
memoriam renovahdam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut 
ad prcescribendam intellectionem, quae latius patere queat ; 
veluti cum dicimus, C. Caesar, Is qui postea dictator fuit. 
Nam aliifuere C Cccsares. Sic Grajch K»7a-a§ o avroxfi* 
t&>£. De Caus, Ling. Lat. c. 131. 

4 



Book the Second. 235 

remain indefinite, were we to take them Ch, L 
away ? The same is evident in such 
Sentences, as— Some substances have sen- 
sation; others wantit—Chuse any zcay 
of acting, and some men will find faulty 
&c. For here some, other, and any, 
serve all of them to define different Parts 
of a given Whole ; Some, to denote a 
definite Part ; Any, to denote an indefi- 
nite ; and Other, to denote the remain- 
ing Part, when a Part has been assumed 
already. Sometimes this last Word de- 
notes a large indefinite Portion, set in op- 
position to some single, definite, and re~ 
maining Part, which receives from such 
Opposition no small degree of heighten- 
ing. Thus Virgil, 

Excudent alii spirantia mollius cera; 

(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de mar- 
more vultus; 

Orabunt causas melius, ccelique meatus 

Describent radio, et surgentia sidera 
decent : 

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, 
memento, &c. ZEn. VI. 

Not u \ \r. 




HERMES. 

Nothing can be stronger or more 
sublime, than this Antithesis ; one Act 
set as equal to many other Acts taken to- 
gether, and the Roman singly (for it is 
Tu Romane, not Vos Komatii) to all other 
Men ;" and yet this performed by so tri- 
vial a cause, as the just opposition of 
Alii to Tu. 

But here we conclude, and proceed 
to treat of Connectives. 



CHAP 



Book the Second, 237 

CHAR II. 

Concerning Connectives, and first those 
called Conjunctions. 

Connectives are the subject of C h. n. 

what follows ; which, according as they ^^ 
connect either Sentences or Words, are 
called by the different Names of Con- 
junctions, or Prepositions. Of 
these Names, that of the Preposition is 
taken from a mere accident, as it com- 
monly stands in connection before the 
Part, which it connects. The name of 
the Conjunction, as is evident, has refe- 
rence to its essential character, 

Of these two we shall consider the 
Con j unction first,because it connects, 
not Words, but Sentences. This is con- 
formable to the Analysis, with which we 
began this inquiry*, and which led 

us, 

* Sup. p. 11, 13. 




HERMES. 

us, by parity of reason, to consider Sen* 
fences themselves before Words, Now 
the Definition of a Conjunction is as 
follows — -a Part of Speech, void of Sig- 
nification itself but so formed as to help 
Signification, by making two or more sig^ 
nificant Sentences to be one significant 
Sentenced. 

This 



(") Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunct 
tion as connecting rather single Parts of Speech, than 
whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like 
with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, 
Case with Case, Sfc. This SanSlius justly explodes. — t. 
Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut 
imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsa enim partes inter se con* 
junguntur — sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit, — 
Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by 
a variety of examples. He had already said as much, 
L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed Sea- 
liger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunc- 
tions autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodiderc ; 
neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsa enim 
partes per se inter se conjunguntur) — sed conjunctio est, 
qua conjungit Orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 

165. 

This 



Book the Second. 239 

This therefore being the general €h.H. 
Idea of Conjunctions, we deduce 
their Species in the following manner. 

CojSf- 



This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, 
who in the several places, -where he mentions the Con- 
junction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting 
Sentences and not Words, though in his works now ex- 
tant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. . 
p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234. 

But we have stronger authority than this to support 
Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's Definition, 
as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and 
Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is 

Qwvri oiam^os, Ix z:\itovuv /x-ev (puvu/v [Alois, o"r)[j.xvlix.uv $s, zyoisTv 

vzE$vy.v7x pitzv <pajvr,v <7yij.xvltx.10v. An articulate sound, devoid 
of Signification, whkh is so formed as to make ohe signi- 
ficant articulate Sound out of several articulate Sounds, 
izhich are each of them significant. Poet. c. 20. In this 
view of things, the one significant articulate Sound, formed 
by the Conjunction, is not the Union of two or more Sj I. 
lables in one simple Word, nor even of two or more 
Words in one simple Sentence, but of two or more sim- 
ple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which is consider- 
ed as one, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected 
by the Conjunctions. For example, let us take the Sen. 
tence, which follows. If Men arc by nature social, if ft 

their 



240 HER M E S. 

Ch.ll. Conjunctions, while they connect 
Sentences, either connect also their mean- 
ings, or not. For example : let us take 

thesa 



their Interest to be just , though it were not so ordained by 
the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences, 
(1.) Men. are by nature social. (2.) It is Man's Interest 
to be just. (3.) It is not ordained by the Laws of every 
Counfry that Man should be just. The first two of these 
Sentences are made One by the Conjunction, If ; these, 
One with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, Tho' ; 
and the three, thus united, ma^ethat 9 WV ^ W« o^avlixn, 
that one significant articulate Sound, of which Aristotle 
speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive Power, 

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he men, 
tions the same Subject, 'o y«? o-t vW//,oj h <cW to vyoXXtx.- 
#$-« lav IZougsBri, c^Aov art rayocvrlov h»t to ev «yoXX«. The 
Conjunction makes many, one ; so that if it be taken away, 
it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many. 
Rhet. III. c. \1. His instance of a Sentence, divested of 
its Conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, 
faSov, wMwx, 2$eofW>> veni, occurri, rogavi, where by the 
way the three Sentences, resulting from this Dissolution, 
(for yXQov, airw%<rat t and !$eo/a*iv, are each of them, when 
unconnected,, so many perfect Sentences) prove that 
these are the proper Subjects of the Conjunctions connec, 

tivc faculty. 

Jmjnonius\ 



Book the Second. 241 

these two Sentences — Rome was en- Ch. II. 
slaved — Ccesar was ambitious — and con- 
nect them together by the Conjunction 
Because. Rome was enslaved, be- 
cause Ccesar was ambitious. Here the 
Meanings, as well as the Sentences, ap- 
pear to be connected. But if I say, — 
Manners must be reformed, or Liberty 
will be lost — Here the Conjunction, or, 
though it join the Sentences, yet as to 
their respective Meanings, is a perfect 

Disjunc- 



Ammonius's Account of the use of this Part of Speech 

is elegant. A<o >£ twv Xoycov o //Jv vvrxgZiv fxlxv a-Yiixoiivuv, o 
xvp'iojs eTj, uvx\oy&> oiv llU tw ^y^kftu tst[ayi[a.Ivu) £vAa>, x^ J/a 
tbto hit Xtyoptvu' o $e ^y.ilovxs lirx^sts tiyhwv, hx (lege Six) 
riva. Se o-yy^EO-fAov rivvaQxi zjus Soxo/v, avxXoysT rrj vtjj rn In ctoX- 
Kwv cvyy-zipivn £#>•&;» viro Se ruv yo(x<pwv (pxivopevnv Ix^^V T * v 
'ivwaif. Of Sentences (hat, which denotes one Existence 
simply, and which is strictly one, may be considered as 
analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called 
on this account One. That, which denotes several E I isf- 
ences, ami which appears to be made ovy. by some Conjunc- 
tive Particle, is analagoks to a Ship made up of many 
pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails ha 
apparent Unity. Am. in Lib, do Interpret, p. 54. ti. 

a 



S42 HERMES. 

Ch.ll. J)isj unc tive. And thus it appears, that 
though all Conjunctions conjoin Sen- 
tences, yet with respect to the Sense, 
some are Conjunctive, and some 
Disjunctive; and hence ( 6 ) it is x hat 
we derive their different Species. 

The Conjunctions which conjoin both 
Sentences and their Meanings, are either 
Copulatives, or Continuatives. 
The principal Copulative in English is, 
And. The Continuatives are If, Be- 
cause, Therefore, That, $c. The 
Difference between these is this — The 
Copulative does no more than barely 
couple Sentences, and is therefore ap- 
plicable to all Subjects whose natures 
are not incompatible. Continuatives, on 
the contrary, by a more intimate con- 
nection, consolidate Sentences into one 

continuous 



C*) Thus Scaliger. Aut ergo Sensum eanjungunt r ac 
/ erba ; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Si/mum vero dtS' 

fungunt, De*C. L. Lat. c. 167. 



Book the Second. 243 

continuous Whole, and are therefore ap- ch - ir - 
plicable only to Subjects, which have 
an essential Co-incidence. 

To explain by examples — It is no 
way improper to say, Lysippus was a 
Statuary, and Priscian was a Gramma- 
rian — The Sun shineth, and the Sky is 
clear — because these are things that 
may co-exist, and yet imply no absur- 
dity. But it would be absurd to say, 
Lysippus was a Statuary, because Pro- 
dan was a Grammarian ; tho' not to say, 
the Sun shineth, because the Sky is 
clear. The Reason is, with respect to 
the first, the Co-incidence is merely ac- 
cidental; with respect to the last, it is 
essential, and founded in nature. And 
so much for the Distinction between 
Copulatives and Confirmative*®. 

R 2 As 



( c > Copulafiva est, qua: copulat tarn Verba, quam San- 
sum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scalier is more ex- 
plicit — ri Sensum conjungunt (conjundior.es tie.) out ne« 

.'diio. 



244 HERMES. 

Ch.n. As to Continuatives, they are either 
Suppositive, such as, If; or Posi- 
tive, such as Because, Therefore, 
As, fyc. Take Examples of each — you 
will live happily, if you live honestly — 
you live happily, because you live ho- 
nestly. The Difference between these 
• Continuatives is this — The Suppositives 
denote Connection, but assert not actual 
Existence; the Positives imply both the 
one and the other^. 

Farther 



cessarib, aut non nccessarib : fy si noil necessario, turn 
Jiunt Copulativce, &c. De C Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's 
own account of Continuatives is as follows. Continuativce 
sunt, quce continuationem fy cotisequentiam rerum signifi- 
cant — ibid, Scaliger's account is — caussam aut prcestitu- 
unt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name foj 
the Copulative was 2v*W/a©« o-^-s-XexW*; for the Conti- 
nuative, avwiflixos ; the Etymologies of which words 
justly distinguish their respective characters. 

( d > The old Greek Grammarians confined the name 
iwotvlncoif and the Latins that of ContimuiUvce, to those 

Con- 



Book the Second. 245 

Farther than this, the Positives Ch.ll. 
above mentioned are either Causal, 
such as, Because, Since, As, §c. 
or Collective, such as, Therefore, 
Wherefore, Then, fyc. The Dif- 
ference between these is this — The Can- 
sals subjoin Causes to Effects — The Sun 
is in Eclipse, because the Moon inter- 
R 3 Denes 



Conjunctions, -which we have called Suppositive or Con~ 
ditional, while the Positive they called zjx^a,avixTi\ixoiy or 
Subcontinuativa. They agree however in describing their 
proper characters. The first according to Gaza are, 
It vjr*e%>* (Mt «, axoXtQixr & nvx j£ tx%iv S*jAS»te* — L. IV. 
Prisaan says, they signify to us, qualis est ordinatio % 
natura rerun* , cum dubitatione aliqua essentia: rerum — p. 
1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin sine substitentia 
nccessuria; potest enim subsistere fy non subsist ere ; 
utrnmr/ue enim admitiunt. Ibid. c. 168. On the con- 
trary of the Positive, or >n*?xcrv*xvlKol (to use his own 
name) Gaza tells us, 'dri xj vvx^n piTtx ri-^tus <rrnA.amtai* 
«To<yE— And Priscian says, causam cojitinuationis osten- 
dunt consequentem aim essentia rerum — And Scaliger, non 
ex hypothesis sed ox eo y quod subiistit^ conjungunt. Ibid. 



346 HERMES. 

Ch.Il. venes — The Collectives subjoin Effects to 
Causes-~-The Moon intervenes, there- 
fore the Sun is in Eclipse. Now Ave use 
Causals in those instances, where, the 
Effect being conspicuous, we seek its 
Cause ; and Collectives, in Demonstra- 
tions, and Science properly so called, 

where 



It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Po- 
sitive Conjunctions should have been considered as 
Subordinate to the Suppositivc, which by their antient 
Names appears to have been the fact. Js it, that the 
Positive are confined to what actually is; the Suppo- 
sitive extend to Possibles, nay even as far as to Impossi- 
bles? Thus it is false to affirm, As it is Day, it is Light, 
unless it actually be Day. But we may at midnight af- 
firm, If it be Day, it is Light, because the, If, extends 
to Possibles also. Nay we may affirm, by its help 
(if we please) even Impossibles. We may say, If tJic 
Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular ; If the Sky fall, 
then shall zvc catch Larks. Thus too Scaliger upon the 
same occasion — amplitudinem Continuativa' pcra'pi ex eo, 
quod ctiam impossibile aliquando prcesupponit. Dc C. L. 
Lat. C. 168. In this sense then the Continiiative, Sup- 
positive or Conditional Conjunction is, (as it were) su- 
perior to the Positive, as being of greater latitude in its 
application. 



Book the Second. 247 

where the Cause being known first, by Ch.II. 
its help we discern consequences'^. 

All these Continuatives are resolvable 
into Copulatives. Instead of, Because 
it is Day, it is light, we may say, It h 
Day, and it is Light. Instead of, Ir it 
be Day, it is Light, we may say, It is at 
the same time necessary to be Day, and 
to be Light ; and so in other Instances. 
The Reason is, that the Power of the 
Copulative extends to all Connexions, as 
well to the essential, as to the casual or 
fortuitous. Hence therefore the Conti- 
nuative may be resolved into a Copula- 
tive and something more, that is to say, 
into a Copulative implying an essential 
Co-incidence (/) in the subjects con- 
joined. 

R 4 As 



(c) The Latins called the Causals, Causalcs or Causa- 
fiva:; the Collectives, Collecttvie or lllalivce ; Thv Greeks 
railed the former 'AirtoXoytxol, and the latter 2vXAoy/s-<>co'. 

(~ f ) Resolvuntur autcm in Copulativas omnes hw, jyrop- 
trvea quod Causa cum Ejfcctu Suaptv naturu conjuncta 
est. Seal, de C L. Lat. c. 160. 



248 HERMES 

Ch. II. As to Causal Conjunctions (of which 
we have spoken already) there is no one 
of the four Species of Causes, which 
they are not capable of denoting : for 
example, the Material Cause — The 
Trumpet sounds, because it is made of 
Metal — The formal — The Trumpet 
sounds, because it is long and hollow— 
The efficient — The Trumpet sounds^ 
because aw Artist blows it — The final 
— The Trumpet sounds, th at it may liaise 
our courage. Where it is worth observ- 
ing, that the three first Causes are ex- 
prest by the strong affirmation of the 
Indicative Mode, because if the Effect 
actually be, these must of necessity be 
also* But the last Cause has a different 
Mode, namely, the Contingent or Poten- 
tial. The Reason is, that the Final 
Cause, tho* it may be first in Specula* 
tion, is always last in Event. That is to 
say, however it may be the End, which 
set the Artist first to work, it may still be 
an End beyond his Power to obtain, 
and which, like other Contingents, may 

either 



Book the Second. 249 

either happen or not^. Hence also ch - fl- 
it is connected by Conjunctions of 
a peculiar kind, such as, That, 7wb, 

Ut, $c. , 

The Sum is, that all Conjunc- 
tions, which connect both Sentences and 
their Meanings, are either Copulative, 
orCoNTiNUATivE; the Continuatives 
are either Conditional, ox Positive; and the 
Positives are either Causal or Collective. 

And now we come to the Disjunc- 
tive Conjunctions, a Species of 
Words which bear this contradictory 
Name, because, while they disjoin the 
Sense, they conjoin the Sentences( h ) . 

With 



<e> See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note 
VIII. p. 271. For the four Causes, sec Vol. I. Note 
XVII. p. 280. 

(h) 0/ St Sia^ewtl/xo/ rot, $ ixfyvyiA.lt a, avvriOtixo'i Kj v crf«y^.<x 
mtro zJgayfji.ocT©* f *) zrgoaumov unto zy^oautta diafyvyvZvrts, ryv 
fzatvn linav^iatv. CazcB Gram. L. IV. Diyuiiclivcc 

sunt, 



250 H E R M E S 

Ch. II. With respect to these we may ob- 
serve, that as there is a Principle of 
Union diffused throughout all things, 
by which this Whole is kept together, 
and preserved from Dissipation ; so there 
is a Principle of Diversity diffused 
in like manner, the Source of Distinc- 
tion, of Number, and of Order^. 

Now 



hint, qua, quamvzs dictiones conjmigant, scmum tameii 
iisjunctum habent. Prise. L. XVl. p. 1029. And 
hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunc- 
tives, has a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. 
For though, this as to its Intellection be tHyunctivc 
(its end being to disjoin the Subject from the predicate) 
jet as it combines Terms together into one Proposition, 
it is as truly synthetical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. 
See Chap. I. Note (b) p. 3. 

<*> The Diversity, which adorns Nature may be 
Said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different 
Subjects, to become more and more intense. Some 
things only differ, when considered as Individuals, but 
if we recur to their Species, immediately lose all Dis- 
tinction ! such for instance arc Svcrates and Plato. 
Others differ as to Species, but a? to Genus are the 

sajne : 



Book the Second. 251 

Now it is to express in some degree the Ch. II. 
Modifications of this Diversity, that Dis- 
junctive Conjunctions seem first 
to have been invented. 

Of these Disjunctives, some are 
Simple, some Adversative — Simple, 
as when we say, either it is Dai/, or it 

is 



same : such are Man and Lion. There are others 
again, which differ as to Genus, and co-incide only in 
those transcendental Comprehensions of Ens, Being, Ex- 
istence, and the like : such are Quantities and Quali- 
ties, as for example an Ounce, and the Colour, White. 
Lastly all Being whatever differs, as Being from No?u 
being. 

Farther, in all things different, however moderate 
their Diversity, there is an appearance of Opposition 
with respect to each other, in as much as each thing 24' 
it self, and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects 
this Opposition is not the same. In Relatives, such 
as Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and 
Son, Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than 
in ordinary Subjects, because these always shew it. Ay 
necessarily inferring each other. In CoifTRARin, 
such as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and 

Bad, 



252 HERMES. 

Ch. II. is Night — Adversative, as when we say, 
It is not Day, but it is Night. The Dif- 
ference between these is, that the sim- 
ple do no more, than merely disjoin ; the 
Adversative disjoin, with an Opposition 
- . concomitant. Add to this, that the Ad- 
versative are definite ; the Simple, inde- 
finite, Thus when we say, The Number 

of 



Bad, Virtuous and Vitious, in these the Opposition 
igoes still farther, because these not only differ, but are 
even destructive of each other. But the most potent Op- 
position is that of ''Avlttpaccrts, or Contradiction, when 
we oppose Proposition to Proposition, Truth to Fals-/ 
hood, asserting of any Subject, either it is, or it is not. 
This indeed is an Opposition, which extends itself to all 
things, for every thing conceivable must needs have it* 
Negative, though multitudes by nature have neither Re- 
kttives, nor Contraries. 

Besides these Modes of Diversity, there arc others 
that deserve notice : such for instance, as the Diversity 
between the Name of a thing, and its Definition; be- 
tween the various Names, which belong to the same 
tking, and the various things, which are denoted by the 
same Name; all which Diversities upon occasion become 
a Part of our Discourse. And so much, in short, for 
the Subject of Diversity. 



Book the Second. 253 

of Three is not an even Number, but an ch *^ 
odd, we not only disjoin two opposite 
Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, 
and deny the other. But when we say, 
The Number of the Stars is either even 
or odd, though we assert one Attribute 
to be, and the other not to be, yet the Al- 
ternative notwithstanding is left inde- 
finite. And so much for simple Dis- 
junctives( k K 



As 



(*) The simple Disjunctive £, or Vel, is mostly used 
indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it 
is used definitely, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then 
a perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previ- 
ous, and has the same force with x) «, or, Et non. It 
is thus Gaza explains that Verse of Homer. 

BkAo/a tyu Xxot <roov t[j.(j.titn, v a,Tro\i<r9ai. 

IK. A. 

That is to say, I desire the people should be saved, anb 
Not be destroyed, the Conjunction n being a»a<ff-nxor, 
or sublativc. It must however be confest, that this* 
Verse is otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of 
fruXXoi, or ivrts concerning which see the Comiueu- 
tfctors. 2 



^54 HERMES. 

Ch. II. As to Adversative Disjunctives, it has 
been said already that they imply Op- 
position. Now there can be no Op- 
position of the same Attribute, in the 
same Subject, as when we say, 'Nircus 
was beautiful ; but the Opposition must- 
be either, of the same Attribute in different 
Subjects, as when we say, Brutus was a 
Patriot, but Casar was not — or of dif- 
ferent Attributes in the same Subject, as 
when we say, Gorgias was a Sophist, 
but not a Philosopher — or of different 
Attributes in different Subjects, as when 
we say, Plato was a Philosopher, but 
Hippias was a Sophist. 

The Conjunctions used for all these 
purposes may be called Absolute Ad- 

VERSATIVES. 

But there are other Adversatives, be- 
sides these ; as when we say, JSIireus was 
more beautiful, t ii a n A chilles — Virgil was 
as great a Poet, a s Cicero was an Orator. 

The 



Book the Second. 255 

The Character of these latter is, that ch - IL 
they go farther than the former, by- 
marking not only Opposition, but that 
Equality or Excess, which arises among 
Subjects from their being compared. 
And hence it is they may be- called Ad- 

VERSATIVES OE COMPARISON. 

Besides the Adversatives here men- 
tioned, there are two other Species, of 
which the most eminent are unless and 
alt ho'. For example — Troy will be, 
taken, unless the Palladium be preserved 
— Troy will be taken, altho' Hector de- 
fend it. The nature of these Adversa- 
tives may be thus explained. As every 
Event is naturally allied to its Cause, so 
by parity of reason it is opposed to its 
Preventive. And as every Cause is 
either adequate^' or in-adequate (in-ade- 
quate, 



W This Distinction has reference to common Opi- 
nion, and the form of Language., consonant thereto. I* 
strict metaphysical truth. Ko Come* that is not ad qitaie^ 
?? any Cause at alt. 



556 HERMES. 

. Ch ' n L quate, when it endeavours, without be- 
ing effectual) so in like manner is every 
Preventive. Now adequate Preventives 
are exprest by such Adversatives, as 
unless — Troy willbe taken, unless the 
Palladium be preserved; that is, This 
alone is sufficient to prevent it. The In- 
adequate are exprest by such Adversa- 
tives, as altho' — Troy willbe taken, al- 
tho' Hector defend it ; that is, Hectors 
Defence will prove in-effectual. 

The Names given by the old Gram- 
marians to denote these last Adversa- 
tives, appear not sufficiently to -express 
their Natures^. They may be better 
perhaps called Adversatives Ade- 
quate and In-adequate. 

And thus it is that all Disjunc- 

TIVES,thatisCoNJUNCTIONS,^ic/iC0W- 

join 



<») They called them for the most part, without 
sufficient Distinction of their Species, Adversative ot 

' i T.wvrtco(/.xTr/.oL 



Book the Second. 257 

join Sentences, bid not their Meanings, are Ch.ll . 
either Simple or Adversative , and 
that all Adversatives are either Ab- 
solute or Comparative ; or else Adequate 
or In-adequate, 

We shall finish this Chapter with a 
few miscellany Observations. 

Ix the first place it may be observed, 
through all the Species of Disjunctives, 
that the same Disjunctive appears to 
have greater or less force, according as 
the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more 
or less disjoined by Nature. For exam- 
ple, if Ave say, Every Number* is even, 
or odd — Every Proposition is true, or 
false — nothing seems to disjoin more 
strongly than the Disjunctive, because 
no things are in Nature more incompa- 
tible than the Subjects. But if we say, 
That Object is a Triangle, or Figure 
contained under three right lines — the 
(or) in this case hardly seems to dis- 
join, or indeed to do more, than dis- 
S tincthf 



258 H E R M E S. 

Ch. II. tinctly to express the Thing, first by its 
Name, an d then by its Definition. So if we 
say, That Figure is a Sphere, or a Globe, 
or a Ball — the Disjunctive in this case, 
tends no farther to disjoin, than as it dis- 
tinguishes the several Names, which be- 
long to the same Thin a: &\ 

Again — the Words, When and Where, 
and all others of the same nature, such as, 
Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, 
&c. maybe properly called Adverbial 
Conjunctions, because they partici- 
pate the nature both of Adverbs and 
Conjunctions — of Conjunctions, as they 
conjoin Sentences ; of Adverbs, as they 

denote 



(") The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occa- 
sion, which they called Subdiyunctiva, a Subdisjnnclivc ; 
and that was Sive. Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive 
Mavors. The Greek "e<t' av seems to answer the same 
end. Of these Particles, Scaligcr thus speaks — Et sane 
nomen Subdisjunctharum rccte acceptupi est, ncque cnim 
tarn plane disjimgit, quam Disjunctive. Nain Disjunctives 
sunt in Contrariis — Subdisjunctivai autem ctiam in non 
Conlrariis, scd Divcrsis tantum ; ut, Alexander she Pa- 
ris. De C. L. Lat. c. 170. 



Book the Second. 259 

denote the Attributes either of Time, or Ch. it, 
of Place. ^v^ 

Ag a i n— these A dverbial Conjunctions, 
and perhaps most of the Prepositions (con- 
trary to the Character of accessory Words, 
which have strictly no Signification, but 
when, associated with other words) have 
a kind of obscure Signification, when 
taken alone, by denoting those Attri- 
butes of Time and Place. And hence 
it is, that they appear in Grammar, like 
Zoophytes in Nature ; a kind of ^ mid- 
dle Beings, of amphibious character, 
which, by sharing the Attributes of the 
higher and the lower, conduce to link 
the Whole together W. 

S 2 Axd 



(°) noKKocypv ya.g r> tyvais c^A*j y'mrxi xxrai /x/x£o» (JLtrocGoc- 
iyhctx, wfc a.^<ptcrQr,ru<J^xi I'm rivw, zjortqoi (^wov -h tyvroit. 
Thcmist. p. 74. Ed. Aid. Sec also Arid, de Animal. 
Tart. p. 93. 1. 10. Ed. Syll. 

( p) It is somewhat surprising that the politest and 
most elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all 

the 



260 HERMES, 



Ch. II. 



And-so much for Conjunctions, 
their Genus, and their Species. 

CHAP. 



the rest, should have their works filled with Particles of 
all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular ; while 
in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of 
our neighbours, scarce such a word as a Particle, or 
Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is 
Connection in the Meaning, there must be Words had to 
connect ; but that where the Connection is little or none, 
such connectives are of little use ? That Houses of Cards, 
without cement, may well answer their end, but not 
those Houses, where one would chuse to dwell ? Is 
this the Cause ? or, have we attained an elegance, to the 
Antients unknown ? 

Venimus ad summam fori 'u nee , Sec* 



Book the Second 26l 



CHAP. III. 

Concerning those Connectives, called 
Prepositions. 

x repositions by their name express ch. Ill 
their Place, but not their Character, — v — y^ 
Their Definition frill distinguish them 
from the former Connectives. A Pre- 
position is a Part of Speech, devoid it- 
self of Signification, but so formed as to 
unite two Words that are significant, and 
that refuse to co-alesce or unite of them- 
selves W. This connective Power, (which 
S 3 rejates 



fa) The Stoic Name for a Preposition was U^oQmxl: 
2vvh(T(A.os, P/wpositiva Conjunct iu, a Prepositive Conjunc- 
tion. f fls fj.lv «v k. xxrx. rxs xXXas zjxgxQi<rtis at 'ngoQtciif 
(tvv$eo-ijli)(.7)s cvvla^tus yivovlxt T7x^tiJ.^xrixa.i, XiXzkIxi -nfjuv' t£ 
Zv jc xtpogiAT) tvgriTXi ZJXfoi ToTs ZtvixoTs t« xxXtTcrQxi dvlat 
TlqoQtTixes IwHiio'tJ.tis. Now in 7ih(it manner even in other 
applications (besides the present) Prepositions give proof 
of their Conjunctive Syntar, me have mentioned alreadu ; 

mhencc 



262 HER M E S 



Ch. III. 



relates to J¥o?*ds only, and not Sentences) 
will be better understood from the fol- 
lowing Speculations. 

Some things co-alesce and unite of 
themselves ; others refuse to do so with- 
out help, and as it were compulsion. — 
Thus in Works of Art, the Mortar and 
the Stone co-alesce of themselves ; but 
the Wainscot and the Wall not without 
Nails and Pins. In nature this is more 
conspicuous. For example; all Quan- 
tities, and Qualities co-alesce immedi- 
ately with their Substances. Thus it is 
we say, a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain; 
and from this Natural Concord of Sub- 
ject and Accident , arises the Grammati- 
cal Concord of Substantive and Adjective. 

In 



zclwnce too the Stoics took occasion to call them Preposi- 
tive Conjunctions. Jpollon, L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. — 
Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive Sketch, than a com- 
plete Definition, since there are other Conjunctions, 
which arc Prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. L. IV- 
tie Praiposit. Prise. L. XIV. p. 983. 



Book the Second. 263 

In like manner Actions co-alesce with Ch.in. 
their Agents, and Passions with their 
Patients. Thus it is we say, Alexander 
conquers; Darius is conquered. Nay, as 
every Energy is a kind of Medium be- 
tween its Agent and Patient, the whole 
three, Agent, Energy, and Patient, co- 
alesce with the same facility ; as when 
we say, Alexander conquers Darius. And 
hence, that is from these Modes of na- 
tural Co-alescence, arises the Grammati- 
cal Regimen of the Verb by its Nomina- 
tive, and of the Accusative by its Verb. 
Farther than this, Attributives them- 
selves may be most of them characte- 
rized ; as w.hen we say of such Attribu 
tives as ran, beautiful, learned, he ran 
swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was 
moderately learned, Sec. And hence the 
Co-alescence of the Adverb with Verbs, 
Participles, and Adjectives. 

The general Conclusion appears to 
be tlu|. "Those Parts of Speech 

"UNITE or THEMSELVE8 IN GeAH- 

S A u j\i aji. 



?64 H E ft M E S, 

Ch. III. M M AK? WHOSE ORIGINAL ArCHE- 
"TYPES UNITE OP THEMSELVES IX 

"Nature/' To which we may add, 
as following from what has been said, 
that the great Objects of Natural Union 
are Substance and Attribute. Now 
tho' Substances naturally co-incide with 
their Attributes, yet they absolutely re- 
fuse doing so, one with another ( b \ And 
hence those known Maxims in Physics, 
that Body is impenetrable ; that two Bo- 
dies cannot possess the same place ; that 
the same Attribute cannot belong to diffe- 
rent Substances, &c. 

From these principles it follows, that 
when we form a Sentence, the Substan- 
tive without difficulty co-incides with 
the Verb, from the natural Co-incidence 
of Substance and Energy — The Sun 
warm et 11. So likewise the Energy 

with 



Causa, propter qtiam duo Substantia non ponuntur 
nine copula , e Phitosophia petenda est : nvque ^fim duo 
t,ib>l(inti(ilitt.f umim esse potest, stent Substantia et Ac- 
.ui^as ; itttquc non diras, C.«sak ; Cato ruGNA/r. Scat. 
de Cans. Ling, Lat. c. 177. 



Book the Second. 265 

with the Subject, on which it operates — Ch. III. 
vaiuieth the Earth. So likewise 
both Substance and Energy with their pro- 
per Attributes, — The Splendid Sun, 

— GENIALLY WARMETH — THE FER- 
TILE Earth. Bat suppose we were 
desirous to add other Substantives, as 
for instance, Air, or Beams. How 
would these co-incide, or under what 
Character could they be introduced ? 
Not as Nominatives or Accusatives, for 
both those places are already filled ; 
the Nominative by the Substance, Sun ; 
the Accusative by the Substance, 
Earth. Not as Attributes to these 
last, or to any other thing ; for Attri- 
butes by nature they neither are, nor can 
be ?nade. Here then we perceive the 
Rise and Use of Prepositions. By 
these we connect those Substantives to 
Sentences, which at the time arc* unable 
to co-alesce of themselves. Let us assume 
for instance a pair of these Connectives, 
Tiiro\ and With, and mark their Ef- 
fect upon the Substances here men- 
tioned. 




HERMES. 

tioned. The splendid Sun with his 
Beams genially war-met h thro' the Air 
the fertile Earth. The Sentence, as be- 
fore, remains entire and one ; the Sub- 
stantives required are both introduced ; 
and not a Word, which was there before, 
is detruded from its proper place. 

It must here be observed that most, 
if not all Prepositions seem originally 
formed to denote the Relations of 
Place ( c ). The reason is, this is that 
grand Relation, which Bodies or natural 
Substances maintain at all times one to 
another, whether they are contiguous 
or remote, whether in motion or at rest. 

It may be said indeed that in the 
Continuity of Place they form this Uni- 
verse 



f°) Omne corpus ant movetur aid quicscit : quare opus 
fuit aliqua not a, qua' TO nor significaret 9 sire esset inter 
duo cxtrcma, inter qua: motus Jit, sivc esset in altero ex- 
trcmorum, in quibus fit quics. Hinc clkicmus Preeposi- 
ticmis cs&cntialem dejinitionem. Seal, de Caus. Ling. 
Lat. c. 152. 



Book the Second. %6J 

Ch. III. 
verse or visible Whole, and are v*rvW 

made as much One by that general 
Comprehension, as is consistent with 
their several Natures, and specific Dis- 
tinctions. Thus it is we have Preposi- 
tions to denote the contiguous Relation 
of Body, as when we say, Caius walketk 
with a Staff; the Statue stood upon a 
Pedestal; the River ran over a Sand; 
others for the detached Relation, as 
when we say, He is going to Italy ; the 
Sim is risen above the Hills; these Figs 
came from Turkey. So as to Motion 
and Rest, only with this difference, that 
here the Preposition varies its character 
with the Verb. Thus if we say, that 
Lamp hangs from the Ceiling, the Pre- 
position, From, assumes a Character 
of Quiescence. But if we say, that Lamp 
is falling from the Ceiling, the Prepo- 
sition in such case assumes a Character 
of Motion. So in Mi/ton, 

— To support uneasie steps 
Over the Burning Marie-- ■Par. L 1 
Here over denotes Motion. 

Again — 



268 HERMES, 

Cb. in. Again— 



& 



• — He — with looks of cordial Love 
Hung over her enamour d — Par. L. IV. 



Here over denotes Rest. 

But though the original use of Pre- 
positions was to denote the Relations of 
Place, they could not be confined to* 
this Office only. They by degrees ex- 
tended themselves to Subjects incorpo- 
real, and came to denote Ptelations, as 
well intellectual as local. Thus, because 
in Place he, who is above, has commonly 
the advantage over him, who is below, 
heAce we transfer over and under to 
Dominion and Obedience ; of a King we 
say, he ruled over his People; of a 
common Soldier, he served under such 
a General. So too we say, with Thought ; 
without Attention ; thinking over a Sub- 
ject; under Anxiety; from Fear; out 
of Love ; through Jealousy, fyc. All 
which instances, with many otners of 

like 



Book th£ Second. 269 

like kind, shew that the first Words of Ch.NI> 
Men, like their first Ideas, had an im- 
mediate reference to sensible Objects, 
and that in afterdays, when they began 
to discern with their Intellect, they took 
those Words, which they found already 
made, and transferred them by meta- 
phor to intellectual Conceptions. There 
is indeed no Method to express new 
Ideas, but either this of Metaphor, or 
that of Coining new Words, both which 
have been practised by Philosophers 
and wise Men, according to the nature* 



and exigence of the occasion u \ 



In 



9 

W Among the Words new coined we mu\ ascribe to 
Maxagorjas, 'o^oto^'x ; to Plato, Tlotoms • to Cicero, 
Qualitas; to Aristotle > 'Efktfxu*; to the Stoics^Ovrts, 
npins, and many others. — Among the Words transfer- 
red by Metaphor froni common to special Meanings, to 
the Platonics we may ascribe 'iSc'a; to the Pythagoreans 
and Peripatetics, Kxmyof!*, nm\ Km^nyoftni to the Stoics, 

Kxrxhvt^is, IntArr^is, x.x9yrt\ ; to the Pjjl'i h<-n< si 
hdi^trxt, tV*XPt &C. 



270 HERMES. 

47SJ in. I n the foregoing use of Prepositions, 
we have seen how they are applied 
xaTa -mccqccbecrw, by way of Juxta-position, 
that is to say, where they are prefix t to 
a Word, without becoming a Part of it. 

But 



And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends 
to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philoso- 
phers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite 
and obvious sentences) without accurately knowing the 
Greek Tongue in general; the nice 'differences of many 
Words apparently synonymous ; the peculiar Stile of 
the Author whom he presumes to handle ; the new coin- 
ed Words, and new Significations given to old Words, 
used by such author, and his Sect ; the whole Philoso- 
phy of such Sect, together with the Connections and 
Dependencies of its several Parts, whether Logical, Ethi- 
cal, or Physical; — He I say, that, without this previous 
preparation, attempts what I have said, will shoot in the 
dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will ex- 
plain, and praise, and censure merely by chance ; and 
though he may possibly to Fools appear as a wise Man, 
will certainly among the wise ever pass for a Fool. Such 
a Man's Intellect comprehends ancient Philosophy, as 
his Eye comprehends a distant Prospect. He may see 
perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and 
Seas from Woods ; but for an accurate discernment of 
particulars, and their character, this without farther 
helps, it is impossible he should attain. 



Book the Second. 271 

But they may be used also k«t« (rvvQetrw, Ch. III. 
by way of Composition, that is, they may 
be prefixt to a Word, so as to become 
a real Part of it 0). Thus in Greek we 
have f Eviqaa-bai,, in Latin, Lntelligere, in 
English, to Understand. So also, to 
foretell to overact, to undervalue, to o*z£- 
g-0, &c. and in Greek and Latin, other 
instances innumerable. In this case the 
Prepositions commonly transfuse some- 
thing of their own Meaning into the 
Word, with which they are compound- 
ed; and this imparted Meaning in most 
instances will be found ultimately re- 
solvable into some of the Relations of 
Place, (r) as used either in its proper 
or metaphorical acceptation. 

Lastly. 



W Sec Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Prarpositione. 

W) For example, let us suppose some given Space. 
E and Ex signify out of that Space ; Plr, through it, from 
beginning to end ; In, icithin it ; Sun, under it. Jluu e 

then 



272 HERME S. 

Ch. III. Lastly, there are times, when Pre- 
positions totally lose their connective 

Nature, 



then E and Per in composition augment : Enormis, 
something not simply big, but big in excess ; something 
got out of the rule, and beyond [the measure ; Dico, to 
speak ; Edico, to speak out; whence Edict urn, an Edicl, 
something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to 
hear, and all to obey. So Terence, 

Dico, Edico vobis — Eim. V. 5. l 20, 

which (as Dondtus tells us in his Comment) is an 'At. 
Fari, to speak; Effari, to speak out — hence Effatum, an 
Axioms or self-evident Proposition, something addressed 
as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. 
Q'c. Acad. Ii. 29. Pcrmagnus, Perutilis, great through- 
out, useful through every part. 

On the contrary, In and Sub diminish and lessen. 
Injustus, hdquus, unjust, inequitable, that lies icithin Jus- 
tice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that falls short 
of them ; Subnigcr, blackish; Subrubicundus, reddish; 
tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the 
standard, and belozv perfection. 

Emo originally signified to take azcay ; hence it came 
to signify to buy, because he. who* buys, takes azcay hi* 
purchase. Inteji, Between, implies Di>QQntitumn<*\ 

for 



Book the Secoxd. 273 

Nature, being converted into Adverbs, Ch. IIL 
and used in Syntax accordingly. Thus 
Homer, 

— Ya\cci(Te he ftx&cL rxeql %Q&'i/. 
—And earth smil'd all around. 

IX. T. 362. 

But of this we have spoken in a pre- 
ceding Chapter feA One thing we must 
however observe, before we finish this 
Chapter, which is, that whatever we 
may be told of Cases in modern Lan- 
guages, there are in fact no such things ; 
but their force and power is exprest by 

two 



for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. 
From these two comes, Interimo, to kill, that is to say. 
To take a Man aizay in the midst of Lift, by making a 
Discontinuance of his vital Energy. So also, Pcrinw, to 
kill a Man, that is to say, to take him azcay thoroughly ; 
for indeed what more thorough taking away can well b< 
supposed ? The Greek Verb, 'AvdMftft, and the English 
Verb, To take oJj\ seem both to carry the same allusion* 
And thus it is that Prepositions become Tarts of other 
Words. 

( ti See before, p. 205. 

T 



274 HERMES, 

Ch.III. two Methods, either by Situation, or by 
Prepositions ; the Nominative and Accusa- 
tive Cases by Situation; the rest, by 
Prepositions. But this we shall make 
the Subject of a Chapter by itself, con- 
cluding here our Inquiry concerning 
Prepositions. 

CHAP. 



Book the Secoxd; 275 



CHAP. IV. 



C * oncer ning Cases, 



JA.S Cases, or at least their various Ch. IV. 
Powers, depend on the knowledge part- 
ly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly 
of Prepositions; they have been re- 
served, till those Parts of Speech had 
been examined and discussed, and are 
for that reason made the Subject of so 
late a Chapter, as the present. 

There are no Cases in the modern 
Languages, except a few among the 
primitive Pronouns, such as I and Me; 
Je, and Moy ; and the English Geni- 
tive, formed by the addition of s, as 
when from Lion, we form Lions ; from 
Ship, Ships. From this cjefecl however 
we may be enabled to discover in some 
instances what a Case is, the Veriphra- 
T 2 sis, 



276 HERMES. 

Cb. IV. sis, which supplies its place, being the 
Case (as it were) unfolded. Thus Equi 
is analized into Du Cheval, Of the Horse, 
Equo into Au Cheval, To the Horse. — •' 
And hence we see that the Genitive 
and Dative Cases imply the joint 
Power of a Noun and a Preposition, the 
Genitive's Preposition being A, De, or 
Ex, the Dative's Preposition being A d, 
or Versus. 

We have not this assistance as to the 
Accusative, which in modern Lan- 
guages (a few instances excepted) is only 
known from its position, that is to say, 
by being subsequent to its Verb, in the 
collocation of the words* 

The Vocative we pass over from 
its little use, being not only unknown 
to the modern Languages, but often in 
the anticnt being supplied by the No- 
minative. 

The Ablative likewise was used 
by the Romans only ; a Case they seem 

1 to 



Book the Secoxd 



277 



to have adopted to associate zcith their Ch. IV. 
Prepositions, as they had deprived their 
Genitive and Dative of that privilege ; 
a Case certainly not necessary, because 
the Greeks do as well without it, and 
because with the Romajis themselves it 
is frequently undistinguished. 



There remains the Nomixative; 
which whether it were a Case or no, was 
much disputed by the Anticnts. The 
Peripatetics held it to be no Case, and 
likened the Noun, in this its primary 
and original Form, to a perpendicular 
Line, such for example, as the line 
AB. 

B 

C 




The Variations from the Nominative, 
they considered as if AB were to fall 
from its perpendicular, as for example. 
to AC, or AD. Hence then they only 
T 3 called 



278 HERMES. 

ch > IV > called these Variations IITQSEIE, Cas us, 
Cases, or Fallings. The Stoics on 
the contrary, and the Grammarians 
with them, made the Nominative a Case 
also. Words they considered (as it 
were) to fall from the Mind, or discur- 
sive Faculty. Now when a Noun 
thence in its primary Form, they tiu 
called it HTQSIS OP0H, Casus rectus, 

AN ERECT, Or UPRIGHT CASE Or FALL- 
ING, such as AB, and by this name 
they distinguished the Nominative. — * 
When it fell from the Mind under any of 
its variations, as for example in the 
form of a Genitive, a Dative, or the like, 
such variations they called nTQ£EI2 
xiaafiai, Casus obliqui, oblique 
Cases, or side-long Fallings (such 
as AC, or AD) in opposition to the 
other (that is AB) which was erect and 
perpendicular^. Hence too Gramma- 
rians called the Method of enumerating 
the various Cases of a Noun, KAini:, 
Declinatio, a Declension, it be- 
ing 



(4) 



See Ammon. in Libr. dc Intcrpr. p. 35. 



Book the Second. £79 

ing a sort of progressive Descent from Ch. IV. 
the Noun's upright Form thro its various 
declining Forms, that is, a Descent from 
AB, to AC, AD, $c. 

Of these Cases we shall treat but of 
four, that is to say, the Nominative, 
the Accusative, the Genitive, and 
the Dative, 

It has been said already in the pre- 
ceding Chapter, that the great Objects 
of natural Union are Substance and 
Attribute. Now from this Natural 
Concord arises the Logical Concord of 
Subject and Predicate, and the 
Grammatical Concord o/Subst.anti ye 
and Attributive^. These Cox- 
cords in Speech produce Proposi- 
tions and Sentences^, as that previ- 
ous Concord in Nature produces 
natural Beings. This being ad- 
T 4 milled, 



C 1 See before, p. 2G4. 



280 HER M E S 

Cb.IV. mitted, we proceed by observing, that 
when a Sentence is regular and orderly, 
Natures Substance, the Logicians Sub* 
ject, and the Grammarians Substantive 
are all denoted by that Case, which we 
call the Nominative. For example, 
CiESAR pugnat; JEs jingitur, Domus 
cEclificatur. We may remark too by the 
way, that the Character of this Nomina- 
tive may be learnt from its Attributive. 
The Action implied in pugnat, shews its 
Nominative Cesar to bean Active ef- 
ficient Cause ; the Passion implied in 
fingitur, shew T s its Nominative xEs to 
be a Passive Subject, as does the Pas- 
sion in cedificatur prove Domus to be 
an Effect. 

As therefore every Attributive would 
as far as possible conform itself to its 
Substantive, so for this reason, when it 
has Cases, it imitates its Substantive, 
and appears as a Nominative also. So 
we find it in such instances as — Cice- 
ro est eloquens; Vitium c^turpe; 

Homo 



Book the Second. 281 

Homo est animal, &c. "When it has Cb. iv, 
no Cases, (as happens with Verbs) it is 
forced to content itself with such assi- 
milations as it has, those of Number 
and Person* ; as when we say, Cicero 
loquitur; nos loquimur; Homi- 
nes LOQUUNTUR. 

From what has been said, we may 
make the following observations — that 
as there can be no Sentence without a 
Substantive, so that Substantive, if the 
Sentence be regular, is always denoted 
by a Nominative — that on this occasion 
all the Attributives, that have Cases, ap- 
pear as Nominatives also — that thcrs 
may be a regular and perfect Sentence 
without aiuj of the other Cases, but that 
without one JSomi native at least, this is 
utterly impossible. Hence therefore 
we form its Character and Description — 

THE NoMLNATIVE is that Cast', without 

which 



* What sort of Number and lVrt<»i. \ <tf)>! Li\i\ bee 
before, p. 170, 171. 



$82 HERMES. 

Ch.IV. which there can be no regular^ and per- 
^"^""""^ feet Sentence. We are now to search 
after another Case* 

When the Attributive in any Sen- 
tence is some Verb denoting Action, we 
may be assured the principal Substantive 
is some active efficient Cause. So we 
may call Achilles and Lysippus in such 
Sentences as Achilles vulneravit, Lysip- 
pus fecit. But though this be evident 
and clearly understood, the Mind is 
still in suspence, and finds its concep- 
tion incomplete. Action, it well knows, 
not only requires some Agent, but it 
must have a Subject also to work on, 
and it must produce some Effect. It is 
then to denote one of these (that is, the 
Subject or the Effect J that the Authors 

of 



(0 We have added regular as well as perfect, because 
there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfect 
without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, 
made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics n«^^- 
€a.(j,xT/x. or naig<z>cxTY)yo£r)[AXT<z, such as ZaKe*™ /y-tra/ittXEi, 

Socruh'tn potnitct, &c. Sec before ; p. 18Q. 



Book the Secoxd. 2SS 

of Language have destined the Acer- Ch.iv. 
sative. Achilles vulneravit He c to- 
re m — here the Accusative denotes the 

Subj ec t . Lysippus fecit statuas- 

here the Accusative denotes the Effect, 
By these additional Explanations the 
Mind becomes satisfied, and the Sen- 
tences acquire a Perfection, which be- 
fore they wanted. In whatever other 
manner, whether figuratively, or with 
Prepositions, this Case may have been 
used, its first destination seems to have 
been that here mentioned, and hence 
therefore we shall form its Character and 
Description — the Accusative is that 
Case j 'which to an efficient Nominative and 
a Verb of Action subjoins either the Effect 
or' the passive Subject. We have still left 
the Genitive and the Dative, which we 
Investigate, as folio- 

It has been said in the preceding 
Chapter^, that when thi Places of the 

Nonii- 



W See i 



284 HER M E S. 

Cb.IV. Nominative and the Accusa five are filled 
by proper Substantives, other Substan- 
tives are annexed by the help of Pre- 
positions. Now, though this be so far 
true in the modern Languages, that (a 
very few instances excepted) they know 
no other method , yet is not the rule of 
equal latitude with respect to the Latin 
or Greek, and that from reasons which 
we are about to offer. 

Among the various Relations of Sub- 
/ stantives denoted by Prepositions, there 
appear to be two principal ones ; and 
these are, the Term or Point, which 
something commences from, and the 
Term or Point, which something tends 
to. These Relations the Greeks and 
Latins thought of so great impor- 
tance, as to distinguish them, when 
they occurred, by peculiar Termina- 
tions of their ozvn, which exprest their 
force, without ihe help of a Prepo- 
sition. Now it is here we behold the 
Rise of the anticnt Genitive, and Da- 
tive, 



Book the Second. 2S5 

tive, the Genitive being formed to ex- ch * lv - 
press all relations commencing from it- 
self ; the Dative, all Relations tend- 
ing to itself. Of this there can be no 
stronger proof, than the Analysis of these 
Cases in the modern Lan^ua^es, which 
we have mentioned already^. 

It is on these Principles that they say 
in Greek— teo\xctL?,orJlhx[jA?:o\, Or thee 
I ask, To thee I give. The reason is, in 
requests the person requested is one 
whom something is expected from ; in 
donations, the person presented, is one 
whom something passes to. So again 
— (J) ifofr&Afnw Xi'Q«, it is made of Stone. 
Stone was the passive Subject, and thus 
it appears in the Genitive, as being the 
Term from, or oat of zchich. Even in 
Latin, where the Syntax is more formal 

and strict, we read — 

Impl en t u r 



') See before, p. 27 :>, 27 0\ 

(f! XtvcroZ zmrotrjAivoi, \§ fafycttldt, ntlttk of Gold ttttd 
hory. So says Pbtlfuiffai of the Ott/mpitin Japitcr 9 \>. 
V. p. 400. See also Horn. Iliad. ». 57 l. 



286 HERME S. 

P^X* Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque fe- 
rince. Virg* 

The old Wine and Venison were the 
funds or stores, of or from which they 
were filled. Upon the same principles, 
Tiiym T8 vSai.Q.fy is a Phrase in Greek ; and 
Je bois de Veaii, a Phrase in French, as 
much as to say, I take some or a certain 
fart, from or out of a certain whole. 

When we meet in Language such 
Genitives as the Son of a Father ; the 
Father of a Son; the Picture of a Pain- 
ter; the Painter of a Picture, &c. these 
are all Relatives, and therefore each 
of them reciprocally a Term or Point 
to the other, from or out of which it 
derives its Essence, or at least its Intel- 
lection, te) 

The 



(s) All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually 
Infer each other, and therefore they are often exprest by 
this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, 

Tlavloc <$s ra. vjgos n nyq'os ecilirgtyoflx hiytrxi otov b c^aA©-' <W- 



Book the Second. 28/ 

The Dative, as it implies Tendency Ch. IV. 
ft, is employed among its other uses to 
denote the Final Cause, that being 
the Cause to which all Events, not for- 
tuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus 
used in the following instances, among 
innumerable others. 

Tib i suaveis dcedala tellus 



Submit tit fiores — Lucret 
Tib i brachia contrahit ardens 



Scorpius — Virg. G. L 

— — Tib i serviat ultima Thule. 

Ibid. 

And so much for Cases, their Origin 
and Use; a Sort of Forms, or Termina- 
tions, 



VTOTH S«A©-, ^ o ho-TToTvii oaAy oivnorr.s Xiytrxi eUvxi, >t, to '7/- 
irKd(rio¥ y){j.i<7B^ oittXxctiov, ■£. ro n(Aiffv onr?.'XTiii ryAiov* Om- 
nia vero, quce sunt ad aliquid, rcfcruntur ad ea, qua: n - 
ciprocantur. lit sere us did tar domini serous ; ct domi* 
fius, seroi dominus ; neenon duplum, dimidii duplum ; < ' 
dimidium, dupli dimidiam. Categor. C \ 11. 







288 HERME S. 

Ch. IV. tions, which we could not well pass 
over, from their great importance ( /? ) 
both in the Greek and Latin Tongues; 
but which however, not being among 
the Essentials of Language, and there- 
fore not to be found in many particular 
Languages, can be hardly said to fall 
within the limits of our Inquiry. 

CHAP. 



( h ) Annon et ittud observation? digniun (licet nobis mo- 
dernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas plc- 
fias dedinationum, casuum, conjugationum, ct similium 
fuisse ; modernas, his fere destitutas^ plurima per prcc- 
positiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire ? Sane fa- 
cile quis covjiciat (utcimque nobis ipsiplaceamus) ingenia 
priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtu 
liora. Bacon, de Augm. Sci&nt. VI. 1. 



Book the Second, 28Q 

CHAP. V. 

Concerning Interjections — Recapitulation 
— Conclusion. 

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. v. 
mentioned, there remains the Inter- ^^^^ 
jection. Of this Kind among the 
Greeks are 'Q, <te£, At, &c. among the 
Latins, Ah ! lieu ! Hei ! &c. among 
the English, Ah ! Alas ! Fie ! &c. These 
the Greeks have ranged among their 
Adverbs ; improperly, if we consider the 
Adverbial Nature, which always co- 
incides with some Verb, as its Princi- 
pal, and to which it always serves in the 
character of an Attributive. Now I N - 
terjections co-incide with no Part of 
Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else 
thrown into a Sentence, without altering 
its Form, either in Syntax or Significa- 
tion. The Latins seem therefore to have 
done better in-f. separating them In 

themselw 

+ Fid, Senium in JEneid XII. v. 486. 

u 



290 HER M E S. 

Ch. V. themselves, and giving them a name by 
way of distinction from the rest. 

Should it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, 
what then are they ? It may be answer- 
ed, not so properly Parts of Speech, as 
adventitious Sounds; certain Voices 
of Nature, rather than Voices of Art, 
expressing those Passions and natural 
Emotions, which spontaneously arise 
in the human Soul, upon the View or 



Narrative of interesting Events^. 



« And 



(«) Inter jectiones a Greeds ad Adverbia referuntur, 
atque eos sequitur etiam Bcethius. Et recte qmdem de lis, 
quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inse~ 
runtur^ ut nota affectus, velut suspirii aid metus 9 viz vi- 
dentur ad classem aliquant pertincre, ut quce naturales 
sint NOTiE; non, altar um vocum instar^ex instituto signi- 
ficant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. Interjectio est Vot 
affectum mentis significans^ ac citra vcrbi opem sentenliam 
complcns. Ibid. c. 3. Restat dassium cxtrema, Inter- 
jectio. IIvjus appdlatio non similiter se habet ac Con- 

junctionis. 



Book the Second. 201 

" And thus we have found that all Ch - v - 
" Words are either significant 
" by themselves, or only signi- 

U 2 " FICANT, 



junctionis. Nam cum hcec dicatur Conjunclio, quia conjun- 
gat ; Interject io tamen, non quia inter jacet, sedquia inter- 
jicitur, nomen accepit. Nee tamen de karla. ejus est, ut in- 
terjiciatur ; cum per se compleat sententiam, nee raro ab 
ed incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. Interjectio- 
nem non esse partem Orutionis sic ostendo : Quod natur ale 
est, idem est apud omnes : Sed gemitus fy signtt Icetitict 
idem sunt apud omnes : Sunt igitur natiirales. Si vero 
naturales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam ex partes, 
secundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturd, debent 
constare. Intcrjeciionem Gra'ci Adverbiis adnumerant ; 
scdfalso. Nam ncque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. 
Interjectionem Grwci inter Adverbia ponimt, quoniam 
hcec quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vol verba ei subaudii.in- 
tur. Ut si dicam — Papac ! quid video ? — vel per se — Pa- 
pae ! — etiamsi non addatur, Miror ; habet in se ipsius vcr- 
bi signijkationcm. Quce res maxime fecit Romanarum ar~ 
Hum Scriptorcs separalim ham partem ab Adverbiis accu 
pert ; quia videtur affectum habere in sese h'crbi, tt pic- 
nam motus animi signijkationcm, etiamsi non addatur Ver» 
bum, demonstrare. Interjeclio tamen non solum ilia, qua: 
dicu?it Grceci er^trXi»(T^ov, signijicat ; sed ctiam voces, qua 
cujnscunque passionis animi pulsu per exclumationcm inter- 
jiciuntur. Prise. L. XV. 




HERMES. 

" FICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED — that 

" those significant by themselves, denote 
" either Substances or Attributes, 
" and are called for that reason Sub- 
" stantives and Attributives — 
" that the Substantives are either Nouns 
"or Pronouns — that the Attribu- 
"tives are either Primary or Se- 
" condary— that the Primary Attri- 
" batives are either Verbs, Partici- 
" ples, or Adjectives; the Secon- 
" dary, Adverbs — Again, that the 
" Parts of Speech, only significant when 
" associated, are either Definitives 
" or Connectives — that the Defini- 
" tives are either Articular or Pro- 
" nominal— and that the Connectives 
" are either Prepositions or Con- 
" junctions/' 

And thus have we resolved Lan- 
guage, as a Whole into its con- 
stituent Parts, which was the first 

thing 



Book the Sjecoxd. 293 

thing, that we proposed, in the course Gh - V. 
of this Inquiry. ^> 

But now as we conclude, methinks 
I hear some Objector, demanding with 
an air of pleasantry, and ridicule — " Is 
" there no speaking then without all this 
" trouble ? Do we not talk every one of 
" us, as well unlearned, as learned ; as 
" well poor Peasants, as profound Philo- 
" sophers ?" We may answer by inter- 
rogating on our part — Do not those 
same poor Peasants use the Lever and 
the Wedge, and many other Instru- 
ments, with much habitual readiness ? 
And yet have they any conception of 
those Geometrical Principles, from 
which those Machines derive their Ef- 
ficacy and Force ? And is the Igno- 
rance of these Peasants, a reason for 
others to remain ignorant ; or to render 
the Subject a less becoming Inquiry ? 
Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that 
V 3 occur 



fore* p. 7. 



894 HERME S. 

Ch. V. occur every day — of Time, of Place, 
and of Motion — of Light, of Colours, 
and of Gravitation — of our very Senses 
and Intellect, by which we perceive 
every thing else — That they are, we 
all know, and are perfectly satisfied — • 
What they are, is a Subject of much 
obscurity and doubt. Were we to re- 
ject this last Question, because we are 
certain of the first, we should banish all 
Philosophy at once out of the World. ^ 

But a graver Objector now accosts 
us. " What (says he) is the Utility ? 
" Whence the Profit, where the Gain ?" 
Every Science whatever (we may an- 
swer) has its Use. Arithmetic is ex- 
cellent 



(O \\AX* IV* zjoMo. twv ovJftJv, * rviv /aev v<n*fhv 1'x*' yvvfi- 
pt,urtXTV)V, ayvuroroiTviv £e Tvjv tso-iocv uxjui^ rtrs Kivrta-is, Kj T0- 
<Ttos. ert Se (xahKov o x?° vos - ' E,c *^ 8 7<*f t&tuv to /aev fiveti yvui- 
gifxov tq uvx^iXsycrov ris Se vjoTt lf<v avruv r> turi'x, ru>v x x ^ s ~ 
tiujtxtcuv ogxQvvxi. Ef< £e $vt ri ru>v rotircjv k, v ^vx* To ^" £V 
yxp slvxt ri Twv vj/f^vjv, yvueipurxTov >L tyxnguiTxrov' ri o\ zjotb 
eV<v> » pa^iov y.xTX[Axf)iiv. 'AXb^xvc). 'A£>£oo\ Ylsgt ^vx^ s ) ^ • 
p. 142. 



Book the Second. 295 

cellent for the gauging of Liquors ; ch - V. 
Geometry, for the measuring of Estates ; 
Astronomy, for the making of Alma- 
nacks ; and Grammar perhaps, for the 
drawing of Bonds and Conveyances. 

Thus much to the Sordid — If the 
Liberal ask for something better than 
this, we may answer and assure them 
from the best authorities, that every 
Exercise of the Mind upon Theorems 
of Science, like generous and manly 
Exercise of the Body, tends ' to call 
forth and strengthen Nature's original 
Vigour. Be the Subject itself immedi- 
ately lucrative or not, the Nerves of 
Reason are braced by the mere Em- 
ploy, and we become abler Actors in 
the Drama of Life, whether our Part 
be of the busier, or of the sedater 
Jkind. 

U 4 Perhaps 



$96 HERME S. 

Ch. V. Perhaps too there is a Pleasure even 
in Science itself, distinct from any End, 
to which it may be farther conducive. 
Are not Health and Strength of Body 
desirable for their own sakes, tho' we 
happen not to be fated either for Por- 
ters or Draymen ; And have not Health 
and Strength of Mind their intrinsic 
Worth also, tho' not condemned to 
the low drudgery of sordid Emolu- 
ment? Why should there not be a 
Good (could we have the Grace tore- 
cognize it) in the mere Energy of our 
Intellect, as much as in Energies of 
lower degree ? The Sportsman believes 
there is Good in his Chace ; the Man 
of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the 
Glutton, in his Meal. We may justly 
ask of these, why they pursue such 
things ; but if they answer, they pur- 
sue them, because they are Good, it 
would be folly to ask them farther, 
why they pursue what is Good. It 
might well in such case 1 be replied on 

their 






Book the Second. £97 

their behalf (how strange soever it may Ck v - 
at first appear) that if there was not 
something. Good, which was in no respect 
useful, even things useful themselves 
could not possibly have existence. For 
this is in fact no more than to assert, 
that, some things are Ends, some 
things are Means, and that if there 
were no Ends, there could be of course 
no Means. 

It should seem then the G rand Ques- 
tion was, what is Good — that is to say, 
what is that which is desirable, not for 
something else, but for itself; for whether 
it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the 
Meal, may be fairly questioned, since 
Men in each instance are far from being 
agreed. 

In the mean time it is plain from daily 
experience, there are infinite Pleasures, 
Amusements, and Diversions, some for 
Summer, others for Winter; some for 

Country, 
3 




HERMES. 

Country, others for Town ; some, easy, 
indolent, and soft; others, boisterous, 
active, and rough ; a multitude diver- 
sified to every taste, and which for the 
time are enjoyed as perfect Good, 
without a thought of any End, that may 
be farther obtained. Some Objects of 
this kind are at times sought by all men, 
excepting alone that contemptible 
Tribe, who, from a love to the Means 
of life wholly forgetting its End, are 
truly for that reason called Misers, or 
Miserable. 

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, 
a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something 
valuable for its self without view to any 
thing farther, in so many Objects of the 
subordinate kind; shall we not allow 
the same praise to the sublimest of all 
Objects ? Shall the Intellect alone 
feel no pleasures in its Energy, when we 
allow them to the grossest Energies of 
Appetite, and Sense? Or if the Rea- 
lity of all Pleasures and Goods were 
2 to 



Book the Second. 2.99 

to be controverted^ may not the' Intel- Ch. V. 
lectual Sort be defended, as rationally 
as any of them? Whatever may be 
urged in behalf of the rest (for we are 
not now arraigning them) we may safe- 
ly affirm of Intellectual Good, that 
it is " the Goodof that Part, which is 
" most excellent within us ; that it is a 
" Good accommodated to all Places 
" and Times ; which neither depends 
" on the will of others, nor on the af- 
" fluence of external Fortune ; that it 
" is a Good, which decays not with 
" decaying Appetites, but often rises 
" in vigour, when those are no more. W 

There is a Difference, we must 
own, between this Intellectual Virtue, 
and Moral Virtue. Moral Virtue, 
from its Employment, may be called 
more Human, as it tempers our Ap- 
petites 



< d > See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c. 



300 HERMES, 

Ch.v. petites to the purpose* of- human Life. 
But Intellectual Virtue may be 
surely called more Divine, if we con- 
sider the Nature and Sublimity of its 
End. 

Indeed for Moral Virtue, as it is 
almost wholly conversant about Ap- 
petites, and Affections, either to re- 
duce the natural ones to a proper 
Mean, or totally to expel the unna- 
tural and vitious, it would be impious 
to suppose the Deity to have occa- 
sion for such an Habit, or that any 
work of this kind should call for his 
attention. Yet God Is, and, Lives. 
So we are assured from Scripture it 
self. What then may we suppose the 
Divine Life to be? Not a Life of 
Sleep, as Fables tell us of Endymion. 
If we may be allowed then to con- 
jecture with a. becoming reverence, 
what more likely, than A perpetual 
Energy or the purest Intellect 

about 



Book the Second. 301 

about the first, all-comprehen- ch. v. 
sive Objects of Intellection, 
which Objects are no other 
than that Intellect itself? For 
in pure Intellection it holds the 
reverse of all Sensation, that the per- 

CEIVER AND TlIING PERCEIVED are 
ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME^ 

It was Speculation of this kind con- 
cerning the Divine Nature, which 

induced 



( € ) E< a» utcos ii> *'/&> ui visits zjots, o Qeos ecu, $x:[/.x?ov' 
\t c>f fxx>,Aov, in SxviJ.ocviuJTEgov' iysi de u$e. y! £w7) 5e yz vttoc.%- 
yts 7) yxg NS l*£(>yiix, Quitj" 'ExfTv;? ct t v> htgyttx' Ivtqytix oa n 
xxQ* dvrriv, suflva &i) xgi'rv -Z xtotos. fyxyJiv oz tov Qsov slvxt 
{^u>ov xtoiov, oi^i^ov' w^t *cux •£. utujv (7Vityr>s k, acloios xrnx^yfi tw 
Qif TOYTO yxe O ©EOS. TZ» (a.btx rx $v>r- A', f . It is 
remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly charac- 
terized as a living God, in opposition to all false and 
imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretension! to 
Iiife at all ; others to none higher than that of Vegeta- 
bles or Brutes; and (he best were nothing better than 
illustrious Men, whose existence was circumscribed by 
the short period of IiumaniU 

To 



302 HERMES. 

Ch. V. induced one of the wisest among the 
Ancients to believe — " That the Man, 
" who could live in the pure enjoy- 
ment of his Mind, and who properly 
cultivated that divine Principle, was 
" happiest in himself \ and most beloved by 
" the Gods. For if the Gods had any 
" regard to what passed among Men 
" (as it appeared they had) it was pro- 
" bable they should rejoice in that, 
" which was most excellent, and by na- 
" ture the most nearly allied to them- 
"selves; and, as this was Mind, that 
" they should requite the Man, who 
" most loved and honoured This, both 
" from his regard to that which was 
u dear to themselves, and from his act- 
" ing a Part, which: was laudable and 
" right GO.* 

Axd 



To the passage above quoted, may be added another, 
which immediately precedes it. 'Avrov $1 voe? o vZf kxto. 

/^.ETa>v*)4//v th vovjtk" voyTos yoe,^ yiveroc?, ^fiy[cHvuv >Cj VOWV' W£T 
TAYTON NOTE KAI NOHTON. 

(f> 'HQiK' Nntopajg' T» K'. xvp. * 



Book the Second. 303 

And thus in all Science there is ch - V. 
something valuable for itself \ because it 
contains within it something which is 
divine. 



END OF THE SECOND BOOK 



HER 



[ 305 ] 

HERMES 

OR ' 

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 

CONCERNING 

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK III 



CHAP. I, 



Introduction — Division of the Su/ject into 
its principal Parts. 

oOAIE things the Mind performs Ch.i; 
thro' the Body ; as for example the va- ^^ 
rious Works and Energies of Art. — 
Others it performs without such Medium ; 
as for example, when it thinks, and rea- 
sons, and concludes. Now tho' the 
Mind, in either case, may be called the 
Principle or Source, yet are these last 
X more 




HERME S. 

more properly its own peculiar Acts, as 
being immediately referable to its own 
innate Powers. And thus is Mind ulti- 
mately the Cause of all; of every thing 
at least that is Fair and Good. 

Among those Acts of Mind more 
immediately its own, that of mental Se- 
paration may be well reckoned one. — 
Corporeal Separations, however accurate 
otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, 
as they nvdj be repeated without end. 
The smallest Limb, severed from the 
smallest Animalcule (if we could sup- 
pose any instrument equal to such dis- 
section) has still a triple Extension of 
length, breadth, and thickness ; has a 
figure, a colour, with perhaps many 
other qualities; and so will continue to 
have, tho* thus divided to infinity. But 
W the Mind surmounts all power of Con- 
cretion, 



C«) Itaque Natures facienda est prorsus Solutio 8f Sepa- 
rated ; nan per Ignem certe, scd per Men ton, tanquam 
ignem divinum. Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16. 

1 



Book th£ Third. 

tretion, and can place in the simplest 
manner every Attribute by itself, con- 
vex without concave; colour without 
superficies; superficies without Body; 
and Body without its Accidents; as 
distinctly each one, as tho' they had 
never been united. 

And thus it is that it penetrates into 
the recesses of all things, not only di- 
viding them, as Wholes, into their more 
conspicuous Parts, but persisting, till it 
even separate those Elementary Princi* 
pies, which, being blended together after 
a more mysterious manner, are united 
in the minutest Part, as much as in the 
mightiest Whole S® 

Now if Matter and Form are 
among these Elements, and deserve 
perhaps to be esteemed as the principal 
among them, it may not be foreign to 
the Design of this Treatise, to seek whe- 
X 2 the* 




<*) See below, p. 312. 



308 HER M E & 

. ch - 1- ther these, or any thing analogous to them, 
may be found in Speech or Lan- 
guage/ ) This therefore we shall at- 
tempt after the following method. 

Every 



00 See before, p. 2. 7. Matter and Form (in 
Greek YAH and EIA02) were Terms of great import in 
the days of antient Philosophy, when things were scruti- 
nized rather at their beginning than at their End. They 
have been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, 
which almost wholly employs itself about the last order 
of Substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal or 
concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even 
in this, but those made by mathematical Instruments or 
Chemical Process. 

The original meaning of the Word TAH, was Sylva, 
a Wood. Thus Homer, 

Tgg/xE o* xnzz fj.xy.px yIj YAH, 
Tioairiv vii oc9(zvoi~0i(7i Tloazidoiuivos lovroz. 

As Neptune past , the Mountains and the Wood 
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet. 

Hence as Wood was perhaps the first and most useful 
kind of Materials, the Word "y;», which denoted it, 
came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote 
Matter or Materials in general. In this sense Brass 
was called the TAu or Matter of a Statue; Stone, the 

"XKvt 



Book the Third. 309 

Every thing in a manner, whether chI - 
natural or artificial, is in its constitution 
X 3 com- 



*Y\v or Matter of a Pillar ; and so in other instances. — 
The Platonic Chalcidius, and other Authors of the latter 
Latinity use Sylva under the same extended and com- 
prehensive Signification. 

Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned, (Stone, 
Metal, Wood, fyc.) occur most frequently in common 
life, and are ail nothing more than natural Substances or 
Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, Matter and Body have 
been taken to denote the same thing ; Material to mean 
Corporeal ; Immaterial, Incorporeal, &c. But this was 
not the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the 
Term Matter was seldom used under so narrow an ac- 
ceptation. By these, every thing was called YAH, or- 
Matter, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was 
capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded 
into something else, whether from the operation of Art, 
of Nature, or a higher Cause. 

In this sense they not only called Brass the"YA» of a 
Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables 
they called the "YA«< of Words ; Words or simple Terms, 
the"TXxi of Propositions ; and 'Propositions themselves 
the "Tkxi of Syllogisms. The Stoics held all things out 
of our own power (ra. »x Itf V<V) such as Wealth and 
Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness, 

Life 



310 HERMES. 

CVI. compounded of something Common, 
and something Peculiar; of some- 
thing 



Life and Death, to be the YAaf ? or Materials of Virtue 
or Moral Goodness, which had its essence in a proper 
conduct with respect to all these, (Vid. Arr. Epict. 
L. 1. c. 29. Also Vol. the first of these miscellaneous 
Treatises, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. 
X. 18, 19. where the 'TAocov and .*AiT*55s* are opposed 
to each other.) The Peripatetics, tho' they expressly 
held the Soul to be oiau^aros, or Incorporeal, jet still 
talked of a Nw HftM&j a material Mind or Intellect. — 
This to modern Ears may possibly sound somewhat 
harshly. Yet if we translate the Words, Natural Capam 
city, and consider them as only denoting that original 
and native Pozcer of Intellection, which being previous 
to all human Knowledge, is yet necessary to its recep- 
Hon \ there seems nothing then to remain, that can give 
us offence. And so much for the Idea of TAH, or Mat- 
ter. See Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arzst, 
Metaph. p. 121, 12$, 141. Edit. Sytt. Prod, in 
Euclid, p. 22, 23. 

As to EIA02, its original meaning was that of Form 
»r Figure, considered as denoting visible Symmetry, 
and Proportion ; and hence it had its name from tTSv to 
see, Beauty of person being one of the noblest and most 
excellent Objects ol Sight. Thus Euripides y 

Fair Form to Empire gave the Jirst pretence. 



Book the Third. 311 

thing Common, and belonging to many chI * 
other things ; and of something Pecidia?\ 

X 4 by 



Now as the Form or Figure of visible Beings tended 
principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its 
Name and Essence ; hence in a more general sense, 
whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) 
was peculiar, essential^ and distinctive, so as by its ac- 
cession to any Beings, as to its"YAu or Matter, to mark 
them with a Character, which they had not before, was 
called by the Antients EIA02 or Form. Thus not only 
the Shape given to the Brass was called the Eldos or Form 
©f the Statue ; but the Proportion assigned to the Drugs 
was the ET&js or Form of the Medicine ; the orderly Mo- 
tion of the human Body was the ET£o? or Form of the 
Dance ; the just Arrangement of the Propositions, the 
Eloos or Form of the Syllogism. In like manner the ra- 
tional and accurate Conduct of a wise and good man, in 
all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made 
that ETSos or Form, described by Cicero to his Son, — 
Form am auidam ipsam, Marca fdi, et tanquam faciem 
IIonesti vides: quae, si oculis ccrneretur, mirabiles amores 
(ut ait Plato) excitaret sapienticc, &c. De Offic. I. 

We may go farther still — tut- supuem v. Intelligence, 
which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to 
our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, this supreme In- 
telligence has been called EIA02 EIAHN, the Form of 
Forms, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all 
Good, and of all Truth j and as imparting to every 

Being 



312 HERMES. 

Ch. I. by which it is distinguished, and made 
to be its true and proper self. 

Hence 



Being those essential and distinctive Attributes, which 
make it to be itself, and not any thing else. 

And so much concerning Form, as before concerning 
Matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting 
of these, that every thing generable begins to exist ; in 
their separating, to perish, and be at an end — that while 
the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxtaposition, 
like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate Co- 
incidence, complete in the minutest part — that hence, if 
we were to persist in dividing any substance (for exam- 
ple Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after 
every section both Matter and Form, and these as per- 
fectly united, as before the Division began— lastly, that 
they are both pre-existent to the Beings, which they 
constitute ; the Matter being to be found in the world 
at large ; the Form, if artificial, pre-existing within the 
Artificer, or it" natural, within the supreme Cause, the 
Sovereign Artist of. the Universe, 

^—Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse 

Mundum menie gvrens, simitiquc in imagine for mans. 

Even without speculating so high as this, we may sec 
among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form 
pre-existing in their immediate generating Cause ; Oak 
being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion ; Man of Man, 

Cicero's 



Book the Third. 313 

Hence Language, if compared ac- Ch.i. 
cordino- to this notion to the murmurs 
of a Fountain, or the dashings of a Ca- 
taract, has in common this, that like 
them, it is a Sound. But then on the 

contrary 



Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows. 

Matter. 

Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque ca- 
rentem omni ilia qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usi- 
tatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex 
qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint : (quce tota omnia ac- 
cipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni 
parte) ebque etiatn inlerire, non in nihilum^ &c. — 
Acad. I. 8. 

Form. 

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tarn pul- 
thrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde Mud, ut ex ore aliquo, 
quasi imago, exprimalur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, 
neque ullo sensu pcrcipi potest : cogitatione tantum et 

mente complectimur. Has rerum form as appcllat 

Ideas Me non intclligcndi sohtm 9 sed etiam dicendi gravis- 
simus auctor et magister, Plato : casque gigni ncgat, et 
ait semper esse, ac rationc et intelligent ia conlineri: 
ccelcra nusci, occidcre, Jlucre, lain; nee diutiiis esse una 
et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo rationc ct 
via disputclur, id est ad uliimam sui generis Forma** 
specie mque ridige-ndum y Cic. ad M. Brut. Qrat. 



314 H ERMES. 

Ch. I. contrary it has in peculiar this, that 
whereas those Sounds have no Meaning 
or Signification, to Language a Mean- 
ing or Signification is essential.: — 
Again, Language, if compared to the 
Voice of irrational Animals, has in com- 
mon this, that like them, it has a Mean- 
ing* But then it has this in peculiar to 
distinguish it from them, that whereas 
the Meaning of those Animal Sounds is 
derived from Nature, that of Lan- 
guage is derived, not from Nature, but 
from Compact.^ 

From 



( d -> The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their 
definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a 
part of their character to be significant x&rx ffwWx.im, &y 
Compact. See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius 
translates the Words kccto. o-wQ-nwy ad placitum 9 or se- 
cundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment 
— Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quondam 
positionern, placitumque poncntis aptatur ; nullum cnim 
nomen naturaliter constbtutum est, ncque unquam, sieut 
subjecta res a nalura est, ita quoquc a natura veniente 
vocabulo nuncupatur. Scd hominum genus, quod et ruli- 
one, et oratione vigerel, fiomina posuit, eaque quibus 

Ubuii 



Book the Third. 315 

From hence it becomes evident, that Ch - T - 
Language, taken in the most compre- 
hensive view, implies certain Sounds, hav- 
ing certain Meanings ; and that of these 
two Principles, the Sound is as the 
Matter, common (like other Matter) 
to many different things; the Mean- 
ing as that peculiar and characteristic 
Form, by which the Nature or Essence 
of Language becomes complete. 

CHAP. 



libuit Uteris syllabisque conjungens, singulis subject arum 
rerum substantiis dectit. Boeth, in Lib. de Interpret, 
p. 308. 



316 HERMES. 



CHAP. II. 



Upon the Matter, or common Subject of 
Language. 

Ch - IL , 1 HE TAH or Matter of Language 
comes first to be considered, a Subject, 
which Order will not suffer us to omit, 
but in which we shall endeavour to be 
as concise as we can. Now this TAH or 
Matter is Sound, and Sound is that 
Sensation peculiar to the Sense of Hear- 
ing, when the Air hath felt a Percussion, 
adequate to the producing such Effect S a ) 

As. 



(^This appears to be Priscian y s Meaning when he 
sa,ys of a Voice, what is more properly true of Sound 
in general, that it is — mum sensibile aurium, id est, quod 
propria auribus accidit. Lib. I. p. 537. 

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the 
cause of Sound to an Undulation in the Air propagated 
circularly, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of 

water. 



Book the Third. 317 

As the Causes of this Percussion are QM L 
Various, so from hence Sound derives 
the Variety of its Species. 

Farther, as all these Causes are ei- 
ther Animal or Inanimate, so the two 
grand Species of Sounds are likewise 
Animal or Inanimate. 

There is no peculiar Name for 
Sound Inanimate ; nor even for that of 
Animals, when made by the trampling 
of their Feet, the fluttering of their 
Wings, or any other Cause, which is 

merelv 



watcr, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, 
and to be as plausible as any — Axovtn of, t? ij.ito.Iv t« 

Tl tyuVOVVTOS 5C T« XXHOVTOS X'cPOS Z7}.r,Tl0(AiVH cr^xiqoti^xs ', ilTX 

xv^xTovixivUy £ rx7s xkox7s 'jT^oa-Triiflovros, us av^xrurxt to I* 
Trj otZxfxvrTj vSug y.xrx kvuXovs vtto t« lfxQ?,Y)9ivros Xi9e — <r 
Vorru audire, cum iV, qui medius inter loqucntcm^ ct au- 
dtentetn est, a\r vcrherutur orbkularitcr, dcindc a git at US 
auribus infinity quemadmodum et ci^tcrncc aqua per orbet 
injecio agitatur lupidu. Diog. Laert. VII. 



318 HER M E & 

Ch. II. merely accidental. But that, which they 
make by proper Organs, in consequence of 
some Sensation or inward Impulse, such 
Animal Sound is called a Voice. 

As Language therefore implies that 
Sound called Human Voice ; we may 
perceive that to know the Nature and 
Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to 
know the Matter or common Subject 
of Language. 

Now the Voice of Man, and it should 
seem of all other Animals, is formed by 
certain Organs between the Mouth and 
the Lungs, and which Organs maintain 
the intercourse between these two. The 
Lungs furnish Air, out of which the 
Voice is formed ; and the Mouth, when 
the Voice is formed, serves to publish it 
abroad. 

What these Vocal Organs precisely 
are, is not in all respect*? agreed by 

Philo- 






Bootf the Third. 319 

Philosophers and Anatomists. Be this Clu IT. 
as it will, it is certain that the mere 
primary and simple Voice is completely 
formed, before ever it reach the Month, 
and can therefore (as well as Breathing) 
find a Passage thro* the Nose, when the 
Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the 
least utterance. 

Now pure and simple Voice, being 
thus produced, is (as .before was ob- 
served) transmitted to the Mouth. Here 
then, by means of certain deferent Or- 
gans, which do not change its primary 
Qualities, but only superadd others, it 
receives the Form or Character of Arti- 
culation. For Articulation is in 
fact nothing else, than that Form or 
Character, acquired to simple Voice, by 
means of the Mouth and its several 
Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips. 
&c. The Voice is not by Articula- 
tion made more grave or acute, more 
loud or soft (which are its primary Qua- 
lities) 



320 HERME S. 

^ F; lities) but it acquires to these Charac- 
ters certain others additional, which are 
perfectly adapted to exist along with 
themfi) 

The 



( & ) The several Organs above mentioned not only serve 
the purposes of Speech^ but those very different ones 
likewise of Mastication and Respiration ; so frugal is 
Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so 
careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in 



He, that would be informed, how much better the 
Parts here mentioned are framed for Discourse in Man, 
zzho is a Discursive Animal, than they are in other Ani- 
mals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his Trea- 
tise de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. 
Do Anima. L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c. 

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius 
truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philoso- 
pher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in 
which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. 
But if he have any taste or value for autient literature, 
he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of 
his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the 
Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those 
Anticnts still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are 
so ready on every occasion to give the preference to 

themselves. 

The 



Book THfc Third* 321 

The simplest of these new Characters ch - n - 
are those acquired thro' the mere Open- 
ings 



The following account from Ammonius will shew 
whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and 
What authority we have to distinguish Voice from mere 
Sound ; and articulate Voice from simple Voice. 

K«( ¥0<I>02 fxh Is - ' '&}-v)yr> aigos a'urQviTV) axori' 4>flNH SI, 
-^/6<pos If Ifx-^vy^a yivopsvos, ora,v llta. tvjs (tv^oKyis t» Sw^axos 
IxQA/Co/aevos ocno ts <vjvsv[ji.ovos o zi<r r n\iivQzis ocr)e zjgoa'rriTflvj 
clQgous Tr? na.KiHJ.tvn Tq<xj(zla. dgrnqla., j£ ttj vzjigvcc, v)tqi ru 
yagyagtwvt, £ oia. rr>s 'cyKriyrts a-TTortK^ tivx -hy(pv aJaQ'/jroy, 
•A.a.Tx riva- of/A^v rys "^vyvis' ovne liri rwv l^zjvsv^uiv zjtxga. 
to?s {jLuaixoTs xoc\ts[/.lvLiv ogyavuv (TvlaQolIvzi, oiov avhuv Ttj a-vgiy- 
yuv' rvts yXvrlris, x^ ruv oSovtwv, k, x e '^ uv ^^ s M>l THN 
AIAAEKTON avayxa/wv farm, ta^os Se THN 'AIlAfJS 
4>ftNHN « KJtxvTws oviaGccMoiaIvuv, — Est que Sonus ? ictus 
aeris qui auditu sentitur : Vox autem est sonus, quern 
animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem tier attrac- 
tus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam aspe- 
ram vocant, et palatum, aid gurgulionem impingit, et ex 
ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu 
pcrficit. Id quod in imtrumentis qua? quia injlant, ideo 
f/z.-Trxft^r* a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac 
fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam 
necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino con* 
ferant. Amnion, in Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. 
etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630. 

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of 
X the 



322 ;.:< HERMES. 

Ch.H. i n g $ f fj ie Mouth, as these Openings, 
differ in giving the Voice a Passage. It 
is the Variety of Configurations in these 
Openings only, which gives birth and 
origin to the several Vowels ; and 
hence it is they derive their Name, by 
being thus eminently Vocal 9 ( c ) and easy 
to be sounded of themselves alone. ' 

There are other articulate Forms, 
which the Mouth makes not by mere 
Openings, but by different Contacts of 
its different parts ; such for instance, as 
it makes by the Junction of the two 

Lips, 



the Peripetetics) used the word <f>HNH to denote Sound 
in general. They defined it therefore to be — To t$to> 
dtaQyrov axo»j*, which justifies the definition given by 
Priscian, in the Note preceding. Animal Sound they 
defined to be — 'A^, tVo oqyJhs «rswXuy/A«'w, Air struck (and 
so made audible) by some animal impulse ; and Humax 
or Rational Sound they defined— -"Evador >£ «<** 
Tiimoixs Ix.irsfA'rroiAsrny Sound articulate and derived from the 
discursive faculty. Diog. Laert. VII. 5£, 

(c) ^ONHENTA. 



Book the Third. - 323 

Lips, of the Tongue with the Teeth, ^J^ 
of the Tongue Avith the Palate, and the 
like. 

Now as all these several Contacts, 
unless some Opening of the Mouth 
either immediately precede, or imme- 
diately follow, would rather occasion 
Silence, than to produce a Voice ; 
hence it is, that with some such Open- 
ing, either previous or subsequent, they 
are always connected. Hence also it 
is, that the Articulations so produced are 
called Consonant, because they sound 
not of themselves, and from their own 
powers, but at all times in company with 
some auxiliary Vowels 

There are other subordinate Dis- 
tinctions of these primary Articulations, 
which to enumerate would be foreign to , 
the design of this Treatise. 

It is enough to observe, that they a 
Y 2 all 

(<*) 2TM*ONA. 



324 HER M E S. 

Ch. II. a n denoted by the common Name of 
Element,^) in as much as every Arti- 
culation of every other kind is from 
them derived, and into them resolved. 
r- Under their smallest Combination they 
produce a Syllable ; Syllables properly 
combined produce a Word ; Words 
properly combined produce a Sentence ; 
and Sentences properly combined pro- 
duce an Oration or Discourse. 

Anb 



(«) The Stoic Definition of an Element is as follows — 

w Es"* £e ro/%Eibv, 1% ov ot^wts ylveraci roc ytvopEvx., ^ sis o e<txjx.~ 
tov dvotXvErxi. An Element is that, out #f which, as their 
first Principle, things generated are made, and into which. 
as their last remains, they are resolved. Diog. Laert. 
VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon Elements with 
respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to 

— $>mr\s soiyiiat,^ f| wv ervyxsiroti v> (pcuvrt, x^ e\s a. ^ixi^eHtxi 
tcry^ixTa,' IkeTvx. <$l (a.'/iket' e\s oi\\<xs <puvus ete^xs tuj stott dvrui. 

The Elements of articulate Voice are those things, 
out of which the Voice is compounded) and into which, «* 
its last remains, it is divided: the Elements themselves 
being no farther divisible into other articulate Voices, dif- 
fering in Species fro m th em . Metaph. V. c. 3. 
1 



Book the Third. 

And thus it is that to Principles ap- 
parently so trivial ,^ as about twenty 
plain elementary Sounds, we owe that 
variety of articulate Voices, which have 
Y 3 been 



^ The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inven- 
tor of Letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they 
called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped 
under the Name of Hermes, and represented commonly 
by a Head alone zcithout ether Limbs, standing upon a 
quadrilateral Basis. The Head itself was that of a beau- 
tiful Youth, having on it a Petasus, or Bonnet, adorned 
with two Wings. 

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to 
the 'EPMHS AOTIOSj the Hermes of Language or 
Discourse. He possessed no other part of the human 
figure but the Head, because no other was deemed requi- 
site to rational Communication. Words at the same time, 
the medium of this Communication, being (as Homer well 
describes them) Ettex zjk^oivr^ Winged Words, were re- 
presented in their Velocity by the Wings of his Bonnet. 

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the Front of 
his Basis (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with 
some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by 
which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a Youth 
be seen drawing off this Veil ; and a Nymph, near the. 
Youth, transcribing idiul She there discovers. 

Sacfe 





HERMES. 

been sufficient to explain the Senti- 
ments of so innumerable a Multitude, 
as all the present and past Generations 
of Men. 

It 



Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. 
The Youth we might imagine to be the Genius of 
Man (Naturae Deus humance, as Horace stiles him ;) the 
Nymph to be MNHMOZYNH, or Memory ; as much as 
to insinuate that u Man, for the Preservation of his 
u Deeds and Inventions, was necessarily obliged to have 
ci recourse to Letters ; and that Memory, being con- 
u scious of her own Insufficiency, was glad to avail her- 
" self of so valuable an Acquisition." 

Mr. Stuart, well known for his accurate and elegant 
Edition of the Antiquities of Athens, has adorned this 
Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, 
and that in a taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one 
possesses more eminently than himself. 

As to Hermes, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, 
Figure, Sfc. Vid. Platon. Phileb. T. IT. p. 18. Edit. 
Serran. Diod. Sic. L. I. Horat. Od. X. L. 1. Hesiod. 
T/teog. V. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucid. 
VI. 27. et Scholiast, in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. 
Thesaur. T. IX. p. J 16-4. 

For the value and importance of Principles, and ihr 

difficulty in attaining them, see Aristct. dc Sophist. 

Elcnch. c. 34. 

The 



Book the Third. 327 

It appears from what has been said, Ch.ll. 
that the Matter or common Sub- 
ject of Language is that Species of 
Sounds called Voices articulate. 

What remains to be examined in 
the following Chapter, is Language 
under its characteristic and peculiar 
Form, that is to say, Language consi- 
dered, not with respect to Sound, but to 
Meaning. 

Y 4 CHAP. 



The following Passage, taken from that able Mathe- 
matician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to 
what has been said in this chapter concerning Elementary 
Sounds, p. 324, 325. 

Mille milliones scriptorum mille annorum millionibus 
non scribent omnes 24 litter arum alphabeti permutaf tones 9 
licet singuli quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quorum una- 
quceque cuntineret diver sos ordines litcrarum 24. Tacquet 
Arithmetical Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663. 



328 HERMES, 



CHAR III. 

Upon the Form, 01* peculiar Character of 
Language, 

2^2* WHEN to any articulate Voice there 
accedes by compact a Meaning or Sig- 
nification, such Voice by such accession 
is then called a Word ; and many 
Words, possessing their Significations 
(as it were) under the same Compact^ 
unite in constituting a particular 
Language, 

It 



(«) See before Note GO p. 314. See also Vol. I. 
Treatise II. c. 1. Notes («) and ( c \ 

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remark- 
able — K#0a9T£f «v to fj.lv xocra. toVov kiveTo-Qcu, <pvaa-, ro $1 og- 
y/icrQati, Seasi >y axrct o-vvQvwyiv, Kj ro ulv |uAov. (pvcrei, y Se Sv^a, 
hivzi' hto) yCf to fA.lv (pcovB7y f -<pv<TEt, to <& oV 6vo[/.druiv y prifj-olruv 
trvpcJmv, Secret — ^ eWs Tfly fj.lv (pcovvirixvv lvvocfj.iv, ogyotvov xaa.* 
twv °\vxjkwv h yfMv dvv(ifJ.£OJV yvwTixvv., ■» IgriDtKvv, xixrct (pvcrtv 



Book the Third. 329 

It appears from hence, that a Word Ch - m * 
may be defined a Voice articulate, and 
significant by Compact — and that Lan- 
guage may be defined a System of such 
Voices, so significant. 

It is from notions like these concern- 
ing Language and Words, that one may 

be 



e%s/v o avQ^^Tr©- zfftxgocnXvicrius toTs aXoyois Cpiots' to oe ovof^xaiv* 
V) pr)(ji.x<Tiv, n roTs ex. t&tojv o-vyKSitAsvois Xoyois ygnaQcti zigos t*J¥ 
ari[j,!X<Tia,v (tsKETt tyvuti &(riv, aXXa. §e<te( ) l|a/^£Tov E^ttv tzgos TX 
oihoyx Qox, dlon it; //.ov©-* ruv Svvitwv xvroKivnTa (A$rs^s7 -vJ/yp^S", 
-A riyyiKus hegyuv <$vvx(ji.svv)s, 't'vx •£. Iv txvru rw QwvsTv 09 te^voc^ 
dyrys ^txxgiwrxi Vjux^is' <JsA«<r/ $e rxvrot oi its xxKk&> crvvri- 
Qspsvoi Koyot (Asra, /aet^wv, 10 aivsv ^et^wv. In the same man- 
ner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Danc- 
ing is something positive ; and as Timber exists in Nature, 
but a Door is something positive ; so is the power of pro- 
ducing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of ex- 
plaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something positive* 
And hence it is, that as to the simple power of producing 
vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Instrument 
to the SouVs faculties of Knowledge or Volition) us to this 
vocal power 1 say, Jthan seems to possess it from Nature, 
in like manner as irrational animals : but as to the em- 

fl iijing 



330 HERMES. 

Ch. Hi. be tempted to call Language a kind 
of Picture of the Universe, where 
the Words are as the Figures or Images 
of all particulars. 

And yet it may be doubted, how 
far this is true. For if Pictures and 
linages are all of them Imitations, it 

will 



ploying of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out of 
them, in the explanation of our Seniments (the thing thus 
employed being founded not in Nature, but in Position} 
this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, be- 
cause he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, 
which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that 
even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power shews 
itself; as the various elegant Compositions both in Metre, 
mud without Metre, abundantly prove. Amnion, de. 
Interpr. p. 51. a. 

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, 
(Ingyih rs^vixus) of which Ammonius here speaks, and 
which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the 
Human Soul, means something very different from the 
mere producing works of elegance and design ; else it 
could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, 
and many other Species of Animals, such as the Bee', 
the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10. 
158, 159, #c. 



Book the Third. 

will follow, that whoever has natural 
faculties to know the Original, will by 
help of the same faculties know also 
its Imitations. But it by no means fol- 
lows, that he who knows any Being, 
should know for that reason its Greek 
or Latin Name. 

The Truth is, that every Medium 
through which we exhibit any thing to 
another's Contemplation, is either de- 
rived from Natural Attributes, and then 
it is an Imitation ; or else from A c- 
cidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a 

Symbol.^ 

Now, 



<*) AsotQegei 2e to OMOIHMA tS 2YMBOAOY, xatOoo-ov to 
fxh o^oIcofA/x ryv (puaiv uvtyiv t« Ttqa.y^.a.ros yiocra. to dvvocrov 
u r rrsix.ovi( i E<T9a,i /3«AsTa/, 5C «x eV'v l(p v)[mv ocvro ^Brcx.TfXua'ai.i' 
to yxq h Tw tlxovt yzyqx(x(xivH tS *Zuk£0,ths o^oiufxac, h [xrt •£ 
to <pa.\a.x.gov, tL to <7ifM>v yL to If&!><p0aA//.ov ^ £i r ** ^uytqa,ms } 
«xst' «v oLvth \iyoiro tivoti o^olu^a.' to 1$s ys av^uGoXov, titoi an" 
fAziot, {dpfyoTz^cx. yxq o (ptXocrotp©^ txvro ovofAcL&t) to oAov lip' vtfxh 
£%£<, ccrs >Cj ex. [xovns v^i^ocy^zvov rys ri^ri^xs sirwoixs' o'ivj, t» 
icroTe liii ov(J&a,Kha)) «Mr?Ao<$ t«; w^^ayTOJ, ^vvxraK7v^.(ooXov 




332 HERMES*- 

Ch. III. Now, if it be allowed that in far 
the greater part of things, not any of 
their natural Attributes are to be found 
in articulate Voices, and that yet 
through such Voices things of every 
kind are exhibited, it will follow that 
Words must of necessity be Symbols, 
because it appears that they cannot be 
Imitations. 

But here occurs a Question, which 
deserves attention — " Why, in the com- 
" mon intercourse of men with men, 
4e have Imitations been neglected,, and 

" Symbols 



, E7T£t §' cctpeiBn zyvgaos, us rvgo-riviyJins 
1>ixXiiiy[os viyps, arti^x (pomov yukyyts. 
£vvxtxi 5e ris viroOsuQan j£ oorxr^ uvxrocaiv, k, (oiXes atpso-iv, 
yC aXXa. /AUg/a.— A REPRESENTATION Of RESEMBLANCE 

differs from a Symbol, in as much as the Resemblance 
aims as far as possible to represent the very nature of tlic 
things nor is it in our pou'er to shift or vary it. Thus a 
Representation intended for Socrates in a Picture^ if it 
have not those circunibtanccs peculiar to Socrates, the bald, 

the 



Book the Third. 333 

u Symbols preferred, although Symbols Ch - *** 
" are only known by Habit or Institu- 
" tion, while Imitations are recognized 
" by a kind of natural Intuition?" — 
To this it may be answered, that if the 
Sentiments of the Mind, like the Fea- 
tures of the Face, were immediately vi- 
sible to every beholder, the Art of 
Speech or Discourse would have been 
perfectly superfluous. But now, while 
our Minds lie inveloped and hid, and 
the Body (like a Veil) conceals every 
thing but itself, w r e are necessarily 
compelled, when we communicate our 

Thoughts, 



the flat -nosed) and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly 
be called a Representation of kirn. But a Symbol or 
Sign (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both names) is 
xchollij in our ozen power ^ as depending singly for its c,r- 
istence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the 
time zihen tzco armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign 
may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a 
Torch , (according to what Euripides says, 

But uhen the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the sign 
Qf purple fight, as uhen the Trumpet sounds, &c.) 
or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the dart- 
ing? of a Weapon, and a thousand z:ays besides* Amnion. 
in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b. 



334 HERME S. 

Ch. III. Thoughts to convey them to each other 
s through a Medium which is corporeal^ 
And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, 
Imitations, and Symbols must needs 
be sensible, and addressed as such to 
the Se?ises.W Now the Senses, we 
know, never exceed their natural Li- 
mits ; the Eye perceives no Sounds ; 
the Ear perceives no Figures nor Co- 
lours. If therefore we were to con- 
verse, not by Symbols but by Imitations, 
as far as things are characterized by 

Figure 



( c ) A* -^v/xi xt v>[A£T£gizi, yvpvxi t*h k<rxi ruiv a-co^iruv, 
wSvvxvro S;' xvtojv ruv vo^^xruv o-vtyLxlmii aXkriKxis rx ts^xy- 

(AXTX' '"EvSi^ri %£ GUfXXGl (TVv'($£$£VTa.l, §IX.Y)V va<pg? 'EEglX.xXv'ffliiO'lV 
O.VTUV TO VOEPQV, I^EYi8yi(7XV TUV 0V0[AXTUV, 0/' UV <TV\lKXlVii<Jl'i xX- 

^■nXxts rx 'ZjgaypotTx. Animi nostri a corporis compage se» 

creti res vicissim animi conceptionibus significare possent : 

cum autem corporibus involuti sint^ perinde ac nebula ipso* 

i^um intelligendi vis obtegitur : quocirca opus eisjdt nomi- 

nibusy quibus res inter se signijicarent. Amnion, in Prae- 

dicam. p. 18, a. 

'I 

( dJ Quicquid scindi j)ossit in differentias satis numero- 

sasy ad notionum varietatem cxplkandam (modo differen- 
tiae illce sensui perceptibilcs sint) fieri potest vehiculum co- 
gitationum de homine in homincm. Bacon, de Augm; 
Scient, VI. 1. 

1 



Book the Third. 335 

Figure and Colour, our Imitation would Ch. III. 
be necessarily thro' Figure and Colour 
also. Again, as far as they are charac- 
terized by Sounds, it would for the 
same reason be thro' the Medium of 
Sounds. The like may be said of all 
the other Senses, the Imitation still 
shifting along with the Objects imitated , 
We see then how complicated such Imi- 
tation would prove. 

If we set Language therefore, as a 
Symbol, in opposition to such Imitation; 
if we reflect on the Simplicity of the 
one, and the Multiplicity of the other; 
if we consider the Ease and Speed, with 
which Words are formed (an Ease which 
knows no trouble or fatigue; and a 
*"Speed, which equals the Progress of 
our very Thoughts) if we oppose to this 
the difficult}' and length of Imitations ; 
if we remember that some Objects arc 
;apable of no Imitations at all, but that 
all Objects universally may be typified 
by Symbols ; we may plainly perceive 

an 

* Lttsx zfltfoivrz — Sec before, p. 325. 



136 HER M E S. 

Ch. in. an Answer to the Question here pro- 
posed, " Why, in the common inter- 
" course of men with men, Imitations 
" have been rejected, and Symbols pre- 
« ferred/' 

Hence too we may perceive a Rea- 
son, why there never was a Language, nor 
indeed can possibly be framed one, to ex- 
press the Properties and real Essences of 
things, as a Mirrour exhibits their Fi- 
gures and their Colours. For if Lan- 
guage of itself imply nothing more, than 
certain Species of Sounds with certain Mo- 
tions concomitant ; if to some Beings 
Sound and Motion are no Attributes at 
all; if to many others, where Attributes, 
they are no way essential (such as the 
Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during 
a storm) if this be true — it is impossible 
the Nature of such Beings should be ex- v 
pressed, or the least essential Property 
be any way imitated, while between the 
Medium and themselves there is nothing 



CONNATURAL 



(e) 



W See Vol. I. Treatise II. cn 3. p. 70. 



Book the Third. 337 

It is true indeed, when Primitives Ch. III. 
were once established, it was easy to 
follow the Connection and Subordina- 
tion of Nature, in the just deduction 
of Derivatives and Compounds. Thus 
the Sounds, Water, and, Fire, being 
once annexed to those two Elements, 
it was certainly more natural to call 
Beings participating of the first, Watry, 
of the last, Fiery, than to commute the 
Terms, and call them by the reverse. — 
But why, and from what natural Con- 
nections the Primitives themselves might 
not be commuted, it will be found, I 
believe,, difficult to assign a Reason, as 
well in the instances before us, as in 
most others. We may here also see the 
Reason, why all Language is 
founded in Compact, and not in 
Nature ; for so are all Symbols of which 
Words are a certain Species. 

The Question remains if words arc 

Symbols, then Symbols or what? — 

Z If 



338 HERMES. 

Ch. III. if it be answered, of things, the Ques* 
tion returns, of what Things ? — If it 
be answered, of the several Individuals 
of Sense, the various particular Beings, 
which exist around us — -to this, it is re- 
plied, may be raised certain Doubts, 
In the first place every Word will be 
in fact a proper Name. Now if all 
Words are proper Names, how came 
Lexicographers, whose express business 
is to explain Words, either wholly to 
omit proper Names, or at least to ex- 
plain them, not from their own Art, 
but from History ? 

Again, if all Words are proper 'Names, 
then in strictness no Word can belong to 
more than one Individual. But if so, 
then, as Individuals are infinite, to make 
a perfect Language, Words must be infi- 
nite also. But if infinite, then income 
prehensible, and never to be attained by 
the wisest Men ; whose labours in Lan- 
guage upon this Hypothesis would be 
as idle as that study of infinite written 

Symbols, 



Book the Third. 339 

Symbols, which Missionaries (if they Cb. III. 
may be credited) attribute tq the Chi- Vs "* PV *~ / 
nese. 

Again, if all Words are proper Names, 
or (which is the same) the Symbols of 
Individuals ; it will follow, as Indivi- 
duals are not only infinite, but ever pas- 
sing, that the Language of those, who 
lived ages ago, will be as unknown now, 
as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay 
the Language of every Province, of 
every Town, of every Cottage, must be 
every where different, and every where 
changing, since such is the Nature of 
Individuals, which it follows. 

Again, if all Words are proper Names, 
the Symbols of Individuals, it will fol- 
low that in Language there can be no 
general Proposition, because upon the 
Hypothesis all Terms are purticidar ; nor 
any Affirmative Proposition, because no 
one Individual in nature is another. It 
remains, there can be no Propositions, 
Z 2 but 



340 HER M E S-. 

Ch. in. but Particular Negatives. But if so* 
then is Language incapable of com- 
municating General Affirmative Truths — 
If so, then of communicating Demon- 
stration — If so, then of communicating 
Sciences, which are so many Systems of 
Demonstrations — If so, then of com- 
municating^r^ which are theTheorems 
of Science applied practically — If so, 
we shall be little better for it either in 
Speculation or in Practiced And so 
much for this Hypothesis ; let us now 
try another. 

If Words are not the Symbols of 
external Particulars, it follows of course, 
they must be the Symbols of our 
Ideas : For this is evident, if they are 

not 



(*) The whole of Euclid (whose Elements may be cal- 
led the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon 
general Terms and general Propositions , most of which are 
affirmative. So true are those Verses, however barba- 
rous as to their stile, 

Sj/llogfcari non est ex Purticutari, 
Neve Ncgativif, rente conciudere si vis. 



Book the Third, 341 

not Symbols of things without, they can ch - IIT - 
only be Symbols of something within. 

Here then the Question recurs, if 
Symbols of Ideas, then of what 
Ideas ? — Or sensible Ideas.— Be it 
so, and what follows ? — Every thing in 
fact, which has followed already from 
the supposition of their being the 
Symbols of external Particulars ; and 
that from this plain and obvious rea- 
son, because the several Ideas, which 
Particulars imprint, must needs be as 
infinite and mutable, as they are them- 
selves. 

If then Words are neither the Sym- 
bols of external Particulars, nor yet of 
particular Ideas, they can be Symbols 
of nothing else, except of general 
Ideas, because nothing else, except 
these, remains. — Arud what do we mean 
by general Ideas ? — We mean such 
as ark common to many Indivi- 
duals ; not only to Individuals which 
Z 3 exist 



342 HERMES, 

Ch.lll. exist now, but which existed in ages 
past, and will exist in. ages future ; such 
for example, as the Ideas belonging to 
the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar.— Admit 
it, and what follows ? — It follows, »that 
if Words are the Symbols of such general 
Ideas, Lexicographers may find employ, 
though they meddle not with proper 
Names. 

It follows that one Word may be, not 
homonymously, but truly and essentially 
common to many Particulars, past present 
and future ; so that however these Par- 
ticulars may be infinite, and ever fleeting, 
yet Language notwithstanding may be 
definite and steady. But if so, then at- 
tainable even by ordinary Capacities, 
without' danger of incurring the Chinese 
Absurdity.* 

Again, it follows that the Language 
of those, who lived ages ago, as far as 

it 



Sec p. 338, 339, 



Book the Third. 343 

it stands for the same general Ideas, may ch< m * 
be as intelligible now, as it was then, — 
The like may be said of the same Lan- 
guage being accommodated to distant 
Regions, and even to distant Nations, 
amidst all the variety of ever new and 
ever changing Objects. 

Again* it follows that Language 
may be expressive of general Truths ; 
and if so, then of Demonstration, and 
Sciences, and Arts • and if so, become 
subservient to purposes of every kind.^ . 

Now if it be true " that none of 
" these things could be asserted of Lan- 
" guage, were not Words the Symbols 
u of general Ideas— and it be further 
" true, that these things may be all 
" undeniably asserted of Language" — 
it will follow (and that necessarily) that 
Words are the Symbols oe gene- 
ral Ideas. 

Z 4 And 



W See before Note ( e h 



344 11 ERME S. 

Cb. ill. And yet perhaps even here may be 
an Objection. It may be urged, if 
Words are the Symbols of general 
Ideas, Language may answer well 
enough the purpose of Philosophers, 
who reason about general and abstract 
Subjects — but what becomes of the bu- 
siness of ordinary Life ? Life we know 
is merged in a multitude of Particulars^ 
where an Explanation by Language is 
as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. 
The Vulgar indeed want it to no other 
End. How then can this End in any 
respect be answered, if Language be 
expressive of nothing farther than ge- 
neral Ideas ? 

To this it may be answered, tlmt Arts 
surely respect the business of ordinary 
Life ; yet so far are general Terms from 
being an Obstacle here, that without 
them no Art can be rationally explained. 
Ho\y for instanee should the measuring 
Artist ascertain to the Reapers the price 
of their labours, had not he first through 

general 



Book the Third, S45 

general Terms learnt those general The- Ch. III. 
orems, that respect the doctrine and 
practice of Mensuration ? 

But suppose this not to satisfy a per- 
severing Objector — suppose him to in- 
sist, that, admitting this to be true, 
there were still a multitude of occasions for 
minute particularizing , of which it wa$ 
not possible for mere Generals to be sus- 
ceptible — suppose, I say, such an Ob*- 

jection, what should we answer ? 

That the Objection was just ; that it was 
necessary to the Perfection and Comple- 
tion of Language, that it should be par- 
pressive of Particulars, as well as of 
Generals. We must however add, 
that its general Terms are by far its 
most excellent and essential Part, since 
from these it derives "that comprehen- 
" sive Universality, that just proportion 
" of Precision and Permanence, without 
" which it could not possibly be either 
" learnt, or understood, or applied 
11 to the purposes of Reasoning and 

" Science f 



346 HER M E S. 

Ch. in. « Science;"— that particular Terms have 
their Utility and End, and that there* 
fore care too has been taken for a sup- 
ply of these. 

Oiste Method of expressing Particu- 
lars, is that of Proper Names. This 
is the least artificial, because proper 
Names being in every district arbitrarily 
applied, may be unknown to those, who 
know the Language perfectly well, and 
can hardly therefore with propriety be 
considered as parts of it. The othef and 
more artificial Method is that of Defi^- 
nitives or Articles/^ whether we 
assume the pronominal, or those more 
strictly so called. And here we cannot 
enough admire the exquisite Art of 
Language, which, without wandering 
into infinitude, contrives how to denote 
things infinite ; that is to say in other 
words, which, by the small Tribe of 
Definitives properly applied to general 

Terms, 

$ Sec before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c. 



Book the Third. 34? 

Terms, knows how to employ these last, Ch. III. 
tho' in number finite, to the accurate 
expression of infinite Particulars. 

To explain what has been said by a 
single example. Let the general Term 
be Man. I have occasion to apply 
this Term to the denoting of some Par- 
ticular. Let it be required to express 
this Particular as unknown; I say, a 
Man — known; I say, the Man — indefi- 
nite ; any Man — definite ; a certain 
Man— present and near; this Man — 
present and distant; that Man — like 
to some other ; such a Man — an inde- 
finite Multitude ; many Men — a definite 
Multitude ; a thousand Men — the ones 
of a Multitude, taken throughout ; eve b y 
Man — the same ones, taken with dis- 
tinctions ; each Man — taken in order ; 
first Main, second Man, &c. — the 
whole Multitude of Particulars taken col- 
lectively ; all Men — the Negation of 
this Multitude ; no Man. But of this 
we have spoken already, when we in- 
quired concerning Definitives. 

The 



348 HERMES. 

Ch.lll. The Sum of all is, that Words ARfi 
the Symbols of Ideas both gene* 
ml and particular ; yet of the 
general, primarily, essential* 
iy, and immediately ; of the 
particular, only secondarily) 
accidentally, and mediately. 

Should it be asked, "why has Lan- 
" guage this double Capacity ?" — May 
we not ask, by way of return, Is it not 
a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or In- 
tercourse of our Ideas ? Should it not 
therefore be framed, so as to express 
the whole of our Perception ? Now can 
we call that Perception intire and whole, 
which implies either Intellection 
without Sensation, or Sensation with- 
out Intellection ? If not, how should 
Language explain the zohole of Our Per- 
ception, had it not Words to express 
the Objects, proper to each of the two 
Faculties ? 

To conclude — A§ in the preceding- 
Chapter we considered Language with 

a view 






Book the Third. 349 

a view to its Matter, so here we have Ch - ni « 
considered it with a view to its Form. 
Its Matter is recognized, when it is 
considered as a Voice ; its Form, as it is 
significant of our several Ideas ; so that 
upon the whole it may be defined — A 
System or articulate Voices, the 
Symbols of our Ideas, but oe those 
principally, which are general 

or universal. 

CHAR 



350 HERMES, 

CHAP. IV. 

Concerning general or universal Ideas. 

2^: MUCH having been said in the pre- 
ceding Chapter about general or 
universal Ideas, it may not perhaps 
be amiss to inquire, by what process we 
come to perceive them, and what kind of 
Beings they are ; since the generality of 
men think so meanly of their existence, 
that they are commonly considered, as 
little better than Shadows. These Sen- 
timents are not unusual even with the 
Philosopher now a days, and that from 
causes much the same with those, which 
Influence the Vulgar. 

The Vulgar merged in Sense from 
their earliest Infancy, and never once 
dreaming any thing to be worthy of 
pursuit, but what either pampers their 
Appetite, or fills their Purse, imagine 

nothing 



Book the Third. 351 

nothing to be real, but whjat may be Q ^^J 
tasted, or touched. The Philosopher, 
as to these matters being of much the 
same Opinion, in Philosophy looks no 
higher, than to experimental Amuse* 
ments, deeming nothing Demonstration, 
if it be not made ocular. Thus instead 
of ascending from Sense to Intellect (the 
natural progress of all true Learning) 
he hurries on the contrary into the 
midst of Sense, where he wanders at 
random without any end, and is lost in 
a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. — 
Hence then the reason why the sub- 
limer parts of Science, the Studies ot 
Mind, Intellection, and intelli- 
gent Principles, are in a manner 
neglected ; and, as if the Criterion of 
all Truth were an Alembic or an Air- 
pump, what cannot be proved by Ex* 
periment, is deemed no better than 
mere Hypothesis. 

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, 

amid the prevalence of such Notions, 

1 that 



359 HERMES. 

Ch.lV. that there should still remain two 
Sciences in fashion, and these having 
their Certainty of all the least contro- 
verted, which are not in the minutest a?*- 
tide depending upon Experiment. By 
these I mean Arithmetic, and Geo- 
metry.W But to come to our Subject 
coacerning general Ideas, 

Man's 



(*) The many noble Theorems (so useful in life, and 
so admirable in themselves) with which these two 
Sciences so eminently abound, arise originally from Prin- 
ciples, the most obvious imaginasle ; Principles, so 
little wanting the pomp and apparatus of Experiment, 
that they are self-evident to every one, possessed of com- 
mon sense. I would not be understood, in what I hare 
here said, or may have said elsewhere, to under value 
Experiment ; whose importance and utility I freely 
acknowledge, in the many curious Nostrums and choice 
Receipts, with which it has enriched the necessary Arts 
of Life. Nay, I go farther — I hold all justifiable Prac- 
tice in every kind of Subject to be founded in Experi- 
ence, which is no more than the result of many repeated 
Experiments. But I must add withal, that the man who 
acts from Experience alone, tho' he act ever so well, is 
but an Empiric or Quack, and that not only in Medicine, 
but in every other Subject. It is then only that we re- 
cognize Art, and that the Empiric quits this name for 

the 



Book the Third. 353 

Man's first Perceptions are Ch. IV. 
those of the Senses, in as much as 
they commence from his earliest Infan- 
cy. These Perceptions, if not infinite, 
are at least indefinite, and move fleeting 
and transient^ than the very Objects, 
which they exhibit, because they not 

only 



Science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, 
what is to be done, but why it is to be done ; for Art 
is a composite of Experience and Science , Experience pro- 
Tiding it Materials, and Science giving them a Form. 

In the mean time, while Experiment is thus necessary 
to all practical Wisdom, with respect to pure and spe- 
culative Science, as we have hinted already, it has not 
the least to do. For who ever heard of Logic, or Geo- 
metry, or Arithmetic being proved experimentally ? It is 
indeed by the application of these that Experiments are 
rendered useful; that they are assumed into Philosophy, 
and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise no- 
thing better than puerile amusements. But that these 
Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects, on 
which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion 
the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble. 

A a 



»M HERMES 

Ch. IV. on jy depend upon the existence of those 
Objects, but because they cannot sub- 
sist, without their immediate Presence. 
Hence therefore it is, that there can be 
no Sensation of either Past or Future, 
and consequently had the Soul no 
other Faculties, than the Se?ises, it never 
could acquire the least Idea of Tim e^. 

But happily for us we are not de- 
serted here. We have in the first place 
a, Faculty, called Imagination or 
Fancy\ which however as to its ener- 
gies it may be subsequent to Sense, yet 
is truly prior to it both in dignity, and 
use. This it is which retains the fleet- 
ing Forms oft/ii?igs, when Things them- 
selves are gone, and all Sensation at an 
end. 

That this Faculty, however connect- 
ed with Sense, is still perfectly different, 

may 

(*) See before, p. 10;>. See also, p. 112. Note (f). 

2 






Book thb Third. S55 

may be seen from hence. We have an Ch. IV. 
Imagination of things, that are gone and 
extinct; but no such things can be 
made objects of Sensation. We have 
an easy command over the Objects of 
our Imagination, and can call them 
forth in almost what manner we please; 
but our Sensations are necessary, when 
their Objects are present, nor can wq 
controul them, but by removing either 
the Objects, or ourselves^). 

A a 2 As 



( c > Besides the distinguishing of Sensation from Ima- 
gination, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, 
which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be 
distinguished from it, and these are MNHMH, and ANAM- 
NH2I2, Memory, and Recollection. 

"When we view some relict of sensation reposed with- 
in us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any 
sensible ObjeSf, this is Phansy or Imagination. 

When we view some such relict, and refer it withal to 
that sensible Object, which in time pait uas its cause and 
original, this is Memory. 

Lastly 




II E R M E S. 

As the Wax would not be adequate 
to its business of Signature, had it not 
a Power to retain, as well as to receive; 
the same holds of the Soul, with res- 
pect 



Lastly the Road, which leads to Memory through a 
aeries of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or 
casually, this is Recollection. I have added casually, 
as well as rationally, because a casual connection is of- 
ten sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of 
its Owner ; thence of his Habitation ; thence of Woodsy 
thence of Timber ; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, 

Tf the Distinction between Memory and Phansy be not 
suniciently understood, it may be illustrated by being 
compared to the view of a Portrait. When we con- 
template a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the 
"Portrait, such Contemplation is analogous to Piiansy. 
When we vieAV it with reference to the Original, whom it 
represents, such Contemplation is analogous to Me. 



We may: go farther. Imagination or IJhansy may 
exhibit (after a manner) even things that arc to come. It 
»s here that Hope and Fear paint all their pleasant and 
all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But Memory is 
confined in the strictest manner to the past. 

Wha* 



Book the Third. 357 

pcct to Sense and Imagination. Sense Ch. IV, 
is its receptive Power ; Imagination, 
its retentive. Had it Sense without 
Imagination, it would not be as Wax, 
but as Water, where tho' all Impres- 
sions may be instantly made, yet as 
soon as made they are as instantly 
lost. 

Thus then, from a view of the twe 
Powers taken together, we may call 
Sense (if we please) a kind of transient 
Imagination; and Imagination on the 
contrary a kind of permanent Sensed. 

A a 3 Now 



What we have said may suffice for our present pur- 
pose. He that would learn more, may consult Aristot. 
dc Jnimdj L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise dc Mem. et 
Rcminisc. 

(d) 'j7 to/vuv ?s"/yii tyxvlxaiat u>$t xi yvufta-xtfji.tv' oi7 vciTy Iv i?//.?* 
aTro ruv htgytiuv ruv tJi^i rx xt?9nrci, otov rvTrlov (Icpe rCno*) 
nix *j m.vx^uyfx<pnfAX tv ru zj^uirv «ia , 0»)T^/«, lynxrxKtifAfj(.x n 
rr>s vto tS a<<70>j)5 yivo(A.ivv)$ aivv<tsu)S, o k, f^VKin tb otiaOnru <sjx~ 
givros, vmofxivH ri j^ o-Jj^ztxi, ov vazjtg Iik'Jjv rts xvru, o x^ TTji 
p.vr)/AT):> 7)1*7* evZpfAvtov dlhoi yiurat' to toiutm lytcxrd^nfAfAXy 



358 HERMES. 

Oh. iv. Now as our feet in vain venture to 
walk upon the River, till the Frost 
bind the Current, and harden the yield- 
ing Surface; so does the Soul in vain 
seek to exert its higher Powers, the 
Powers I mean of Reason and In- 
tellect, till Imagination first fix 
■the fluency of Sense, and thus provide 
a proper Basis for the support of its 



higher Energies. 



After 



■j£ tov to/Stov uo-nttg rvwov, 4>ANTA2IAN xxXuatv. Now what 
Phansy or Imagination is, we may explain as follows. 
We may conceive to he formed ivithin us, from tJw opera- 
lions of our Senses about sensible Subjects, some Impression 
(as it were) or Picture in our original Sensorium, being a 
relict of that motion caused within us by the external ob- 
ject ; a relict, which when the external object is no longer 
present, remains and is still preserved, being as- it iccre 
its Image, and which, by being thus preserved, becomes 
the cause of our having Memory. Now such a sort of re- 
lict and (as it were) Impression they call Phansy or Ima- 
gination. Alex. Aphrod. de Animd, p. 135. b. Edit* 
Aid. 



Book the Third. 3*39 

After this manner, in the admira- ch - IV > 
ble Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures 
subordinate made subservient to the 
higher. Were there no Things external, 
the Senses could not operate; were there 
no Sensations, the Imagination could not 
operate ; and were there no Imagination, 
there could be neither Reasoning nor 
Intellection, such at least as they are 
found in Man, where they have their 
Intensions and Remissions in alternate 
succession, and are at first nothing bet- 
ter, than a mere Capacity or Power. 
Whether every Intellect begins thus, 
may be perhaps a question ; especially 
if there be any one of a nature more di- 
vine, to which " Intension and Remis 
" sion and mere Capacity are un- 
" known' e V But not to digress. 

A a 4 It 



' See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of 
Man's Existence is not a little different from that of the 
Deity. The Lifi: of Man has its Essence in Motion. 

This 



360 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. I T is then on these permanent Phan- 
tasms that THE HUMAN MlND first 

works, 



This is not only true with respect to that lower and 
subordinate Life, which he shares in common with Vege- 
tables, and which can no longer subsist than while the 
Fluids circulate, but it is likewise true in that Life, 
which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects from without 
Jirst move our faculties, and thence we move of ourselves 
either to Practice or Contemplation. But the Life or 
Existence of God (as far as we can conjecture upon so 
transcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout 
Eternity, but complete in every Instant, and is for that 
reason immutable and superior to all Motion. 

It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he 
tell US — Ov yxe (tovov Ktvno-tus £S"/v higyux, <zAAi -^ awvumj' 
jc r$ovrj /a£AAov h rie*pi<* *S"'\ *> *" ycivva-ei' ptrxGoXY) de tnavruv 
yAyjtu, xa.ro. Toy tzoiwtyjv, ^ta. zzovyglav rtvx' uame 7*f ocvQeu- 
itoi lvfJ.srcHCoXos o Tjovygls, Kj r> <pv<ris * o^o/ae'v*) ^iratQoKns' xy&f 
avXn, ovo brmx&s. For there is not only an Energy of 
Motion, but of Immobility ; and Pleasure or Felici- 
ty exists rather in Rest than in Motion ; Change of all 
things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a principle 
of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same man* 

ner 



Book the Third. 36.1 

works, and by an Energy as spontane- ch - IV * 
ous and familiar to its Nature, as the - 
seeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, 

it 



ner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is that 
Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such Na- 
ture is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. 
Si Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin. 

It IS to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that 

Boethius refers, when he says in those elegant verses, 
Tempus ab JEvo 



Ire jubes stabilisque maxens das cuncta moveri. 

From this single principle of Immobility, may be de- 
rived some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes ; su«h 
as that of Impassive, Incorruptible, Incorporeal, 
&c. Vide J ristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 
7, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. See also Vol. I. of these Trea- 
tises, p. 262 to 266 — also p. 295, where the Verses of 
Boethius are quoted at length. 

It must be remembered however, that though we are 
not Gods, yet as rational Beings we have ^ rthin us some- 
thing Divine, and that the more Ave can become supe- 
rior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and 
place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, 

per- 



362 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. it discerns at once what in manT is 
one ; what in things dissimilar and 
different is similar and the 
9AM£^. By this it comes to behold 

akind 



permanent, and rational, the higher we shall advance in 
real Happiness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient 
writer says) — 'O^olwais rZ QtZ xxrcc. to ^wxrov, the be- 
coming like to God, as far as in our pozoer. ToTs pi» ya^ 
SsoTs mois o /3/®* [AXKag i&>' to7s>^ a.v$eu ( nois y \<p" oaov o[aoiu(aoI 
ri rns roiccvrys Ivsgyiixs vva-eyii. F° r &° TIIE Gods (as 
says another antient) the zchole of life is one continued hap- 
piness ; but to Men, it is so far happy, as it rises to the 
resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat, in Theae- 
tet. Arist. Eth. X. 8. 

(/) This connective Act of the SonI, by which it 
views one in many, is perhaps one of the principal. 
Acts of its most excellent Part. It is this removes that- 
impenetrable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence 
invisible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even 
the sensible World (with the help of all our Sensations) 
would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index". 
It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, 
nor the Odour alone, that makes the Rose, but it is 
made up of all these, and other attributes united ; not 
an unknown Constitution of insensible Parts, but a .known 
Constitution of sensible Parts, unless we chuse to extir- 
pate the possibility of natural Knowledge. 

What 






Book the Third. - S6S 

a kind of superior Objects ; a new Race Ch. IV. 
of Perceptions, more comprehensive 

than 



What then perceives this Constitution or Union ? 
- — Can it be any of the Senses ? — No one of these, we 
know, can pass the limits of its own province. Were 
the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the 
Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be 
Sight also. It is the same in other instances. We 
must necessarily therefore recur to some higher col- 
lective Power, to give us a prospect of Nature, even 
in these her subordinate Wholes, much more in that co?n- 
prehcnsive Whole, whose Sympathy is universal, and of 
which these smaller Wholes are all no more than 
Parts. 

But no where is this collecting, and (if I may be al- 
lowed the expression) this unifying Power more con- 
spicuous, than in the subjects of pure Truth. By* 
virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea, 
in many Individuals; One Proposition in many general 
Ideas ; One Syllogism in many Propositions ; till at length, 
by properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with 
Syllogism, it ascend into those bright and steady regions 
of Science. 

Qua s neque^ concutiunt v^nti, neque nubila nimbis 
Adspergunt, $c. Lucr. 

Even 



364 II E R M E 8, 

Ch.iv. than those of Sense; a Race of Per- 
ceptions, each one of which may be found 

intire 



Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions can- 
not subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions 
together, so necessary is this uniting Power to every 
Species of Knowledge. Sec p. 3. 250. 

He that would better comprehend the distinction be- 
tween sensitive Perception, and intellective, may 
observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by 
our Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these 
two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of 
such, as hear the sounds, without knowing the language. 
But to shew their difference still stronger, let us 
suppose them to concur in the same Man, who shall 
both hear and understand the Truth proposed. Let 
the Truth be for example, The Angles of a Triangle 
are equal to tzvo right Angles. That this is one Truth, 
and not tzvo or many Truths, I believe none will deny. 
Let me ask then, in what manner does this Truth be- 
come perceptible (if at all) to Sensation ? — The An- 
swer is obvious ; it is by successive portions of little 
and little at a Time. When the first Word is present, 
all the subsequent are absent ; when the last Word is 
present, all the previous arc absent ; when any of the 
middle Words are ipres ent, then are there some absent, 
as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at 

once 



Book the Third. 365 

intire and whole in the separate individu- ch - * v - 

ah of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, 

without 



once than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much 
it not, (to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had been, 
or never was to be. And so much for the perception 
of Sense, than which we see nothing can be more 
dissipated^ fleeting, and detached, — And is that of the 
Mind similar? — Admit it, and what follows? — it fol- 
lows, that one Mind would no more recognize one 
Truth, by recognizing its Terms successively and apart , 
than many distant Minds would recognize it, were it 
distributed among them, a different part to each. The 
case is, every Truth is one, tho' its Terms are many. 
It is in no respect true, by parts at a time, but it is true 
of necessity at once and in an instant. — What Powers 
therefore recognize this Oneness or Unity ?— Where 
even does it reside, or what makes it ? — Shall we an- 
swer with the Slagirite, To Sf EN noiOYN tSto o NOY£ 
Ifxarov — If this be allowed, it should seem, where Sen- 
sation and Intellection appear to concur, that Sen- 
sation was of Many, Intellection was of One; that 
Sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive; In- 
tellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once. 

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, we shall find 
at the Circumference that they are many ; at the Center 
that they are one. Let us then suppose Sense and 
Mind to view the came Radii, only let Sense view them 

if. 



366 HERMES. 

^^J zcithout cjeparting from the unity and 
permanence of its own nature, 

Anb 



at the Circumference ; Mind at the Center ; and hence 
we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even 
where they jointly appear to operate in perception of 
the same object. 

There is another Act of the Mind, the very re. 
verse of that here mentioned ; an "Act, by which it per- 
ceives not one in many, Jbut mamy in one. This is that 
mental Separation, of which we have given some account 
ii the first Chapter of this Book ; that Resolution or 
Analysis which enables us to investigate the Causes, and 
Principles, and Elements of things. It is by Virtue of 
this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular At- 
tribute, and make it by itself the Subject of philosophi- 
cal Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be 
difficult for particular Sciences to exist ; because other- 
wise they would be as much blended, as the several At- 
tributes of sensible Substances. How, for example, 
could there be such a Science as Optics, were we necessi- 
tated to contemplate Colour concreted with Figure, two 
Attributes which the Eye ran never view, but assoeiated ? 
I mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, 
some of which still present, themselves, whenever we look 
o-;i any coloured Body. 

Those 



Book the Third. 367 

And thus we see the Process by which ch * IV * 
we arrive at general Ideas ; for the 

Per- 



Those two noble Sciences, Arithmetic and Geome- 
try, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this 
separative Power. They are both conversant about 
Quantity; Geometry about continuous Quantity, 
Arithmetic about Discrete.., Extension is essential to 
continuous Quantity , Monads, or Units, to Discrete. 
By separating from the infinite Individuals, with which 
we are surrounded, those infinite Accidents, by which 
they are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple 
and perfectly similar Units, which being combined 
make Number, and are the Subject of Arithmetic. — 
Again, by separating from Body every possible subor- 
dinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Ex- 
tension of Length, Breadth, and Thickness, (of which 
were it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we 
arrive at that pure and unmixed Magnitude, the con- 
templation of whose properties makes the Science of 
Geometry. 

By the same analytical or separate Power, we inves- 
tigate Definitions of all kinds, each one of which i9 a 
developed Word, as the same Word is an inveloped Defi- 
nition. 

To conclude — Is Composition and Division con. 

tISTI 



368 II ERME S. 

° h 'iL P erce ptions hefe mentioned are in fact 
no other. In these too we perceive 
the objects of Science and real 
Knowledge, which can by no means 
be, but of that which is general, and de- 
finite, and fixt(g). Here too even In- 
dividuals, 



sists the whole of science, composition making 
Affirmative Truth, and shewing us things under 
their Similarities and Identities; Division making 
Negative Truth, and presenting them to us under 
their Dissimilarities and Diversities. 

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question. — 
If all Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Sci- 
ence as well to compound as to separate, may we not say 
that those Philosophers took Half of Wisdom for the 
Whole, who distinguished it from Wit, as if Wisdom 
only separated, and Wit only brought together ? — Yet 
so held the Philosopher of Malmsbury, and the Author 
of the Essay on the Human Understanding. 

(S) The very Etymologies of the Words EniXTHMH, 
Scientia, and Understanding, may serve in some de- 
gree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of 
those Beings, their true and proper Objects. HniSTH- 

MH wvo/A«rai, 5<a to Ell I S ZTA2IN k, 8fo» Tw» w^ay/xaTav 

aytnt 






Book the Third. 569 

dividuals, however of themselves un- ch - IV - 
knowable, become objects of Know- 
ledge, 



«yr/v rivals tvs aogiriscs r^ (xstx^oayis ruv I<7n £«.?£«? a.tta.yacci.'' 
v> y<xe ItrirvtiAV) -ete£< ri y.xQoXa r^ a^trocitluroc axra.y!vtracr 
Science (EillSTHMH) has its name from bringing us (Em 
2TA2IN) to some Stop and Boundary of things, taking 
us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Par- 
ticulars ; for it is conversant about Subjects, that are ge- 
neral, and invariable. Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. 
p. 21. 

This Etymology given by Blcmmides, and long be- 
fore him adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally 
from Plato, as may be seen in the following account of 
it from his Cratylus, In this Dialogue Socrates, having 
first (according to the Ileraditean Philosophy, which 
Cratylus favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words 
With a view to that Flore and unceasing Mutation, sup- 
posed by Hcraclitus to run thro' all things, at length 
changes his System, and begins to etymologize from 
another, which supposed something in nature to be per- 
manent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds 

2xo7rw//.rv o\j, If ocvruiv uvxaxQovtis zr^u/rov fxiv t«to to ovopx 
TW EmiTHMHN us a(j.q>tG6>>ov fY<, x^ {aoAXm totxt cfr.fj.ahif 
yt on I2TH2IN 19/xa/v ETII tc/V zy^xyfjixat t^v -^vyr,*, 7) on 
W(Airi£i$ifsTau. Let us consider, then (says he) some of 
the very Words already examined ; and in the first place. 
B b the 



370 H E R M E S. 

Ch. IV. 1 edge, as far as their nature will per- 
mit. For then only may any Particu- 
lar 



the Word Science ; how disputable isJhis (as to its for- 
mer Etymology) how much more naturally does it appear 
to signify^ that it Stops the Soul at things, than that 
it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. 
Edit. Serr. 

The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, 
was a strange one of his own making in the former part 
of the Dialogue, adapted to thejlowing System of Hera- 
clitus there mentioned. According to this notion, he 
had derived EniSTHMH from eW0«< and ^wiv, as if it 
kept along with things, by perpetually following them in 
their motions. See Plato as before, p. 412. 

As to Scientia, we are indebted to Scaliger for the 
following ingenious etymology. Ratiocinatio motus 
quidam est : Scientia, quics : unde et nomen^ turn apud 
Gratcos, turn etiam nostrum, Tla,£oL rl Em I2TA20AI, 
EI1ISTHMH. Sistitur enim mentis agitatio f et Jit species 
in animo. Sic Latinum Scientia, St/ y/W«/ 2XE2I2 TOT 
ONTOS. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex ab usu 
abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis partkipiis 
idem adjunxerunt. Audiens, ayteuv uv. Scicns, Gyvi uh 
Seal, in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17. 

4 The 



Book the Third. 371 

lav be said to be known, when by assert- Ch. IV. 
ing it to be a Man, or an Animal, or the 
B b 2 like, 



The English Word, Understanding, means not so 
properly Knowledge, as that Faculty of the Soul, where 
Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, 
that the framers of this Word intended to represent it as 
a kind of firm Basis, on which the fair Structure of 
Sciences was to rest, and which was supposed to stand 
under them, as their immoveable Support. 

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether 
they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors 
to have considered Science and Understanding, not 
us fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather 
as steady, permanent, and durable Comprehensions. — 
But if so, wc must somewhere or other find for them 
certain steady, permanent, and durable Objects; since 
if Perception of any kind be different from the 
thing perceived, (whether it perceive straight as 
crooked, or crooked as straight; the moving as fixed, 
or the fixed as moving) such perception must of ne- 
cessity be erroneous and false. The following pas- 
sage from a Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again 
hereafter) seems on the present occasion not without its 

Weight — Ei J$-i yvuxTis aKfi(sES-e'f# Ths durOvta-eus, tty av •k. yvx- 
5-a d?.v)9erifx ruv etto-farZi/. Tf there be A K.NOWLEDG r. more 

accurate 



372 HERMES, 

Ch. IV. like, we refer it to some such compre- 
hensive, or general Idea. 

Now it is of these comprehensive 
and permanent Ideas, the ge- 
nuine Perceptions ofpureMind, 
that Words of all Languages, however 
different, are the Symbols. And 
hence it is, that as the Perceptions 
include, so do these their Symbols ex- 

pressy 



accurate than Sensation there must be certain objects of 
such knowledge more true than objects of Sense. 

The following then are Questions worth considering, 
— What these Objects are? — Where they reside? — And 
how they are to be discovered ? — Not by experimental 
Philosophy it is plain ; for that meddles with nothing, but 
what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable — nor even by 
the more refined and rational speculation of Mathematics ; 
for this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects 
for granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our 
own Minds, (and who, that has never looked there, can 
affirm they do not ?) then will the advice of the Satirist 
be no ways improper, 

— — NEC TE QU^SSIVERIS EXTRA. 

Vers. 



Book the Third. 373 

press, not this or that set of Particulars ch - 1V - 
only, but all indifferently, as they happen 
to occur. Were therefore the Inhabi- 
tants of Salisbury to be transferred to 
York, tho' new particular objects would 
appear on every side, they would still 
no more want a new Language to ex- 
plain themselves, than they would want 
new Minds to comprehend what they 
beheld. All indeed, that they would . 
want, would be the local proper Names; 
which Names, as we have said alrea- 
dy*, are hardly a part of Language, 
but must equally be learnt both by 
learned and unlearned, as often as they 
change the place of their abode. 

It is upon the same principles wc 
may perceive the reason, why the dead 
Languages (as we call them) are now 
intelligible; and why the Language of 
modern England is able to describe 
B 1) 8 antient 



Sup. p. 345. 



374 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. antient Rome; and that of antient Rome 
to describe modern England^, But of 
these matters we have spoken before. 

§ 2. And now having viewed the 
Process, by which we acquire general 
Ideas, let us begin anew from other 
Principles, and try to discover (if we 
can prove so fortunate) whence it is that 
these Ideas originally come. If we can 
succeed here, we may discern perhaps, 
what kind of Beings they are, for this at 
present appears somewhat obscure. 

Let 



(*) As far as Human Nature 9 and the primary Genera 
both of Substance and Accident are the same in all places, 
and have been so thro' all ages : so far all Languages 
share one common Identity. As far as peculiar 
species of Substance occur in different regions ; and 
much more, as far as the positive Institutions of religious 
and civil Polities are every where different ; so far each 
Language has its peculiar Diversity. To the Causes of 
Diversity here mentioned, may be added the distinguish- 
ing Character and Genius of every Nation^ concerning 
which wc shall speak hereafter. 



Book the Third. 375 

Let us suppose any man to look for Ch. IV. 
the first time upon some Work of Art, 
as for example upon a Clock; and 
having sufficiently viewed it, at length 
to depart. Would he not retain, when 
absent, an Idea of what he had seen ? — 
And what is it, to retain such Idea? — 
It is to have a Form internal corres- 
pondent to .the external; only with 
this difference, that the Internal Form is 
devoid of the Matter; the External is 
united with it, being seen in the metal, 
the wood, and the like. 

Now if we suppose this Spectator to 
view many such Machines, and not sim- 
ply to view, but to consider every part 
of them, so as to comprehend how these 
parts all operate to one End, he might 
be then said to possess a kind of in- 
telligible Form, by which he would 
not only understand, and know the 
Clocks, which he had seen already, but 
every Work also of like Sort, which he 
might see hereafter. — Should it be 
13 b 4 asked, 



376 HERMES. 

Cb. IV. asked, " which of these Forms is prior, 
" the External and Sensible, or the In- 
" ternal and Intelligible ;" the Answer 
is obvious, that the prior is the Sensible. 

Thus then we see, there are in- 
telligible Forms, which to the 
Sensible are subsequent. 

But farther still — If these Machines 
be allowed the Work not of Chance, but 
of an Artist, they must be the Work of 
one, who knew what he was about. And 
what is it, to work, and know what one is 
about ?~It is to have an Idea of what 
one is doing; to possess a Form inter- 
nal, corresponding to the external, 
to which external it serves for an Exem- 
plar or Archetype. 

Here then we have an intelligi- 
ble Form, which is prior to the 
sensible Form; which, being truly 
prior as well in dignity as in time, can no 

more 



Book the Third. 377 

more become subsequent, than Cause can Ch. IV. 
to Effect. ^^ 

Thus then, with respect to Works 
of Art, we may perceive, if we attend, 
a triple Order of Forms; one Or- 
der, intelligible and previous to these 
Works ; a second Order, sensible and con- 
comitant ; and a third again, intelligible 
and subsequent. After the first of these 
Orders the Maker may be said to work; 
thro' the second, the Works themselves 
exist, and are what they are; and in the 
third they become recognized, as mere 
Objects of Contemplation. To make 
these Forms by different Names more 
easy to be understood; the first may be 
called the Maker's Form; the se- 
cond, that of the Subject; and the 
third, that of the Coxtemplator. 

Let us pass from hence to Works of 
Nature. Let us imagine ourselves 
viewing some diversified Prospect; " a 
4; Plain, for example, spacious and fer- 

" file: 



378 H E R M E S. 

Ch. IV. •« tile ; a river winding thro' it ; by the 
" banks of that river, men walking, and 
" cattle grazing ; the view terminated 
" with distant hills, some craggy, and 
" some covered with wood/' Here it 
is plain we have plenty of Forms na- 
tural. And could any one quit so 
fair a Sight, and retain no traces of 
what he had beheld ? — And what is it, 
to retain traces of what one has beheld? 
— It is to have certain Forms inter- 
nal correspondent to the external, 
and resembling them in every thing, 
except the being merged in Matter. And 
thus, thro' the same retentive and col- 
lective Powers, the Mind becomes 
fraught with Forms natural, as before 
with Forms artificial. — Should it be 
asked, " zvhich of these natural Forms 
" are prior, the External ones viewed hj 
" the Senses, or the Internal existing in 
" the MindY' the Answer is obvious, 
that the prior are the External. 

This 



Book the Third. 379 

Thus therefore in Nature, as well Ch.iv. 
as in Art, there are intelligi- 
ble Forms, which to the sensible 
are subsequent. Hence then we 
see the meaning; of that noted School 
Axiom, Nil est in Intellectu quod 
non prius fuit in Sensu; an Axiom, 
which we must own to be so far allow- 
able, as it respects the Ideas of a mere 
Contemplator. 

But to proceed somewhat farther — 
Are natural Productions made by 
Chance, or by Design ? — Let us ad- 
mit by Design, not to lengthen our in- 
quiry. They arc certainly* more ex- 
quisite than any Works of Art, and 
yet these we cannot bring ourselves to 
suppose made by Chance. — Admit it, 
and what follows? — We must of necessi- 
ty admit a Mind also, because Design 
implicsMixD, wherever it is to be found. 
Allowing therefore this, what do vre 

mean 



» A fist, dt Part. Animal. L. I. c. 



380 HERM ES. 

Cb. IV. mean by the Term, Mind ? — We mean 
something, which, when it acts, knows 
what it is going to do ; something stored 
with Ideas of its intended Works, agreea- 
bly to which Ideas those Works are fa- 
shioned. 

That such Exemplars, Patterns, 
Forms, Ideas, (call them as you 
please) must of necessity be, requires no 
proving, but follows of course, if we 
admit the Cause of Nature to be a 
Mind, as above mentioned. For take 
away these, and what a Mind do we 
leave without them? Chance surely 
is as knowing, as Mind without 
Ideas; or rather Mind without 
Ideas is no less blind than Chance. 

The Nature of these Ideas is not 
difficult to explain, if we once come to 
allow a possibility of their Existence. 
That they are exquisitely beautiful, va- 
rious, and orderly, is evident from the 
exquisite Beauty, Variety, and Order, 

seen 



Book the Xhird. 381 

seen in natural Substances, which are Ch. IV» 
but their Copies or Pictures, That they v- " v "*" / 
are mental is plain, as they are of the Es- 
sence of Mind, and consequently no 
Objects to any of the Senses, nor there- 
fore circumscribed either by Tifne or 
Place. 

Here then, on this System, we have 
plenty of Forms intelligible, 

WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL 

Forms sensible. Here too we see 
that Nature is not defective in her 
triple Order, having (like Art) her 
Forms previous, her Concomi- 
tant, and her Subsequent 1 ^. 

That 



(0 SimpliciuS) in his commentary upon the Predica- 
ments, calls thcjirst Order of these intelligible Forms, 
roc. <et£« rris (AeOiZivsi those previous to Participation^ and 
at other times, r> l&rnuitn Kottirns', the transcendent Uni- 
versality or Sameness; the second Order he calls ra h 
fjn9t^ny those which exist in Participation, that is, those 
merged in Matter; and at "other times, he calls them 

■n x.x- 



382 HERMES. 

Ch. IV. That the previous may be justly so 
called is plain, because they are essen- 
tially 



% xxrccTsrx'ypt.hv) xoivorys, the subordinate Universality or 
Sameness ; lastly, of the third Order he says, that they 
have no independent existence of their own, but that — 

7}[X,s7s CCtptXoVTZS (XVTCC. Iv TCC4S Yi^TsecilS IvVOlXIS, KxP SXVToi 

yTrer^o-a/xEv, we ourselves abstracting them in our own Ima- 
ginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence 
as of themselves. Sinip. in Prasdic. p. 17. In another 
place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, 
yet still conformable to the same doctrine — MuVors h rgir- 
tov Awlsov to kohiov, to /xsv IJ^iogYiiAtvov ruv x.tx.9' iyitxrot, >£ oiirtov 

Tr)S Iv aVToTs XOIVOTYiTOS, KOCTCC TnV [AttXV ItZVTii (pva-iv, ueirze >£j 

rris otxtpGgoTWTos xoctol T'/jv tsoXvei'Sy) , E7£o^?j\J//v — oevTsgov oe lart 
to xotvov, to cLiro koivS diria roTs ^ixtpogois I'/oW/v hotooixsyov, }£ 
hv7ioiex ov avroii — t^/tov $e, to Iv rx7s vests' gxts Sixvoiscis II; 
a.$ccigk<jius vpt<rra[jisvov, va-rsgoyEvssov — Perhaps therefore K6 
must admit a triple Order of what is Universal 
and the Same; that of the first Order, transcendent and 
superior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is 
the cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro 1 its 
multiform preconception it is the cause of their Diversity 
— that of the second Order, tekat is infused from the first 
universal Cause into the various Species of Beings, and 
irfiich has its existence in those several Species — 4hat of the 
third Order, what subsists by abstract ten in our own Un- 
derstandings, being of subsequent origin to the other tzco. 
Ibid. p. 21. 

To 



Book the Third. 3S3 

tially prior to all things else. The whole ch - IV « 
visible World exhibits nothing 

more 



To Simpiicius we &hall add the two following Quota- 
tions from Ammonius and Nicephorus Blemmzdes, which 
we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their 
uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doc- 
trine here advanced, and the works of these authors are 
not easy to be procured. 

'EvvosiirQiJ TOt'nrv ^xxlv\tos ris lx}v<jru(AX £%^v, £< rvyja^ 
'A^i^eus, tCj xnglx zsoWx ZTXcxxEifXEvx' o <$e H>X7£lv\i<&> atygx- 
yiCJiru rtss *»}£«? tsxvlxs' vstgov 1$e rts zlcrtXQuv j£ ^exctx^ev^* 
rx xygtx, \-ni<?r\?xs on tzxvlx a| avor titrit IxIWs^ai©', e^e'tw 
•cra^' avrw to IxlvitufMt ry ^txvotx. e H rotwv o-<pgxyls r> Iv rui 
XxKTvXt'u Xsytrxi TWO TON nOAAHN eIvxc v) 1$e Iv rois xmgtms, 
EN TOIX riOAAOIS" r] $e ev tti Sixvoix tb a.7rofji.x^XfxEve, Ell I 
T0I2 nOAAOIS, t£j l<rz%oytvv)s. TSro v.v IvvotiaQu iC, Itti txi 
ytvwv ■>£. IttHuv' o yxg ^(Aie^yts, 'zjoiuv 'zjxvtx, iyjt tsxg ieevrSt 
rx. zsxvruv zjxox^ily^xrx' otov, zjoimv a»9^i7rov, f%ei to tioas 
isxq exvtw t« xvO^utth, zjgos o a$o(>uv, rzxvrxs tzoiu. 'Et 01 
TtS hfx'tv) Xiyuv, us tsx. hcrt zyx^x tZ Avvu^yw rx tiSv), dxaeru 
rxZrx, us o Ayfjuvgyos or^iv^yii, v) hdus rx lir xvra Zr.^xt- 
egynfAtvx, v) ex lidus. 'AAA' h [xh y.y hous, hk xv H>v){xizgyriaEi. 
Tts yxg, fj.tkXwv z?9ir)TEiv ri, uyvoli • y.tKhtt zjuniv) it yxg, us n 



384 HERME S, 

Ch ; IV. more, than so many passing Pictures of 
these immutable Archetypes. Nay thro' 

these 



(pvcris, aXoyw ^vvdc^i moist' (oQsv ^ iroiti ^ (pvcris, vk tp/favHca 
yvu<?iy.ws tw yiyvojxsvu) 'E< oe t< xoiQ' 'sl-iv Xoyixriv zroisT, oi^stSH 
isuvrtos to yiyvo^svov lit* avru. 'E* roivvv (avj %£<fov, 79 nxroi 
av9gu>7rov, Qsos ttoisi, oi^e to vtt' auT« yiyvopsvov' h %s oi^sv o 
TSQisi, avroQi t^Aov, us s^iv Iv tw A*j/x*g£yw ra s<oV "Es^ o*e to 
ei^oi" |v tw Av)[Aizgyu, us Iv tw SaxlvX/w rvitos' j£ Xsyerxt t«t« 
to sISos riPO TfXN nOi^AHN, Kf x«?To» «*«* »*»*■ * E S*< ^e *• 
sT^oj t5 otvOeuim yL h roTs xafl' sytot^ov ocvBeuirois, lis ra lv to« 
y.ygots \yl\vitu\j.xrx' *) Xlysroci roc roioivrx EN TOIX nOA- 
A0I2 tlvxi, •£; d^ueiTX rvs vXns. Qsxa-x^svoi Ss t«S x«t* 
{aepo? dyBquiras, on tzavrss to auTo slcta* t« dv^qufra synatv 
{us lirl tS yfS|ov JaQovto?, j^ Sea<7#/x.!vtf ra yene'ioc) dvs(AX^tifAs9» 
dvro h'rn <Wvo/V jc Xs'yETa; t«to EHI TOI2 I10AAOI2, yyovv 

[aetcc. roc -CToAAa, y£j vrseoysvis- Intelligaiur cumulus^ qui ali- 
cujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem insculptam habeat : multx 
insuper cerce sinl, el ah annulo imprimantur : venial de- 
lude quispi&m, vidcalque ceras omnes unius anriuli impres- 
stone formataS) annulique impress ionem in mente eonlineat : 
sigillum annulo insculptum, ante mult a dicetur : in cc- 
rulis impressum, in multis ; quod vcro in illius^ qui illo 
xencrat inlclligeniia rcmanserit^ post multa. ct poste* 

iius 



Book the Third. 385 

these it attains even a Semblance of Ch. IV. 

Immortality, 



rius gentium dieetur. Idem in generibus et formis intel- 
ligcndum censeo ; etenim tile optimus procreator mundi 
DeuSf omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud 
sc : ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam 
habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cceteros facial 
oynnes. At si quis restitcrit, dicatque rerum formas apud 
Creatorem non esse ': quccso ut diligenter attendat : Opi- 
fex, quce facit, vel cognoscit, vet ignorat : sed is, qui 
nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciei : quis enim id facere 
aggreditur, quod facere ignorat ? Neque enim facilitate 
quddam rationis experte aliquid aget, prout agit natura 
(ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, ctsi qucefaciat 
non advertat;) Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, 
quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur 
Deus non ppjore ratione, quam noma, facit quid, quce 
fecit cognovit: si cognovit quce fecit, in ipso rerum for- 
mas esse perspicuum est. forma: autem in opijice sunt 
pcrinde ac in annulo sigillum, htccquc forma (ANTE multa, 
et avulsa a materia dicitur. At qui hominis species i/t 
unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilta in 
ceris ; et in multis, nee avulsa a materia dicitur. At 
cam singula* homines animo conspicimus, et eandem in 
unoquoque fermam atque effigiem videmus, ilia cfligics in 
mrntc nostra insidens post multa, et posterius genita 
dieetur : veluti in ilio quoquc dicebamus, qui multa sigillu 
in cerd uno eteodem annulo imprcssa conspexerat. Amnion. 
in Porphyr. Introdttct. p. 29. b. 

AiyoyU' 

' Cc 



386 HERME S. 

Ch. IV. Immortality, and continues throughout 



ages 



Asyovlxi tie ri yiv» x) ra. tiifa UFO TflN riOAAHN, EN 
TOIS HOAAOI2, Em TOIS nOAAOIS- olov hwiio-Bu rt 
<T<pgxyi<rv)giov, expv t£j litlv<jrcj{Aoc. to rvyov, l| a x»g/a ctoAXcx 
f^craXaCtTo; tS ex'Ww/aizt©', xxi rts vir o^/tv xyxyiru rxvra, 
f*.* , 3T£0xa;TJ0 > wv fAij^' oAws- to (j(p^a,ytS't\qiot' eugaxus $e ra iv o<j 
•To IvAvTtujxoc., »£ Ign^^o-ar ot; zsuvIol tS at»T« ^iriyHara IxJuww- 
pta&r®-, x^ ri oNixavrat -croXXa r*J Xoyu crwocOgoicrxs eh h, ex* r( ° 
tSto kxtx titxvotxv. To //Jv av atpgxytr'rigiov tIkoj^x Xiysrxi 
TYPO TflN nOAAHN- to 5' Iv rots xngiots, EN TOIS nOA- 
AOIS* to o^e l| auTaiv y.a,rx\io(pQev , K, KO.ro. Zixvotxv xvXus 
1%'oto.v, EI1I TOIS riOAAOIS. "O'jt^s av x} t* ysvu x} ra, 
t\1* nPO TAN I10AAAN /aev e<s-<v ev tu A*}/x.<afyo/, xaTit Tas 
•CTOiiiTiKay Xoyaj" Iv too Qsui ycig o\ H<rto7toiot Xoyoi ruv ovruv 
hiatus iBgovtyE$-r))tsi(Ti } x«9' hs Xoyas o iiTTs^aV*©' to. bvias ziavlx 
•*L ZJgowgttrs 5c 'ZJxgriyxytv' vtyy-yxivxt tis Xsyovlxt to, ylw) x) T* 
j;^ EN T0I2 nOAAOlS, Sion h roTs koto. pjg©« JUBfatauf 

TO T« a.vQp'MTrU El^OS ETl, yt. TOIS KXTO, (jLS0&> lUTtOlS TO T« llTTTa 

s\$&>' h avQguTrois Is, Kj 'tvnrois, xj rois aXXots tyots to yev©* 

EVglorxETXt TiOV TOtiruV EJ^WV, OTTEf £f< TO £iov' X«V TO(V £wOi<? 

opta x^ To?? fyotyvrois to y.xQo\tx.u)Tzcov yh®*i T0 XKrvyTiaov, 
i^ETai^ETxr <jvv*y$hrm tis x} t£v (puTi/v, Se^e^tou to i'pc\J/y- 

36*' 



Book the Third. 387 

as;es to be specifically oxe, amid Ch.iv. 

v- — j 

C c 2 those 



ypv' i) §e avv rots l^^vyon IQstet ns Inxicnco'ffiTv 'Z, rx a.-\vya, 1 
ro tru^x avfj.'TKx.v •/.xro-^zrxi' avv^^x^Hauv §e ro7s hgnixivois ruv 
xa-uyLxruv vaiwv, ro ztgwrov yzv<&> tyxidrxi x^ ytvixurxlov' >£} 
i'ro/ (jt.lv EN T012 II0AA0I2 v^eY^xe rx, e<5>j ■>£. rx ysvn. K«- 
rxXxQuv o^i t/j ex rwyxara //.££©' xvOguirav rr,v xvruJv<P"j<7iv,rr,v 
xvBgwnoTriTx, Ik dl ruv kxtx /ae^©- I'wTr&'v «'jtw t^v JiwroTJira, >£ 
«tottov x.x9okn xvOguvrov, x^ tov xa#oA.« \ r n , nov\'n wmaxs >c to xa- 
0oA« ^ft/ov ex t£v xat,9iy.xrx ru \oyw avvxyxyuv' k, ro kx9oKh x'tr- 
9v)TiX.o)i, •<£. to xadoAa e/x-vj/v^ov, j£ ro xaSoAy a^a, ;£ T^y x«9oA<- 
xwTaT*jv tscrtxi IJ- xirxvrujv (rv\Xoyi(7X[ji.Ev&' } o roiaros lv rr\ 
tX'jTu Sixvoicc rx ytvn x^ rx s't'^v xvXus vnsrvczy Em TOIL 
nOAAOIX, tsteV', perx rx zso^Kx vCj v<?ycoytvxs. Genera verb 
ct Species dicuntur esse ante multa, in multis, post 
multa. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillujn, quamlibct figuram 
habcns, ex quo mitltce cerce ejusdem figures sint participes, 
et in medium aliquis has prqferet, nequaquam proviso s/gii- 
lo. Cum an tern xidisset eas cents in quibusfigura expri- 
mitur, et animadxertisstt o/nnes candem figuram participare, 
et qua-, videbantur mult<r, ra/ione in nnum cucgissct, hoc in 
mtnte teneat. Nempe sigillum dicitur ease species ANTE 
multa : ilia xcro in ceri.s, EM MULTIS ; qua: zero ab lis de- 
sumitur. et in mente immaterialitcr subsist it , post multa. 
Sic igitur ct Genera et Species ANTE multa in Creature 
sunt, secundum rationed efficients. In Deo enim rerum 

tffectrkes 



388 HERMES. 

Cb. IV. those infinite particular changes, that 
befal it every moment^). 

May 



effect rices rationes una et simpliciter prce-existunt ; secun- 
dum quas rationes Me supra-substantialis omncs res et 
prccdestinavit et produxit, Existere autem dicuntur Ge- 
nera et Species in multis, quoniam in singulis hominibus 
hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In ha- 
?ninibus ceque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus hivenitur 
harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam 
una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensiti- 
vum exquiritur. Additis vero plant is t spectatur Genus ani- 
roatum. Si verb una cum animatis quisquam relit perscru- 
tari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem 
entia incorporea conjunctafuerint Us modo tractatis, appa- 
rebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem 
in multis subsist unt Genera et Species. Comprehendens 
vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsa?n hu- 
manam.y et ex singulis equis ipsam equinum, atque ila uni- 
versalem hominem et unive>salcm equum considcrans, et 
universale animal ex singulis ratione coll/gens, et universale 
sensitivmn, et universale animatuni, ct universale corpus, et 
maxime universale ens ex omnibus coll/gens, hie, inquam, in 
sud mente Genera et Species immaterialiter const it uit 
KII TOI2 nOAAOlS, hoc est, post multa, et posterius 
genita. JSIiceph. F)lcm. Log. Kpit. p. G'2. Vid. etiam 
Alcii.i. in Platonic. Philosoph. Introduc. ('. IX. X. 



( A '> The following elegant lines of Virgil arc worth 
attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than 
Bees. 

Lrgo 



Book the Third. 389 

May we be allowed then to credit Cb. IV. 
those speculative Men, who tell us, " it 
C c 3 " is 



Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus ccvi 
Excipiat ; (neque enim plus septima ducitur wlas) 
At Genus immortale manet G. IV. 

The same Immortality, that is, the Immortality of the 
Kind, may be seen in all perishable substances, whether 
animal or inanimate ; for tho' individuals perish, the 
several Kinds still remain. And hencc 3 if we take Time, 
as denoting the system of things temporary, we may col- 
lect the meaning of that passage in the Timoeus, where 

the philosopher describe Time to be ^ivo»r^ aiwv&> 

iv hi Ka.T ugiQ^ov Itio-xv aiuviov Iikqvx. JEternitatis in uno 
permanentis Imaginem quondam, certis numerorum articu- 
lis progrcdicntem. Plat.V. III. p. 37. Edit.Serran. 

We have subjoined the following extract from Boe- 
thius, to serve as a commentary on this description of 
Time. — JEternitas igitur est, intcrminabilis vitce tota 
simnl et perfect a possessio* Quod ex collatiane tempora- 
Uum clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in tempore, id 
■prtesens a prateritis in futura procedit : uihilque est in tem- 
pore ita constitution, quod latum vide sua; spatium paritcr 
possit amplccli ; scd crust in urn quidem iiondinn apprchendit, 
he sternum vero jam perdidit. In hodierna quoque vita non 
impliiu vivitis, quam in ilia nwbili transitorioque momenta. 

Quod 



390 HERMES. 

rh 'w "^ z/? these permanent and comprehen- 
u sive Forms that the Deity views at 
" 07^ce, without looking abroad, all pos- 
" sible productions both present, past, and 
''future — that this great and stupendous 
" View is but a View of himself \ where. all 
" things lie inveloped in their Principles 
" and Exemplars, as being essential to the 

"fulness 



Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet mud, sicut 
de mwido censuit Aristoteles, nee cxperit unquam esse, nee 
desinat, vitaquc ejus cum temporis infinitatc tendatur, non- 
dum tamen tale est, ut (sternum esse jure credatur. Non, 
enim ■ to turn simul infinites licet vitce spatium comprehendit , 
atque complcctitur, sed futura nondum transacta jam non 
habet. Quod igitur inter minabilis vitce plenitudinem totam 
pariter comprehendit, acpossidet, cui neque futuri quidquam 
absit, nee presteritijluxcrit, id sternum esse jure pcrhibe- 
fur : idque neeesse est, et sui compos prcesens sibi semper 
(issistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere prccsentem. 
Unde quidam non recta, qui cum audiunt visum Platoni, 
wundum hunc nee habuisse initium, nee habiturum esse de- 
ject urn, hoc modo conditori conditum mundumjieri co-ueter 
■nun pu fan t. Aliud est enim per intermix abilem duci 
vitam, {quod Mundo Pla/o tribuit) aliud interminabi- 

i.H VIT/E TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PR.ESEXTIAM, 

quod Divinx Mentis proprium esse manifestum est, Nequc 

enim 



Book the Third. 391 

"fulness of his universal Intellect ion t ,f 7^'^? 
— If so, it will be proper that we invert 
the Axiom before mentioned. We 

must now say Nil est in Sensu, 

quod non prius fuit in Intellects 
For tho' the contrary may be true with 
respect to Knowledge merely human, 
yet never can it be true with respect to 
C c 4 Know- 



etiim Dcus conditis rebus antiquior tideri debet temporis 
quantitate, sed simplkis potius proprietate naturae. HuncJ 

ENIM VITyE IMMOBILIS PRESENT A RIUM STATUM, INFFNI- 
TUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR ; CUm- 

que cum ejfingere, atquc ccquare non possit, ex immobilitate 
deficit in motum ; e.r simplialate prcescjrfice decrescit in in- 
Jinitam j'uturi ac prcetcrici quantitatem ; et, cum totam pa- 
riter vitce sua: plenitudinem nequeat possidcre, hoc ipso, quod 
aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud, quod implcrc at que 
exprimere non potest, aliquatcnus vidctur ccmulari, alligans 
se ad qualemcunque pra?sentiam hujus exigui volucrisquc 
momenti: qua', quoniam manentis illius pr.esenti/e 
QUANDAM G EST AT IMAGIMEM, quibuscumquc contigerit, id 
prcrsfat, ui esse lidcanlur. Quoniam icro manere non 
potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arr/puit ; coque modo fac- 
tum est, ut continuakf.t vitam eundo, cujns plenitudi- 
nem complect i. mm xaluit perm an en do. Itaque, &C. De 
Oonsolat. Philosoph. L, V. 




HERMES. 

Knowledge universally, unless we give 
Precedence to Atoms and lifeless 
Body, making Mind, among other 
things, to be struck out by a lucky Con- 
course. 

§ 3. It is far from the design of this 
Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is 
the Hypothesis of our latter Metaphy- 
sicians. But yet it is somewhat re- 
markable, in their several Systems, 
how readily they admit of the above 
Precedence. 

For mark the Order of things, ac- 
cording to their account of them. — 
First comes that huge Body the sensi- 
ble World. Then this and its Attributes 
beget sensible Ideas. Then out of sen- 
sible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and 
pruning, are made Ideas intelligible, 
whether specific or general. Thus should 
they admit that Mind was coeval 
with Body, yet till Body gave it Ideas, 

and 



Book the Third. 393 

and awakened its dormant Powers, it Ch. IV. 
could at best have been nothing more, 
than a sort of dead Capacity ; for in- 
nate ideas it could not possibly have 
any. 

At another time we hear of Bodies 
so exceedingly fine, that their very Exi- 
lity makes them susceptible of sensation 
and knowledge ; as if they shrunk into 
Intellect by their exquisite subtlety, 
which rendered them too delicate to 
be Bodies any longer. It is to this no- 
tion we owe many curious inventions, 
such as subtle JEther, animal Spirits, 
nervous Ducts, Vibrations, and the like ; 
Terms, which modern Philosophy, 
upon parting with occult Qualities, has 
found expedient to provide itself, to 
supply their place. 

But the intellectual Scheme, which 
never forgets Deity, postpones every 
thing corporeal to the primary mental 

Cause 



394 HERMES. 

Cb. IV. Cause. , It is here it looks for the origin 
of intelligible Ideas, even of those, 
which exist in human Capacities. For 
tho' sensible Objects may be the des- 
tined medium, to awaken the dormant 
Energies of Mans Understanding, yet 
are those Energies themselves no more 
contained in Sense, than the Explosion 
of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave 
it fire (0. 

In 



CV The following Note is taken from a Manuscript 
Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted be- 
fore, p. 371.) upon the Pkcedo of Plato ; which, tho' per- 
haps some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine 
of Platonic Reminiscence, yet it certainly gives a better 
account how far the Senses assist in the acquisition of 
Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers. 

. OuSettots yxg roc y^i^oj k, Szvrsgx <%gx<x,t v) dirloci hen ruv 
xgsirlovujv h\ds o*e7 yiL rxTs syxvxXi'ois It-vyncrscn zsuQtcrQai, ^ ug- 
yw hirsTv Tviv dZio-Qricnv rr>s lm<?v)[AV)s, Ae|o/x,£v aurw «f %t)v *X 
cos T30iY)Ti>Lw, «AA' ojs IgEQiQtO'xv rvv 4)[as1e£xv ^vxpiv els' dvtxy.vn- 
<nv twv xaSoAs — Hard ra.v%v <$t rriv lyvoixv ligyirai k, to tvTi- 
t*,x!u>, on dt' ovpe.vs Yy axons tow tpiXoerotytxs liroeierxfAsQci yis^. 
dtori ex Twv diaQnrwv els dva^vvenv d(pixv»[A.s9x. Those things, 
which are inferior and secondary, arc by no means the 
2 Principles 



Book the Third. 395 

In short all Minds, that are, are Ch.IV. 
Similar and Congenial ; and so 

too 



Principles or Causes of the more excellent ; and though we 
admit the common interpretations, and allozo Sense to be 
a Principle of Science, we must, however, call it a Prin- 
ciple^ not as if it zoas the efficient Cause, but as it rouses 
our Sold to the Recollecton of genaral Ideas — According to 
the same way of thinking is it said in the Timcrus, that 
through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves 
Philosophy, because nee pass from ObjeCls of Sense to Re- 
miniscence or Recollection. 

And in another passage he observes — 'E^rs/c^ yx.% %sa.yw 

ftogtyov olyaXfxci £V<v r> -^'J^rt, 'ttu.iluv twv ov?wv tyjajat. Koyas, %£i~ 
Qt^ofxsvn vzro ruv atcrO-nruv uvonAifAvnaxsroci wv ev^ov tyti Xoyo/v, 
■£) T«T«f w^oCaXXfTa/. For in as much as the Soul, by con. 
taining tlie Principles of all beings, is a sort of omniform 
Representation or Exemplar ; when it is roused by 
objects of Sense, it recollects those Principles, which it 
contains within, and brings (hem forth. 

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Plctho, writes 
upon the same subject in the following manner. T^v vj,u- 

yv\v <poc<riv 01 rot, st$v) TiQifjitvot dvxhot/j.Gxvacrxv eo-ye lz7i<rr\(j.'w T#s 
sv Tojj ctHTVriToTs Xoy«r, ax^Ce'r^v avTzs I'^pvrxs >c TiXbvte^ov 
h lavry t<TXtiv, r, iv roXs ai<r8ylo7s t-^H(Ti. To av teXewte^ov t«to 
'Kj aKfiGlrtgov ax av utro Tw» olio-Qtotuv '1<t%iiv rr,v -^v^vv, I'yf //.->) 
*f<v fv avr©K. Ov S' av (j.x>$<Z{a* a?Xo9t ov aitvv t£ avTKS uixvos7a- 



396 HER M E S. 

Ch. IV. too are their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. 
Were it otherwise, there could be no 
intercourse between Man and Man, or 

(what 



Qxi' y 51 yxg 'CSEtyvx.ha.t rv}V J^vxjnv (j.v)oxtxr) ov, ri <$ixvot7<rQxi' 
Txs yxg •^evo^e'is twv do%uv sp^j [/.y ovruv xXX 1 ovrvv (jlsv, a\Xwv 
Se xaf xXXcov hvxi crvvOiCBis rtvxs, « axrx to of 9ov "y/vo/jtevar. 
AimtaQxt 5e «<£>' fTs^a? t/vox - tyvazus woWx in y^slrlovos re yl 
TsXsuregxs xpriKGiv r : r> 4 /V XV T ° rsXsurs^ov TtfTO TWV £V TO?* «/<r- 

Qnrois Xoyuv. Those who suppose Ideal Forms, say that 
the Soul, ivhen she assumes, for the purposes of Science, 
those proportions, which exist in sensible objects, possesses 
them with a svperior accuracy and perfection, than that to 
which they attain in those sensible objects. Now this superior 
Perfection or Accuracy the soul cannot have from jsensibh 
objects, as it is in fact not in them ; nor yet can she conceive 
it herself as from herself, without its having existence any 
where else. For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, 
which has existence no where, since even such opinions, as 
arc false, are all of them compositions, irregularly formed, 
not of mere Non-Bei?igs, but of various real Beings, one 
with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, 
which is superior to the Proportions existing in sensible ob- 
jects, must descend to the Soul from some other Nature, 

WHICH IS BY MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PER- 
FECT. Pleth. dc AristotcL et Platonic. Pliilosoph. Diff. 
■pdit. Ports laJl. 

The TOAOI or Proportions, ©f which Gemisiius 

here 



Book the Third. 397 

(what is more important) between Man Ch.IV. 

and God. 

For 



here speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions 
of Equality and Inequality, which exist in Quantity, 
(such as double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, 
they may be extended to mathematical Lines, Angles, 
Figures, &c. of all which A070' or Proportions, tho' we 
possess in the Mind the most clear and precise Ideas, 
yet it may be justly questioned, whether any one of 
them ever existed in the sensible world. 

To these two authors we may add Bocthius, who, 
after having enumerated many acts of the Mind or In- 
tellect, wholly distinct from Sensation, and indepen- 
dent of it, at length concludes, 

H(£c est efficicns magis, 

Longe caassa potentior, 

Quam qucv mute rice modo 

Itnpressas patitur notas. 

Mrvectdit tamcn excitant, 

Ac vires animi movent, 

Vivo in cor pore passio. 

Ciim let lux oculosj'erit, 

Velvox auribus instrepit ; 

Turn mentis vigor excitus, 

QUAS INT US SPECIES TENET, 

Ad mot us simileis vocans, 
Notts applkut ejitcris, 

InTKORSUMQUE ItECONDITIS 

I OBMIS m'usct t imagines. 

Dv Consolat Philosoph. L. V. 




HERMES. 

For what is Conversation between 
Man and Man ? — It is a mutual inter- 
course of Speaking and Hearing. — To 
the Speaker, it is to teach; to the Hear- 
er, it is to learn. — To the Speaker, it is 
to descend from Ideas to Words ; to the 
Hearer, it is to ascend from Words to 
Ideas. — If the Hearer, in this ascent, 
can arrive at no Ideas, then is he said 
not to understand ; if he ascend to Ideas 
dissimilar and heterogeneous, then is 
he said to misunderstand. — What then is 
requisite, that he may be said to un- 
derstand? — That he should ascend to 
certain Ideas, treasured up within him- 
self, correspondent and similar to those 
within the Speaker. The same may be 
said of 9, Writer and a Reader; as when 
any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or 
here or in Italy, what Euclid wrote in 
Greece two thousand years ago. 

Now is it not marvellous, there should 
be so exact an Identity of our Ideas, if 
they were only generated from sensible 

Objects, 



Book the Third. 399 

Objects, infinite in number, ever chang- ch - IV ~- 
ing, distant in Time, distant in Place, 
and no one Particular the same with 
any other ? 

Again, do we allow it possible for 
God to signify his will to Men; or for 
Men to signify their wants to God ? — 
In both these cases there must be an 
Identity of Ideas, or else nothing is done 
either one way or the other. Whence 
then do these common Identic Ideas 
come ? — Those of Men, it seems, come 
all from Sensation. And whence come 
God's Ideas ? — Not surely from Sensation 
too ; for this we can hardly venture to 
affirm, without giving to Body that no- 
table Precedence of being prior to the In- 
tellection of even God himself — Let them 
then be original ; let them be connate, 
and essential to the divine Mind. — If 
this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, 
that Ideas of corporeal rise, and others 
of mental, (things derived from subjects 

so 



400 HER M E S. 

Ck IV- so totally distinct) should so happily co- 
incide in the same wonderful Identity ? 

Had we not better reason thus upon 
so abstruse a Subject ? — Either all 
Minds have their Ideas derived; or 
all have them original; or some have 
them original, and some derived. If all 
Minds have them derived, they must 
be derived from something, which is 
itself not Mind, and thus we fall insen- 
sibly into a kind of Atheism. If all 
have them original, then are all Minds 
divine, an Hypothesis by far more 
plausible than the former. But if this 
be not admitted, then must one Mind 
(at least) have original Ideas, and the 
rest have them derived. Now suppo- 
sing this last, whence are those Minds, 
whose Ideas are derived, most likely to 
derive them? — From Mind, or from 
Body? — From Mind, a thing homo- 
geneous; or from Body, a thing hetero- 
geneous? From Mind, such as (from 
the Hypothesis) has original Ideas; or 

from 



Book the Third. 401 

from Body, which we cannot discover Ch. JVj 
to have any Ideas at all ? (0 — An Exa- 
mination of this kind, pursued with 
accuracy and temper, is the most pro- 
bable method of solving these doubts. 
It is thus we shall be enabled with 
more assurance to decide, whether we 
are to admit the Doctrine of the Epi^ 
curean Poet, 

Corporea natura animum constare, 
animamque ; 

or trust the Mantuan Bard, when he 
sings in divine numbers, 

Igneus est ollis vigor, et c^lestis 
origo 

Seminihus. 

But 



(0 NOTN Se k&ev XHMA yewa' wwj yxg av roc ANOHTA 
NOYN ytvvrxroi ; No Body produces- Mind '.fur how .should 
Things devoid of Mind produce Mind ? Sallust dc 
Diis ct Mundo, c. 8. 



402 HER M E S, 

Ch. IV, But it is now time, to quit these 
Speculations. Thos^e, who would trace 
them farther, and have leisure for such 
studies, may perhaps find themselves 
led into regions of Contemplation, af- 
fording them prospects both interest- 
ing and pleasant. We have at present 
said as much as was requisite to our 
Subject, and shall therefore pass from 
hence to our concluding chapter. 

CHAR 



Book the Third. 403 



CHAP. V, 

Subordination of Intelligence — Difference 
of Ideas, both in particular Men, and 
in whole Nations — Different Genius of 
different Languages — Character of the 
English, the Oriental, the Latin, and 
the Greek Languages — Superlative Ex- 
cellence of the Last — Conclusion. 

Original Truth W, having the Ch. V. 
most intimate connection with the su- 
D d 2 preme 



T*) Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of Being and 
Knowledge arc derived from Body and Sensation, have a 
short method to explain the Nature of Truth. It is a 
factitious thing, made by every man for himself; 'which 
comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot; 
which in the order of things makes its appearance the 
last of any, being not only subsequent to sensible Ob- 
jects, but even to our Sensations of them. According 
to this Hypothesis, there are many Truths, which have 
been, and are no longer ; others, that will be, and have 

not 



404 HERMES. 

Ch. V. p reme Intelligence, may be said (as it 
were) to shine with unchangeable splen- 
dor, enlightening throughout the Uni- 
verse every possible Subject, by nature 
susceptible of its benign influence. — 
Passions and other obstacles may pre- 
vent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and 
vapours may obscure the Sun ; but it- 
self neither admits Diminution, nor 
Change, because the Darkuess respects 

only 



not been yet \ and multitudes, that possibly may never 
exist at all. 

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have 
had very different notions ; those I mean, who represent 
"[Truth not as the last, but thejirst of Beings ; who call 
It immutable, eternal, omnipresent ; Attributes, that all 
indicate something more than human. To these it must 
appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that 
a crude account of the method hoio they perceive Truth, 
was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to de- 
scribe the road to London, could be called a Description 
of that Metropolis. 

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensa- 
tion and Reflection, and am taught the process at large 
how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the hu- 
man 



Book the Third. 405 

only particular Percipients. Among Ch.v* 
these therefore we must look for igno- 
rance and errour, and for that Subordi- 
nation of Intelligence, which is their na- 
tural consequence. 

We have daily experience in the 
Works of Art, that a partial Knowledge 
•will suffice for Contemplation, tho' we 
know not enough, to profess ourselves 
Artists. Much more is this true, with 
respect to Nature; and well for man- 
Dd3 kind 

man Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are 
produced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may 
consist (for aught we know) of natural materials, but 
are as much creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir. 

If Milton by his Urania intended to represent 
Truth, he certainly referred her to a much more an* 
tient, as well as a far more noble origin. 
Heav'ntij born ! 

Before the hills appeared, or fountains /obV, 

Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse, 

Wisdom tin/ Sister ; and with her didst pftijj 

hi presence of tW almighty Father, picas' d 

With thy celestial Song. P. L. VII. 

. See Proverbs Vlll. 22, *c. Jeremiah X. 10. M 
Antonin. IX. 1. 



406 HERMES. 

Ch. V. ki n( j i s it found to be true, else never 
ibould we attain any natural Knowledge 
at all. For if the constitutive Proportions 
of a Clock are so subtle, that few con- 
ceive them truly, but the Artist him- 
self; what shall we say to those seminal 
Proportions, which make the essence 
and character of every natural Subject? 
— Partial views, the Imperfections of 
Sense; Inattention, Idleness, the turbu- 
lence of Passions; Education, local 
Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, con- 
spire in many instances to furnish us 
with Ideas, some too general, some too 
partial, and (what is worse than all this) 
with many that are erroneous, and con- 
trary to Truth. These it behoves us to 
correct as far as possible, by cool sus- 
pense and candid examination. 

And thus by a connection perhaps 
little expected, the Cause of Letters, 

and 



Book the Third. 407 

&nd that of Virtue appear to co-in- Ch.V. 
cide, it being the business of both to 
examine our Ideas, and to amend them by 
the Standard cf Nature and of Truth W. 

In this important Work, we shall be 
led to observe, how Nations, like sin- 
gle Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how 
these peculiar Ideas become the Ge- 

XIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, Since 

the Symbol must of course correspond 

to its Archetype ^ ; how the Wisest Na- 

D d 4 tions 



W How useful to Ethic Science, and indeed to 
Knowledge in general, a Grammatical Disquisition 
into the Etymology and Meaning of Words was esteem- 
ed by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by 
consulting Plato In his Crafylus ; Xenopk. Mem. IV. 5, 
6. Arrian. Evict. I. it. II. 10. Marc. Anton. III. IK 
V. 8. X. 8. 

(c) HOOTS XAPAKTHP fr) T ' a^uire AOT02. Stob. 
Capiuntur Signa hand levity sed observatu digna (quod 
fortassc (jui'piam ?ion pularil) dc ingentu ei moribus popu* 
lorum ct nationum ex Unguis ipsorum. Bacon, de Augm. 
Scient. VI. 1. Vid. ctiam. Quintil. L. XI. p. 075. Edit 
Cappcron. Diog. L. ]. p. 58. et Mom;:. Com, 
Dhp.X. 16. 



408 HERMES, 

Ch. V. tions, having the most and best Idea*, 
will consequently have the best and 
most copious Languages; how others, 
whose Languages are motley and com- 
pounded, and who have borrowed from 
different countries different Arts and 
Practices, discover by Words, to whom 
they are indebted for Things. 

To illustrate what has been said, by 
a few examples. We Britons in our 
time have been remarkable borrowers, 
as our multiform Language may suffici- 
ently shew. Our terms in polite Lite- 
rature prove, that this came from Greece ; 
our Terms' in Music and Painting, that 
these came from Italy, our Phrases in 
Cookery and War, that we learnt these 
from the French', and our Phrases in 
Navigation, that we were taught by the 
Flemings and Low Dutch. These many 
and very different Sources of our Lan- 
guage may be the cause, why it is so 
deficient in Regularity and Analogy. 
Yet we have this advantage to compen- 
sate 



Book the Third. 409 

sate the defect, that what we want in Ch. V. 
Elegance, we gain in Copiousness, in 
which last respect few Languages w r ill 
be found superior to our own. 

Let us pass from ourselves to the 
Nations of the East. The (<0 East- 
ern World, from the earliest days, has 
been at all times the Seat of enormous 
Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty 
never shed its genial influence. If at 
any time civil Discords arose among 
them (and arise there did innumerable) 
the contest was never about the Form of 
their Government ; for this was an ob- 
ject, of which the Combatants had no 
conception;) it was all from the poor 
motive of, who should be their Master, 

whether 



(&) Aii ya£ to S^XtKurtpoi tlvxt rce, : n9y hi /xtv BxgZxgot rZv 
T?./Yivujv, hi $1 'cstgi rriv Aaixv rut VJtgl TW Evgdnmt, yW0f*fMJ«« 

Tr.V ^ITTtOTlAriV &gX,W> «^E" 0VO-%Sg(XlV0VTES. Fof t/lC liariKi.- 

riaos by being more slavish in their Manners than the 
Greeks, and those of Asia than those of Europe, submit 
to despotic Government without murmuring or u 
Arbt. Polit III. 4. 



410 HERME S. 

Ch. V. whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxe^ £ 
Mahomet or a Mustapha. 

Such was their Condition* and what 
tvas the consequence ? — Their Ideas be* 
came consonant to their servile State, 
and their Words became consonant to 
their servile Ideas. The great Distinc- 
tion, for ever in their sight, was that of 
Tyrant and Slave ; the most unnatural 
one conceivable, and the most suscep- 
tible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. 
Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, 
and of themselves, as the meanest and 
most abject Reptiles. Nothing was 
either great or little in moderation, but 
every Sentiment was heightened by in* 
credible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they 
sometimes ascended into the Great and 
Magnificent ( e ) 9 they as frequently dege- 
nerated 



(c) The truest Sublime of the East may be found in 
the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is 
the intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated; 
the Creation of the Universe, the Dispensations of di- 
vine Providence, &C. 



Book the Thied. 411 

nerated into the Tumid and Bombast. Ch - v - 
The Greeks too of Asia became infected 
by their neighbours, who were often at 
times not only their neighbours, buttheir 
masters ; and hence that Luxuriance of 
the Asiatic Stihy. unknown to the chaste 
eloquence and purity of Athens. But 
of the Greeks we forbear to speak now, 
as we shall speak of them more fully, 
when we have first considered the Na- 
ture or Genius of the Romans. 

AxVD what sort of People may we pro- 
nounce the Romans? — A Nation en- 
gaged in wars and commotions, some 
foreign, some domestic, which for seven 
hundred years wholly engrossed their 
thoughts. Hence therefore their Lan- 
guage became, like their Ideas, copi- 
ous in all Terms expressive of things 
political, and well adapted to the pur- 
poses both of History and popular Elo- 
quence. — But what was their Philosophy? 
— As a Nation, it was none, if we may 
credit their ablest Writers. And hence 
die Unfitness of their Language .to this 
1 Subject; 



412 HERMES. 

Cb. V. Subject; a defect, which even Cicero is 
compelled to confess, and more fully 
makes appear, when he writes Philoso- 
phy himself, from the number of terms, 
which he is obliged to invent ( J\ Vir- 
gil 



(f) See Cic. de Fin. I. C. 1, % 3. III. C. I, 2, 4. &c. 
but in particular Tusc. Disp. I. 3. where he says, Phi- 
i,osoviiiAJcic7nf usque ad kanc mtatem^ncc idlum habuit lu± 
men Literarum Latinarum ; quce illustrandu et excitan*. 
da nobis est ; id si, &c. See also Tusc. Disp. IV. 3. and 
Acad. I. 2. where it appears, that till Cicero applied 
himself to the writing of Philosophy, the Romans had 
nothing of the kind in their language, except some mean 
performances of Amufanius {he Epicurean, and others 
of the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted 
to Cicero for Philosophy, and with what industry, as 
well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be 
seen not only from the titles of those Works that are 
now lost, but much more from the many noble ones 
still fortunately preserved. 

The Epicurean Poet Lucretius, who flourished near- 
ly at the same time, seems by his silence to have over- 
looked the Latin writers of his own sect ; deriving all 
his Philosophy, as well as Qccro, from Grecian Sources ; 
and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing 
in Philosophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the 
Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject. 

Nee 



Book the Third. 

gil seems to have judged the most tru- 
ly of his Countrymen, when admitting 
their inferiority in the more elegant 
Arts he concludes at last with his usual 
jnajesty, 

Tu 



Nee me animifallit, Graiorum obscura reperta 

Difficile inlustrarp Latinis versibus esse, 

(Multa novis rebus prccsertim quom sit agendum,) 

Propter egestatem linguje et rerum novitatem : 

Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas 

Suavis amiciticc quemvis perferre laborem 

Suadet Lucr. 1. 137, 

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, 
wrote some in the way of Philosophy ; as did the Patriot 
Brutus, a Treatise concerning Virtue, much applauded 
by Cicero ; but these Works are now lost. 

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Ho- 
race, some of whose satires and epistles may be justly 
ranked amongst the most, valuable pieces of Latin Phu 
losophy, whether we consider the purity of their Stile, 
or the great Address with which they treat the Sub-i 
ject. 

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from 
the days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist 
Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus ; 
to whose precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life, 

so 





HERMES. 

Tu REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, jRo« 

mane, memento, 
(Hce tibi erunt artes) pacisque impo-* 

nere morem, 
Par cere subjectis, et debellare superbos^ 

From 



so his works, tho' small, shew an. early proficiency in, 
the Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he 
is almost the single difficult writer among the Latin Clas- 
sics, whose meaning has sufficient merit to make it worth- 
while to labour through his obscurities. 

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, livei 
also Seneca ; whose character, both as a Man and a 
Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble 
author of the Characteristics , to whom we refer. 

Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the 
Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him), 
Agellius, an entertaining writer in the miscellaneous 
way ; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity ; who 
tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a Philoso- 
pher, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from 
the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in nis 
works. 

With Aulas Gellius we range Macrobius, not because 
a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived under 

Jlonorius, 



Book the Third. 415 

From considering the Romans, let us ch - v - 

pass tO THE GREEKS. TlIE GRECIAN 

Commonwealths, while they main- 
tained 



Honorius and Theodosius) but from his near resemblance, 
in the character of a Writer. His works, like the other's, 
are miscellaneous ; filled with Mythology and antient 
Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His 
Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero may 
be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind. 

In the same age with Aldus Gellius, flourished Apu* 
jleius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whose 
Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected 
Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age 
when he lived. 

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher 
Stile, was Martianus Capella, if indeed he deserve 
not the name rather of a Philologist, than of a Philo- 
sopher. 

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, 
tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are 
doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agree- 
able than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear 
to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his 
work being a laudable Commentary upon the Tmiacus 
of Plato. 

The 



416 HERMES. 

Ch. v. tained their Liberty, were the most he- 
roic Confederacy, that ever existed. 

They 



The last Latin "Philosopher was BoethiUs, Who was 
descended from some of the noblest of the Roman Fami, 
lies, and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Cen- 
tury. He wrote many philosophical Works, the greatest 
part in the Logical way. £ut his Ethic piece, On the 
Consolation of Philosophy ', and which is partly prose and 
partly verse, deserves great encomiums both for the 
Matter, and for the Stile ; in which last he approaches 
the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all 
respects preferable to those crabbed Africans already 
mentioned. By command of Theodoric king of the 
Goths, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to suffer 
death ; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the last re- 
mains of Roman Dignify, may be said to have sunk in 
the western Worlds 

There were other Romans, who left Philosophical 
Writings ; such as Musonius Rufus, and the two Em- 
perors, Marcus Antoninus and Julian ; but as these 
preferred the use of the Greek Tongue to their own, 
they can hardly be considered among the number o£ 
Latin Writers. 

, And so much (by way of sketch) for the Latin, 

Authors of Philosophy; a small number for so vast 

an Empire, if wc consider them as all the product of near 

six successive centuries. 

The 



Book the Third. 4i? 

They were the politest, the bravest, and Ch.V. 
the wisest of men. In the short space 
of little more than a Century, they be- 
came such Statesmen, Warriors, Orators, 
Historians, Physicians, Poets, Critics, 
Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and 
(last of all) Philosophers, that one can 
hardly help considering that Golden 
Period, as a Providential Event in 
honour of human Nature, to shew to 
what perfection the Species might 
ascend^). 

Now 



(s) If we except Homer, Hesiod, and the Lyric Poets, 
we hear of few Grecian Writers before the expedition of 
Xerxes, After that Monarch had been defeated, and 
the dread of the Persian power was at an end, the 
Effulgence of Grecian Genius (if I may use the ex- 
pression) broke forth, and shone till th« time of Jlexan- 
der the Macedonian, after whom it disappeared, and ne- 
ver rose again. This is that Golden Period spoken of 
above. I do not mean that Greece had not many writers 
of great merit subsequent to that period, and especially 
of the philosophic kind ; but the Great, the Striking, 
the Sublime (call it as you please) attained at that time 
to a height, to which it never could ascend in any after 

age. 

E c The 



418 HERME S. 

Ch.^V. Now the Language of these 
Greeks was truly like themselves, it 
was conformable to their transcend ant 

and 



The same kind of fortune befel the people of Rome. 
When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage their 
dreaded rival was no more, then (as Horace informs us) 
they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon 
after this, their great Orators, and Historians, and 
Poets, arose, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden 
Period, which lasted to the death of Octavius Ccesar. 

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Ge- 
niuses that flourished in each, oneTHESocRATic Period, 
the other the Ciceronian. 

There are still farther analogies subsisting between 
them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude 
for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and 
such wars impended, as threatened their destruction by 
Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears 
were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead 
of attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, 
they began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. 
Now, as these naturally produced a kind of wanton in- 
solence (not unlike the vitious temper of high-fed ani- 
mals) so by this the bands of uuion were insensibly dis- 
solved. Hence then among the Greeks that fatal Pelo- 

ponncsian 



Book the Third. 419 

and universal Genius. Where Matter ch - V. 
so abounded, Words followed of course, 
E e 2 and 



ponnesian War, which together with other wars, its im- 
mediate consequence, broke the confederacy of their 
Commonwealths ; wasted their strength ; made them 
jealous of each other ; and thus paved a way for the 
contemptible kingdom of Macedon to enslave them all, 
and ascend in a few years to universal Monarchy. 

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among 
the Romans; raised those unhappy contests between 
the Senate and the Gracchi ; between Sylla and Metritis; 
between Pompey and C&sar ; till at length, after the last 
struggle for Liberty by those brave Patriots Brutus and 
Camus at PhiUppi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony 
at Actium, the Romans became subject to the dominion 
of a Fellow-Citizen. 

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexander and 
Octavius had established their Monarchies, there were 
many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their 
Government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and 
epistolary correspondence with Alexander. In the lime 
of the same Monarch lived Thcoplirastus, and the Cynic 
Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and A^chines Bpoke 
their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time. 
of Octavius^ Virgil wrote his JEneid, and with ll> 

Fartu4 , 



420 • HERMES. 

Ch- V- and those exquisite in every kind, as 
the Ideas for which they stood. And 
hence it followed, there was not a sub- 
ject to be found, which could not with 
propriety be expressed in Greek. 

Here were Words and Numbers for 

the Humour of an Aristophanes ; for the 

'native Elegance of a Philemon or Me- 

nander ; for the amorous Strains of a 

Mirnnermus 



Varius, and many other fine Writers, partook of his pro- 
tection and royal munificence. But then it must be re- 
membered, that these men were bred and educated in 
the principles of a free Government. It was hence they 
derived that high and manly spirit which made them the 
admiration of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of 
Government left by Alexander and Octavius, soon stopt 
the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is 
that noble saying of Longinus — Qgi^ai re y*g tx*vv ro\ 
<Pgovri(jt.oLrtx riov (jLtyocXotpgovuv ri EAEY0EPIA, ^ Iw&irKrcci, ^ 
a,fj.x <Stu9t7v ro TzgoOvfAOV rvs tjgls cxXXriXas 'i^itos, x^ rr>s megi 
ra, z3%ojrh& (piXort^Us. It is Liberty that is formed to 
nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses ; to inspire them 
with hope ; topushfoi^ward the propensity of contest one 
with another ', and the generous emulation of being the first 
in rank. De Subl. Sect. 44. 



Book the Third. 421 

Mimnermus or Sappho; for the rural Cb ;3 
lays of a Theocritus or Bion ; and for the 
sublime Conceptions of a Sophocles or 
Homer. The same in Prose. Here Iso- 
crates was enabled to display his Art, 
in all the accuracy of Periods, and the 
nice counterpoise of Diction. Here 
Demosthenes found materials for that 
nervous Composition, that manly force 
of unaffected Eloquence, which rushed, 
like a torrent, too impetuous to be 
withstood. 

Who were more different in exhibit- 
ing their Philosophy, tlmnXenopho?i, Pla- 
to, and his disciple, Aristotle? Different, 
I say, in their character of Composition ; 
for as to their Philosophy itself, it was in 
reality the same, Aristotle, strict, me- 
thodic, and orderly; subtle in Thought; 
sparing in Ornament; with little ad- 
dress to the Passions or Imagination ; 
but exhibiting the whole with such a 
pregnant brevity, that in every sentence 
E e .°, we 



422 HERME S. 

Ch. v. W€ seem to read a page. How exqui- 
sitely is this all performed in Greek? 
Let those, who imagine it may be done 
as well in another Language, satisfy 
themselves, either by attempting to 
translate him, or by perusing his trans- 
lations already made by men of learn- 
ing. On the contrary, when we read 
either Xenophon or Plato, nothing of this 
method and strict order appears. The 
Formal and didactic is wholly dropt. 
Whatever they may teach, it is without 
professing to be teachers; a train of Dia- 
logue and truly polite Address, in 
which, as in a Mirrour, we behold hu- 
man Life, adorned in all its colours of 
Sentiment and Manners. 

And yet though these differ in this 
. manner from the Stagirite, how diffe- 
rent are they likewise in character from 
each other? — Plato, copious, figurative, 
and majestic ; intermixing at times the 
facetious and satiric; enriching his 
1 Works 



Book the Third. . 423 

Works with Tales and Fables, and the ch - v - 
mystic Theology of antient times. Xe- 
?iophon 9 the Pattern of perfect simplici- 
ty; every where smooth, harmonious, 
and pure ; declining the figurative, the 
marvellous, and the mystic; ascending 
but rarely into the Sublime; nor then so 
much trusting to the colours of stile, as 
to the intrinsic dignity of the Sentiment 
itself. 

The Language in the mean time, in 
which He and Plato wrote, appears to 
suit so accurately with the Stile of both, 
that when we read either of the two, 
we cannot help thinking, that it is he 
alone, avIio has hit its character, and 
that it could not have appeared so ele- 
gant in any other manner. 

And thus is the Cheek Tongue, 

from its propriety and Universality, made 

for all that is great, and all that is beau- 

Ee4 tifid, 




H ERIE S. 

tiful, in every Subject, and under every 
Form of writing. 

Gil a lis ingeniiim, Graiis dedit ore 

rot undo 
Musa loqui. 

It were to be wished, that those 
amongst us, who either write or read, 
with a view to employ their liberal lei- 
sure (for as to such, as do either from 
views more sordid, we leave them, like 
Slaves, to their destined drudgery) it 
were to be wished, I say, that the libe- 
ral (if they have a relish for letters) 
would inspect the finished Models of 
Grecian Literature; that they would 
not waste those hours which they can- 
not recall, upon the meaner produc- 
tions of the Trench and English Press ; 
upon that fungous growth of Novels 
and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be 
feared, they rarely find any rational 

pleasure 



Book the Third. 425 

pleasure, and more rarely still, any solid Ch - v - 
improvement. 

To be competently skilled in antient 
learning, is by no means a work of such 
insuperable pains. The very progress 
itself is attended with delight, and re- 
sembles a Journey through some plea- 
sant Country, where every mile we ad- 
vance, new charms arise. It is certain- 
ly as easy to be a Scholar, as a Game- 
ster, or many other Characters equally 
illiberal and low. The same applica- 
tion, the same quantity of habit will fit 
us for one, as completely as for the 
other. And as to those who tell us, 
with an air of seeming wisdom, that it 
is Men, and not Books, we must study- 
to become knowing; this I have alwavs 
remarked, from repeated Experience. 
to be the common consolation and lan- 
guage of Dunces. They shelter their 
ignorance under a few bright Exam- 
ples 



426 HERMES. 

Ch. V* -p]es ? whose transcendent abilities, with* 
out the common helps, have been suffi- 
cient of themselves to great and impor- 
tant Ends. But alas ! 

Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile- — 

In truth, each man's Understanding 
when ripened and mature, is a compo- 
site of natural Capacity, and of super- 
induced Habit. Hence the greatest 
Men will be necessarily those, who pos- 
sess the best Capacities, cultivated with 
the best Habits. Hence also moderate 
Capacities, when adorned with valuable 
Science, will far transcend others the 
most acute by nature, when either neg- 
lected, or applied to low and base pur- 
poses. And thus for the honour of 
Culture and good Learning, they 
are able to render a Man, if he will take 
the pains, intrinsically more excellent than 
his natural Superiors. 

And 



Book the Third. 427 

And so much at present as to ge- Ch.v. 
neral Ideas; how we acquire them; 
whence they are derived; what is their 
Nature; and what their connection with 
Language. So much likewise as to the 
Subject of this Treatise, Universal 
Grammar. 



.FND OF THE THIRD BOOK. 



AD- 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

J. HE following Notes are either Trans- 
lations of former Notes, or Additions to 
them. The additional are chiefly Extracts 
from Greek Manuscripts, which (as tht 
Author has said already concerning others 
of the same kind) are valuable both for 
their Rarity, and for their intrinsic 
Merit. 



( 431 ) 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 

X AG. 95. to Stop, SfC.~] The Quotation from 

Proclus in the Note may be thus rendered — That 

THING IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUB- 
SEQUENT is in the same place, both itself and its 
Parts. 

P. 105. In the Note, for yiyvo^vov read ys V o(juvov, and 
render the passage thus — For by this faculty f namely the 
faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future^ nor the 
Fast , but the Present only. 

P. 106. Note (d).~\ The passage of Philoponus, 
here referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to 
the notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were 
said to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Au- 
thor explains this, among other reasons, by the follow- 
ing — Tlus $1 roTs [jL-h tsa-i ysirvix^si ; Tlgurov [aev, lirtidv lvrxZ9x 

to zjocgthOov ifi ttf to /w-e'AAov, raXiTot, <$e (A.r> ovrx' to fxlv yx% v)(poi- 

vitoci -iL tm trt iff, to Se «7rw esV <xvi/.7rccg(xQzEi dl tw Xfovw to. 

(pvcrty.x kjxvIx, //.aAAov 04 Tys Kirncrsus avruv GJOcgxyioXtsQriiAoi £f< 

o x^ jV(JS - How therefore is it (hat they cmiroach nearly to 

Non-Entitys? In the first place, because HERE (where 

they exist) exists the Past ««(/ the Fcture, and these 

are Non-Entitys/ for the one is vanished^ and is no 

more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Substances 

puss aicuij along tilth Time, or rather it is upon their Mo. 

Hon that Time is an Attendant. 

V. 119. 



432 Additional NOTES, 

F. 110 — in the Note here subjoined mentioii is, made 
of the Real Now, or Instant, and its efficacy. To 
which we may add, that there is not only a necessary 
Connection between Existence and^e Present Instant , be- 
cause no other Point of Time can properly be said to be y 
but also between Existence and Life, because whatever 
lives, by the same reason necessarily Is. Hence Sophocles^ 
speaking of Time present, elegantly says of it — 

- ' '%govy rui ^wvli, >g zrocgovh vvv 

The Living, and now present Time. 

Trachin. V. 118S. 

P. 227. — The Passage in Virgil, of which Strvius here 
speaks, is a description of .Turnus's killing two brothers, 
Amycus and Diores ; after which the Poet says of him ? 

— : — curru abscissa Duorum 



Suspendit capita, — ■ — 

This, literally translated, is — he hung up on his chariot 
the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas 
the sense requires, of the Two persons, that is to say,. 
of Amycus and Diores. Now this by Amborum would 
have been exprest properly, as Amborum means The 
* Two ; by Duortlfo is exprest improperly, as it mean* 

only Two indefinitely. 

P. 259. — The Passage m Note (o) from Thcmistius 
may be thus rendered — Nature in many instances ap- 
pears to make her transition by little and little, so that i?i 
some Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, 

or Vegetable. 

P. 294. 



Additional NOTES. 433 

P. 294. — Note (c) — Tliere are in the number of things 
many, which have a most known Existence, but a most 
unknown Essence ; such for example as Motion, Place, 
and more than either of them, Time. The Existence of 
each of these is knozen and indisputable, but what their 
Essence is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things 
to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class : that it is 
something, is most evident ; but what it is, is a matter not 
so easy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142. 

P. 340 — Language — incapable or communicating 
Demonstration.] See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 
220, and the additional note to the words, The Source 
°f infinite Truths, &c 

P. 368 — in the Note — yet so held the Philosopher of 
Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, &c.J 

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pytha- 
goras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his 
account of Wisdom or Philosophy, and its Attributes, 
or essential Characters. — "l£/ov yxg (ptXoo-otpias to lv rois 
'aokhois iyjivi StaQogav lii^ai rvv xotvwvtav, ^ to lv rois zroXXoTs 
i%Hai xoivuviotv 'Siitai rlvt HiatpiPXO-tV « yap ovo-ftPiS to oe7%ai 
fyarvns {lege (parks) x} zjtPt^tPas x.otvvviav{z:avTi yap npZ'nlov), 
a>X a (lege oVaj to Stdtpopov raruv Isniir b^e xvvos ^ IWtf 
SixQoPxv, aX?,a ri xoivov lyncnv- It IS THE PROPER BUSINESS 

or Philosophy to shew in many things, which have 

DlFFEKENflE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; and 
IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A CoMMO.V CHARACTER, 

thro' what it is they DIFFER. It is indeed no difficult 

F f matter 



434 Additional NOTES. 

matter to shew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon 
and a Dove, (for this is evident to every one), but rather 
to tell where lies the Diffen^ice ; nor to tell the difference 
between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what 
they possess in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. 
Anthm. 

P. 379— THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, <SfC.] The 

Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these — ^x\\o» 

S' If/ TO S EVEKX JO TO KxXoV EV TQIS T7)S fyVGEWS ZgyotS, V) EV ToTi 

tyis rexvys. The Principles of Design and Beaut y are 
more in the Works of Nature, than they are in those of 
Art. 

P. 379 — we must of necessity admit a Mind, &c] 
The following quotation, taken from the third Book of 
a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of 
Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have cu- 
riosity with regard to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by 
antient Philosophers. 

"Ei Se $e7 <TVtr'o[f.'j}? hirsiv ryv airiav rys ru>v I'cSeuiv vitoQiazccs, 
oi hv Ixeivois ygsaE, priTBov ori rxvrx 'Giavra ocra ogxra, tsgxvix 
£j L7ro asX-nwiv, yj alio rxvlo^xrs lf/v, w xxr atrlav' aXX' alio 
rxvlo[/.xre x^vvxrov IV' yxg Iv ro7s vfEgois ra, xqEir\oix } ves, •£. 
Xoyos,^ atria., ^ rx atrixs, jc, srco rx aitorikza^ara xgsirlco 
ra>v ag^ay, zjqos t« »co (pyariv o ' 'Agifor&ns' Se7 ct^o rm xxrx, 
o-v[aQe£v)x.os airluv eIvxi rx xxQ' xvrx, r&ncv yotg ex£«07S ro Ka- 
ra. <7v[a.£eQ \%os w<^e t« xtto rxvlo^ara ivgEo-fjvrsgov xv yv ro xxr' 
Kiriav, h Kj auo rxvlo^xm rx Getorxrx r,v rvv tyxvzgwv. 

if 



Additional NOTES. 435 

If therefore zee are to relate concisely the Cause, why the 
Hypothesis of Ideas pleased them (namely Parmenides^ 
Zeno, Socrates , &c.) zee must begin by observing that all ' 
the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as zcell 
as the sublunary, are either from Chance, or according 
to a Cause. From Chance is impossible ; for then the 
more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and 
Cause, and the Effects of Cause) zcill be among those 
things that come lw<t, and so the Endings of things zcill be 
more excellent than their Beginnings. To zzhich too may 
be added what Aristotle says; that essential Causes 
ought to be prior to accidental, in as much as eve- 
ry ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS \ DEVIATION FROM THEM; SO 

that whatever is the effect of such essential Cause [as is 
indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] must 
needs be prior to that zchich is the Effect of Chance, even 
though zzc were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible, 
objects [the heavens themselves]. 

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause 
of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew 
that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this 
Cause must be One. After which he goes on as fol- 
lows. 

Ei [jAv fv ctAoyov tSto, utottov' i^xi yxq ri zjxXtv tuv 

varrseuv Tr t s tktuv uinxr xphtIov, ro xocroc Xoyov k. yvcJo-iv zjoitv, 

I'iTto t« TIxvtos ov, it; r£ "()>.« pi^o?, o Ittiv xii our las xKoyx 

( return. Ei oe Xoyov z%ov, k* xvro yivuaaov, oioev exvto ^'/ittu rxv 

^xvtcuv ainov ot ) 'o thto xyvoxv, ayvencrst ttqv Ixvra (pvaiv. Et 

' uoit/ on kxt eaixv £7T< t« zjxvIos ainov, to ol w^ivyXivs h- 

F f 2 ols 



i 



436 Additional NOTES. 

$os Soirsgov, yi) ScirEgov o<o*£V If avoifxvis, oi^sv olga, ^ « iV'v aivt»v 
&!^ia^vcos' otdsv sv ^ to Ilav, "it, uxvlx if wv to riav, <Jv if; >£ 
oliriav. Kal 1/ tSto, 79T0/ hs lavro-olgx fiXtTFov, ^ iauTo yivwcrxov, 
oi$e ra. /!a£t' afTo. Aoyois ocgct t£j ei$s<tiv olvXois oi$e rss Ko<r(A.i- 
jcsj- Koyss, it, ra. eifin, if <vv to Ilav, >£ gfin iv »vru to Ilav, wsr 

"ly piriy, x^Z" r * s %&**• Now if this Cause be void of 

Reason, that indeed would be absurd ; for then again 
there would be something among those things, which came 
last in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cause. 
I mean by more excellent, something operating according 
to Reason and Knowledge ? mid yet within that Universe, 
and a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a 
Cause devoid of Reason, 

But if, on the contrary, the Cause of the Universe 
be A Cause, having Reason and knowing itself, it of 
course knows itself to be the Cause of all things; else, be- 
ing ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own na+ 
ture. But if it know, that from its very Essence It is 
the Cause of the Universe, and if that, which knows 
one part of a Relation definitely, knows also of necessity 
the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of 
which it is the Cause. It knows therefore the Uni- 
verse, and all things out of which the Universe is com- 
posed, of all which also it is the Cause. But if this be 
true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by 
knowing itself, it knows what comes after itself, 
and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain 
Reasons and Forms devoid of Matter that it knows 

those 



Additional NOTES. 437 

those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the Uni- 
verse is composed, and that the Universe is in it, as in a 
Cause j distinct from and without the Matter. 



P. 380 AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WoRKS 

are fashioned, <$c] It is upon these Principles that 
Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Be- 
ing an Artist — 1» t*J t« TE^y/Va 0eS Sixvoix, in Dei artificis 
mente. Where T J hiloponus, in his manuscript Comment, 
observes as follows — tiyv'nw ( ? >50 "' T ° v © £ ° v > ^ s Wvl^v rxs 
vzgurtzs xirlxs >£/ res hoy us dvru/v i%pira. He calls God an 
Artist, as possessing within himself the first Causes of all 
things, and their Reasons or Proportions. Soon after 
speaking of those Sketches, after which Painters work 

and finish their Pictures, he subjoins w<rm% h vp&, 

*<*■ rx. roixvrx <TKixy%x<pv)[jLXTx (jXettovIss, ijo<S//,sv t<$e ri, uru 
•*j o Syixiegyos, 'zzgas IkbTvx cL f noQ'hk<nojv, rx t»$s r usx^\x xekoot/.*)- 
X!v' aXV tft09 f ort rx ixlv rr,be <rx.ixygx(pv)[A.xTx xtbXyi ehjiy, IxsT- 
yoi os o/ Iv tw Qeu> Koyoi xgyirvnoi >£. tsxvliXaol Itartv, jls 
therefore we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make 
such and such particular things, so also the Creator, look- 
ing at those Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with 
beauty all things here below. We must remember, how- 
ever, that the Sketches licit are imperfect ; but that the 
others, those Reasons or Pn-jjortious, which exist in God, 
arc Archetypal and all-perfect. 

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton rrpre. 
sents God, after he had created this visible World, con- 
templatiug 

F f . C J 



438 Additional NOTES. 



how it showed 

In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair, 

Answering his great Idea.- 

P. Lost, VII. 556. 



Proclus proves the Existence of these General Ideas 
or Universal Forms by the following Arguments— — 

I' roivvv iftv ocirix r« tjocvIos ocvtu ru livoci njotyaa,, to $£ cIvtw 

TU ciVXl ttOliSV OCTJO TV)S SOLVT& 'UyOiEl Z<TIXS T«TO l<?t 'uSPU- 
7'JJS, 07TS£ TO VJOlUpEVOV ^EVTEgOJS Yy £<?l T3gUTUS, OlSiiJtTl Ttt 

TSoiaiAzvo} ^wri^cfjs' olov to izvg ytj ^louat §eg(AOTylz, oiKKw, yy. 
s^i S'sfftov, v) -^vj(y> <>i6w<7i £w>jv, y£) £%£< ^ccyiv, tCj ett* zjav\w '/dots 
ocv dkYiQw Tov Aoyoy, ocrtz ccvtw too iivoci 'Eoiii. yL to oIitiov av t2 

'ZUOivioS dvTUI TM clVOLt ttOliiV tSto If/ 'GJPWTtiS, 07T££ KOdtAOS !$VJ~ 

TEgus. h <$v) o x.ocr[j,os zjXwgcupx h^cov Ij-j 'ssocvloiwv, sri xv yL sv tw 

dtTICO T« YOCjXH TOCVTOi TZgUTUS' TO y<Xg OiVTO CCiTlOM y! 'ohlOV, vZj 

csXrivviv, ic, olv&gioirov vKErna-E, y£j 'wboy, ^ oKojs T« s$?i t T» £V 
Tw 'uTXvlt. tocvtoc a.ga, VJguTws if/v iv Tr> oiiTioc, ts zsxvlls, cLXhos 

V\\lOS GSOLQCX. T&V l[A(p'<Xvfl^ >Lj CcKKoS CLvQ(?U"K0S } Y^ Tuv hSuv QUOICOS 

£>:«rov. fS-lV agx Too B:dr} ZJqb-Twv cx,ia-9v)Tuv ) r^ aiTioc uVToZv Tol 
!j'/)jAinqyiy.a, KCtTu, tIv hg'/![AEV0v Aoyov, h TV) [xia. tS koo-^h 'Gyaylls 

aiTioc isqovirdLgxpAx. If therefore the Cause of the Uni- 
verse be a cause which operates merely by existing^ and if 
that which operates merely by existing, operate from its 
own proper Essence, such Cause is Primarily, what 
its Effect is secondarily, and that which it is primarily, 
it giveth to its .Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire 
both giveth Warmth to something else, and is itself -warm ; 
that the Soul giveth Life, ana posses scth Life .; and this 



Additional NOTES. 439 

reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things what- 
ever, which operate merely by existing. It follows there- 
fore, that the Cause of the Universe, operating after 
this manner, is that primarily, which the World is 
secondarily. If therefore the World J )e the plenitude 
o/Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be prima- 
rily in the Cause of the World, for it was the same 
Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and 
Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in 
the Universe. These therefore exld primarily in the Cause 
of the Universe ; another Sun besides the apparent, ano- 
ther Man, and so zvith respect to every Form else. The 
Forms therefore, previous to the sensible and external 
Forms, and which according to this reasoning are their 
active and efficient Causes, are to p lie-ex- 

isting in that One and common Cause of all the 
Universe. Prodi Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. 
L. 3. 

Wo have quoted the above passages for the same 
reason as the former ; for the sake of those, who may 
have a curiosity to sec a sample of (his antient Philoso- 
phy, which (as some have held) may be traced up from 
Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Or- 
pheus himself. 

, If the Phrase, to operate mt >'> [n by existing^ should ap- 
pear questionable, it mu ipon a suppo- 
sition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are se~ 
condary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, 
peer perfect and essential. Seep. \(>l. 35p. 

F f 1 That 



440 Additional NOTES. 

That we should not therefore think of a blind uncoru 
scious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the 
Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Know- 
ledge xscitli natural Efficacy, where he forms the Charac- 
ter of these Divine and Creative Ideas. 

But let us hear him in his own Language. — *\X sWej 

WiXoipEv tvjv toiorvla uvrwv (sc. Io^ewv) uQogio-oto-Qixi o\a ru* 
yvvgiycorsguv, a<7ro yh tuv (pvcrixu* Aoywv Aa£ft>/*£V to uvtu tw 
tTvxt 'csoifittY.QV, uv $w tCj izot&trr yino Se twv te^v/kwv to yvcorixov, 
uv 'SJoiSa-iv, h Kj yw jivr? t« woci tJoiSa-i, Kj rocvrtx svuaxvlss <p«- 
//,sv Gciriocs shut rocs 1$e<zs ^fj.m^yty.as olyot K, voEgxs itxvrw ru* 
xxra. Qvo-iv atfoTEAa/xsvov. But if we should chuse to define 
the peculiar character of Ideas by things more known to 
us than themselves, let us assume from natural Princi- 
ples the Power of effecting, merely by existing, 
all the things that they effect ; andfrom artificial Prin- 
ciples the Power of comprehending all that they effect, 
although they did not effect them merely by existing ; and 
then uniting those two, let us say that Ideas are at ones 
the efficient and intelligent Causes of all things pro- 
duced according to Nature. From book the second of 
the same Comment. 

The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute 
writer, has the following sentence, perfectly correspond- 
ing with this Philosophy. Res omnes comparantur ad 
Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificial a ad Artem, 



The 



I 

Additional NOTES. 441 

The Verses of Orpheus on this subjccl may be found 
in the tract Ite Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. Edit. 
Sylburg. 

Zivs a^cm ymro, Zsvf x. T. A. 

P. 391. — Where all things lie inveloped, fyc] 

— oax -ete^ eY' TA FIOAAA xara <$r> rivx [ASgio-y.ov, tovxvtx 
jC, TO EN IxeTvo zj<>q t» {xtgiTjj.H '/.ccxa, to ZJccvlvf ci[Azgss' « yoig 
iv } us 1\<zyi<tov 7 xaSctTTE^ o 'Zirsixriwos 'ido%e Xsyttv «AA' EN 
fiS IIANTA. 2f* numerous as is the Multitude of In- 
dividuals by Partition, so numerous also is that Prin- 
ciple of Unity by universal Impartiality. For it is 
not One, as a minimum is one (according to what Speu- 
cippus seemed to say,) but it is One, as being all 
things. Damascius zregi 'Agxuv, MS. 

P. 408 — the wisest Nations — the most copious 

Languages.] It is well observed by Muretus Ntd- 

li unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas expri- 
mercnt, quuesierunt. Var. Lect. VI. 1. 

P. 411 But what was their Philosophy?] 

The same Muretus has tlio following passage upon the 

Roman Taste for Philosophy. Beati aulem Mi, et , 

opulenti, et omnium gentium wc/omRoMANi, in pctendis 
honoribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in extcris naiionibus 
verbo componendis, re compilandis occupali, philosophandi 
an am scrvis aul libcrtis ««>, et Grnrulis esurientibus re- 
linqucbanf. lpsi, quod ab aiuritia, quod ab ambitione, 

quod 



442 Additional NOTES. 

quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus si par- 
tern aliquant out ad audicndum Grcecum quempiam philoso- 
phwn, aid ad aliquem de philosophia libellum vel Zegendum 
?el scribendum contulissent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen 
pervenisse^ jam victamase et prqfligatam jacere Grceciam 
'somniabant, Var. Lect. VI. 1. 



INDEX. 



INDEX. 



A 



A 



DJECTIVE, how it differs from other Attribu- 
tives, such as the Verb, and the Participle, 186. 
verbal, 187. pronominal, 189. strictly speaking can 
have no Genders, — — 190 

Adverbs, their character and use, 192 to 194. Ad- 
verbs of Intension and Remission, 195. of Compa- 
rison, 196 to 199. of Time, and Place, and Mo- 
tion, 204, 205. made out of Prepositions, 205. Ad- 
verbs of Interrogation, 206. affinity between these 
last, and the Pronoun relative, 206 to 208. Adverbs 
derived from every Part of Speech, 209. found in, 
every Predicament, 210. called by the Stoics 
n«»5ejtW, — - — — ibid. 

^Es CHINES, — — — 419 

Ale.\a\i)i:i! ApHRODfsiENSis, 294, 310, 433. his Ac- 
count of Phansy or Imagination, — . 357 

Alexander and Thais, 71. his influence upon the 
Greek Genius, — — 419,420 

Amafanius, ' — — — — 112 

Ammonius, his account of Speech, and, its relations, 4. 
of the Progress of human Knowledge from Complex 
to Simple, io. of the Soul's two principal Powers, 17. 
of the Species- of Sentences, ibid, his notion of (ion, 
55. quoted, 59. his notion of a Verb, <S7, 193. his 
notion of Time, 100. illustrates from 'Homer the Spe- 
cies of Modes or Sentences, 115, quoted, 15 1. his 
notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the Unity 

, which they produce, 211. quoted, 27S. his account 
of Sound, Voice, Articulation, e>. 32l, 328. of 

the 



INDEX. 

the distinction between a Symbol and a Resemblance, 

331. what he thought the human Body with respect 

to the Soul, 334. his triple order of Ideas or Forms, 

382 
Analysis and Synthesis, 2, 3, 367. analysis of Cases, 27 5,, 

276, 285 
Anaxagoras, — — — 269 

Anthologia Gr. s — — — 47, 50 

Antoninus, — 183, 310, 405, 407, 416 

Apollonius, the Grammarian, explains the Species of 
Words by the Species of Letters, 27. bis elegant 
name for the Noun and Verb, 33. quoted, 63. his 
idea of a Pronoun, 65, 67. quoted, 70. explains the 
Distinction and Relation between the Article and the 
Pronoun, 73, 74. his two Species of Atfys or Indi- 
cation, 77. holds a wide difference between the Pre- 
positive and Subjunctive Articles, 78. explains the 
nature of the Subjunctive Article, 80. corrects Homer 
from the doctrine bf Enclitics, 84, 85. his notion of 
that Tense called the Vrccteritum perfeffium, 129. 
holds the Soul's disposition peculiarly explained by 
Verbs, 141. his notion of the Indicative Mode, 151. 
of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, 155. ex- 
plains the power of those past Tenses, found in the 
Greek Imperatives, 156. his idea of the Infinitive, 
165. his name for it, 16$. quoted, 168, 175. his 
notion of middle Vprbs, 176. quoted, 179, 181, 195. 
explains the power and effect of the Greek Article, 
217 to 222. holds it essential to the Pronoun not to 
coalesce with it, 225 to 228. shew^ the different 
force of the Article when differently placed in the 
same Sentence, 231. quoted, 238, 239, his idea of 
the Preposition, — — — 261 

4 Apu- 



INDEX. 

Apuleius, short account of him, — — 415 
Aquinas, Thomas, quoted, — — 440 

Argument a, priori & a posteriori, 9, 10. which of the 
two more natural to Man, — — - ibid* 

Aristophanes, — — — 420 

Aristotle, his notion of Truth, 3. quoted 8. his notion 
of the difference between things absolutely prior, and 
relatively prior, 9, 10, quoted, 15. his Definition of a 
Sentence, 19. of a word, 20. of Substance, 29. di- 
vides things into Substance and Accident, 30. how 
many Parts of Speech he admitted, and why, 32, 33, 
34, S)C. his notion of Genders, 42. his account of 
the metaphorical use of Sex, 48. quoted, 55, 56, 89. 
his Definition of a Verb, 96. his notion of a Now 
or Instant, 102. of Sensation limited to it, 104, 105, 
431. of Time, 106, 107. of Time's dependence on 
the Soul, 112. quoted, 119, 193. his notion of Sub- 
stance, 202. calls Euripides o tobttfrfa 223. himself 
called the Stugirite, why, ibid, a distinction of his, 
224. his definition of a Conjunction, 239. a passage 
in his Rhetoric explained, 240. his account of Rela- 
tives, 286. his notion of the divine Nature, 301. 
whom he thought it Mas probable the Gods should 
love, 302. his notion of Intellect and intelligible Ob- 
jects, ibid, held Words founded in Compact, 314, 
315. quoted, 310, 320. his account of the Elements 
or Letters, 324. his high notion of Principles, 325. 
quoted, 357, 379, 434. his notion of the diilerence 
between moveable and immoveable Existence, 360. 
between intellectual or divine Pleasure, and that which 
is subordinate, ibid, quoted, 3G1. his notion of the 
divine Life or Existence, compared w itti that of Man, 

362- 



INDE X. 

362. of the difference between the Greeks and the 
Barbarians j 409. his character, as a JVriter, com- 

, pared with Plato and Xenophon, 421. corresponds 
with Alexander, — — — - 419 

Arithmetic, founded upon what Principles, 352. (Sec 
Geometry.) its subject, what, 367. owes its Being to 
the Mind, how, ~r — — ibid. 

Art, what, and Artist, who, — 111, 352 

Articles, 31. their near alliance with Pronouns, 73. 
of two kinds, 214. the first kind, 214 to 232. the 
second kind, 233 to 236. English Articles, their 
difference and use, 215. Greek Article, 219. Articles 
denote pre-aequamtance, 218, 220. thence eminence 
ancl notoriety, 222 to 224. with what words they 
associate, with what not, "224 to 229. Greek Article 
marks the Subject in Propositions, 230. Articles, 
instances of their effect, 231, 232. Articles prono- 
minal, 72, 73, 233.. instances of their effect, 235, 236, 
347. Subjunctive Article, see Pronoun relative or sub- 
junctive. 

Articulation, see Voice. 

Asconius, — — — — 132 

Attributives, 30, 31. defined, 87. of the first order, 
87 to 191. of the second order, 192 to 211. Sec 
Verb, Participle, Adjective, Adverb. 

Aulus Gellius, short account of him as a Writer, 414 

B 

Bacon, his notion of Universal Grammar, 2. of antient 
Languages and Geniuses, compared to modern, 288. 
of mental Separation or Division, 306. of Symbols, 
to convey our Thoughts, 334. of the Analogy 

between 



INDE X. 

between the Geniuses of Nations and tlleir Lan- 
guages, — — — — 407 
Being or Existence , mutable, immutable, 90, 371. 
temporary, superior to Time, 91, 92. See Truth, 
God. 
Bellisarius, — — — 150 
Blemmides, Nicephorus, his notion of Time present, 
119. his Etymology of 'E^s-^t?, 368. his triple order 
of Forms or Ideas, — — — 386 
Body, Instrunv . >f the Mind, 30.3. chief Object of 
n^odern Philosophy, 308. confounded with Matter, 
o0:>. hum; a, the Mind's veil, 333. Body, that, or 
Mind, which has precedence in different Systems, 392, 

393 
Boeriia.ave, — — - 321 

Boetiiils, how many Parts of Speech he admitted 
as necessary to Logic, 33. his idea of God's Exist- 
ence, 92. illustrates from Virgil the Species of Modes 
or Sentences, 146. quoted, 312. held Language 
founded In Compact, 315 refers to the Deity's unal- 
terable Nature, 361. his notion of original, intelli- 
gible Ideas, 397. of the difference between Time 
(however immense) and Eternity, 389. short ac- 
count oi' his Writings and character, — 416 
Both (lifters from Tico y how, — — 227 
Brutis, — — 413,419 

C 

ir, C. Julius, his Laconic Epistle, — 178 

i:, Octavius, inllnencc of Ms Government upon 

the Roman Genius, — ' — 419,420 

Callimacki -, — — — Wi 



INDEX. 

Cases, scarce any such thing in modern Languages, 
273. name of, whence, 277. Nominative, 279 to 
282. Accusative, 282, 283. Genitive and Dative, 
284 to 287. Vocative, why omitted, 276. Ablative, 
peculiar to the Romans, and how they employed it, 

276, 277 
Causes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with 
their effects, 248, final Cause, first in Speculation, but 
last in Event, ibid, has its peculiar Mode, 142. pecu- 
liar Conjunction, 248. peculiar Case, — > 287 
Chalcidius, 301. short account of him, — 415 
Chance, subsequent to Mind and Reason, — 434, 435 
Charisius, Sosipater, — — 205, 210 

Cicero, 132, 170, 269, 272, 311, 313,407, compelled 
to allow the unfitness of the Latin Tongue for Phi- 
losophy, 411.- one of the first that introduced it into 
the Latin Language, 412. Ciceronian and Socratic 
Periods, — — — 418 

City, Feminine, why, — — — 48 

,Clark, Dr. Sam. — — — 128 

Comparison, degrees of, 197 to 199. why Verbs admit 
it not, 200. why incompatible with certain Attribu- 
tives, ibid, why with all Substantives, — 201 
Conjunction, 32, its Definition, 238. its two kinds, 
240, 241. Conjunctions Copulative, 242. Continua- 
tive, x ibid. Suppositive, Positive, 244. Causal, Col- 
leaive, 245, 246. Disjunctive Simple, 252. Adversa- 
tive, ibid. Adversative absolute, 254. of Comparison, 
255. Adequate, ibid. Inadequate, 256. Subdisjunct- 
ive, 258. Some Conjunctions have an obscure Signifi- 
cation, when taken alone, — — 259 
Connective, 30, 31. its two kinds, 237. its first kind, 
ibid, to 260. its second, 261 to 274. See Conjunc- 
tion, Preposition. 

' Con- 



INDEX. 

Consentius, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 43. of 
middle Verbs, 177. of the positive Degree, — 198 
Consonant^ what, and why so called, — 323 

Contraries, pass into each other, 132. destructive of 
each other, ■ — — — 251 

Conversation, what, — — — 398 

Conversion, of Attributives into Substantives, 38. of Sub- 
stantives into Attributives, 182, 189. of Attributives 
into one another, 187. of Interrogatives into Rela- 
tives, and vice versa, 206, 207. of Connectives into 
Attributes, — — — 205, 272 

Corn. Nepos, < — -r- — 212 

Country, Feminine, why, — — 48 

D. 

Damascius, his notion of Deity, — — 441 

Death, Masculine, why, 51. Brother to Sleep, — 52 
Declension, the name, whence, — — 278 

Definitive, 30, SI, 214. See Articles. 
Definitions, what, — — — 367 

A«?tf, — — — — 6 4, 76 

Demosthenes, — — 49, 419, 421 

Derivatives more rationally formed than Primitives, 

why, — _ _ _ 335 

Design, necessarily implies Mind, — 379, 134 

Diogenes, the Cynic, — — 419 

DiOGEWES Laeetius, 3 1, 1 15, 154, 317, 322, 324. 107 
Diomysius of Halicarnassiuj — — 34, 35 

Diversify, its importance to Nature, 250. heightens by 

degrees, and how, — — ibid, to 252 

Donates, — _ _ _ 7.4. 272 

E. 

Earth, Feminine, why, — 47 

C £ Eccle- 



INDEX. 

Ecclesiasticus, — — 56 

Element, defined, 324. primary Articulations or Letters 
so called, why, ibid, their extensive application, 325. 
See Letters. 
Empiric, who, — •*- - — 352 

Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character, 84, 85 
English Tongue, its rule as to Genders, 43. a peculiar 
privilege of, 58. expresses the power of contradistinc- 
tive and enclitic Pronouns, 85. its poverty as to the 
expression of Modes and Tenses, 148. its analogy 
in the formation of Participles, 185, 186. neglected 
by illiterate Writers, ibid, force and power of its Ar- 
ticles, 215 to 233. shews the Predicate of the Propo- 
sition by position, as also the Accusative Case of the 
Sentence, 26, 274, 276. its character, as a Lan- 
guage, — — — — 408 
Epictetus, — ' — - — 310, 407 
Effi^D, its Etymology, — — 368 
Ether Masculine, why, — — 46 
Euclid, a difference between him and Virgil, 69. his 
Theorems founded upon what, — 340 
Euripides, — — 52, 310, 331 
Existence, differs from Esse?ice, how, — 294, 433 
Experience, founded on what, — 352 
Experiment, its utility, 352. conducive to Art, how. 
ibid, beholden to Science, tho' Science not to that, 353 

F. 

Form and Matter, 2, 7. elementary Principles, 307. 
mysteriously blended in their co-existence, ibid, and 
312. Form, its original meaning, what, 310. trans- 
ferred from lower things to the highest, 311. pre-ex- 

' intent, where, 312. described by Cicero. 311, 313, i» 



INDEX. 

Speech, what, 315, 326, 327, &c. Form of Forms, 
312. triple order of Forms in Art, 374. in Nature, 
377. intelligible or specific Forms, their peculiar 
character, 364, 365, 372, 380, 396, 436, 438. 

Fortune, Feminine, why, — -^-57 

Fuller, — — — 183 

G. 

Gaza Theodore, his Definition of a Word, 21. ex- 
plains the Persons in Pronouns, 67. hardly admits the 
Subjunctive for an Article, 78. his account of the 
Tenses, 129. of Modes, 140. quoted, 151. calls the 
Infinitive the Verb's Noun, 165. quoted, 181. his de- 
finition of an Adverb, 195. arranges Adverbs by 
classes according to the order of the Predicaments, 
210. explains the power of the Article, 218. quoted, 
225. explains the different powers of conjunctive Par- 
ticles, 245. of disjunctive, 249. his singular explana- 
tion of a Verse in Homer, 253. quoted, 262, 271 

Gemistus, Georgius, otherwise Plctho, his doctrine of 
Ideas or intelligible Forms, — — 395 

Genders, their origin, 41. their natural number, 42. 
(See Sex) why m anting to the first and second Pro- 
noun, — — — — 69 

Genus and Species, why they (but not Individuals) ad- 
mit of Number, — — — 39 

Geometry, founded on what Principles, 352. that and 
Arithmetic independent on Experiment, ibid. (See 
Science.) its Subject, what, 3G7. beholden for it to 
the Mind, how, — — ibid. 

Con, expressed by Neuters, such as T o SeTov, Numen &-c. 

why. 54, 55. as Masculine, why, ibid, immutable. 

G g 2 and 



INDEX, 

an<J superior to Time and its distinctions, 92. allwise, 
and always wise, 301. immediate objects of his Wis- 
dom, what, ibid, whom among men he may be sup- 
posed to love, 302. Form of Forms, sovereign Artist, 
312, 313, 437. above all Intensions and Remissions, 
162, 359, 439. his Existence different from that of 
Man, how, 360, 362. his divine Attributes, 361. his 
Existence necessarily infers that of Ideas or exemplary 
Forms, 379, 380, 436. exquisite Perfection of these 
divine Ideas or Forms, 380, 437. his stupendous view 
of all at once, 389, 390, 442. region of Truth, 162, 
391, 403, 405. in him Knowledge and Power unite, 

440 

Goody above all utility, and totally distinct from it, 297. 
sought by all men, 296, 298. considered by all as va- 
luable for itself, ibid, intellectual, its character, 299. 
See Science , God. 

Gorgias, — — — 52 

Grammar, philosophical or universal, 2. how essential 
to other Arts, 6. how distinguished from other 
Grammars, — — — 11 

Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 177. 
In degrees of Comparison, 198. in the Syntax of Con- 
junctions, — — — 238 

Greeks, their character, as a Nation, 415, Sfc. Asiatic 
Greeks, different from the other Greeks, and why, 410. 
Grecian Genius, its maturity and decay, 417, fyc. 

Greek Tongue* how perfect in the expression of Modes 
and Tenses, 147. force of its imperatives in the past 
tenses, 156. wrong in ranging Interjections with Ad- 
verbs, 289. its character, as a Language, 418, 423 

Grocinus, hi6 System of the Tenses, — 128 

II. Herac- 



INDEX". 

H. 

Heraclitus, Saying of, 8. his System of tilings, what, 

369, 370 

Hermes, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 324, 
325, 326. Authors who have writ of him, 326 

Hesiod, called o zsoi-m^s, the Poet, by Plato, — 223 

Hoadly's Accidence, — ■ — ■ 128 

Homer, 50, 52, 82, 84, 145, 149, 221, 223, 235, 253, 

273, 285, 308, 417, 421 

Horace, 57, 80, 125, 142, 163, 169, 178, 199, 207, 

232, 260, 413, 424, 425 
I. 

Ideas, of what, Words the Symbols, 341 to 347. if only 
particular were to exist, the consequence what, 337 
to 339. general, their importance, 341, 342. under- 
valued by whom, and why, 350. of what faculty the 
Objects, 360. their character, 362 to 366, 390. the 
only objects of Science and real Knowledge, why, 368. 
acquired, how, 353, to 374. derived, whence, 374, 
$c. their triple Order in Art, 376. the same in Na- 
ture, 381. essential to Mind, why, 379, 380. the first 
and highest Ideas, character of, 380, 440. Ideas, their 
different Sources, stated, 400. their real source, 434, 

438 

Jkremiait, — — — 405 

Imagination, what, 354. differs from Sense, how, 355. 
from Memory and Recollection, how, — ibid, 

Individuals, why so called, 39, 40. quit their character, 

how and why, 40, 41. their infinity, how expressed 

by a finite number of Words, 21 1 to 217, 234, 846. 

become objects of Knowledge, how, — 369 

Instant. See Now. 

Intellect. See Mind, 

G g 3 Inter- 



INDEX. 

Interjections, their application and effect, 289. no 
distinct Part of Speech with the Greeks, though with 
the Latins, 289. their character and description, 290 

Interrogation, its species explained and illustrated, 151, 
to 154. Interrogatives refuse the Article, why, 228 

Johannes Grammat. See Philoponus. 

isocrates, — — — 421 

Julian, — — — 416 

K. 

Kuster, — _ 176 

Knowledge, if any more excellent than Sensation, the 
consequence, — — - — 371, 372 

L. 

Language, how constituted, 327. defined^ 329. founded 
in compact, 314, 327. fSee Speech.) symbolic, not 
imitative, why, 332 to 355. impossible for it to express 
the real Essences of things, 335. its double capacity 5 
why necessary, 348. its Matter, what, 349. its Form, 

» what, ibid, its Precision and Permanence derived 
whence, 345. particular Languages, their Identity, 
whence, 374. their Diversity, whence, ibid. See En- 
glish, Greek, Latin, Oriental. 

Latin Tongue, deficient in Aorists, and how it supplies 
the defect, 125. its peculiar use of the Procter it urn 
Perfection, 131. has recourse to Auxiliars for some 
Modes and Tenses, i48. to a Periphrasis for some 
Participles, 185. in what sense it has Articles, 
233. the Ablative, a Case peculiar to it, 276. right 
in separating Interjections from the other Parts of 
Speech, 289, 290. its character, as a Language, 411. 
not made for Philosophy, ibid. 412. sunk with Boe- 
thius, — — — 416 

Letters*, 



INDEX. 

Letters, what Socrates thought of their Inventor, 325. 

divine honours paid him by the Egyptians, ibid. See 

Element. 

Liberty, its influence upon Men's Genius, — 420 

Life, connected with Being, — 300, 301, 432 

Linnaeus, — — — 44 

Literature, its cause, and that of Virtue, connected, 

how, 407. antient, recommended to the Study of the 

liberal, 424. its peculiar effect with regard to a man's 

character, — — 425, 426 

Logic, what, — — — 3, 4 

Longinus, noble remark of, • — — 420 

Luciax, — — — 41 

Lucilius, . — — — ibid. 

M. 

Macrobius, short account of him, 414. quoted, 127, 

157, 168 
Man, rational and social, 1, 2. his peculiar ornament, 
what, 2. first or prior to Man, what, 9, 269. his Ex- 
istence, the manner of, what, 359. how most likely 
to advance in happiness, 362. has within him some- 
thing divine, 302. his Ideas, whence derived, 393 to 
401. Medium, through which he derives them, what, 
359, 393. his errors, whence, 406*. to be corrected, 
how, — — — ibid 

Manuscripts quoted, of Olympiodorus, 371, 394,395. 
of PniLoroNus, 431, 433, 437. of Proclls, 4. r ' 1. 
435, 438, 4 10. of Damascius, — 4 41 

Maucianus Capelul, short account of him. 41.1 

Master Artist, what forms his character, — ■ 111 

Matter joined with Form, 2, 7. its original meaning, con- 
founded by the Vulgar, how, 309. ii^ extensive cha- 
racter according to antient Philosophy. :;08. described 
Gg4 bj 



INDEX. 

by Cicero, 313. of Language, what, 315. described 

at large, — — — 316, Sfc. 

Maximus Tyrius, his notion of the supreme Intellect, 

Memory and Recollection, what, 355. distinguished from. 
Imagination or Phansy, how, — ibid. 

Metaphor, its use, — — 269 

Metaphysicians modern, their Systems, what, — 392 
Milton, 13, 14, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 59, 60, 
112, 124, 147, 207, 267, 268. 404, 437. 
Mind (not Sense) recognizes time, 107 to 112. univer- 
sal, 162, 311, 312, 359. differs not (as Sense does) 
from the objects of its perception, 301. acts in Part 
through the body, in Part without it, 305. its high 
power of separation, 306, 366. penetrates into all 
things, 307. NoD* 'vxutls, what, 310. Mind differs 
from Sense, how, 364, 365. the source of Union by 
viewing One in Many, 362 to 365. of Distinction by 
viewing Many in One, 366. without Ideas, resembles 
what, 380. region of Truth and Science, 371, 372. 
that or Body, which has precedence, 392, &~c. Mind 
human, how spontaneous and easy in its Energies, 
361, 362. all Minds similar and congenial, why, 395 
Modes or Moods, whence derived, and to what end 
destined, 140. Declarative or Indicative, 141. Poten- 
tial, 142. Subjunctive, 143. Interrogative, ibid. In- 
quisitive, ibid. Imperative, 144. Precative or Opta- 
tive, ibid, the several Species illustrated from Homer, 
Virgil, and Milton, 145 to 147. Infinitive Mode, its 
peculiar character, 162, 163. how dignified by the 
Stoics, 164. other Modes resolvable into it, 166. its 
application and coalescence, 167. Mode of Science, 
of Conjecture, of Proficiency, of Legislature, 168 to 
170. Modes compared and distinguished, 119 to 160. 

Greek 



INDEX. 

Greek Imperatives of the Past explained and illus- 
trated, — — — 156, 157 

Moon, Feminine, why, — — 45 

Motion, and even its Privation, necessarily imply Time, 

95 

Muretus, quoted, 441, 442. his notion of the Ro- 
mans, — — — ibid. 

IIusonius Rufus, — — 416 

N. 

Names, proper, what the consequence if no other 
words, 337 to 339. their use, 3 45. hardly parts of 
Language, — — 346, 373 

Nathan and David, — — 232 

Nature, first to Nature, first to Man, how they differ, 
9, 10, frugality of, 320. Natures subordinate subser- 
vient to the higher, — — 359 

Nicepiiorus. Sec Blemmides. 

Nicomacmi:.*, — — — 437 

Noux, or Substantive, its three Sorts, 37. what Nouns 
susceptible of Number, and why, 39. only Part of 
Speech susceptible of Gender, — 41, 171 

A Now or Instant, the bound of Time, but no part of 
it, 101, 102. analogous to a Point in a geometrical 
Line, ibid, its use with respect to Time, 101. its mi- 
nute and transient Presence illustrated, 117. by this 
Presence Time made present, 116, 117, US. See 
Time, Place, Space. 

Aumbcr, to what words it appertains, and why, 39 : 40 

O. 

Qbjetiors, ludicrous^ 203. grave, — 204 

Ocean, 



I N D E.I 

Ocean, Masculine, why, -— — 4P 

Oeympiodorus, quoted from a Manuscript -his no- 
tion of Knowledge, and its degrees, 371,372. of ge- 
neral Ideas, the Objects of Science, 394, 395 
Oke, by natural co-incidence, 162, 173, 192, 241,262 
to 265. by the help of external connectives, 241, 265 
Oriental Languages, number of their Parts of Speech, 
35. their character and Genius, — 409 

Orphefs^ — — — 441 

Ovi% — — 132, 141, 206 



Participle, how different from the Verb, 94, 184. its 
essence or character, 184. how different from the 
Adjective, 186. See Attributive, Latin and En- 
glish Tongues. 

Particulars, how, though infinite, expressed by Words 
which are finite, 346. consequence of attaching our- 
selves wholly to them, — — 351 

Fausanias, — — — 285 

Perception and Volition, the Soul's leading Powers, 15, 
17. Perception two-fold. 348. In Man what first, 9, 
10, 353, 359. sensitive and intellective differ, how, 
364, 365. if not correspondent to its objects, erro- 
neous, — — — 371 

Period. See Sentence. 

Peripatetic Philosophy, in the latter ages commonly 
united with the Platonic, 160. what species of Sen- 
tences it admitted, 144. its notion of Cases, 277. 
held words founded in Compact, — 314 

Perizonius, 



INDE X. 

Perizonius, his rational account of the Persons in 
Nouns and Pronouns, — — 171 

Persius, 76, 163, 372. short account of his charac- 
ter, — — — — 413 

Persons, first, second, third, their Origin and Use 5 

05 to 67 

Phanstj* See Imagination. 

Piiiloponus, his notion of Time, 431. of the business of 
Wisdom or Philosophy, 433. of God, the Sove- 
reign Artist, — — \ — 437 

Philosophy, what would banish it out of the World, 
293, 294. its proper business, what, 433. antient 
differs from modern, how, 308. modern its chief 
object, what, — — — f ibid 

Philosophers, antient, who not qualified to write or talk 
about them, 270. provided words for new Ideas, 
how, — — — — 269 

Philosophers, modern, their notion of Ideas, 350. their 
employment, 351, their Criterion of Truth, ibid, de- 
duce all from Body, 392. supply the place of occult 
Qualities, how, — — — 393 

Place, mediate and immediate, 1 1 8. applied to illustrate 
the present Time, and the present Instant, ibid, its 
various relations denoted, how, 266, 271, its Lati- 
tude and Universality, — — 26G 

Plato, 21. how many parts of Speech he admitted, 32. 
his account of Genius and Species, 39. quoted, 92. 
his Style abounds with Particles, vvhy, 259. new- 
coined Word of, 269. quoted 325. in what he placed 
real happiness, 362. his two different and opposite 
Etymologies of 'E-jnpi^y, 369, 370. his Idea of Time, 
389. quoted, 407. his character, as a writer, com- 
pared with Xcnophon and Arisioth^ — 422 

Plstho. 



INDEX. 

Pletho. See Gemistus. 

Pliny, his account how the antient artists inscribed 
their names upon their Works, — 136 

Plutarch, — — — 33 

Poetry, what, — — — 5, 6 

Porphyry, — — — 39 

Position, its force in Syntax, 26, 274, 276, 230 

Peepositions, 32. defined, 261. their use, 265. their 
original Signification, 266. their subsequent and figu- 
rative, 268. their different application, 270, 271. 
force in Composition, 271, 272. change into Adverbs, 

272, 205 
Pi~inciples, to be estimated from their consequences^ 7. 
232, 23fr, 325. of Union and Diversity, their different 
ends and equal importance to the Universe, 250. 
{See One, Union, Diversity.) elementary Principles 
mysteriously blended, 307. their invention difficult, 
why, 325. those of Arithmetic and Geometry how 
simple, — — — 352 

Priscian, defines a Word, 20. explains from Philoso- 
phy the Noun and Verb, 28, 33. quoted, 34. explains 
how Indication and Relation differ, 63. the nature of 
the Pronoun, 65. of pronominal Persons, 67. his rea- 
son why the two first Pronouns have no Genders, 70. 
why but one Pronoun of each sort, 71. ranges Arti- 
cles with Pronouns according to the Stoics, 74. a per- 
tinent observation of his, 88. explains the double 
Power of the Latin Pmieriium, 125, 131. his doc- 
trine concerning the Tenses, 130. defines Moods or 
Modes, 141. his notion of the Imperative, 155. of 
the Infinitive, 165, 166. of Verbs which naturally 
precede the Infinitive, 168. of Impersonals, 175. of 
Verbs Neuter, 177. of the Participle, 194. of the Ad. 
Ycrb, 195. of Comparatives, 202. quoted, 210. his 

reason 



I N D EX. 

reason why certain Pronouns coalesce not with the 
Article, 225, 226. explains the different powers of 
Connectives which conjoin, 243, 244, 245. of 
Connectives which disjoin, 250. quoted 262, 
his notion of the Interjection, 291. of Sound or 
Voice, — — — 316 

Proclus, his Opinion about Rest, 95, 431. quoted, 310. 
explains the Source of the Doetrine of Ideas, 434, 

435, 436, 438 

Pronouns, why so called, 65. their Species, or Persons, 
65, 66. why the first and second have no Sex, 69, 70. 
resemble Articles, but how distinguished, 73. their co- 
alescence, 74, 75. theirimportanccin Language, 77. re- 
lative or subjunctive Pronoun, its nature and use, 78, 
to 83. those of the first and second person when expres- 
sed, when not, 83. 'EyaA/J/xai and o£0oto»«/*!v«/, how dis- 
tinguished, 84. Primitives, refuse the Article, why, 225 

Protagoras, his notion of Genders, 42. a Sophism of 
his, —.___-_ 144 

Proverbs of Solomoji, ■••— — 405 

Pub li us Syrus, — — — 124 

Q. 

Quintilian, — — 154,233,407 

Qualities occult, what in modern Philosophy supplies 

their place, — — — 393 

R. 

Relative^ mutually infer each other, 251, 28G. their 
usual Case, the Genitive, — — ibid. 

Rhetoric, what, — — — 5, 6 

Romans their character as a Nation, 411. Roman Ge- 
nius, its maturity and decay, — 418, $c. 

S. Salluw- 



INDEX 



s. 

SALttTStltlf Philosoph. — — 401 

Sanctius, his elegant account of the different Arts res- 
pecting Speech, 5. quoted, 36, 163, 171. rejects Im- 
personate, 175. quoted, 202. his notion of the Con- 
junction, after Scaliger, 238. of the Interjection, 

291 
Scaliger, his Etymology of Quis, 82. his notion of 
Tenses from Grocinus, 128. his elegant observation 
upon the order of the Tenses, 138. upon the pre- 
eminence of the Indicative Mode, 169. his account 
how the Latins supply the place of Articles, 233. 
his notion of the Conjunction, 238. his subtle expli- 
cation of its various powers, 242, to 247, 258. his 
reason from Philosophy why Substantives do not 
coalesce, 264. his origin of Prepositions, 266. his 
Etymology of Scientia, — — 370 

Science, 5. its Mode the Indicative, and Tense the Pre- 
sent, why, 159. its Conjunction the Collective, why, 
246. defended, 295. valuable for its consequences, 
ibid, for itself, 296 to 303. (See God.) pure and 
speculative depends on Principles the most simple, 
352. not beholden to Experiment, though Experi- 
ment to it, 353. whole of it seen in Composition and 
Division, 367. its Etymology, 369. residence of it- 
self and its objects, where, 372. See Mind. 
Scriptures, their Sublimity, whence, — 410 

Seneca, — — — 47,139.414 

Sensation, of the Present only, 105, 107, 139. none of 
Time, 105. each confined to its own Objects, 333, 
369. its Objects infinite, *338, 353. Man's first Per- 
3 ception, 



INDEX. 

eeption, ibid, consequence of attaching ourselves 
wholly to its Objects, 351. how prior to Intellection, 
379. how subsequent, — — 391 

Sentence* definition of, 19, 20. its various Species inves- 
tigated, 14, 15. illustrated from Milton, 147, c)'C. 
connection between Sentences and Modes, 144 

Separation, corporeal inferior to mental, why, 306 

Servius, — — 132,227,432 

Sex, (See Gender.) transferred in Language to Beings, 
that in Nature want it, and why, 44, 45. Substances 
alone susceptible of it, — — 171 

Shakspeare, — 12, 13, 23, 41, 47, 51, 53 

Ship, Feminine, why, — — 48 

Simplicius, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms, 381, 

382 
Sophocles, — — — 432 

Soul, its leading Powers, — — 15, <$c. 

Sound, species of, 314, 317. the YA», or Matter of 

Language, 315. defined, 316. See Voice. 
Space, how like, how unlike to Time, 100. Sea 

Place. 
Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, 1, 2. how resolved 
or analysed, 2. its four principal Parts, and why 
these, and not others, 28, to 31. its Matter and Form 
taken together, 307 to 315. its Matter taken sepa- 
rately, 316 to 326. its Form taken separately. 327 
to 359. necessity of Speech, whence, 332, 333, foun- 
ded in Compact, — — 314,327 
Spenser, — — t — 134, 164 
Spirits, animal, subtle Ether, nervous Ducts, Vibrations. 
fyc. their use in modern Philosophy. Sec Qualities 
occult. 



INDEX. 

Stoics, how many Parts of Speech they held, 34. ran- 
ged Articles along with Pronouns, 74. their account 
of the Tenses, 130. multiplied the number of Sen- 
tences, 144. allowed the name of Verb to the infini- 
tive only, into which they supposed all other Modes 
resolvable, 164 to 166. their logical view of Verbs, 
and their Distinctions subsequent, 179 to 181. their 
notion of the Participle, 194. of the Adverb, 195. cal- 
led the Adverb CTav^ibcV, and why, 210. called the 
Preposition crw&eriMs tsgoQerixos, 261. invented new 
Words, and gave new significations to old ones, 269. 
their notion of Cases, 278. of the- "TA»j or Matter of 
Virtue, 309, 310. of Sound, 316. of the Species 
of Sound, 322. their Definition of an Element, 

324 

Subject and Predicate, how distinguished in Greeley 230. 

how in English^ ibid, analagous to what in nature, 

279 
Substance and Attribute, 29. the great Objects of natu- 
ral Union, 264. Substance susceptible of Sex, 171, 
41. of Number, 40. coincides not with Substance, 
264. incapable of Intension, and therefore of Com- 
parison, — — — 201, 202 
Substantive, 30, 31. described, 37. primary, ibid, to 
62. secondary, 63 to 67. (See Noun, Pronoun.) 
Substantive and Attributive, analogous in Nature to 
what, — — ■ . — 279 
2t>/xCa/Aa T\oc,g<xo-v[A.Qa,[X(X,) &C. i *■— — 180 
Sun, Masculine, why, — - — 45 
Si/lva, a peculiar Signification of, — 308, 309 
Symbol, what, 330. differs from Imitation, how, ibid. 
preferred to it in constituting Language, why, 332 

T. Tenses, 



INDEX 



Tenses^ their natural number, and "why, 119, 120. 
Aorists, 123. Tenses either passing or completive, 
what authorities for these distinctions, 128 to 130* 
Prceteritum perfect um of the Latins^ peculiar uses of, 
131 to 134. Impe?fectum 9 peculiar uses of, 135 to 
137. order of Tenses in common Grammars not for- 
tuitous, — — — — 138 

Terence, — — 205, 206, 272 

The and A. See Article. 

Themistius, 9. his notion how the Mind gains the idea 
of Time, 108. of the dep«ndance of Time on the Soul's 
existence, 112. of the latent transition of Nature from 
one Genus to another, — — 259, 432 

Tiieodectes, — — — 35 

Theophrastus, his notion of Speech under its various 
Relations, 4. mentioned, — — 419 

Theutii, inventor of Letters, 324. See Hermes. 

Tibullus, — — 76,132,133 

Time, Masculine, why, 50. why implied in every Verb, 
95 9 96. gave rise to Tenses, ibid, its most obvious 
division, 97. how like, how unlike, to Space, 100 to 
103. strictly speaking no Time present, 105. in what 
sense it may be called present, 116, 117,432. all 

. Time divisible and extended, 118, 100, 101. no ob- 
ject of Sensation, why, 105. how faint and shadowy 
in existence, 106, 431. how, and by what power, we 
gain its idea, 107. Idea of the past, prior to that of the 
future, 109. that of the future, how acquired, 109, 
110. how connected with Art and Prudence, 111. of 
what faculty, Time the proper Object, 112. how 
II h intU 



INDE X. 

intimately connected with the Soul, ibid, order and va- 
lue of its several Species, 113. what things exist in it, 
whatnot, 160 to 162. its natural effect on things ex- 
isting in it, 161, 50. described by Plato, as the 
moving Picture of permanent Eternity, 389. this ac- 
count explained by Boethius, ibid. See Now or In- 

\ STANT. 

Truth, necessary, immutable, superior to all distinctions 
of present, past, and future, 90,91, 92, 159, 160, 
404, 405. (See Being, God.) its place or region, 162, 
372. seen in Composition and Division, 3, 367, even 
negative, in soife degree synthetical, 3, 250, 364, 
every Truth One, and so recognized, how, 364, 365. 
factitious Truth, — — — 403 

V. 

Va&ro, — — 56, 61, 74, 413 

Verb, 31. its more loose, as^well as more strict accep- 
tations, 87, 193. Verb, strictly so called, its charac* 
ter, 93, 94. distinguished from Participles, 94. from 
Adjectives, ibid, implies Time, why, 95, Tenses, 98, 
119. Modes or Moods, 140, 170. Verbs, how suscep- 
tible of Number and Person, 170. Species of Verbs, 
173. active, 174. passive, ibid, middle, 175, 176. 
transitive, 177. neuter, ibid, inceptive, 126, 182. de- 
siderative or meditative, 127. formed out of Substan- 
tives, 182, 183. (See Time, Tenses, Modes.) Imper- 
sonal s rejected, — — 175 
Verbs Substantives, their pre-eminence, 88. essential to 
every Proposition, ibid, implied in every other Verb, 
90, 93. denote existence, 88. vary, as varies the Ex- 
istence, or Being, which they denote, 91, 92. See 
Being, Truth, God. 

Verses^ 



INDEX. 

Verses, logical, — — 340 

Vice, Feminine, why, — — - 56 

Virgin, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 68, 83, 132. his peculiar 
method of coupling the passing and completive Tenses, 
133 to 136. quoted, 141, 182, 198, 199, 206, 235, 
286, 287, 389, 401, 432. his idea of the Roman Ge- 
nius, — — — 235, 412 
Virtue, Feminine, why, 55. moral and intellectual dif- 
fer, how, 299, 300. its Matter, what, 309, 310, its 
Form, what, 311. connected with Literature, how, 

407 
Understanding, its Etymology, 369. human understand- 
ing, a composite of what, — 425 
Union, natural, the great objects of, 264, 279. per- 
cei?ed by what power, 363. in every Truth, whence 
derived, — — — — 365 
Universe. See World. 

Voice, defined, 318. simple, produced how, 318, 319. 
differs from articulate, how, ibid, articulate, what, 
319 to 324. articulate, species of, 321 to 323, See 
Vowel, Consonant, Element. 
Volition. See Perception. 

Vossius, — — — 35, 75, 290 

Vowel, what, and why so called, — 321, 322 

Utility, always and only sought by the sordid and illibe- 
ral, 294, 295, 298. yet could have no Being, were 
there not something beyond it, 297. See (hod. 

\\. 

Whole and Parts, — — 7 

Wisdom, how some Philosophers thought it distinguished 

from Wit, — — 368, 433 

Words, 



• I N r> E X. 

Words, defined, 20, 21, 328. the several Species of, 
23 to 31. significant by themselves, significant by Re- 
lation, 27. variable, invariable, 24. significant by 
themselves and alone, 37 to 211. by Relation and as- 
sociated, 213 to 274. significant by Compact, 314, 
327. Symbols, and not Imitations, 332. Symbols, of 
what not, 337 to 341. Symbols, of what, 341 to 349, 
372. how, though in Number finite, able to express 
infinite Particulars, — — 346, 372, 373 

World, visible and external, the passing Picture of what, 
383, 437. preserved one and the same, though ever 
changing, how, 384, 385. its Cause not. void of Rea- 
son, — — — — 436 

Writers, ancient polite, differ from modern polite, in 
what and why, — — 259, 260 



Xenophon, $6, 407. his character, as a Writer, com- 
pared with Plato and Aristotle, — 422, 423 

Y. 

YXu, 308. See Matter, Sylva. 



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